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Abstract 
 
Land use planning and management of cities and different zones of industrial/commercial activities represents a major 
challenge today. Decision makers have to consider complex sets of constraints of different nature and to integrate wider 
range of risks before taking decisions and committing resources for medium and long term planning. These constraints 
may be of societal, economical, geo-political and even ethical nature. They need rationalizing their decisions and 
minimizing potential risks in order to guarantee an acceptable level of global security. Risks could be of varying kinds: 
natural, man-induced, systemic or criminal. These different sources of risk are interacting in today’s developed societies. 
Subsequently, rational and optimized land use planning decision-making process can’t be guaranteed except through the 
development of multidisciplinary robust tools and methodologies based on full identification of risks.  
The European Safety, Relability and Data Association (ESReDA) has organized its 43rd Seminar hosted at INSA, Rouen, in 
France, in October 2012. The present volume of Proceedings contains the papers and discussions at that Seminar.  
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Foreword 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Land use planning and management of cities and different zones of industrial/commercial 
activities represents a major challenge today. Decision makers have to consider complex sets 
of constraints of different nature and to integrate wider range of risks before taking decisions 
and committing resources for medium and long term planning. These constraints may be of 
societal, economical, geo-political and even ethical nature. They need rationalizing their 
decisions and minimizing potential risks in order to guarantee an acceptable level of global 
security. 
 
Risks could be of varying kinds: natural, man-induced, systemic or criminal. These different 
sources of risk are interacting in today’s developed societies. Subsequently, rational and 
optimized land use planning decision-making process can’t be guaranteed except through the 
development of multidisciplinary robust tools and methodologies based on full identification 
of risks.  
 
Upper Normandy is known for its long history of industrial activities. Subsequently, the 
research in reduction of industrial risks and environmental impacts is emerging as a new 
technical underlying activity in the region. Upper-Normandy is engaged in supporting and 
encouraging the emerging research in this field and is willing to develop the relevant skills 
and knowledge. 
 
Co-Editors 
Mohamed Eid, CEA, France 
Michalis Christou, IET-JRC 
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Mobile Ad-Hoc Network designed to communicate during Crisis 
Damien Olivier, LITIS; University of Le Havre, Normandie Université, Le 
Havre, France 
 
15:40-16:40 TECHNICAL SESSION - TS24: Risk modelling to support decision 
making 
Chairperson: Alain Ledoux (LSPC/INSA-Rouen, St. Etienne du Rouvray, 
France) and Lionel Estel (LSPC/INSA-Rouen, St. Etienne du Rouvray, 
France) 
 
Support Decision Tools to lower risks in urban planning operation 
Mathieu Garnier; Fondaterra, European Foundation for Sustainable 
Territories, Versailles, France 
 
Modelling and analysis of large systems with high availability constraints 
Dimitri Lefebvre; GREAH, University Le Havre, France 
 
Benefit-cost analysis as a decision-support tool for risk-informed land use 
planning 
Eric Msrsden; Foundation for an Industrial Safety Culture (FonCSI), 
Toulouse, France 
 
Consequence analysis of the domino effect phenomena in the context on 
Land Use Planning 
Lionel Estel; LSPC/INSA-Rouen, St. Etienne du Rouvray, France 
 
15:40-16:40 
 
ROUND TABLE - RT-22: Technological Risk Prevention Plans 
Implementation 
Chairperson: Pierre-Edouard Gille (Head of the regional service of 
technological and natural hazards, Regional directorate for environment, 
planning and housing of Upper Normandy LSPC/INSA-Rouen, St.Etienne du 
Rouvray, France, Rouen, France) 
 
16:40-16:45 Seminar Synthetic Report & Next ESReDA Event Announcement 
Mohamed Eid – ESReDA 
 
16:45-17: 30 Plenary Closing Session 
President of ESReDA 
President of Valmaris 
General Director of the INSA 
Official 
 
17:30 Delegates Farewell & Departure 
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Lessons learned from an industrial accident 
 
Philippe ESSIG 
Institute for an Industrial Safety Culture 
Toulouse, France 
 
 
Abstract 
 
In the wake of the explosion on the AZF ammonium nitrate plant in Toulouse, in 
September 2001, the French Prime Minister of the time asked me to coordinate a 
national debate on industrial risks, and to summarize the main conclusions and 
recommendations of the debate in a report, which I addressed to him in February 
2002. The debate, and my report, highlighted a number of problems related to land-
use planning around hazardous facilities.  
Keywords: hazard, facilities, explosion, Seveso, AZF, LUP 
 
 
The national debate on industrial risks 
After the accident, the French Prime Minister of the time, Lionel Jospin, asked me to 
organize a national debate on industrial risks. Its objective was to collect inputs from 
a variety of stakeholders, in order to define an action plan which could improve the 
level of safety around Seveso-type establishments in France, through the 
implementation of new organizational, regulatory and legal measures. The debates 
were organized around three primary themes: 
1. industrial production, safety and supervision by the competent authorities; 
2. information and consultation procedures; 
3. land use planning around hazardous establishments, in particular in urban 
areas. 
Over a three month period, I organized a total of 27 debates in different French cities, 
with around 7000 participants in total.  
A variety of groups and stakeholders participated in these meetings: leaders from 
industry, trade union representatives, local government officials, journalists, members 
of ONGs, researchers and representatives from national government and the 
competent authorities. The debate was sometimes passionate, in particular for the last 
meeting held in Toulouse (for understandable reasons), but a variety of points of view 
were expressed (there were no “taboo” subjects) and many suggestions were made.  
I presented a report containing a summary of these debates and the suggestions made 
to the French Prime Minister in February 2002. I will focus on three issues which are 
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related to land use planning and the governance of industrial risks: 
The land use planning components of the Seveso II directive, as transcribed into 
French law and implemented by local government officials over several decades of 
urban development, were not able to prevent the development of situations where 
hazardous industrial facilities were located too close to residential areas. The pressure 
from urban development had proven, over time, too strong for local government 
officials, who authorized building in locations which risk analysis showed to be 
dangerous.  
 Many stakeholders considered that they were excluded from the decision-
making process concerning industrial safety, and expressed a desire for a more 
inclusive consultation process; 
 At a national level, the safety culture was insufficiently developed, and too 
many people had been encouraged to adopt a “zero risk” doctrine, leading to a 
lack of acceptance of each citizen’s responsibility in terms of industrial safety;  
New legislation concerning the prevention of technological risks was published in 
July 2003. It includes modifications to risk analysis methods (a change from 
deterministic to probabilistic frameworks for safety cases), to land use planning, and 
to information and consultation processes, which I will describe and comment in 
more detail.  
Changes in risk analysis methods 
Prior to the 2003 legislation, France used a deterministic approach to risk assessment, 
based on “worst case” scenarios. Detailed analysis of these “worst case” scenarios, 
with pessimistic assumptions of the failure of all active preventive or protective safety 
barriers, led to the definition of two geographic zones representing the level of 
exposure to the effects of the hazardous event: 
1. Z1 was the 1% lethality zone, and comprised all areas where one out of a 
hundred people exposed to the effects of the hazardous event are expected to 
die; 
2. Z2 was the limit zone for irreversible effects to health.  
After a local consultation process, these zones were converted into land use planning 
zones called “close protection” and “distant protection”. National recommendations 
existed concerning the types of industrial development, buildings and transport 
infrastructures which could be built in each zone. 
Several criticisms were made of this deterministic approach: 
 it provided insufficient guidance to local officials on which land use 
possibilities were compatible with the level of technological risk; 
 the process of converting from zones of level of exposure to effects to land 
use planning zone was somewhat opaque, and in some cases local political 
pressures led to zoning decisions which were incompatible with sound risk 
management; 
 lack of consistency in the choice of worst case scenarios led to differences in 
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effect distances between plants using the same technologies; 
 comparison with practices in other European countries, which often used more 
probabilistic approaches to risk assessment, was difficult.  
Several criticisms were made of this deterministic approach: 
 it provided insufficient guidance to local officials on which land use 
possibilities were compatible with the level of technological risk; 
 the process of converting from zones of level of exposure to effects to land 
use planning zone was somewhat opaque, and in some cases local political 
pressures led to zoning decisions which were incompatible with sound risk 
management; 
 lack of consistency in the choice of worst case scenarios led to differences in 
effect distances between plants using the same technologies; 
 comparison with practices in other European countries, which often used more 
probabilistic approaches to risk assessment, was difficult.  
Following the AZF accident, the law in France was changed to require the use of a 
probabilistic approach to risk assessment, which allows more risk-informed decision-
making. A scenario-based approach is mandated: the industrial operator must identify 
a number of “representative” accident scenarios, which are then assessed using a 
semi-probabilistic (LOPA-type) analysis. The scenarios are placed in a risk matrix, in 
which certain positions are defined to be unacceptable, and others “ALARP”.  
The change in assessment methodology has required significant extra workload 
both from industrial operators, who undertake the risk assessment and write the safety 
case, and from the competent authorities, who analyze and approve the safety case. 
The increased workload has led to a significant increase in the use of subcontracting 
with expertise firms to assist in the risk assessment process and in writing the safety 
case. The number of inspectors working for the competent authorities has roughly 
doubled since the Toulouse accident.  
 
Changes to land use planning legislation 
Before 2003, French land use planning legislation only concerned new facilities, and 
was not able to affect local land use plans when an existing facility was modified, nor 
was it able to “correct” urban planning when a new risk assessment of an existing 
facility led to changes in the safety perimeter. The 2003 legislation introduced new 
instruments, called Technological Risk Prevention Plans, which were inspired by 
existing French legislation concerning flooding risk. These plans comprise several 
new features: 
 the local consultation process is strengthened (involving both local 
government officials and local residents), and is open to the public. A national 
implementation doctrine limits the extent to which local consultation may 
affect land use plans. 
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 the authorities are able to expropriate inhabitants who live in areas which are 
exposed to a high level of risk (homeowners are forced to leave their home, 
and are compensated for its market value, estimated without the presence of 
industrial activity), or allow relinquishment (homeowners may require that the 
state purchases their home at its market value). Funding of these measures 
(which are sometimes extremely costly) is shared between the industrial 
operator, local government and national government.  
 the authorities can require home owners in medium risk zones to implement 
protective measures in their homes (for example, reinforcing windows in areas 
exposed to explosion risk, and building a confinement room in areas exposed 
to a toxic risk).  
Certain details of the implementation of the law are still somewhat unclear in 2012. 
For example, people who live close to an industrial facility and whose home is 
exposed to a medium level of risk,  must implement constructive measures in their 
homes in order to protect them against the risk. The cost of these measures is borne 
entirely by home owners, but they can deduct a part of the cost (the percentage 
changes in each yearly budget) from their income tax 1 . The law specifies that 
homeowners have an obligation to implement such constructive measures, but does 
not anticipate how the obligation will be enforced, nor the implications for insurance 
coverage of possible victims of an industrial accident, who did not implement the 
prescribed constructive measures.  
 
Better information and consultation of local populations 
A last component of my report to the Prime Minister concerned the information given 
to local populations concerning industrial risk, their inclusion in consultation 
procedures and their degree of involvement in local decision-making. As is often the 
tradition in France, the decision-making process concerning industrial safety and land 
use implications was rather technocratic, with issues too often being decided by small 
groups of experts (from industry and from the competent authorities), with very little 
information provided to (and even less consultation of) local citizens. 
My report suggested that information given to local citizens could be improved, with 
a greater degree of transparency in the process.  
I also suggested that a move should be made from a process of information to a more 
participatory process (moving towards a “democracy of risk”), that local 
government officials should play a stronger role in the mediation between industry 
and citizens, and that alternative forms of expertise should be encouraged (despite 
the implications in terms of cost) and consulted. This reinforced citizen participation 
in discussion and decisions concerning industrial safety is in my mind a protection 
against the establishment of a routine, a reduction in the degree of vigilance with 
respect to different hazards.  
In 2005, the law in France decreed the creation of local consultation bodies, called 
                                                        
1 This measure introduces an asymmetry between households who pay income tax and poor 
households who do not pay income tax.  
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CLIC2, around all top tier Seveso facilities. These bodies, comprising members from 
industry, the competent authorities, trade unions, local government and local citizens, 
meet approximately twice a year.  
Information is provided concerning the management of technological risks and on 
incidents and accidents which occur on the plants. The creation of the CLIC was 
inspired by existing consultation bodies around nuclear power plants.  
Experience has shown that the CLIC, as currently organized in most regions in 
France, function in an excessively rigid manner. They are presided by the Préfet, who 
represents national government regionally, and who traditionally adopts an 
authoritarian, rather than consultative, approach to government. In my opinion, whilst 
some progress has been made towards the objective of the Prime minister at the time 
of the AZF accident of reinforcing citizen’s participation in governing technological 
risks, much remains to be done. Indeed, in practice the decision process remains fairly 
technocratic, and is still primarily governed by negotiation between experts from 
industry and from the competent authorities.  
More flexible consultative bodies such as SPPPI (informal bodies which already 
existed in certain industrial regions in France at the time of the AZF accident), and 
recent experimental bodies such as the Conférence riveraine in Feyzin3, suggest ways 
in which consultation practices should, in my opinion, evolve in the future.  
A separate change to legislation following the Toulouse accident involves simplified 
summaries of safety case reports. Safety case documents for hazardous 
establishments are often written in such a technical language that they can only be 
understood by experts in risk assessment, generally working for industry or for the 
regulator. Other interested parties, such as technical advisers in local government 
authorities, trade union representatives and local citizens, were unable to comprehend 
the contents. The law has changed to require non-technical summaries of these 
documents, which help in the consultation process and assist the development of a 
safety culture around industrial facilities.  
 
Political calendars and real-life implementation 
The AZF explosion, which caused the death of 31 people, approximately 4500 
injured, and significant damage to nearby buildings, naturally led to significant 
emotion. The Minister of the Environment at the time, Yves Cochet, stated two days 
after the explosion that the law would « certainly have to change ». Less than a week 
later, the Prime Minister confirmed, during a speech made in Toulouse, the need for a 
change of legislation, and gave an outline of the changes he intended. 
The national debate was organized quickly, and concluded in December 2001; my 
report was presented to the Prime Minister in January 2002. The parliamentary 
inquiry into the safety of hazardous industrial facilities and research laboratories and 
the protection of people and the environment in case of a major industrial accident4, 
which heard 400 witnesses and visited numerous industrial sites, concluded in 
February 2002.  
                                                        
2 Comité Local d’Information et de Concertation 
3 More information concerning the Conférence riveraine can be found at http://www.icsi-
eu.org/.  
4 http://www.assemblee-nationale.fr/11/dossiers/installations_industrielles.asp  
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The law was first presented to Parliament at the beginning of 20035, voted in July 
2003 and the accompanying decrees were mostly promulgated in 2005. The 
guidelines written by the Ministry of the environment to assist in the implementation 
of the law were published between 2005 and 2007.  
One of the principle consequences of the law, the Technological Risk Prevention 
Plans (421 in France, concerning 670 establishments), were initially intended to be 
completed in 2007. Today in 2012, less than half of them are concluded; the 
significant financial consequences of some of these plans, in today’s difficult 
economic context, do not facilitate prompt resolution of these problems6.  
As is often the case, political focus on an issue is linked to its visibility by the public, 
and people's attention is very high after a catastrophe, but decreases quite quickly 
afterwards.  
 
Creation of the ICSI in 2003 
In 2003, I was approached by a small group of people from different backgrounds 
(industry, research, local government, trade unions) who planned to create a non-
profit organization which would work to improve knowledge and dialogue on issues 
related to industrial safety and the cohabitation of hazardous facilities and local 
populations.  
They asked me to become the President of this organization, the Institute for an 
Industrial Safety Culture, which today works to improve dialogue between all 
stakeholders concerned by industrial safety, organizes graduate-level and professional 
training on risk management and undertakes research aiming to improve safety and 
safety culture in Europe.  Since 2003, the ICSI has undertaken a number of activities 
which contribute to a shared safety culture and cohabitation of industrial activity and 
other forms of land use: 
 a working group in 2004, comprising representatives from local government, 
research, industry, trade unions and NGOs, developed a common 
understanding of a vocabulary (in French) concerning technological risk, 
consultation processes and decision-making, with an accompanying 
pedagogical toolkit which has been used in a number of initial sessions of 
CLIC consultation bodies; 
They asked me to become the President of this organization, the Institute for an 
Industrial Safety Culture, which today works to improve dialogue between all 
stakeholders concerned by industrial safety, organizes graduate-level and professional 
training on risk management and undertakes research aiming to improve safety and 
safety culture in Europe.  Since 2003, the ICSI has undertaken a number of activities 
which contribute to a shared safety culture and cohabitation of industrial activity and 
                                                        
5 Intervening elections had led to a change in the government, and thus to a new Minister of the 
environment.  
6 In ordinary circumstances, new expenditure for the government which is anticipated to result 
from a new law, should be included in the national budget. However, the costs which would be 
generated by measures resulting from the PPRT legislation were not included in the national budget at 
the time the law was voted, since the measures were conditional on each local plan being approved, 
and thus fairly remote in time. The significant costs to national government, local governments and 
industry of measures resulting from PPRT legislation were not readily apparent at the time the law was 
voted.  
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other forms of land use: 
 a working group in 2004, comprising representatives from local government, 
research, industry, trade unions and NGOs, developed a common 
understanding of a vocabulary (in French) concerning technological risk, 
consultation processes and decision-making, with an accompanying 
pedagogical toolkit which has been used in a number of initial sessions of 
CLIC consultation bodies; 
 a working group in 2005 and 2006 comprising representatives from industry, 
trade unions, research and NGOs wrote a document concerning appropriate 
management of subcontracting on Seveso-type facilities (subcontracting was 
one of the important issues discussed in the aftermath of the AZF accident); 
 a working group in 2006 and 2007 produced a pedagogical document 
concerning the risk assessment process, which aims to help non-expert 
stakeholders to understand the safety case documents, and to assist authors of 
these documents in producing non-technical summaries which can be 
understood by lay people; 
 other working groups have addressed issues including the management of fire 
hazards, human and organizational factors of safety, initiating event frequency 
databases for risk assessment, management of operational experience 
feedback, and communication on long-term health effects of industrial 
pollution. The working groups produce documents which are made freely 
available to the public in PDF format, and the ICSI organizes dissemination 
activities such as seminars, in order to inform interested stakeholders; 
 a number of training courses, both Master-level and short courses for 
professionals, have been developed. 
These activities contribute to the development of a real safety culture, shared by all 
stakeholders concerned by industrial risk, in which people understand the issues and 
are able to participate in an informed way in decision-making. It is a slow process, 
but it is important that risk become an issue of democratic debate, rather than a 
technical issue for a small number of experts.  
 
Philippe ESSIG former President of the SNCF (French railways), is the author of a 
report requested by the French Prime Minister concerning a national debate on 
industrial safety, following the Toulouse AZF accident (2001). He is also President of 
the Institute for an Industrial Safety Culture (Toulouse, France), a non-profit 
organization which was created after the AZF accident.  
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Design and development of public transport systems: how to 
keep them on track  
 
John Stoop; 
Kindunos Safety Consultancy Ltd 
P.O.Box 218 
4200 AE Gorinchem 
The Netherlands 
 
John Baggen 
Delft University of Technology 
P.O.Box 5015 
2600 GA Delft 
The Netherlands 
 
Abstract 
This contribution explores the various levels of decision making, substantive 
arguments and changes in the plans and design alternatives as the appeared 
throughout various processes of infrastructural design. The contribution emphasizes 
the need for a more pro-active and structured approach in planning and developing 
safety in such projects in order to guarantee a consistent and consequent quality of 
the decision making and to assure coherence between all safety aspects in the design. 
 Keywords: safety assessment, infrastructural projects, decision making 
1. Introduction 
1.1 Opportunities 
Realizing new infrastructure and upgrading existing infrastructure is a major societal 
mission because transport infrastructure is considered a carrier of economic 
development. In the past, expansion of infrastructure has been considered a mono-
disciplinary design task. Nowadays, accommodating spatial demands becomes more 
and more difficult due to an intensified and multifunctional use of space. The 
complexity of the design task increases because more and more actors and interests 
are involved, while costs expand and societal benefits are debated. Such major 
projects are characterised by large uncertainties in the area of societal, technological 
and financial complexity. Such projects are organised by public-private partnerships, 
taking over governmental roles in control and management of the projects. Designing 
infrastructure is not only increasing in complexity, but new design aspects are 
involved, such as external safety, rescue and emergency demands and last but no 
least, terrorism and social safety issues. 
The national policy decision making arena in the Netherlands has seen several misfits 
and deficiencies, leading to a series of Parliamentary Inquiries into the design, 
construct, financing and uncontrolled consequences of this development. Already in 
2004, a report on the parliamentary inquiry into major infrastructure projects has been 
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published, the Tijdelijke Commissie Infrastructuur (Temporarily Committee on 
Infrastructure) (TCI 2004). In one of the supporting chapters of the report, the safety 
aspect is elaborated, calling for developing a new tool in safety assessment, the 
Veiligheids Effect Rapportage (Safety Impact Statement). 
Evaluating major projects indicates that it is undesirable to capture effects and 
consequences based on a single performance indicator. Instead, a series of critical 
decisions are involved, which are improved and supplemented during the process. 
Strategic and external effects can be evaluated with a variety of methods and 
techniques. In order to harmonize safety with the decision making process, analyses 
should be conducted in two phases. After a first qualitative phase, based on index 
parameters and clarification of the solution domains, a more detailed analysis is 
performed. Eventually, national politics decides, based on transparent and relevant 
information. In a first phase, bottlenecks, opportunities, and solution domains are 
involved, while in a second phase various project alternatives including technological 
options are substantiated and formal assessment procedures take place. Instruments 
such as cost-benefit analysis and environmental impact statements are performed 
preliminary in a first phase, while in a second phase, they are conducted at length. 
Safety can be positioned in each phase of the project life cycle: 
- In the initial phase, a societal cost-benefit analysis is available, indicating the 
necessity and urgency of a new major project or policy making option. At this 
phase however, the safety aspect is missing. No safety related decision 
making support tool exists. 
- In a second phase, a more detailed assessment of the consequences of the 
options is required, narrowing down the scope to preferential options based on 
a detailed environmental impact assessment and detailed cost-benefit analysis. 
At this phase there is room for a Safety Impact Statement as a tactical decision 
making tool 
- In a third phase, the level of project development and management is 
elaborated, providing a project- or policy-option specific Safety Case for the 
justification of the selected safety strategy, principles and concepts as an input 
for the next phase. 
- In this fourth phase a Safety Management System (SMS) is to be developed as 
the basis for the systems regular operational performance, including in-house 
incident and emergency handling. 
- In cases in which this SMS is insufficiently equipped, in a fifth phase public 
rescue and emergency services and after care is to be provided by local 
authorities as a part of public crisis management policies. At this phase, a 
Critical Event Scenario approach has been developed which refers to 
allocation of rescue and emergency management resources. 
By identifying these phases in safety assessment, national government is provided 
transparency in the safety life-cycle chain, starting with initiating project and policy 
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options until organizing and deployment of rescue and emergency resources (TCI  
2004. 
 
Fig 1. Flow chart decision making processes and instrumental support 
 
1.2. Scenarios  
1.2.1. Scenarios as a decision support tool 
Analyzing the lessons learned from the design and construct of the High Speed Line-
South  railway project, questions were raised about the theoretical justification of the 
project fundamentals (Stoop and Beukenkamp 2002).  New actors and safety notions 
in the area of rescue and emergency, external influences such as the Eschede ICI-train 
derailment and various tunnel fires in the Alp region emphasized the necessity to 
incorporate safety in the decision making process of the project management in a 
major infrastructure project. 
Initially defined as a linear, loosely coupled and closed system design, based on 
proven technology, the HSL-South project demonstrated the need to incorporate 
external influences and new actors in the safety decision making process. Rather than 
compliance with quantitative risk standards and performance requirements at a detail 
engineering level as a part of the Construction and Operation Licensing procedure, a 
dynamic and open process approach proved to be necessary. Such a process should 
stimulate consensus among actors and involve rescue and emergency aspects in the 
early phases of the design and should document principal safety related decisions 
(Leeuwendaal 2001). 
In this approach, the use of scenarios as decision support tools proved to be 
fundamental in order to achieve consensus among stakeholders and to allocate 
specific safety measures to improve the quality of the design. Such an approach 
eventually proved to be beneficial for introducing innovation in the design of a major 
tunnel for the HSL-South railway (Stoop and Beukenkamp 2003).  However, the 
application of scenarios as design support tools remained obscure regarding their 
substantive development, procedural embedding and scope with respect to an integral 
safety approach. In a second project, the Spoorzone Delft, scenarios have been 
primarily applied as a design tool to explore their further substantive development.  
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Scenarios as a design tool 
Scenarios were developed as a design support tool in order to support a substantive 
safety assessment in three phases of the design process and decision-making during 
the project management. In general, three steps are identified in a civil engineering 
design process: 
- Step 1: a conceptual design phase in which design alternatives are based on a 
Program of Requirements, shared by all actors and encompassing all relevant 
design aspects. Such alternatives are collected in a Initiating Document (RIB 
2002) 
- Step 2: a functional design phase, in which a limited set of  most preferable 
alternatives is selected, fit for further elaboration and detailing of critical design 
aspects of the final design option (RIB 2003). 
- Step 3: a detailing phase in which the construction details and safety measures in 
the final option are elaborated into a construction planning phase (DHTrail 2003). 
In each of these phases, safety should be assessed in combination with other relevant 
design aspects and external conditions. Eventually, a most cost-effective design 
should be realized. In order to integrate safety in these decision-making phases, a 
scenario analysis was applied to the Spoorzone Delft project (Prorail 2003).   
Due to the fact that is impossible to evaluate and assess all possible scenarios, a 
selected number of five critical ‘top’ scenarios were identified by expert opinion and 
group discussion among stakeholders. 
Their relevance was based on their ability to demonstrate the perceived critical 
consequences and their ability to indicate design strategies. They should facilitate 
optimization of design solutions for a wide variety of aspects. In a next design phase 
of detailing engineering, all possible scenarios should be evaluated in order to assess 
their influence on the project elements, technical installations and operational 
requirements to assess the safety of the final alternative. 
2. A design case study: the Spoorzone Delft project 
 
2.1 Case description 
The municipality of Delft has been taken initiatives over the years to improve the 
quality of the urban area around the central station and railway track. At present the 
location of the tracks on a high fly-over disturbs the living environment and hampers 
the development of the city center nearby the station. Consequently, the municipality 
has commissioned a design for a railway tunnel in combination with local urban 
development and a multifunctional public transport hub as a replacement for the fly-
over and station.  
The first railway across Delft originates from 1847, replacing the Western city walls 
which were dismantled in the 19th century. From 1878 onwards, the city expanded in 
a Western direction, embedding the railway in the city itself. With the increase of 
railway and road traffic, in 1965 the railways were separated from the road 
infrastructure by creating a flyover facility over the former Western city canal, the 
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Spoorsingel. The disadvantages of this concept soon became apparent, due to the 
noise of the flyover, the barrier effect of the parking lots underneath the flyover and 
the esthetical aspects of the removing canals in old city centers like Delft.   
A full reconstruction became an option when in 1996 in a neighboring city on the 
same railway line, a tunnel and underground station were designed with the support 
of Parliament as a part of the national traffic network development policy. A 
Masterplan for the railway station was ultimately accepted in 2005 with the approval 
of the Spoorzone Delft project. The project consists of a combination of a public 
transport node, combining a four track railway tunnel and underground station, with 
adjacent  underground parking facilities for 450 cars, about 1500 appartments, 54.000 
m2 office facilities of which 50% for the new town hall offices and a reconstruction 
of the city center western hemisphere road traffic network . 
1.2.2. Step 1: Safety as a conceptual design aspect 
In cooperation with the railway provider, Delft has taken a multidisciplinary approach 
in which the public transport hub is pivotal and an integral approach is favored for the 
spatial and transport issues. This approach should direct an urban infrastructure, and 
generate solutions for planning, construction method, alignment and possible 
optimizations. The municipality Delft, the regional authorities and the railway infra 
provider have drawn up a common Program of Requirements in order to conduct a 
modeling study into the location and outlines of the transport hub, in combination 
with the tunnel options and urban environment. Eventually, 14 alternatives were 
developed and assessed, based on the following characteristics:  
- the construction method of the tunnel, such as cut-and-cover versus drilling, 
including the tunnel cross section 
- the length of the tunnel, with a constant northern section length and a variable 
length of the southern section 
- the vertical alignment, focusing on the local urban consequences of various spatial 
functions on the surface level 
- horizontal alignment, depending on required removal of houses and crossing of 
traffic arteries and combination of transport routes 
- location of the public transport hub, varying across the track as well as 
underground or surface level railway stations. 
In total 16 alternatives were tested by expert opinion meetings, based on 12 criteria, 
among which social safety in the railway station environment and internal and 
external safety of the tunnels. As a result of this testing procedure, 5 preferential 
alternatives were chosen for further elaboration (RIB 2002). 
1.2.3. Step 2 Safety assessment of design alternatives 
In order to reach a further reduction in alternatives, the five preferential alternatives 
were assessed more in detail, in particular with respect to safety.  
The following scenarios were selected for assessment of the five preferential 
alternatives: 
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1. fire in a passenger train stopping in the tunnel, possibly in combination with the 
presence of hazardous materials in a freight train. Due to smoke, heat and toxic 
substances, the focus is on the speed of evacuating passengers 
2. collision of a freight train and passenger train at the underground station, 
releasing hazardous materials. This scenario foresees an expansion of the event 
into the underground platforms and adjacent station, requiring rapid evacuation of 
passengers and timely access for rescue workers 
3. small crime and traffic accidents on the ground level station square, focusing on 
interactions between station, parking, transport hub and traffic environment 
4. disturbance of public order and safety during the construction phase. This 
scenario deals with complications during construction and crowd control 
accessibility of the site for rescue and emergency workers during major events in and 
around the tunnel, underground station, adjacent office blocks and parking facilities. 
In the conceptual design the safety analysis focused on two questions: 
- whether a difference in transport of hazardous materials in the present situation 
and a future option of unrestricted transport would affect the required safety 
measures  
- or differences should exist for shorter and longer tunnel alternatives, taking into 
account underground or ground level positions of the railway platforms. 
The Spoorzone Delft project has a number of characteristics, which argue for a group 
risk approach in terms of rescue and emergency resources and facilities. Passenger 
and freigth trains may occupy the tunnel simultaneously, during which a large 
population at risk may be involved in an incident, including the population at the 
underground station. Since the station has no separation between tubes, interactive 
scenarios may occur between station and both tubes. The sizes of the transport of 
hazardous materials and a coincidence with passenger transport are critical issues for 
a safety assessment of the tunnel design. Consequently, group risk may be a critical 
factor in incident handling. Such internal group risk may be triggered by 
transportation of hazardous materials or fire incidents in passenger trains, but no 
national, legal standards are available. Acceptable risk standards for passengers and 
populations at a railway station are defined only on an individual basis. The costs of 
the tunnel and concurrent safety measures to guarantee a sufficient safety level are 
substantial. The analysis focused on fire hazards and incidents with hazardous 
materials. Eventually, a safety philosophy was adopted by all stakeholders. 
2.2 Safety philosophy 
A prominent argument for designing a tunnel in the new Spoorzone project was the 
transport of hazardous materials by rail. The national policy on rail transport of 
hazardous materials in the Netherlands demands unrestricted access to all tracks on 
the railway network. This policy creates an external risk of transport of hazardous 
materials through city centers, which is considered critical in terms of Local Risk and 
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Group Risk standards. Tunneling would eliminate this politically sensitive external 
risk, creating a win-win situation with respect to external risk and elimination of city 
development barriers. However, simultaneously, an internal risk was created for 
internal safety in the tunnel and underground station. In the previous decade, several 
serious accidents have occurred with fires in road and railway tunnels, alerting the 
rescue and emergency community on the risks involved for railway passengers, their 
own staff and the governmental issues on responsibilities and liabilities. For these 
reasons, explicit attention was paid to this new internal risk in the early phases of the 
design. In 2000 a Working Group on Integral safety was established by the 
municipality of Delft, composed of any party involved in the risk domian. The scope 
covered both internal risk, external risk, occupational hazards, social risk, rescue and 
emergency aspects. In addition to the commonly applied Quantitative Risk Analysis, 
the  scenario analysis was adopted, simultaneously covering several policy domains: 
rail transport of hazardous materials, urban planning and rescue and emergency. This 
approach should quarantee a continuous focus on safety throughout the Design and 
Construct phases of the project. The principles of the philosophy covered the notion 
of residual risk: not every risk could be eliminated or fully controlled. The structural 
integrity of the tunnel is designed for a two hours resistance to a fire load of cargo 
train. A residual risk of loss of structural integrity was incorporated, while based on 
risk calculations, the consequences of a hazardous material accident were not 
considered critical: a fire in a passenger train was dominant. The focus in designing a 
coherent set of safety measures was on the exclusion of a conflict between a cargo 
and passenger train in the same tube, the use of sprinkler systems in cargo trains and 
the design of a sophisticated ventilation system for the safe evacuation of passengers 
to either the tunnel ends or the underground railway station. To this purpose, the 
railway station was designated as a safe haven. In addition to the infrastructural 
measures dealing with fire resistant tunnel lining measures, operational measures 
were taken into account, dealing with limitations in access of hazardous materials 
cargo trains during rush hours and a strict separation of cargo and passenger trains in 
tubes and in the station. In order to create a consistent level of safety on the railway 
chain Rotterdam-Delft-Rijswijk-The Hague, safety measures were taken equivalent to 
the measures which already accomodated transport through the nearby Willemspoor 
tunnel and Rijswijk tunnel. 
Consequently, two main packages of safety measures were designed, a Basic Package 
–without hazardous material transport- and a Plus Package –including this transport-. 
The detailed level of design incorporates most prominent safety measures such as a 
safe evacuation of tunnel and station by smoke management. The tunnel tube is 
designed as a safe have escape route, linking the adjacent tube to the accident tube by 
emergency exits. The pressure gradient provides a clean air situation at all times in 
the station, while office buildings and other spaces are disconnected from the 
ventilation and evacuation system  in the railway system. At the south end of the 
tunnel, an unmanned fire fighting command post is foreseen, linked to the railway 
emergency center in Rotterdam, while the local fire station in Delft is situated close to 
the station 
2.3 Delays and unforseen external developments. 
First, the crisis in the real estate developments. Because the lead time of the project is 
about 10 years, several external developments exist which cannot be anticipated in 
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the conceptual phase. The financial crisis has caused a delay of about two years in the 
appartment and office buildings markets. This crisis  forces  a temporarily 
exploitation delay, causes considerable additional work in phasing and logistics of the 
project despite the low technological innovative nature of the project.  The transition 
from two tunnel tracks to the four track final configuration has seen a delay of about 
two years.  In addition the safety assessment of the project ceates additional delays.  
The municipal office estates and the railway station facilities require separate 
emergency facilities; compartimentation of the project requires separate certification 
procedures. However, such certification is not yet fully developed for the social safety 
and risk perception and risk awareness components of certification  
Second, the ground water level  in the shallow levels creates unforeseen 
complications, because several  assumptions with respect to the gradual raising of the 
level prove to be incorrect. This deficiency in assumptions has created uncertainty in 
the designed load and necessitates an extension of the support beams capacity in 
order to compensate for the increased load on the tunnel construction.  Further raises 
in ground water levels are expected due to the termination of the peniciline 
production of the nearby DSM process industry facilities. Since these production 
processes require a high level of water, over decades a deep water supply facility has 
been applied, having a major impact on the deep water flows and stability of the soil 
in the environment. If the water supply should be terminated abruptly simultaneously 
with the termination of the production facility of DSM, a sudden change in deep 
water flow should occur in the wider environment, impacting an aera of about 80 km 
in diameter. In addition, due to such an increase in deep water levels, the tunnel 
construction could brake free from its foundation and flows in an upward direction.   
3. Safety assessment: two assessment processes 
During the design and development of the Spoorzone project, two main streams of 
safety issues have been covered: a substantive assessment of the safety of the design, 
introducing the notion of integral safety, and a process assessment of a democratic 
participation in all phases of decision making (Horvat 2001). 
3.1 Substantive assessment 
A substantive assessment of the safety has been conducted in two phases; the 
conceptual design and the preliminary design. A detailed safety design assessment is 
yet to come, while the safety management during operations will be derived from the 
residual risks that emerge from the design outcomes. 
Three policy domains have been involve in the safety assessment. The Ministry of 
Transport and Infrastructure was involved from a railway safety perspective, covering 
the issue of safety throughout the hazardous materials network development. This 
perspecitve deals with external risk standards and risk contours regarding Local Risk 
and Group Risk as the safety aspect of the national Hazardous Goods Network. This 
project is embedded in the Long Term Planning for Infrastructure, Space and 
Transport, developing main-, brain and greenports. Co-financing by the national 
government is an option in case of supraregional developments, with delegated 
responsibility to regional and local government. As such the risk assessment in the 
Spoorzone deals with railway traffic volumes, traffic management, origin-destination 
issues and track allocation issues. The data are prospective, dealing with anticipating 
Proceedings of the 43rd ESReDA Seminar 
 
17 
 
on future developments in the rail cargo sector. The Ministry of Housing and Spatial 
Development deals with safety from a perspective of multiple use of space, covering 
safety issues of densely populated areas, dealing with multifunctional and potentially 
conflicting use of spaces.  The key policy issues in this perspective cover 
multifunctional use of space and Public Private Partnership project development. 
Finally, the Ministry of Internal Affairs is involved from a rescue and emergency 
perspective. This Ministry designated the Spoorzone project as a benchmark project 
for the development for a Safety Impact Statement as the counterpart of other already 
existing assessment methods for orther policy aspects such as environmental impact, 
economical impact and governance implications. The purpose of this Safety Impact 
Statement is to provide transparency and consistency throughout the design and 
development of the project with respect to safety. The characteristics of such a Safety 
Impact Statement are: integral safety,  a safety chain –proaction, prevention, 
preparation, repression and after care- multiple scenario analysis in order to provide 
generic and specific insights, various planning phases of the project and a cyclic 
decision making procedure. During consecutive project phases, various instruments 
are applied, such as a Safety Case, Quick Scan, Quantitative  Risk Analysis and 
certification standards. An encompassing analysis was performed dealing with 
decomposition of the project into several major components, identification of 
accident types and scenarios, system functions and mulit-actor involvement in the 
various lif cycle phases of the project.  
3.2 Project process assessment 
In urban planning, the redevelopment of city center  station environments is a senitive 
and ctitical issue. Several tensions exist with respect to the role of local, regional and 
national governance, a multi-actor and multi-stakeholder arena on the local level  
considerably omplicates decision making processes (Petter 2005). Hinder and 
disruption may jeopardize public support for a lengthy lead time. While costs become 
visible per interested stakeholder in one phase, benefits may be obscured or allocated 
to other stakeholders in different phases of the process. In a comparative study on 
several railway projects on hazardous goods transport in an urban environment, four 
issues were assessed as critical: the design and construction process, the organisation 
and structure of the project,  the presence of a safety manager as an advocate for 
safety as a strategic value and the influence of external developments which might 
interfere with the project. In Delft, the Spoorzone project was initiated or reasons of 
noise, urban planning and city development, focusing on the reduction of  external 
risk. Safety was a strategic value, adressed by the Ministry of Internal Affairs early 
and high in the decision making process. This resulted in a pro active and structural 
involvement of safety in the decision making process from the beginning of the 
project. The national governancelevel  was involved from the beginning of the 
process. In Arnhem, the project was designated as a Key Project in urban 
development, involving safety only late in the process, creating frustration and 
professional concerns in the fire fighting community. They assessed their 
involvement as ‘too little and too late’. Involvement of the Ministry of Housing and 
Urban Planning at the national level was present, but restricted to the Key Project 
safety aspects, not on integral safety as such. A major external influence appeared late 
in the project when BASF announced the termination of its production site across the 
German border. This facility is nearby the Arnhem station where all hazardous goods 
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traffic have to pass, making obsolete all safety measures that had been taken into 
account. In a third project at Dordrecht, the Ministry of Transport and Infrastructure 
took the lead in the project development. Although the project started with a shared 
vision on the importance of safety as a critical design value, no further elaboration 
was performed. Measures were taken on an actor dependent basis, creating confusion 
and misunderstandings among stakeholders. The feasibility and effectiveness of 
various solutions was debated, creating tensions on the local level, questioning the 
validity and credibility of national standards on Group Risk and Local Risk. 
From this survey, it was concluded that the results of a safety assessment highly 
depended on the focus, starting point and preferential policy of a ministry. In each 
case, where a different ministry took the lead, different results were produced. Active 
involvement of national government facilitated consensus, while in other case in their 
absence, local tensions and limited resources frustrated the progress, coherence of the 
decision making and quality of the substantive results.  A general conclusion form 
this study was that cooperation between local stakeholders, regional and national 
gevernance enabled the achievement of a full safety picture, sharing of knowledge, 
increase of the feasibility of shared solutions. Cooperation created understanding 
among all parties involved, easing sensitive issues across different policy domains.  
3.3 Separating process from content: the Rijn Gouwe Lijn experiences 
In the mid 1990’s public transport needs in the Western part of the Netherlands 
evolved into a series of plans for a light rail version of a classic heavy railway 
connection connecting the western and central parts of Holland. This lightrail system 
aimed to connect several coastal with Gouda in the middle of the Green Heart of 
Holland, crossing rural areas with a high environmental preservation value,  while 
simultaneously penetrating deeply in the old city center of Leiden, connecting the 
railway system with heavy rail stations and the central station in Leiden and Gouda. 
During the project, a safety impact assessment was deemed necessary, requiring a 
mixed assessment framework for the safety assessment of the heavy rail system 
network, the safety impact on the road network while crossing the inner city traffic 
network of Leiden and urban traffic and road capacity planning requirements of the 
knock-on consequences on the wider traffic network in the Leiden environment. 
Simultaneously, a discussion on governmental competences and responsibilities 
emerged between the city of Leiden, the Province of Zuid-Holland an national traffic 
policy agencies, fuelled by local discourses among the population of Leiden and the 
local city council. In this public and governmental decision making environment, the 
usefulness of dedicated tools and decision making procedures  for assessing safety 
prove to run deficient. The eventual consequences for road safety in the city center 
were adressed by an Independent Safety Asessor ISA, on a detailed level of design, 
measuring the safety performance of the new designs by the standstill principle and 
Sustainable Safe criteria for road traffic.  Simultaneously, the same railway systems 
was assessed compliant with heavy railweay certification standards by a second 
safety impact assessment committee, while a third committee assessed the safety of 
the railway systems as a part of the formal environmental impact assessment 
procedures. During the design of the system, various design alternatives were 
developed, each dealing with fluctuating requirements, generated by changes in the 
political debate on the usefullnes and feasibility of the routing of the track through the 
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city center. Eventually, the project was cancelled due to the financial crisis and 
replaced by a road infrastructure, passing along the southern part of the city. 
4. Conclusions 
 
In general, integral safety is not a common approach in practice in the design and 
development of major infrastructural projects. Such an integral safety requires 
explicit attention towards both a substantive and a process component. The 
substantive and process components in such an approach cannot be disconnected 
from each other. A dedicated instrument in a single phase of development, focus on a 
single critical issue –such as hazardous goods on railways or fire in tunnels and 
underground stations- is indispensable, but not sufficient. Several preconditions have 
to be met: a cooperation between all levels of governance, a project safety 
organisation and safety management should be available, while several dedicated 
safety assessment tools should be applied, among which a Safety Impact Assessment.  
Such a tool has proven its value in the Spoorzone project, but does not yet has a legal 
basis for standard application in the Netherlands. Finally, external interferences with 
other industrila processes and production sites may have a major impact on the 
desired and required level of safety in a major project as demonstrated by the BASF 
experiences and the oncoming termination of the DSM facilities in Delft.  
References 
Leeuwendaal 2001 De bochtige weg naar beheerst risico. Naar een evenwichtige 
besluitvorming bij grote infrastructurele projecten. Leeuwendaal Advies BV. 
2001 
Horvat Consultants 2001 Beveiligingsconcept Integrale Veiligheid Spoorzone Delft. 
In iopdracht van Hulpverleningsregio Haaglanden en Gemeente Delft. E. 
Horvat Consultants BV 
RIB 2002 Trechternotitie Planstudie 4-sporigheid Rijswijk-Delft, inclusief Spoorzone 
Delft. Rail Infrabeheer, DHTrail, TCE en Benthem Crouwel, juni 2002 
Stoop J.A. en Beukenkamp W.R. 2002 Al doende leert men. Faculteit TBM 
Technische Universiteit Delft, 2002 
Prorail 2003 Veiligheidsanalyse tunnelvarianten Spoorzone Delft, Jan 2003 Prorail, 
January 2003 
RIB 2003 Keuzenotitie Spoorzone Delft Rail Infrabeheer, Januari 2003 
DHTrail 2003 Maatregelenpakketten Spoorzone Delft DHTrail, TCE en Benthem 
Crouwel, Maart 2003 
TCI 2004 Tijdelijke Commissie voor de Infrastructuur. Onderzoek naar 
infrastructuurprojecten. Tweede kamer, vergaderjaar 2004-2005, 29 283, nrs. 
5-6. 
Petter 2005 Externe veiligheid bij stationsgebieden. Doctoraalscriptie Planologie, 
Radboud Universiteit, Nijmegen. Januari 2005 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Land Use Planning and Risk-Informed Decision Making   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
(This page has been intentionally left blank) 
 
 
Proceedings of the 43rd ESReDA Seminar 
 
21 
 
 
Updating Selection of hazardous Equipment for the Land 
use planning around Seveso Sites in Walloon Region after 
the CLP Regulation 
Beaudoint Damien, Delvosalle Christian, Delcourt Jérémy, Nourry Joachim, 
Rosmorduc Anaïg 
Faculté Polytechnique de l’Université de Mons, Major Risk Research Centre 
Rue de l’Epargne, 56 
7000, Mons, Belgium 
Benjelloun Fessel 
Service public de Wallonie (SPW), Cellule RAM (Risque d’Accidents Majeurs) 
Avenue du Prince de Liège, 15 
5100, Jambes, Belgium 
 
Abstract 
Currently, the method of selection of hazardous equipment in Wallonia explained in 
the Vade-Mecum of the Walloon Region, namely used for land use planning is based 
on risk phrases defined in the Dangerous Substances Directive (67/548/EEC) and the 
Dangerous Preparations Directive (1999/45/EC). However, since December 2010, 
the Classification, Labelling and Packaging (CLP) Regulation (1272/2008) must be 
used for dangerous substances and from June 2015 for mixtures. Later, this 
Regulation will completely replace the two old Directives which will be abrogated 
from June 2015. In this context, it seems justified to adapt the current selection 
method in prevision of the future abrogation of these Directives. Ideally, the new 
selection method should identify as hazardous, the same equipment than the current 
method but it is obvious.  
Keywords: CLP Regulation, adaptation, selection, hazardous equipment. 
1. Introduction 
The article 12 of the Seveso II Directive (1996) [1] requests that Member States 
assure that their land use policy takes into account the need, in the long term, to 
maintain appropriate distances between establishments covered by the Directive and 
various areas. In this context, the Walloon approach selected for the risk assessment 
and the determination of the vulnerable zones is a probabilistic one with particular 
assumptions [2, 3]. Note that to develop and to apply this method since 2004, 
Walloon authorities are helped by the Major Risk Research Centre (MRRC) of the 
University of Mons as technical expert.  
According to this method, after the necessary step consisting in collection of the 
information about the Seveso plant around which a vulnerable zone must be drawn, 
the next step is to select the equipment which will be included in the risk assessment. 
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It is crucial not to select too few equipment in order to have a right assessment of the 
risk level, and not to select too much equipment, which would lead to a high time-
consuming process. In the frame of land use planning issue, only equipment 
contributing to a risk beyond the fence of the plant must be considered. 
For this purpose, the Walloon Region developed a method of selection of equipment 
based on risk phrases defined in the Dangerous Substances Directive (67/548/EEC) 
[4] and the Dangerous Preparations Directive (1999/45/EC) [5]. Initially, this method 
was developed in order to allow industrialists to determine hazardous equipment for 
which they must prove that the risk is under control. For the land use planning this 
method was chosen with particular assumptions. Indeed, in practice in this context, 
we disregard some specific risks because the aim is to quantify the risk of accident for 
human beings beyond the fences of the plant.  
However, since December 2010, the Classification, Labelling and Packaging (CLP) 
Regulation (1272/2008) [6] must be used for dangerous substances and from June 
2015 for mixtures. Later, this Regulation will completely replace the two old 
Directives which will be abrogated from June 2015. The aim of the CLP Regulation 
is to harmonize the classification of hazardous substances and preparations with the 
international Regulation. In fact, this European Regulation permits to apply the 
majority of the SGH recommendations in Europe. However, the CLP Regulation 
introduces some specific rules for Members States of the European Union, in 
particular for environmental matters. The impact of this new Regulation is very 
important because it introduces some new classifications, some new methods of 
classification and it changes some criteria of classification.     
In prevision of the future abrogation of the two Directives and of the publication of 
the Seveso III Directive [7] (update of the Seveso II Directive, especially to take into 
account the CLP Regulation), a study was begun by MRRC to define a new 
methodology of selection of hazardous equipment.  
2. The current Method of Selection of hazardous Equipment 
The philosophy of this method is to consider equipment as hazardous if it contains a 
quantity of hazardous substance higher than a threshold quantity depending on the 
properties of substance. The detail of this method is presented in the Vade-Mecum of 
the Walloon Region [8]. The first step consists in attribution of a threshold mass (Ma) 
for the considered substance. In some cases, this mass must be revised in function of 
the volatility (for liquids) or possibilities of domino effects. The Table 1 presents the 
threshold masses in the current version of the Vade-Mecum [8]. 
Categories of hazard in this table are in fact the same as those of the Seveso II 
Directive [1] (Except for irritating or harmful for human being category which is a 
category added by Walloon authorities). However, the definition of these categories is 
based on the “Risk phrases” of substances [4, 5] which will be replaced with the CLP 
Regulation.   
Note that in this table, the column “non-Seveso” concerns risk phrases added 
(Compared with Seveso II Directive) by Walloon authorities to extent the scope to 
substances which could be hazardous. 
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Table I: Threshold mass Ma according to the hazardous properties of a substance and its physical state 
[8]  
Properties of the substance 
Risk phrases Threshold mass Ma (kg) 
Seveso Non-Seveso Solid Liquid Gas 
1 Very toxic for human being R26-R27-R28 R39 1.000 100 10 
2 Toxic for human being R23-R24-R25 
R40-R41-R45 
R46-R47-R48 
10.000 1.000 100 
3 Irritating or harmful for human being - 
R20-R21-R22 
R36-R37 
100.000 10.000 1.000 
4 Oxidizing R7-R8-R9 - 10.000 10.000 10.000 
5 Explosive R2 R5-R6 500 500 - 
6 Very explosive R3  500 500 - 
7 Flammable R10  - 10.000 - 
8 Highly flammable R17 R11-R15-R30 10.000 10.000 - 
9 Extremely flammable R12 - - 10.000 1.000 
10 Very toxic for environment R50 - 100.000 10.000 1.000 
11 Toxic for environment R51-R53 
R51-R54-R55 
R56-R57-R58 
100.000 10.000 1.000 
12 Other dangers R14-R15 R29 10.000 10.000 - 
3. Proposition for updating of the Table of threshold Masses 
Ideally, the new table of threshold masses must enable to identify as hazardous, the 
same equipment than currently. However, this is not obvious with the important 
changes introduced by the CLP Regulation. To construct this new table, Walloon 
authorities chose the same method than to construct the current version (based on the 
Seveso Directive II [1]). 
However, the future Seveso III Directive adapted to the CLP Regulation is always in 
discussion. Nevertheless, a proposal [7] is available and the categories already 
defined should not be revised. 
In February 2012, the Walloon Region prepared a first version of the new method of 
selection of hazardous equipment adapted to CLP Regulation. This proposition is 
presented at the Table II and was submitted to the MRRC. 
3.1 Missing Hazards from the Proposal 
Although the Seveso II and Seveso III categories are largely different, a comparison 
of the Table I and Table II was realized. In the CLP Regulation, it is important to note 
that this work was not easy because the new hazard statements are less segregative 
than hazard categories. So risk phrases (Dangerous substances/mixtures Directives) 
have to be compared with hazards categories (CLP Regulation). 
To highlight missing hazards in the new proposal, we had to compare risk phrases 
selected by Walloon authorities with categories proposed in the new proposal and 
hazard statements associated to each categories. 
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This work permitted to identify some hazards missing from the proposal while 
equivalent risk phrases (according to annexe VII from CLP Regulation [6]) are 
currently selected: 
 Carcinogens, category 1 (H350/H350i equivalent to R45/R49); 
 Carcinogens, category 2 (H351 equivalent to R40); 
 Germ cell mutagenicity, category 1 (H340 equivalent to R46); 
 Serious eye damage/eye irritation, category 1 (H318 equivalent to R41); 
 Serious eye damage/eye irritation, category 2 (H319 equivalent to R36); 
 Substances or mixtures with hazard statement EUH006 (equivalent to R6); 
 Substances or mixtures with hazard statement EUH070 (equivalent to R39-41); 
 Reproductive toxicity, category 1 and 2 (H360x, H361x equivalent to 
R60/R61/R62/ R63 which replace the R47 risk phrase). 
Otherwise, some environmental risk phrases (R54, R55, R56, R57 and R58) do not 
have an equivalent with the new classification system and so, the information about 
these hazards will disappear with the application of the CLP Regulation. Indeed, in 
environmental matters, only hazards for aquatic environment and for ozone layer are 
considered in the CLP Regulation.    
3.2 Threshold Masses 
For each category at the Table II, Walloon authorities proposed new threshold 
masses, according to the physical state of the substance. Compared with the current 
version of Vade-Mecum, we notice some changes. It should be noted that these 
choices could have great consequences on the selection of hazardous equipment and 
lead to select more or less equipment than with the current method and therefore lead 
to changes for the vulnerable zones and land use planning without real changes on 
Seveso sites. These changes are detailed below. 
3.2.1 Section “H” – Health Hazards 
Most of the threshold masses in the Table II is coherent with the current threshold 
masses table (Table I). However, we notice discordance for the category H3 (Specific 
target organ toxicity, category 1). Indeed, this category is associated to the hazard 
statement H370 (Causes damage to organs) equivalent to risk phrase R39 (Danger of 
very serious irreversible effects) according to annexe VII from CLP Regulation [6]. 
Actually, the risk phrase R39 corresponds to the category very toxic for which, the 
threshold masses are 1.000 kg for solids, 100 kg for liquids and 10 kg for gases. So, 
with the current proposal (Table II), Walloon authorities would be less severe with 
this category of substance because the threshold masses are ten times smaller  
3.2.2 Section “P” – Physical Hazards 
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First of all, for the explosives class there are two categories with different threshold 
masses. Note that classification method for explosives has changed considerably with 
the CLP Regulation so, it was complicated to make comparisons and changes will be 
important for this type of substance whatever are threshold masses chosen. Moreover, 
Walloon authorities make now the choice of two different threshold masses and are 
more severe for the first category (100 kg against 500 kg). This lower threshold mass 
for the first category is justified by the fact that quantities of explosives lower than 
500kg could have an important impact on vulnerable zones around Seveso sites.
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Table II: Proposal of new threshold mass Ma from Walloon authorities, February 2012. 
Categories Threshold mass Ma (kg) 
Seveso Non-Seveso Solid Liquid Gas 
Section H – Health hazards 
H1 Acute Toxic Cat.1  1.000 100 10 
H2 Acute toxic 
- Cat.2 
- Cat.3, dermal and inhalation 
 
 
- Cat.3, ingestion 
10.000 1.000 100 
H’ Acute Toxic - Cat.4, 100.000 10.000 1.000 
H3 Specific target organ toxicity, Single Exposure 
- STOT Cat.1 
 
 
10.000 1.000 100 
H’’ specific target organ toxicity, Single Exposure - STOT Cat.2 100.000 1.000 100 
Section P – physical hazards 
P1a Explosives 
- Unstable explosives or 
- Explosives, Division 1.1, 1.2, 1.3, 1.5, 1.6 
- Explosive according method A.14 
 100 100 - 
P1b Explosives, Division 1.4  500 500 - 
P2 Flammable gases, cat.1 or 2  - - 100 
P3a Flammable aerosols 
‘Extr. flammable’ or ‘flammable’ containing 
flammable gases cat.1 or 2 or flammable liq. cat.1 
 10.000 
P3a Flammable aerosols 
‘Extr. flammable’ or ‘flammable’ not containing 
flammable gases cat.1 or 2 or flammable liq. cat.1 
 100.000 
P4 Oxidizing Gases, Cat.1  - - 10.000 
P5a Flammable liquids 
- Cat. 1, or 
- Cat. 2 or 3 maintained at a temperature above their 
boiling point, or 
- With a flash point ≤ 60°C, maintained at a 
temperature above their boiling point 
 - 10.000 - 
P5b Flammable liquids 
- Cat. 2 or 3 where particular processing conditions, 
such as high pressure or high temperature, may 
create major-accident hazards, or 
- With a flash point ≤ 60°C where particular 
processing conditions, such as high pressure or high 
temperature, may create major-accident hazards 
 - 10.000 - 
P5c Flammable Liquids 
- Cat. 2 or 3 not covered by P5a and P5b 
 - 10.000 - 
P6a Self-reactive and organic peroxides,  type A or B  100 100 - 
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P6b Self-reactive and organic peroxides,  type C, D, 
E or F 
 500 500 - 
P7 Pyrophoric liquids and solids, Cat.1  1.000 1.000 - 
P8 Oxidizing liquids and solids, Cat.1,2 or 3  10.000 1.000 - 
Section E – environment hazards 
E1 Hazardous to the aquatic environment in cat. 
acute 1 or chronic 1 
 
1.000 x LC50 for  
fishes (ppm) 
E1 Hazardous to the aquatic environment in cat. 
chronic 2 
Cat. chronic 3 or 4 
10.000 x LC50 for  
fishes (ppm) 
Section O – other hazards 
O1 Substances or mixtures with hazard statement 
EUH014 
 10.000 10.000 10.000 
O2 Substances and mixtures which in contact with 
water emit flammable gases, Cat.1 
 10.000 10.000 10.000 
O3 Substances or mixtures with hazard statement 
EUH029 
 10.000 1.000 100 
 
We also note that the second category of explosives concerns only explosives from 
the division 1.4 which have the hazard statement H204 (Fire or projection hazard). 
But this classification was made taking into account the packaging of the substance. 
So, the CLP Regulation specifies explicitly that if an explosive from division 1.4 is 
unpacked or repacked, this substance is classed in the division 1.1 without new test. 
The threshold mass for flammable gases is ten times lower than the current one. This 
will lead to increase the number of equipment selected. Furthermore, with the current 
threshold masses there is no difference between vessels containing gas or liquefied 
gas for the same substance.  
As with the current version of selection of hazardous equipment, the new proposal 
fixes a same threshold quantity for all flammable liquids. However, we note that 
changes with the CLP Regulation are important for flammable liquids because, the 
flashpoint limit to be considered as flammable is now 60°C instead of 55°C.   
The categories flammable aerosols are new and the Walloon authorities had to define 
thresholds quantities. In fact, the difference between these two categories is function 
of the type of propellant (flammable gases, flammable liquids, etc.). On this basis, 
Walloon authorities could have proposed a thresholds value similar to the propellant 
threshold but the choice to be less severe was done. To justify this choice, Walloon 
authorities argue the fact that risks fearing towards aerosols are lower because 
quantities of propellant are low. For the second aerosols category, Walloon 
authorities did the choice of threshold ten times less severe because hazards are 
lower.  
By analogy with the current table of threshold masses (Table I), the threshold quantity 
for oxidizing gases was fixed at 10.000 kg. However, with the CLP Regulation, a 
substance will be now considered as oxidizing if the oxidising power is greater than 
23,5%  (instead 21% with dangerous substances/mixtures Directives). The threshold 
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quantity for oxidizing solids is the same as for gases (as with the current Vade-
Mecum) but it is fixed at 1.000 kg for liquids without obvious justification. 
The categories P6a and P6b self-reactive and organic peroxides are new categories 
introduced with the CLP Regulation. These categories regroup on the one hand self-
reactive substances formerly considered as explosives, flammables or not classed and 
on the other hand organic peroxides formerly considered as explosives or oxidizing. 
For these categories, Walloon authorities chose to fix same thresholds as for the two 
explosives categories. For the first one (P6a), this choice is logical because we find in 
this category all self-reactive and organic peroxides for which there is a risk of 
explosion. However, in the P6b category, risks of explosion are excluded so the 
threshold quantity (500 kg) seems to be very severe in comparison with thresholds 
quantities for flammable and oxidizing substances (10.000 kg). Moreover, we will 
find in this category, substances not formerly classed.  
For the new category pyrophoric liquids and solids in which we find solids and 
liquids formerly classed as highly flammable (10.000 kg), the threshold quantity was 
fixed to 1.000 kg. So, the number of selected equipment should be higher.   
3.2.3 Section “E” – Environment Hazards 
The both categories E1 and E2 correspond respectively to very toxic and toxic for 
environment categories in the current version of Vade-Mecum [8]. In this proposal, 
Walloon authorities decided to define particularized thresholds for each substance to 
better take into account hazards for fish even at low concentration (10-4 to 10-5 ppm). 
So, the threshold quantity for this type of substance should be based on lethal 
concentration for fish (LC50). The LC50 is defined as the concentration of a chemical 
in water that kills 50% of the test animals in a given time (usually ninety-six hours) 
for a single dose. To obtain the threshold we must multiply the LC50 by 1.000 for the 
E1 category and 10.000 for E2 category. However, we note that for substances which 
have a LC50 higher than 1 ppm for fish, there is a risk to be much less severe 
compared with the current version of the selection method of hazardous equipment 
(see Table I). 
3.2.4 Section “O” – Other Hazards 
Hazards covered by O1, O2 and O3 categories are the same as those covered by risk 
phrases R14, R15 and R29 in the other hazards categories of the current version of 
Vade-Mecum of Walloon Region. Formerly, the same threshold quantity (10.000 kg) 
was defined for these hazards. In the proposal, it is always the case for the O1 and O2 
categories. However for the O3 category (Substances and mixtures which in contact 
with water emit flammable gases, Cat.1), the threshold quantity should differ in 
function of the physical state of the substance.  
4. Impacts of the Application of the proposed Table 
In addition to the remarks made here above, it is necessary to analyse the impact of 
the new proposed thresholds described above. The aim of this approach is to verify 
that no comment about the threshold masses table was forgotten and to measure the 
potential impact of noted changes in this proposal. 
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As far as land use planning is concerned, four conditions are required for a change in 
the selection of hazardous equipment which has an impact on the quantitative risk 
assessment: 
1. There is a modification of the threshold mass for a substance in the new 
selection; 
2. This change leads to select an equipment no selected with the current method or 
conversely; 
3. An accident associated with this equipment must affect human beings beyond 
the fences of the site (otherwise, this event will not be modeled); 
4. This event must significantly contribute to the global risk (otherwise, the 
changes will be imperceptible). 
The potential impact of the current proposal of selection of hazardous equipment 
adapted to the CLP Regulation was tested on three Seveso sites in Wallonia. In this 
paper, the results for one of this site will be presented below. Moreover it should be 
remembered that the selection method can concerned other aspect than land use 
planning such as the safety report (Seveso II Directives) for example. 
The industrial site presented here is a lower tier Seveso site specialised in paper 
production.    
4.1 Substances 
Twelve different hazardous substances are concerned for this plant. For each 
substance, we searched risk phrases, hazard statements, categories associated and 
threshold masses for the two selection methods (Table I and Table II). 
Risk phrases are provided by the industrialist to authorities. Contrariwise, 
hazard statements are not yet provided so this information was obtained in 
priority from the table 3.2 of the CLP Regulation [6] (The list of harmonised 
classification and labelling of hazardous substances from Annex I to Directive 
67/548/EEC is listed in the separate Volume IIIb), by direct equivalence for 
substances not present in this table or other sources if necessary. 
The Table III lists all substances for which there is a change of the threshold mass in 
the new proposal. In this case, the impact of changes of threshold masses could be 
important because concerns 75% of hazardous substances on this Seveso plants. In 
some cases (Chlorine dioxide 1%, sodium bisulfate, light and heavy fuel), an 
application of the proposal (Table II) would lead to not select these substances. For 
others substances, thresholds quantities would be drastically lowered. 
 
Table III: Substances concerned by changes noted in threshold masses by implementation of the 
method of selection of hazardous equipment proposed for the lower tier Seveso site studied. 
Substance 
Old 
threshold 
mass 
New 
threshold 
mass 
Justification of the change of threshold mass 
Sodium chlorate 
(solid) 
10.000 kg 600 kg New threshold mass calculated in function LC50 for 
fishes (the lowest) 
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LPG (liquefied gas) 10.000 kg 100 kg Threshold lowering and suppression of differentiation 
in function physical state in use 
Propane (liquefied 
gas) 
10.000 kg 100 kg Threshold lowering and suppression of differentiation 
in function physical state in use 
Chlorine dioxide 1% 
(liquid) 
10.000 kg - Equivalent to the risk phrase R36 not taking into 
account  
Hydrogen peroxide 
50% (liquid) 
10.000 kg 1.000 kg Now, differentiation in function physical state for 
oxidizing 
Sodium bisulfate 
(solid) 
1.000 kg - Equivalent to the risk phrase R41 not taking into 
account 
Light fuel 1.000 kg - Equivalent to the risk phrase R45 not taking into 
account 
Heavy fuel 1.000 kg - Equivalent to the risk phrase R40 not taking into 
account 
Hydrogen sulfide 10 kg 2 kg New threshold mass calculated in function LC50 for 
fishes (the lowest) 
 
At this subject, an important remark must be made about propane and LPG, both 
liquefied gases. Indeed, in the current version of the Vade-Mecum [8], the risk phrase 
associated is R12 (Extremely flammable) and so the threshold is chosen in function of 
the physical state of the substance in the equipment (10.000 kg for liquid or 1.000 kg 
for gas). So, for equipment containing liquefied propane, the threshold quantity is 
10.000 kg. With the new classification and labelling Regulation, propane or LPG 
have the hazard statement H220 (Extremely flammable gas) and belong to the 
flammable gases category 1. So, these substances belong to the P2 category of the 
new selection table for which, Walloon authorities propose a threshold quantity only 
for gases (100 kg). Therefore, it is impossible to take into account the fact that these 
gases are liquefied. 
4.2 Selected Equipment 
As most of substances have their threshold masses considerably changed, it is logical 
that the selection of a high number of equipment is affected too. These changes are 
presented at the Table IV.   
Table IV: Impact of the proposal of the Walloon Region for the selection of hazardous equipment 
adapted to the CLP Regulation. 
Equipment Substance 
Threshold mass 
Ma (kg) Correction 
factor S 
Corrected mass 
Mb (kg) 
Real 
mass 
(kg) 
Selection? 
Now Proposal Now Proposal Now Proposal 
Propane 
tanks (1&2) 
Propane 1.000 100 3,7 2.692 100 1.500 No Yes 
MAGFUEL 
tank 
Light fuel 1.000 
- 1 
1.000 
- 13.050 
Yes No 
Light fuel 
tank 
Light fuel 1.000 
- 1 
1.000 
- 26.100 
Yes No 
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IE9110 tank Light fuel 1.000 - 1 
1.000 
- 6.960 
Yes No 
Light fuel 
tray 
Light fuel 1.000 
- 1 
1.000 
- 2.610 
Yes No 
Heavy fuel 
tanks (N&S) 
Heavy 
fuel 
1.000 
- 1 
1.000 
- 1.600 
Yes No 
Heavy fuel 
tank inter 
Heavy 
fuel 
1.000 
- 1 
1.000 
- 30.000 
Yes No 
Heavy fuel 
tray 
Heavy 
fuel 
1.000 
- 1 
1.000 
- 10.000 
Yes No 
Caustification Heavy 
fuel 
1.000 
- 1 
1.000 
- 5.000 
Yes No 
Spain 
Babcock 
Heavy 
fuel 
1.000 
- 1 
1.000 
- 35.000 
Yes No 
Chlorine 
dioxide stock 
north 
Chlorine 
dioxide 
1% 
10.000 - 1,1 9.120 - 300.000 
Yes No 
Chlorine 
dioxide stock 
south 
Chlorine 
dioxide 
1% 
10.000 - 1,1 9.120 - 65.000 
Yes No 
 
4.3 Land use planning  
During the previous land use planning study concerning this plant, fuels (light and 
heavy) were not considered because associated risks are low and do not generate 
effects beyond the fences of the site. Despite this, we can note a visible impact of the 
new proposal on curves obtained by comparing the Figure 1 representing the original 
curves of the global risk generated by the Seveso plant with the current method of 
selection of hazardous equipment and the Figure 2 representing the curves of global 
risk generated following the new proposal. 
Indeed, we note that the cyan curve (individual risk of 10-5/year) underwent a slight 
modification due to suppression of chlorine dioxide stock hazards. The red curve 
(individual risk of 10-6/year) greatly expanded in south due to the addition of propane 
tanks hazards. These two figures clearly show that risk curves used for land use 
planning could be modified by the application of the proposal of selection method 
adapted to CLP Regulation. In this case, modifications only concern the industrial 
zone (in purple) and so, the residential zone (in red and white) is not impacted by the 
curves modification having decisional interest for land use planning in Wallonia 
(individual risk higher than 10-6/year). However, it is likely that curves modification 
on other Seveso plants may have more impacts. 
5. Elaboration of a new Proposal 
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All the remarks presented here highlighted the necessity to modify the consideration 
of some hazards or the definition of some threshold masses in order to limit the 
inevitable impacts of the application of the new method of selection of hazardous 
equipment on risk curves already defined. However, these changes could not be 
totally avoided because for some hazards, threshold values or classification method 
are fundamentally changed. 
Following this work the Walloon authorities, in May 2012, respond at most of 
remarks and critics presented here above. An extract of the new threshold masses 
table giving all modifications done is presented at the Table V. 
 
Figure 1. Original curves of the global risk generated by the Seveso plant with the 
current method of selection of hazardous equipment 
 
 
 
Figure 2. Curves of global risk generated following the new proposal 
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Table V: Extract of the proposal of new threshold mass Ma from Walloon authorities, May 2012. 
Categories Threshold mass Ma (kg) 
Seveso Non-Seveso Solid Liquid Gas 
Section H – Health hazards 
H2 Acute toxic 
- Cat.2 
- Cat.3,  inhalation 
- Acute toxic Cat.3, dermal and 
ingestion  
- Germ cell mutagenicity, cat.1 
- Carcinogens, cat.1 and 2 
- Reproductive toxicity, cat.1 and 2 
10.000 1.000 100 
H’  
- Acute Toxic Cat.4 
- Serious eye damage/eye irritation, 
cat.1 
100.000 10.000 1.000 
H’’  
- Specific target organ toxicity, Single 
Exposure - STOT Cat.2 
- Serious eye damage/eye irritation, 
cat.2 
100.000 1.000 100 
Section P – physical hazards 
P2 Flammable gases, cat.1 and 2  - - 1.000 
P8 Oxidizing liquids and solids, 
Cat.1,2 or 3 
 10.000 10.000 - 
Section E – environment hazards 
E1 Hazardous to the aquatic 
environment in cat. acute 1 or 
chronic 1 
 
1.000 x LC50 for  
fishes (ppm) if LC50 < 1. 
Otherwise 1.000.  
E1 Hazardous to the aquatic 
environment in cat. chronic 2 
Cat. chronic 3 or 4 
10.000 x LC50 for  
fishes (ppm) if LC50 < 1. 
Otherwise 10.000. 
 
Although this new proposal takes into account most of the critics made on previous 
version of table of threshold masses adapted to the CLP Regulation, some remarks are 
still applicable because rejected by Walloon authorities. For example, the hazard 
statement EUH006 is still not taken into account. Likewise, the Walloon Region 
maintains his wish to be more or less severe for some categories of substances.  
6. Conclusion 
Without any doubt, to take the CLP Regulation into account, it is necessary to adapt 
the method of selection of hazardous equipment used by the Walloon Region for land 
use planning. However, this adaptation is not easy. 
This paper presents and criticizes a proposal of the Walloon authorities. Practically 
speaking, we were interested by two aspects, on the one hand the kind of hazards 
considered and on the other hand the threshold masses associated to each category. 
Moreover, to illustrate our analysis, we applied the proposal to some Seveso plant. 
By this work, it was demonstrated that an implementation of the first version of the 
new proposal for the selection of hazardous equipment could have a great impact for 
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industrialists. Indeed, it appeared that the number of hazardous substances concerned 
in a plant could be very important (75% in our example) leading to modifications of 
selected equipment. Moreover, in the case of lower tier Seveso site, risks curves used 
for land use planning could be also impacted by the application of the new threshold 
masses proposed by Walloon authorities. 
Thanks to remarks highlighted in this work, the Walloon Region authorities elaborate 
a new version of the method of selection of hazardous equipment. However, despite 
that most of the critics were considered, there are some remarks not taken into 
account by Walloon authorities. In most cases, these differences result from the will 
to be more or less severe for some categories of substances. 
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Abstract 
This paper offers some reflections regarding the application of regional and 
provincial laws concerning major industrial risks and urban and land use planning, 
and focuses on their application problems and capabilities with reference to some 
practical cases. The European Directive “Seveso 2” was implemented in Italy with 
two national laws, and in Piedmont they were   enforced with the “Guide Lines for 
the assessment of industrial risk in land use planning”. According to the Guide lines, 
the municipalities had to introduce into their urban and land use planning 
instruments new criteria for the areas around Seveso plants. The application of the 
Guide lines requires a multidisciplinary approach but Local authorities are often not 
sufficiently prepared for this kind of multilevel analysis, because they don’t have the 
human or economic resources or even the technical abilities necessary to conduct it. 
As a result, they can underestimate the importance of a correct urban and land 
planning in the areas around major risk installations...  
Application of the National and Regional Seveso normative 
The 334/1999 - Legislative Decree on the implementation of 96/82/EC for the control 
of major accident hazards involving dangerous substances, entered into force in 
October 1999. This decree, which represents the adoption of the Seveso 2 European 
Directive, establishes, for the very first time, the adoption of minimum safety 
requirements concerning land use planning for those areas in which there are major 
risk industrial installations. The adoption of the 09/05/2001 - Ministerial Decree on 
the minimum requirements for land-planning and urban-planning in areas in the 
vicinity of major risks installations, introduced important novelties: provinces and 
municipalities are now obliged to update their urban planning instruments (Piani di 
Coordinamento Provinciali and Piani Regolatori Comunali – Provincial 
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Coordination Plans and City Plans) to 334/1999 Legislative Decree, and to draw up a 
Technical Document which, in relation to the location of the Seveso installations, 
identifies and disciplines the areas that have to be subjected to specific regulations. In 
order to draw up the Technical Document, also known as RIR – Rischio di Incidente 
Rilevante (Major Risk Accident), it is necessary to conduct a detailed analysis of the 
territorial and environmental vulnerability of the land, dividing urban areas and 
buildings into vulnerability classes in relation to the land building index and to the 
number of people that are generally present, as foreseen by the 09/05/2001 - 
Ministerial Decree. 
According to what has been established in the 09/05/2001 - Ministerial Decree, the 
coordination between the regulations that derive from 334/1999 Legislative Decree 
and the urban and land use planning and environmental protection instruments is the 
duty of the regions, which in turn have to arrange the planning procedures between all 
the territorial organisations that are involved. In Piedmont was approved on 26 July 
2010 the 17/377 - Regional decree and Guide lines for the assessment of industrial 
risk in land use planning: Strategic Environmental Assessment and Technical Report 
on Large Industrial Risks.  
The 17/377 - Regional decree and Guide lines offers detailed information on the 
contents and ways of drawing up the RIR Technical Document, but the municipality 
administrations point out some difficulties about it, due to both a lack of financial and 
human resources and to an insufficient scientific and technological preparation 
relative to the required expertise. The drawing up of the document is in fact based on 
environmental and land analyses, but also on evaluations of a chemical engineering 
nature. 
Another problem related to the drawing up of the RIR Technical Document pertains 
to the particular physiognomy of the built up landscape in Italy: the entire national 
territory is in fact characterised by towns and urban agglomerates with high housing 
densities, which, in many cases, have grown without any control and without the use 
of Town Planning instruments. The situation is further complicated in hilly areas, or 
at the foot of mountains, where the land available for urban development is very 
limited and where a jumble of residential and industrial zones has been created, with 
consequent problems concerning the protection of the areas surrounding the industrial 
plants. 
In a similar context, the drawing up of the RIR Technical Document appears more 
and more necessary in order to guarantee the safety of the citizens and the 
safeguarding of the environment as well as of the historical-architectonic patrimony: 
with this document, the municipalities can obtain in depth and updated knowledge 
concerning the environmental and territorial receptors, but also about the elements of 
pressure that are present throughout the municipality territory, and they can then 
arrange planning measures for the areas surrounding the Seveso activities, in this way 
offering controlled and safe development and growth conditions to both industries 
and other urban functions. 
Drawing up of the RIR Technical Document (Regional Guidelines) 
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According to the Regional Guidelines, the RIR Technical Document should be drawn 
up by municipalities with a Seveso plant on their territory and by municipalities not 
housing a Seveso company, but interested by the damage of a possible accident 
occurring in a company that is hosted by a nearby municipality. The drawing up of 
RIR has three different phases: 1) Data collection of the production activities, and of 
the territorial and environmental receptors; 2) Evaluation of the territorial and 
environmental compatibility; 3) Planning. 
Data collection 
The first stage of the RIR Technical Document foresees an extensive data collection 
throughout the entire municipality territory, and it involves very different types of 
investigations: this ranges from information of a naturalistic type to other of an urban-
architectonic type, and even of a purely engineering type. A constant interaction 
between the various municipality offices is however necessary (above all between the 
Technical Office and the Environmental Office), and a great capacity to summarise 
and document the collected data is essential.  
The Guidelines established that all the non-craftsman type productions throughout the 
municipality territory should be identified and characterised. Safety Reports and 
Notifications can be used for the characterisation of Seveso activities, while it is 
necessary to prepare a questionnaire for all the other activities in order to understand 
which hazardous substances are detained, the storage methodology, the presence of 
high pressure/high temperature processes or ionizing radiation, the prevention and 
protection measures adopted, but also the transport modalities of the hazardous 
goods. The collection of the data relative to non Seveso activities can create some 
problems as the companies are under no obligation to denounce the substances they 
use in their manufacturing processes.  
The data collection stage is also conducted in relation to the territorial and 
environmental receptors; as far as the former are concerned, all the areas, buildings 
and infrastructures that are characterised by a significant presence of people, and 
which in some way constitute sensitive objectives in the case of accidental events, are 
considered vulnerable territorial elements. According to the 09/05/2001 – Ministerial 
Decree and to the 17-377 Regional decree and Guide lines, vulnerable elements 
should be divided into 6 categories (from A to F, ref. Table 1) on the basis of the 
number of people that are present, the attendance frequency and the mobility capacity 
of the people.  
As far as environmental vulnerable elements are concerned, both the 09/05/2001 – 
Ministerial Decree and the 17-377 Regional decree and Guide lines define a series of 
factors that should be considered, including protected natural areas, areas suffering 
from hydrogeological instability, historical-environmental-landscape areas of high 
value, zones with high vulnerability aquifers, etc. All the environmental receptors 
identified as vulnerable throughout the municipality territory should be grouped, on 
the basis of the Guidelines, into two categories: very high environmental vulnerability 
elements and relevant environmental vulnerability elements. 
The territorial and environmental compatibility evaluation 
A territorial and environmental compatibility analysis requires that the data from the 
industries are crossed with those relative to the territorial and environmental shape, 
and the interaction between industrial activities and urban functions, the road 
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conditions and the environmental characteristics of the examined area are evaluated 
case by case. Very different disciplines and professional expertise come into play at 
this stage:  a good capacity to analyse and read the territory and the ecosystems is 
necessary, together with the capability of interpreting the mapping of the 
consequences of accidental events, and the potential hazards connected to the 
substances stored in the industrial activities. 
As far as territorial compatibility is concerned, the 17-377 Regional decree and Guide 
lines offer a detailed definition of each step of the evaluation process: the damage 
areas for Seveso activities defined in the Safety Reports or in notifications should be 
superimposed onto the territorial area category identified during the previous data 
collection stage. The regulations define the compatibility cases on the basis of the 
category of the effects of the accidental event - Elevated Lethality, Start of Lethality, 
Irreversible Damage and Reversible Damage – and of the probability of occurrence.  
For example, for an “unlikely event (10-4> p ≥10-6), in the “Reversible Damage” 
zone, the BCDE and F categories  are considered compatible;  for a  “probable” event 
in the “Reversible Damage” zone, only  structures classified as DE or F can be 
present (see Figure 1). 
 
Figure 1: Example of the compatibility of the effects of an accidental event with the 
territorial categories  
As far as non-Seveso activities are concerned, a territorial criticality assessment is 
performed and circular areas are plotted that indicate the potential damage connected 
to the type of substance that is stored. A ranking of “very critical/critical/not critical” 
is assigned to each activity, on the basis of the area and/or point vulnerable territorial 
elements that are inside the plotted areas. For example, if the company stores toxic 
substances, and territorial elements that have been classified as “A” fall into the 
potential damage circles, the company will be evaluated as “Very critical”; however, 
this criticality evaluation can be decreased on the basis of the prevention and 
protection measures the company adopts. 
The approach is more complicated as far as environmental compatibility is 
concerned: the Guidelines only offer some examples of incompatibility and specify 
that the adoption of prevention and protection measures by the company can reduce 
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the danger for environmental receptors. Since the actual criticality of an industrial 
activity depends on a series of variables – the type of substance stored, the foreseen 
accidental events (energetic-toxic with environmental effects), and the vulnerable 
environmental elements that are present – the Guidelines ask for a case by case 
environmental compatibility evaluation. It is obvious that the reliability of the 
analyses depends on both the accuracy of the previously collected environmental 
information and on the capacity of interaction of the different expertise at play: in 
order to evaluate the effects of an industry on the territory, it is necessary to 
understand how the specific accidental event acts over a vast range of possible 
environmental conditions (for example, the spilling of certain substances can cause a 
certain effect on cultivation A, but not on cultivation B).  
Planning 
The planning stage impose the restraints pertaining to the areas surrounding the 
activities and can request the adoption of specific prevention and protection measures 
for individual companies in order to mitigate the hazardous territorial and/or 
environmental situation. In this case, a further effort is requested of those who draw 
up the RIR Technical Document, in that they have to set up the rules that will then be 
transferred and harmonised inside the Technical Actuation Rules of the Municipality 
Regulation Plans, and this inevitably leads to a series of difficulties connected to the 
previous planning previsions for the areas surrounding the companies, and to 
limitations of the building possibilities that are often necessary to introduce. 
The planning stage starts with the definition of two concentric areas of respect, named 
“Exclusion area” and “Observation area” for the Seveso activities and for the other 
activities, whenever judged “critical” or “very critical”. The two areas are drawn up 
starting from the border of the plant and have sizes that depend on the level of 
criticality that has been assigned. The exclusion area can be of 100, 200 or 300 m, 
depending on the case, while the observation area must extend to at least 500 m from 
the plant boundary. The adoption of management measures relative to the control of 
the traffic conditions, in the case of an accident, should above all be foreseen inside 
the observation area, while more restrictive measures, including the prohibition of 
carrying out modifications that involve an increase in the anthropic load, and the 
prohibition of introducing new urban functions that fall into categories A and B, must 
be introduced inside the exclusion area. However, a careful evaluation of the 
measures that should be adapted to safeguard the environment and the already 
existing buildings in order to protect these buildings and activities is necessary case 
by case.  
Drawing up of the RIR Technical Document (Provincia di Torino 
Guidelines) 
The Provincia di Torino is the only province that has so far elaborated a Variation of 
the Territorial Coordination Plan in order to update it to the prescriptions of the 
09/05/2001 – Ministerial Decree. The so-called “Seveso Version” of the Plan was 
approved by the Regione Piemonte only on 12 October 2010. 
The indications of the Seveso Version to the Provincial Coordination Plan are 
analogous to those of the 17-377 Regional decree and Guide lines (see paragraph 2); 
however, the Province introduced further obligations for plant managers, which are 
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not considered in the Regional Regulations. The managers in fact have to draw up a 
Territorial and Environmental Compatibility Report for new installations of Seveso 
factories, or for changes to already existing Seveso factories that could involve an 
increases in the risk of accidental events. These reports should be sent to the 
municipality offices, which will then decide on the request on the basis of the actual 
compatibility of the intervention. As far as territorial compatibility is concerned, the 
factory manager should make a classification, according to the categories outlined in 
the 09/05/2001 – Ministerial Decree, of all the areas that fall into the observation area 
of the activities (500 m); the Municipality will then verify whether either categories A 
or B fall into the exclusion area, and will determine whether the new installation or 
modification is feasible or not. 
Case study 
This examined case study refers to the drawing up of the RIR Technical Document 
for the Municipality of Omegna in the Province of Verbano Cusio Ossola; this 
experience proved to be particularly interesting, both because it was one of the first 
application cases  of the application of the new Regional Guidelines in Piedmont, and 
because the analysis zone presented some particular features which certainly made 
the drawing up of the RIR Technical Document more complex - but also more 
interesting. 
The town of Omegna looks onto the northern edge of the Orta lake, and is a typical 
area at the foot of the mountains, characterised by the first signs of the foothills of the 
mountain relief of the Ossola and Strona Valleys; urban growth has always been 
concentrated in the areas at the end of the valleys, between Lake Orta and Lake 
Maggiore, and over the years a connection has formed between the bordering 
municipalities of Casale Corte Cerro and Gravellona Toce. During the twentieth 
century, many municipalities in the zone, including Omegna, underwent a rapid 
development in production activities, above all connected to the taps and fittings 
sector, and the industries developed inside town centres without any regulation, with 
a consequent series of inconveniences connected above all to the problem of 
pollution. In spite of the transformations that these territories have undergone over the 
last century, the zone still has a very elevated landscape value, due to the presence of 
the lakes. In recent years, the beauty of the landscape and architecture in the zone has 
encouraged touristic fruition.  
As far as Omegna is concerned, the duty of drawing up the RIR Technical Document 
fell to the Municipality, as there are two Seveso activities on its lands: the first is a 
galvanic slime depurator, while the second is a galvanic activity. According to what 
has been established in the 31-286 - Regional Decree of 5 July 2010, the 
Administration could not approve variations that would lead to modifications in the 
areas at risk to Seveso activities (areas of direct impact from an accident originating 
from production activities), until the RIR Technical Document had been approved. 
Since the Omegna industries are often located within residential or commercial areas, 
or are surrounded by disused areas whose reconversion is foreseen, the Municipality 
had an urgent need to understand where the areas of risk were in order to be able to 
go ahead with the normal planning activities.  
The drawing up of the RIR Technical Document started with the data collection 
phase, which required a great deal of time to find and subsequently organise the data; 
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the research activities were conducted both by consultants and by the Municipality 
offices, and these activities require a continuous feedback and monitoring of the 
information. As far as the production activities were concerned, the consultants 
identified the Seveso and sub-threshold Seveso activities on the basis of the regional 
databanks  (named SIAR), while the other potentially hazardous activities were 
identified on the basis of the ATECO  codes recorded in the Chamber of Commerce 
lists; they were arranged according to their sub-threshold and the other activities in 
the questionnaire, which was sent out and also collected by the Municipality. The 
Municipality offices also dealt with collecting the data relative to the presence and 
frequency of shopping centres, churches, hospitals, schools and nursery schools, 
while the data relative to the environmental matrices were deduced by the consultants 
on the basis of regional and provincial cartography.  
Once this phase was finished, the companies and environmental vulnerability 
elements were characterised and after this, a verification of environmental and 
territorial compatibility was conducted. This latter activity pointed out possible 
critical situations for 7 companies in the Omegna territory. The exclusion and 
observation areas were identified for these companies, on the basis of the degree of 
criticality that had been assigned, and the consequent planning actions were agreed 
upon: since many of these activities are located in the vicinity of the edge of the 
Strona Torrent, in areas of very high environmental vulnerability, the exclusion areas 
were 200 m. The companies located close to the stream are reported in the Figure 2, 
with the relative exclusion and observation areas.  
 
Figure 2: The exclusion and observation areas of the Omegna industries 
Some difficulties were encountered by the Administration and the technicians, during 
the execution of the various phases concerning the comprehension of the necessity of 
an analysis extended to the entire Municipality, rather than just around the Seveso 
activities. As foreseen in the Regional Guidelines,  the territorial and environmental 
vulnerability categories should in fact be defined for the entire territory of the 
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municipality,  and not only the effects of the Seveso activities were evaluated, but 
also those of the other production activities:  this led to a multiplication of the areas 
subjected to constraints (the exclusion areas), which in fact limited the potential 
building in many areas of the Municipality. However, investigations extended to the 
entire territory of a municipality allows the administration offices to have detailed and 
complete knowledge of the environmental and territorial receptors present throughout 
the entire territory that can easily be updated. This knowledge is useful to establish 
criteria for new installations and modifications of Seveso activities for production 
areas or harmful activities in general. Furthermore, the inclusion and analysis of non 
Seveso activities allows the municipalities to collect more detailed information on 
industries which, although often storing large quantities of hazardous substances, are 
not subject to any controls as they do not fall into the categories mentioned in the 
334/1999 Legislative Decree.  
Another problem was encountered during the translation phase of the contents of the 
RIR Technical Document into the urban regulations: the Regional laws in fact impose 
that the RIR Technical Document should be contained in a structural version, which 
should be subjected to approval by the Region, but the insertion of the specific 
technical dispositions regarding the Seveso activities and the constraints concerning 
the exclusion areas in the regulations of the Regulation Plan is not so easy. The 
Guidelines generically prescribe that anything that falls into categories A and B 
should not be constructed in the exclusion areas, and that no interventions that would 
involve increases in the anthropic load should be activated: however, the Technical 
Offices of the municipality have to define precise urbanistic parameters with which to 
outline the building possibilities and the distinction of use in the exclusion areas, and 
this can in fact be a contradiction of the very same previsions of the PRG in force or 
even of the National and regional laws. However, this translation phase of the 
dispositions of the RIR Technical Document of the plan regulations was followed 
very closely by the Region and by the Province during the planning activities: the 
informal meetings, but above all the planning conferences in which the proposing 
Municipality participated together with the two organisations, helped to clearly define 
the modalities of drawing up the final RIR Technical Document and the structural 
variations. 
 
Conclusions 
On the basis of the work experience that have been undertaken, it is possible to state 
that the RIR Technical Document is a fundamental instrument for the planning of the 
territory and to obtain knowledge of the territory itself, but also that the levels of 
close examination and specificity requested in the investigations are often not part of 
the expertise of the municipality offices, and this makes drawing up the document 
very difficult for the municipality offices themselves. The same problem has been 
encountered in the drawing up of the Compatibility reports, a duty which falls to the 
managers of the factories and which are foreseen in the Guidelines of the Seveso  
Variation to the Territorial Coordination Plane of the Province of Turin. It should be 
pointed out that it would surely be of help for the Piedmont municipalities if all the 
provinces were to update their Territorial Coordination Plans to the 09/05/2001 – 
Ministerial Decree and to the 17-377 Regional decree and Guide lines; this 
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superordinated urban instrument has a vast and strategic baggage of information at its 
disposal which, at a municipality level, would not be possible, and it constitutes an 
important point of reference for the drawing up of all the RIR Technical Documents 
of a certain Province. 
Moreover, although it is important to safeguard the health of citizens and the 
environment, it is also in the interest of the local communities and of the region that 
these productions should continue. The regions, provinces and municipalities should 
therefore demonstrate a sufficient level of sensitivity and be able to mediate between 
the requirements of the production activities and those of the environment, which, at 
the same time, are the conditions that are necessary  for sustainable development: the 
planning phase of the RIR Technical Document is also certainly the most suitable 
occasion to sustain the requests of the productive world, in this way drawing up 
regulation elaborations that are as fair as possible for everybody concerned.   
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Incidents learned-Lessons Sharing in French Oil Industry 
Jean des DESERTS 
UFIP Industrial risk/safety coordinator 
4 avenue Hoche  
75008 Paris, France 
Abstract 
           The aim of this presentation is to describe the various ways used by current oil 
industry operated in France to share incidents lessons learned. There are several 
ways, developing more diversified approaches as long as the major oil companies are 
splitting (sales or shutdown) all or part of their activities in numerous smaller 
companies. These new smaller actors are not necessarily sized to handle this 
‘”Experience Return” (REX in French, standing for Retour d’Expérience). Therefore, 
they contract REX, explicitly or implicitly, to inter professional bodies such as:  
GESIP founded in 1953; BARPI, a French government body in charge of populating 
an incident database called ARIA; UFIP gathering several events related to REX, in 
close relation with UIC; other bodies (such as AFIAP, ImdR) participate also 
partially  to this activity. 
1. Introduction 
1.1. Why do we need REX ?  
 Basically, REX efforts are motivated to avoid reoccurrence of a given past incident 
(in a given unit). It is easily enlarged to other similar or quasi-similar units or 
processes. In these cases, management must ask himself the question: does this 
incident could have been occurred in my unit? REX is requested by EU Seveso 
directives. It is also a great help for risk assessments and scenario exercises, which 
are also requested by EU Seveso directives through the Safety Management System 
(SMS). It should be noted that non Seveso sites can also find great profits in these 
activities. In some cases, unknown phenomena can be discovered through exhaustive 
root causes analyses, which will be an other reason to share largely this type of 
discovery.        
Lastly, while the REX approach looks relevant for major incidents, it should be 
pinpointed that it has also credits for “weak signals”, from which management should 
select what is frequently called “high potential near miss”.  
1.2. How do we do REX ?   
There are various ways to present an incident analysis (fish bones, root cause, fault 
tree, Taproot or equivalent model, etc.). All of them request however to firstly 
establish a non ambiguous factual chronology of the events, whatever committed or 
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involved interests are. Legal potential consequences should not jeopardize this 
process.  
The following sections describe some of REX sharing ways currently existing and 
used in France.   
 
2. Main vectors dealing with REX 
Some large international oil companies may have developed internally their own 
incident databases. However, they can hardly be shared with other companies for 
proprietary and computer hardware reasons. In addition, even the biggest company is 
… too small to cope with all the type of risks, even within its core activity. This is 
why several shared tools have been implemented within various NOIA’s.    
GESIP           
GESIP association was founded in 1953. It holds a quarterly meeting focused on 
incidents or accidents shared by its various members. Presentations are available on 
the internet GESIP’s site freely for association members (ca 60 oil, gas, chemicals 
companies or bodies). It has handled in the past a database called Victor with several 
thousand reported incidents, which can still be consulted even if it is no more 
populated.  GESIP publishes various technical reports on safety issues. For instance, a 
report was dedicated to the ZIP effect on storage tanks review over the last 70 years. 
BARPI           
The BARPI is a French government body in charge of populating an incident 
database called ARIA. It has gathered more than 40 000 incidents, national and 
international, the most important of them being deeply investigated and analyzed, 
including root causes when available (sometimes several years after the incident). 
Every year, BARPI publishes an inventory of technological accidents for Seveso 
sites, dams, road & rail transportation, gas and rocks activities. For 2012, BARPI 
director emphasized on “enrich and add value to the experience return” with some 
statistics and root causes analysises.  
BARPI periodically issues monographies on a specific thematic. Last one was related 
to the failure of safety captors/instruments as a root cause of incident.                                            
A symposium is held periodically called IMPEL at the European level. A CD is then 
issued with many incidents reports on a given topic (e g quick opening of storage 
tank). 
UFIP             
UFIP is responsible for gathering significant materials/metallurgical incidents 
reported by refineries inspection sections. Commonly with Chemical equivalent body, 
the database is now rich of more than 115 leaflets. Every single year, UFIP organizes 
a two days meeting in order to sharing significant incidents and lessons learned: the 
26th edition occurred in Dunkirk on last June 27/28,  2012 with French administration 
partial participation. Two booklets of ca 200 pages have been distributed to the 55 
participants. One of the most interesting item was related to an incident which 
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occurred in Anacortes (Tesoro US refinery) where 7 people were killed, nearby an 
exchanger which suddenly exploded. Following this tragedy, the referenced Nelson’s 
curves, used for more than half a century, on hydrogen attack on carbon steel have 
been reviewed to increase the safety margin on operating pressure/temperature.        
During their quarterly meeting, national inspectors meeting reviewed also the best 
strategy to adopt with the administration.  
New technical documents are then issued and officially recognized by the 
administration (ex: how to control valves quality, following a major quality incident 
on Chinese imported defective valves in dangerous process in 2009).                                                                                                                             
Every year, UFIP holds two safety meetings for national unions representatives. One 
of it is related to incidents sharing (last March 2012, two incidents were analysed: 
difficulties in firefighting in Singapore refinery in September 2011; furnace explosion 
in Donges French refinery and associated action plan).                                                                                                     
Every quarter, the French SHE coordinators meeting organized by UFIP reviews 
significant incidents and requested action plan in the national level if any.  
IFPEN  
IFPEN hosts the inspection incident database mentioned here above. 
Pipelines specific case          
Following a major spill on August 7, 2009 in a crude pipe in south of France (5000 
tons released above the ground), a research program has been funded to assess and  
determine rigorously the root causes of such a failure (overall costs evaluated to more 
than 50 M€). All potential mechanisms have been in depth understood and presented 
in a new yearly meeting to the French administration and to all the pipeline operators 
in France. In addition, a new exhaustive incident database has been demanded by 
administration, covering the 5000 kms of oils/chemicals pipes, and the 50 000 kms of 
gas transportation pipes. It is now fully operational within GESIP supervision. More 
detailed than the EEGIP European consolidated database, it is therefore 
complementary to it. French regulations  have been reinforced to control and monitor 
such pipes submitted to “pressure swing cycle” due to process requests. As far as 
France is concerned, they must be inspected every 6 years (vs 10 years previously). 
An other significant incident occurred in a gasoline pipe on May the 1st, 2010 within 
an underground storage area. Deep analyses led to a plan of changing several old 
pipes for a current cost in the range of 10 to 20 M€. 
AFIAP                             
AFIAP is a professional body which edits two reference books called CODRES level 
1 (for construction of new tanks) and level 2 (for operation and maintenance of 
tanks) and also a guide for Acoustic Emission. Depending upon structured 
experience feedback, those three guides are regularly updated to take into account the 
real experiences of various operators, engineering and contractors companies, both 
positive and negative. Meetings are regularly held to manage efficiently the required 
changes in a timely manner, and in close relation with normative body. 
IMdR    
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Last May 31st, 2012, IMdR organized a full day on “Interests and values of technical 
experience feedback”. Cross functional approach was used, with people from nuclear, 
chemical, transportation, automobile, aeronautic and space industries.  Periodic 
meetings (several per quarter) are organized on this multiple industries approach 
relative to risk management for both safety and security concerns.   
3 Conclusion 
Input for Hazard study  
To perform the “hazard study” requested by the French administration, number of 
failures probability figures are needed. Even if some specific specialized international 
data bases already exist, any change from them can be argued and accepted base on 
the use of French REX data bases.  
These hazards studies are a key entry point for complying with the French legislation 
called PPRT (*) around large Seveso sites. This is why it is important to get figure as 
reliable as possible regarding the various failures probability.    
 (*) PPRT have been created after the AZF catastrophic explosion in Toulouse on 
September 21st, 2001. It is a plan defining zones around Seveso sites where it is 
forbidden to build/live and/ or where reinforcement of existing buildings is 
mandatory. It is anticipated to cost to all the implied parties up to around 3 B€.  
Example for distribution/retail activities  
An example can be given on the probability of being fired while feeding a car with 
gasoline with a mobile phone in service. It has been reported by US Federal 
government that approximately 200 cases of persons have been lighted while filling 
their cars with petrol over 10 years (1991-2000) for 17 billions of filling cars acts. 
Induced probability is then computed to be around 10 ** - 9 per year. Adaptation of 
this figure to the French case requests to recognize that gasoline sales are roughly 5 
times less than diesel which cannot be ignited easily, due the higher flash point (55 to 
60 °C vs - 45 °C). Moreover, the possibility to block open the oil gun into the 
vehicule tank is prohibited in France, while commonly used in the US. This 
drastically reduced the similar risk in France. These two factors allowed us to 
estimate this risk 10 times below the US one, to 10**-10. In addition, the 200 US 
reported events covered all sort of incidents (portable tanks filling, smoking, etc..). 
The mobile phone as a root cause is probably 10 times or more below this value. This 
is why no big research program is justified regarding the mitigation of this risk. A 
simple “warning leaflet” posted on gasoil dispensers is largely enough… essentially 
to cover the residual legal risk. A US federal program tried unsuccessfully to ignite 
gasoline vapor by a mobile phone in a normalized test. It has been then induced that 
the very few events, if any, of gasoline ignition with mobile is likely related to 
malfunctioning mobile (such as opened battery).          
Various ways, not a single answer 
In term of industrial risk regulation, debates occurred regularly between the so called 
“determinist” and / or “probabilistic” approaches, and also between “lumpsum” and 
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“integral full computing” approaches. To help to discriminate the best, or most likely 
the less worst, answers, usage of incidents database appears to be powerful tools, 
complementary of basic cost/benefits approaches.   
A virtuous cycle to progress                   
A traditional approach of safety improvement shows interrelations between 
equipment integrity, safety management system and behavior based system, in 
addition to the strict compliance to law and regulations. Thorough and in depth root 
causes analysis is a key entry to improve these three basic components.  Specifically, 
the regulator should periodically review its own technical regulated demands in view 
of their effectiveness in practical life. This question should be addressed both at the 
local and/or national levels depending upon the issues. In some cases, it will need 
reinforcement (for instance, tragic examples in France where safety valve in LPG 
tanks on passenger vehicles was in the first place prohibited); in other cases, it could 
lead to simplification. Some “intrinsically safe” technical solution should be favored 
as often as possible (ie very resilient to most technical or human failures).   A future 
development may lead to identify some “safe technology”, subject to legal impact 
assessment of its implementation. This approach could be enlarged to many various 
economical sectors, and even in the private life, such as domestic, transportation - 
including commuting -, leisure activities.     
This type of cycle should be organized in reference to the PDCA (Plan, Do, Check, 
Act) wheel: for instance, new regulations should be checked and appraised in regards 
to their pertinency/ability to have avoided old accidents “if they were implemented” 
at the time of the incident (“what if “ past approach). 
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Abstract 
 
The reduction of flood risk is a crucial and complex issue. In order to reduce flood 
risk an integrative land use planning (LUP) on a catchment level, the relevant 
hydrological scope, is of high importance. By LUP measures for mitigation of risk but 
also for adaptation to flood risk can be identified and specified. Within the EU 
project SAWA a method was developed to identify target areas of high relevance and 
for pooling measures in order to realise an efficient planning and also realisation of 
measures.  
By the development of an integrative river basin management plan in a participatory 
approach with regional stakeholders allocated information were produced which 
could be easily integrated in already existing planning instruments such as land use 
plan, landscape plan or water management plans.  
 
Keywords: flood risk, integrative river basin management planning, target area 
analysis, cascading GIS analysis 
1 Introduction  
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The number of natural hazards, especially meteorological and also hydrological 
events, has increased significantly since 1980 (MunichRe 2012). The number of flood 
disasters has increased significantly, from 524 to 1,729 over the same period (CRED 
2011). 
Thus, the reduction of flood risk is essential but also a complex issue. An important 
feature of flood risk management is to integrate ecological, economic and social 
aspects on prevention and mitigation measures. The realization that absolute flood 
protection is never attainable, and that structural flood protection measures, such as 
dams, dikes and levees cannot be the only solution to flood management – has moved 
the general thinking in flood management from flood protection towards flood risk 
7 management (FRM). Therefore the European Directive on the assessment and 
management of floods, which came into force in 2007, is not focusing only on 
protection but also on prevention and mitigation.  
The Flood Directive (Art. 7) requires taking into account inter alia soil and water 
management, spatial planning, land use, and nature conservation. Against this 
background it is crucial to integrate land use planning into the FRM system.  
Land use plans can designate areas to keep them free of urban development, it can 
support adaptive development (architecture or type of use) or it can mitigate the 
dimension of the hazard by land uses which retain water in the catchment.   
Different types of land use such as wetlands, agriculture, urban development, 
forestry, or water management are especially relevant for flood issues.  
However, aspects of water and flood management are often either badly or too late 
included into the land use planning process. Furthermore, there is the challenge to 
implement the measures which were identified and described. Another problem is that 
flood and planning issues are not regarded and handled on the level of river basins but 
on administrative areas.  
Within a case study in Germany (river basin of the river Ilmenau which is a tribiutary 
to river Elbe) we developed an integrative river basin management plan as an 
interactive and participatory planning process. By cascading GIS-Analyses target 
areas for synergetic and most efficient measures were identified and displayed in an 
Atlas with referenced pdf-maps. A regional stakeholders group was working out a 
matrix of measures, each from her or his perspective in order to reduce flood risk. 
The integrative river basin plan can be integrated into other planning instruments such 
as master plans or landscape plans.  
An integration of FRM and land use planning based on a participatory process could 
support key elements of sustainable development.   
 
2  The European Flood Risk Management Directive - a short 
description  
 
                                                        
7 Risk is understood here as the product of the probability and intensity of a hazard and the potential 
damages.  
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Within the European Union Directives are central legal instruments to influence and 
steer environmental and land use policies and planning.   
In 2007 the Directive on the assessment and management of floods came into force. 
Its aim is: 
… to establish a framework for the assessment and management of flood 
risks, aiming at the reduction of the adverse consequences for human 
health, the environment, cultural heritage and economic activity 
associated with floods in the Community’ (EC 2007, Article 2).  
Under the directive, member states should first carry out a preliminary assessment to 
classify and identify the river basins and associated coastal areas at risk of flooding 
(Article 4). For such zones they would then need to produce flood maps and 
indicative flood damage maps (Article 7).  
The second stage is the development of flood hazard maps and flood risk maps for 
areas with potentially significant flood risks. These maps have to indicate flood 
extent, water depths and, where appropriate, flow velocities or the relevant water 
flows in the following three scenarios: 
(a) floods with a low probability, or extreme event scenarios; (b) floods with a 
medium probability (likely return period 100 years); and (c) floods with a high 
probability, where appropriate. 
The flood risk maps have to show the potential adverse consequences in these three 
scenarios. The deadline for the flood hazard and flood risk maps is 22 December 
2013. 
Even more interesting from an integration and land use planning point of view is the 
need for flood risk management plans (FRMP) (Article 9) by 22 December 2015 as an 
important instrument for integrative flood risk (and river basin) management. Article 
9, paragraph 1 of the Directive requires that a flood risk management plan at the level 
of river basin district or sub-river basin is developed which should address all phases 
of the flood management cycle and focus on prevention, protection and preparedness.  
The FRMP have to contain “appropriate objectives” for the management of flood 
risks, focusing on the reduction of potential adverse consequences of flooding for 
human health, the environment, cultural heritage and economic activity, and, if 
considered appropriate, on non-structural (such as information, prediction etc.) 
initiatives and/or on the reduction of the likelihood of flooding (art. 7.2). The plans 
also have to include measures for meeting the goals. Furthermore, they have to take 
relevant aspects into account, such as costs and benefits, areas with a potential for 
retaining flood water, such as natural floodplains, the environmental objectives of the 
Water Framework Directive (2000/60/EC), soil and water management, spatial 
planning, land use, nature conservation, navigation and port infrastructure. The plans 
“may also include the promotion of sustainable land use practices, improvement of 
water retention as well as the controlled flooding of certain areas in the case of a 
flood event” (art. 7.3).  
 
The central characteristics of this directive can be described as follows:  
- a transboundary approach  
- flood management on a river basin scale  
- integration of aspects in the catchment related to flood risk and an assessment of 
the risk with regard to the potentials of reduction 
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- coordination with the Water Framework Directive.       
 
3 Case study:  Integrative River Basin Management Planning  
In order to identify land use planning aspects and allocated measures a case study on 
a specific catchment was carried out. With the example of the river Ilmenau 
catchment in Northern Germany a methodology for identifying target areas within an 
integrative river basin management planning approach was worked out where 
synergetic effects are identified and certain focus areas for certain measures are 
analyzed. This study was carried out within the European project Strategic Alliance 
of Water Management Actions (SAWA) (www.sawa-project.eu).  
By an integrative river basin management approach a tool, the integrative river basin 
management plan (IRBMP), was developed for improving the coordination and 
implementation processes in river basin and land use planning with the aim to 
promote flood mitigation resp. flood-neutral spatial development (Evers & Rubach 
2010).  
The IRBMP contains a series of maps which are compiled in a river basin atlas. The 
maps contain following data and information: 
 Distributed data and information of the various sectoral planning (e.g. from water 
management, conservation, spatial planning and  agriculture) are collected, 
visualized and made available to the professional public 
 Synergy and conflict potentials between the spatially-relevant planning are  
presented  
 The pooling of resources through prioritization of measures is supported. 
The information was developed by the following procedure: 
 (1) Providing the basis for trans-sectoral catchment-based coordination and planning:  
 GIS-based spatial analysis for identification of relevant flood areas to control 
measures for a preventive flood risk management  
 development of an catchment-based Atlas in pdf-format with geo-referenced 
maps and background information on data and applied methodologies 
 Preparation of data and the current action plan in line with international 
standards   (Open Geospatial Consortium (OGC)) to enable data exchange and 
compatibility  
(2) Recommendations and prioritization of measures in the catchment area of the 
Ilmenau, together with key stakeholders (representatives of technical authorities on 
different fields and levels): 
 Identification of fields of action and measures based on the spatial analysis 
and the package of measures for a precautionary flood risk management 
 Develop an Integrative River Basin Management Plan (IRBMP) 
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For identification of action priorities and options we have undertaken following 
working steps (see fig. 1).   
 
The process for identifying main target areas within a catchment starts on the general, 
non-spatial specific level by doing a synopsis of relevant guideline, directives and 
other legally binding frameworks. Against this background more specific goals and 
quality standards have to be categorized such as protected areas or water quality 
standards to be met.  
Furthermore, a regional assessment of the area-specific quality standards and a status 
quo analysis is conducted in order to identify the regional deficits. This analysis is 
based on monitoring data, geo data, documents, expert interviews etc.  
Based on this assessment the range for cascading analyses can be made out in order to 
run a series of related analyses like (1) identification of river stretches with high flood 
risk, (2) discover hydromorphological structure with a bad status and (3) indicated 
areas for restoration of floodplains as compensation measures or due to a habitat 
management plan. By doing so priority areas can be determined and mapped 
precisely on the local level.    
Catalogue of flood reduction measures and their implications with other 
planning fields  
Together with regional stakeholders from Land use planning, water management, 
agriculture, nature conservation and forestry a catalogue of measures was developed. 
The catalogue is a compilation of adaptive measures and instruments which can be 
applied to reduce flood risk. It provides a quick overview for stakeholders and with 
the European Floods Directive and also all relevant planning institutions which are 
involved in the process of generating Flood Risk Management Plans in accordance 
fields. The catalogue is structured along types of measures for a) Preservation of 
existing and potential flood retention areas, b) Recovery / Extension of retention 
areas, c)  Increase retention in the catchment, d) Minimizing the damage potential.  
The fields of planning and action addressed are: Spatial Planning, Urban Land Use 
Planning, Agriculture, Forestry, Landscape Planning / Nature Conservation, Water 
Management, Private Preventive Action. 
 
Target Area Analysis 
The aim of target area analysis is to examine important hydrological issues which are 
relevant for preventive flood risk management, such as areas with significant flood 
risk, flood retention potential but also other water related aspects as fine sediment 
flux or the issue of water shortages. The principle of the target area analysis is by 
means of the intersection of several thematic maps in GIS, focusing on areas that are 
especially relevant to the particular analysis and therefore worth to be considered as 
potential areas for the implementation of measures. Through the query in several 
steps, the cascading analysis, areas can be narrowed down further and further until 
finally the target areas for focussing measures are covered (see fig. 2). 
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By this approach a comprehensive overview of the main problem areas can quickly 
and with relatively little effort be identified for the catchment area. Within this, the 
analysis of the retention potential is an important result and the basis for further 
analysis. From the representation of multiple target area analysis results, synergies 
can be derived.  
This information is processed and provided via a catchment-based Atlas in pdf-format 
with geo-referenced maps (see fig. 3). The different layers of these maps can be made 
visible or invisible by clicking on the respective layer. The Atlas contains also 
background information on data and applied methodologies and on predicted regional 
climate change data.  
 
 
 
Spatial Level             Methodological steps            
Exemplifications 
Above all:  WFD, FD, 
FFH, German Water 
Resources Act (WHG), 
Federal Nature 
Conservation Act   
 
e.g. Good ecological   
state, protection and 
development of habitats 
and species 
 
e.g. type-specific good 
                  status, habitat-
arget  
species 
Evaluation of regional 
documents and plans and 
technical and spatial data, 
for example 
Inventory WFD 
 
 
Method: Target-
performance-comparison, 
inclusion of regional 
expertise;  
Topics: e.g. River 
stretches with flood risk, 
important Water 
Management Issues etc. 
 
 
Fig. 1: Methodology for Identification of Target Areas 
 
Guidelines and relevant legal 
frameworks for IRBM 
Quality Objectives / Standards / 
Development Goals 
 
Spatial specific 
Quality 
objectives / 
standards / 
development 
goals 
Status Quo 
Analysis 
Identification of priority (regional) 
deficit / problem areas 
Target area identification by cascading 
analyses 
Spatial un-specific 
Regional Level 
Local Level 
Determine action priorities / - options 
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Fig 2: Example for a cascading analysis – here to identify most suitable areas for increasing 
retention capacity in the flood plain 
 
4  Summarising remarks 
 
The described approach of an integrative river basin management plan(ning) is based 
on two tools and the coordinated and participatory process of their development.  
One tool is the Atlas which contains a series of analyses of basic information such as 
retention capacities in the river basin, environment qualities or planned activities. The 
investigations are following iterative cascades of (mainly GIS-)analyses. It is also a 
sample of maps which are showing target areas for measures for improving 
water/environmental quality AND reduction of flood risk. These maps are gathered in 
a digital Atlas for the catchment of the river Ilmenau.  
 
 
 
Fig. 3: Extract of the Ilmenau-Atlas (includes general spatial information, flood risk specific 
analysis such as retention potential and target areas, identified by cascading GIS-analysis) 
The other tool is a catalogue of measures which shows a series of measures for better 
water and environment quality as well as for reduction of flood risk. The measures 
are structured along different planning and management sectors; by structuring them 
this way an overview is given not only for possible measures and perspective 
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implementation measures. It is also showing clear synergies between different 
sectors, e.g. between water management, spatial planning and agriculture.  
Both tools were developed in coordination with regional stakeholders by a series of 
expert interviews and two workshops where the approaches were discussed and 
respective input was integrated.     
The content of this plan can easily be integrated in divers relevant planning tools such 
as land use plans, landscape plans, water management plans and others.   
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Abstract 
 
One of the major difficulties in decision making consists in setting the target 
reliability according to optimal cost-benefit balancing. As this issue is a matter of 
society consideration of risk acceptability, which is neither intrinsic nor time-
invariant, the challenge is to define a framework that ensures low sensitivity 
regarding socio-economic changes and preferences. 
 
The present paper discusses the risk aversion regarding catastrophic events, in the 
scope of preventing large-scale losses that cannot be afforded by the decision maker. 
In addition to multi-objective and robust optimization procedures, the cost-benefit 
balancing is considered through reduction of the sensitivity regarding cost parameter 
uncertainties. In case of high-consequences low-probability events, the indirect 
failure costs are considered through interdependent cost-reliability function, in order 
to achieve better decision making for engineering practice. 
Keywords: Cost-benefit balancing, Risk aversion, Reliability, Decision theory. 
1. Introduction 
One of the major difficulties in decision-making is to estimate the involved costs, 
especially time-variant costs due to degradation, failure and maintenance. The 
monetary value depends not only on inflation and discount rates, but also on national 
and international economy, and particularly on the society choices and preferences. It 
is interesting to see how the European and North American citizens are ready to 
spend much more money today for safety, quality and environment protection, than 
twenty years ago. This trend is expected to be more involved in the future, as long as 
no special events or crises appear. The high increase of oil price in recent years 
changes the optimum cost/reliability balance, as transport costs become higher and 
local products, although expensive, may remain cheaper than low cost overseas 
products. The same analysis can be performed for metal prices, especially for steel. 
The problem is almost the same when talking about the target reliability constraint, as 
setting the target reliability is a matter of society appreciation of risk acceptability, 
which is not neither intrinsic nor time-invariant choice. As cost-benefit balancing is 
very sensitive to failure cost estimations [1], the challenge is therefore to define a 
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framework that ensures low sensitivity regarding socio-economic changes and 
preferences. 
According to the expected utility theory, the possible losses are assumed to be 
sustained by the expected profit, as a result of the large number law. It is therefore 
assumed that the utility function is linear in terms of probability. This can be accepted 
in production where failure consequences affect only the economic balance of the 
manufacturing process. The behaviour of people and firms is very different, as high 
consequence events (involving human and high economic losses) are weighted 
differently, whether the probability is low or not. Consequently, the assumption that 
failure cost is independent of the failure probability is clearly wrong, and the utility 
function should be a nonlinear function of probability. This kind of contradiction 
between optimality and risk acceptability could be solved by the integration of failure 
cost-probability dependence, leading to more consistent economic balance for design 
and maintenance. 
In this paper, the cost-benefit formulation of safety against catastrophic disasters is 
discussed in the framework of risk-based decision theory. The expected cost 
formulation is criticized from the risk aversion point of view. The reliability-based 
optimization is reformulated to improve its robustness and efficiency as a decision-
making tool. It is suggested to minimizing the dispersion of the total cost as an 
additional target to ensure robust analysis. Simple numerical examples are provided 
to illustrate the discussed ideas. 
 
2. Decision theory and risk aversion 
 
2.1 Expected utility theory 
 
For a vector of decision variables d, the capital gain  dZ  can be seen as a lottery 
outcome which can be either      ddd 0CBz   in case of good operation or 
       ff PCCBz ,0 dddd   in case of failure (fig. 1), where  dB  is the benefit, 
 d0C  is the initial investment,  ff PC ,d  is the cost of failure consequences and fP  is 
the failure probability. The expectation of the random outcome  dZ  is given by: 
 
 
                   
       dddd
dddddddd
fff
ffff
PPCCB
PPCCBPCBZE
,
,1
0
00


 (1) 
 
Depending on the industrial application, the benefits may or may not depend on the 
design variables. In civil and mechanical engineering, the benefits of using the system 
are often independent of the design variables (e.g. structural dimensions, steel ratio, 
etc.) and the maximization of the expected gain can be equivalently seen as the 
minimization of the expected total cost, which can also be written: 
     dd TCEZE  . 
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Figure 1. Capital gain function for structural systems. 
 
The expected utility theory [2, 3] is widely applied to model designer’s preference. 
According to this theory, the decision maker has to put the consequences in a value 
scale to preserve the preference ordering through a suitable utility function (fig. 2), 
such as the payoff 1z  is preferred to 2z  if: 
 
     2121 zuzuzz   (2) 
 
where  u  is the chosen utility function, depending on which, the decision maker can 
be risk neutral when he/she is indifferent between lottery and its expectation 
     ZuEZEu  , risk averse when he/she prefers the expectation      ZuEZEu   
(implying that u(z) to be strictly increasing and concave function), or risk attracted 
when he/she prefers the lottery      ZuEZEu  . Under risk aversion, the decision 
maker preference corresponds to maximizing the expected utility (i.e. sum of utilities 
of each state weighted by their probabilities). When two alternative designs are 
compared (fig. 2), the risk-averse designer takes less risk to choose the expectation 
than to choose one of the two offered solutions. The certainty equivalent CEz  is the 
amount of money that the decision maker is willing to accept with certainty instead of 
facing the lottery:     ZuEzu CE  . The risk attitude is quantified by the risk 
aversion index, known as the Arrow-Pratt measure, developed independently by Pratt 
[4] and Arrow [5]. The absolute and relative risk aversion measures are respectively: 
 
 
 zu
zu
zAu 

  and  
 
 zu
zzu
zRu 

 ; a decision maker is risk averse if these 
measures are positive. In this way, agents’ risk attitudes are entirely determined by 
the shape (i.e. concavity) of the utility function. Constant Absolute Risk Aversion 
(CARA) holds for )exp()( zAbazu u  and Constant Relative Risk Aversion 
(CRRA) holds for: )1/()(
1
u
R
Rzzu u   . 
 
Consider a given capital gain z subjected to a random cost “shock”  with zero mean 
and standard deviation  , the risk premium  corresponds to the maximum amount 
of money that one would be willing to pay in order to eliminate the shock (i.e. to have 
a sure return): 
 
      zuEzu  (3) 
 
Capital gain: 
Z(d) = B(d) - C0(d)
Capital gain: 
Z(d) = B(d) - C0(d) - Cf(d,Pf)
No f
ailu
re 
1-P f
(d)
Failure
P
f(d)

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Figure 2. Utility function and risk aversion. 
 
Second order expansion for both sides of the above equation allows us to approximate 
the risk premium by: 
  zAu
2
2

  (4) 
 
This expression means that risk premium depends on the variance of the cost shock 
weighted by the risk aversion (i.e. agent’s attitude). It is important to note that in 
Reliability-Based Optimization (RBO), the utility function is systematically taken as 
either the capital gain   TCBzzu   or the total cost   TCzu  :  
 
                     dddddddd
d
ffff PPCCBuPCBuZuE  ,1min 00  (5) 
 
In this case, the utility function is rather linear which means that the decision maker is 
risk neutral. 
2.2 Criticism of the expected utility theory 
Although the expected utility theory is routinely used to evaluate projects and public 
funds, it underestimates and disregards rare events that could have catastrophic 
consequences. Neglecting rare events has led to increasingly paradoxical predictions. 
People decisions under uncertainties give large weight to rare events, showing that we 
do not make decisions based on expected utility alone, by averaging risks.  
A troubling dilemma with the expected utility theory is that low-probability/high-
consequence events (e.g. airplane accidents) will be valued no differently from the 
same risks generated by independent trials (e.g. automobile accidents). Indeed, 
valuing the former more than the latter may even be considered immoral to the extent 
that one values lives lost collectively more than those same lives lost individually. It 
comes out that utility theory is insufficient for modeling risk attitudes adequately [6].  
 
Violations of expected utility theory were firstly recognized as a result of the work by 
Allais [7] who showed that decision maker weigh both expected outcomes and 
probabilities associated with these outcomes (i.e. expected utility functions are not 
linear in probabilities). The weighting of probabilities is intuitively linked to 
individual’s attitudes towards risk. It seems plausible that people weigh catastrophic 
losses or gains (with low probability) differently than they weigh normal losses or 
u(z1)
z1
Risk aversion
Utility
Outcome (capital gain)
z2E[Z]
u(E[Z])
E[u(Z)]
u(z2)
u(E[Z]) > E[u(Z)]
zCE
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gains. Rabin [8] has shown that expected utility takes too simplistic a view towards 
risk. By only assuming increasing and concave utility functions, agents will behave 
absurdly to large stakes bets if they act risk averse to more moderate bets.  
Allais, Ellsberg and Petersburgh paradoxes did not cause expected value to be 
supplanted as economists’ canonical model of individual choice behavior over 
lotteries. Note that to get an expected utility function, and not just an ordinal utility 
function, we need stronger assumptions about the consistency of preferences: in 
addition to completeness and transitivity, we need independence and Archimedian 
conditions. Human behavior is contradictory to transitivity assumption when the 
difference between various choices is small. Machina [9] demonstrated that 
individuals do not necessarily conform to many of the key assumptions or predictions 
of the expected utility model of choice under uncertainty. Systematic violations of the 
expected utility model can be categorized into [9]: (i) violations of the Independence 
Axiom (Allais’ Paradox), (ii) violations of the hypothesis of probabilistic beliefs 
(Ellsberg’s Paradox) and (iii) violations of the model underlying assumptions of 
descriptive and procedural invariance (such as reference-point and response-mode 
effects). 
To overcome the above difficulties, non-expected utility theories represent a very 
active research field in economic science. Weighted expected utility, rank dependent 
utility, and cumulative prospect theory are three prominent alternatives to expected 
utility [10]. Each is capable of accommodating the common consequence effect and 
thus able to explain the Allais’s paradox. Although these theories are very different in 
some aspects, they have at least one feature in common: the probabilities of the 
various outcomes enter the utility function in a nonlinear manner. For instance, the 
application of these economical models to cost-benefit engineering models still 
requires to be tested regarding the robustness of the decision making process. 
 
2.2 Risk aversion in public and private context 
The law of large numbers is a powerful rationale for public decision, as it provides an 
undisputed role for governments and for public actions all over the world and creates 
a basis for profitable cooperation between the public and the private sectors. 
However, there are cases where the law of large numbers has limited use: when the 
risks are interconnected and correlated, as is the case in large catastrophes like the 
tsunami and Katrina hurricane. The outcome of the law of large numbers depends on 
the relative size of the pool of people affected over the total population, and therefore 
may require sharing the risks across nations. 
From the point of view of public sector, the target is essentially to set the acceptance 
criteria in order to ensure safety (e.g. human lives saving, damage reduction and 
environment protection), economy (e.g. creation of jobs and tax paying) and service 
(e.g. improving the facilities and life quality) for the society. The prescribed 
regulations should be valid for a large class of structures and systems, with various 
levels of design and construction capabilities. 
 
From the point of view of private sector, the target is to define the design and the 
operating conditions allowing us to maximize the net capital gain. It can also consist 
in minimizing the human and monetary losses in case of failure (especially for 
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sensitive industries such as nuclear power plants) as well as the economic and 
political impacts on the firm.  
For lotteries involving monetary or other quantifiable payoffs, a special case of a 
utility maximizing individual is a risk neutral utility maximizer, who maximizes the 
expected value. Risk neutral attitude would apply to “large firms” that have enough 
money to sustain a possible loss on a business where they can make a substantial 
profit otherwise [11, 12]. In other words, the expected utility theory assumes a kind of 
averaging between losses and gains, where losses can be sustained and compensated 
with gains. However, if losses are very high, this leads to a kind of “end of the game” 
and the lottery process will be suddenly stopped. 
Naturally, the two decision makers (public and private) have partly conflicting 
ordering of preferences. To deal with these targets, several researchers [13-15] have 
defined a maximum failure cost that should be respected with a given probability. 
This condition prevents the risk that unaffordable losses for private and public 
decision makers. The RBDO is thus written as: 
 
 
  
     0Pr:subject to
:min
 dd
d
d
jadUT
T
gandPCC
CE
 (6) 
 
where adP  is the admissible probability for the extra-cost risk and  djg  are 
deterministic constraints for the decision space. 
 
3. Optimal design considering uncertainties 
3.1 Epistemic utility formulation 
 
In practice, the expected utility is always conditioned by the assumptions related to 
cost and probability evaluations (i.e. epistemic variables θ ). The unconditional 
expected utility can be written as: 
 
                
f
f
C
ffC
C
Cf dCCfdCCfdfCCZuEZuE
0
0 000
,,
θ
θ θθθdd  (7) 
 
where    θd ,,0 fCCZuE  is the conditional expected utility for a given set of initial 
and failure costs, and epistemic variables; the probability density functions  θθf , 
 00 CfC  and  fC Cf f  are respectively related to epistemic variables, initial cost and 
failure cost. While the initial cost can be often well estimated, it is practically 
impossible to evaluate precisely the failure probability and the failure costs. 
Although optimal design is very sensitive to different risk attitudes, the classical 
optimal decision is widely applied by using conditional expected utility, where costs 
and reliability estimations are considered as deterministic. A common major 
difficulty appears when applying optimization to real engineering systems: that is, the 
distributions (or at least the standard deviations) of costs and other epistemic data 
should be characterized in order to get unconditional expectation and probability. 
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Therefore, it is practically impossible to calculate the unconditional expectation of the 
total cost or even the probability of exceeding affordable costs, which makes the 
usefulness of cost-benefit balancing very limited in engineering practice. If the 
unaffordable cost CU can be specified by the designer, the decision problem can be 
formulated such that: 
 
      0:subject toPr:min  dd
d
jUT gCC  (8) 
 
where  Pr  is the probability operator,  dTC  is the total cost and  djg  are decision 
constraints. Contrary to expression (17), the minimization of the probability in 
equation (19) leads to a double minimization of cost mean and variance. The impact 
of failure cost uncertainties is thus minimized, whatever the estimation of the cost 
variance. The unaffordable cost CU can be defined as the threshold above which the 
company cannot survive (due to high losses either in design and 
construction/manufacturing costs or in failure-induced costs). 
3.2 Robust risk-based formulations 
The robustness concept is an appropriate alternative, as it does not require accurate 
information about the values of the standard deviations of costs and other epistemic 
data. For each performance property, the robust design objective could be generalized 
into two aspects, namely, “optimizing the mean of performance” and “minimizing the 
variation of performance”; the tradeoff between these two aspects cannot be avoided. 
 
3.2.1 Total cost formulation 
The robust total cost formulation can be written as: 
 
 
         
  0:subject to
,,1:min


d
XdXdd
d
j
TTT
g
CVarCEC 

 (9) 
 
with   a weighting parameter and Var[.] is the variance operator. This expression 
follows the robust optimization philosophy (e.g. [16]), with the difference that the 
total cost is considered instead of the initial cost.  
 
The above problem can be equivalently expressed in terms of the percentile of the 
total cost, in order to avoid undesired high costs: 
 
 
       
  0:subject to
,,:min


d
XdXdd
d
j
TTT
g
CVarkCEC
k
 (10) 
 
where 
kT
C  is the total cost percentile, k  is a number corresponding to the prescribed 
percentile (it does not assume normal distribution of cost, as it can be computed for 
any distribution type); it is to note that k can also be seen as a weighting parameter.  
 
In general, the formulations (20) and (21) allow us to reduce both the expectation and 
the standard deviation of the cost, which is illustrated in fig. 3 by showing the 
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expected cost and the upper and lower percentiles as functions of the design variable. 
As the role of the design variables is different for the mean and standard deviation of 
the total cost, the optimal design for the percentile is usually shifted with respect to 
the optimum based on the expected cost. This is due to the non-constant dispersion of 
the cost function with respect to design variables. 
 
 
 
Figure 3. Cost expectation and percentiles. 
 
3.2.2 Example on the lack of robustness 
Consider the simple case of optimizing a design capacity r to support a random 
demand S, which is normally distributed with mean mS and standard deviation S. The 
initial cost is given by: rcC 00   ( 0c  being the initial cost per unit capacity), and the 
cost of failure consequences fC  is uncertain with mean fCm  and standard deviation 
fC
 (normal distribution is assumed). For the mean and characteristic costs: 
TC
m and 
kT
C , the optimal design capacities are respectively *mr  and 
*
kr given by: 
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 (11) 
 
It is easy to verify that the solution *kr  is risk-averse compared to 
*
mr , the difference 
 **00 mk rrcC   represents the willing to pay in order to overcome the potential 
losses. By introducing the risk premium expression in the condition 
TC
m , we 
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Cost
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percentile
Expected 
total cost
Minimum
expectation
Optimum for
cost expectation 
Design parameter
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Proceedings of the 43rd ESReDA Seminar 
 
67 
 
can write the absolute risk aversion measure in terms of design capacity and failure 
cost variance: 
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 (12) 
 
For illustration purpose, consider the parameters: Sm 300 MPa, S 40 MPa, 0c
10 €/ MPa, 
fC
m 10000 € and 
fC
 5000 €. The optimal strengths are found to be: 
*mr 385.8 MPa with a failure probability 
2106.1   and *kr 401.4 MPa (k = 3) with 
a failure probability 3106.5  ; the corresponding expected costs are respectively 
4018 € and 4071 €. The risk premium corresponding to the willing to pay for risk 
aversion is 156 € (i.e. 4% of increase of initial cost), and the absolute risk aversion 
measure is: Au = 0.0165. 
 
From the cost functions illustrated in fig. 4.a, it can be observed that the cost 
percentile penalizes more the designs with high failure probability (i.e. low design 
capacity). Fig. 5.b shows the CRRA expected utility with risk aversion Ru = 0.0, 0.5 
and 0.95 (for illustration purpose, the utility functions are scaled from 0 to 1).  While 
the optimal design capacity is 385.8 MPa for Ru = 0.0 (risk neutral), it goes to 
393 MPa and 401 MPa for Ru = 0.5 and 0.95, respectively. The solution obtained by 
robust reliability-based optimization corresponds therefore to high risk aversion level, 
confirming the soundness of the approach. 
 
               
Figure 4. a) Cost expectation and percentile and b) Expected utility. 
 
Fig. 5 plots the probability density functions for the expected costs according to the 
two design capacities *mr  and 
*
kr . It is clearly observed that the robust RBDO solution 
leads to less scatter of the expected total cost regarding failure cost uncertainties; the 
solution has therefore low sensitivity to under- or over-estimation of failure 
consequences. For example, if the failure cost were wrongly under-estimated, and the 
actual value is as much as twice the prior estimation, the expected costs would be 
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 5.385
fC
m 4178 € and  4.401
fC
m 4127 €, showing that the second design is less 
affected by the increase of failure costs. 
 
  
Figure 5. PDF of the expected total cost in terms of two design strengths. 
 
3.3 Multi-objective decision making 
 
The drawback of the formulations (9) and (10) lies in the uncontrolled balancing of 
the reductions of cost expectation and variance. Balancing is mandatory as it fits 
better the design requirements in terms of optimality and robustness. It is therefore 
difficult to set the percentile and weighting parameters,   and k, as they are arbitrary, 
in addition to the fact that the failure cost distribution type and variance are not 
known in advance. Even if a normal distribution is assumed, the variance of the 
failure cost cannot be accurately predicted by statistical methods along the structural 
lifetime. Therefore, the choice of the weighting or risk parameter,  , k or Ru, has a 
significant influence on the selected optimal solution. It is also required to minimize 
the sensitivity to uncertainties related to cost parameters, 
0C
m , 
fC
m , 
0C
 and 
fC
 , as 
well as to other epistemic modeling parameters. It can be possible to overcome these 
difficulties by defining a multi-objective optimization formulation, avoiding the 
weighting between expectation and variance.  
 
3.2.1 Multi-objective formulation 
The multi-objective problem can be defined as the minimization of both the cost 
expectation and variance: 
 
 
      
  0:subject to
,;,:min
d
XdXd
d
j
TT
g
CVarCE
 (13) 
 
This multi-objective problem offers a set of dominant solutions and the decision 
maker has to select the appropriate solution according to his/her preference. The 
drawback of this approach lies in the selection step, which still remains affected by 
subjective human opinion and preferences. 
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3.3.2 Multi-objective optimization example 
To illustrate the above idea, let us consider the inference model with the limit state 
function G defined by: SRRG  21 , where 1R  and 2R  are two additive 
component capacities and S  is the demand. Table I provides the means and 
coefficients of variation of the various parameters.  
 
Table I: Parameters of the bi-dimensional design problem. 
Model type Variable Symbol Mean C.O.V. 
Reliability model Capacity of component 1  R1 
1Rm  
0.05 
Reliability model Capacity of component 2 R2 
2Rm  
0.15 
Reliability model Demand S  12.00 MPa 0.20 
Cost model Initial cost C0 2599 €/MPa 0.15 
Cost model Failure cost Cf 
6102 € 0.25 
 
The optimal points obtained by applying the different formulations are provided in 
Table II. The comparison of the first two cases (i.e. minimization of cost expectation 
and standard deviation, respectively) shows two opposite trends: the first case gives a 
large amount of the component with low C.O.V. (i.e. component 1) and a strong 
reduction of the component with high C.O.V., in order to achieve the optimal 
reliability, while the second case tends to reduce the component with large effect on 
cost dispersion (i.e. component 1). In case 2, the expected cost is higher but its 
percentile is still lower. Here also, the percentile minimization (case 3) appears as a 
good compromise between the above formulations. 
 
Table II: Optimal solutions for different one-dimensional formulations. 
Case Cost variable to minimize 
*
1R
m  *
2R
m   
TC
m (k€) 
TC
 (k€) 
kT
C (k€) 
1 Expectation 17.97 2.00  3.086 51.9 6.8 72.3 
2 Std deviation 9.23 11.19  2.842 55.6 4.9 70.4 
3 Characteristic (k=3) 12.29  7.94  2.994 53.3 5.2 69.0 
4 Expectation under  
std deviation optimality 
12.02 8.01 2.920 53.6 5.2 69.1 
5 Std deviation under  
expectation optimality 
16.73  3.23 3.074 52.0 6.5 71.3 
 
The minimization of the expected cost under standard deviation optimality conditions 
(case 4) enforces the standard deviation to be minimum and searches for the best 
expected cost; it leads to a solution similar to that for percentile optimization (robust 
design formulation). Finally, the minimization of the standard deviation of cost, under 
expected cost optimality conditions (case 5), leads to the best configuration as both 
cost expectation and standard deviation are reduced. This solution is similar to the 
first case (classical formulation) in terms of expected cost (with only 0.1% of 
increase), but with the advantage of reducing the standard deviation by 5%. This is 
achieved by slightly decreasing capacity 1 and increasing capacity 2. The resulting 
cost percentile is better than the classical formulation, but still being slightly higher 
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than the percentile formulation with the advantage of a better safety level ( = 3.074 
instead of  = 2.92). 
 
3.4 Interdependence between cost and reliability  
 
When applied to real problems, the utility theory shows a lack of consistency coming 
from the use of fixed cost for failure consequences (e.g. losses, reconstruction costs, 
direct damage, pollution,…). When the failure cost Cf is independent of the failure 
probability Pf, the expected failure cost can be written: E[Cf] = Cf x Pf. This 
formulation leads to inconsistent optimization results as indicated by Ditlevsen and 
Madsen [17], compared to engineering practice and acceptable safety levels. In fact, 
the independence assumption holds as long as the failure rate remains very low under 
a commonly accepted level. However, with increasing the failure rate, the failure cost 
Cf should be considered as a function of the failure probability, as indirect damage 
(e.g. bad propaganda, market losses, public opinion on the company/authority, 
accelerated effects,...) induces much higher losses than direct economic losses.  
 
3.4.1 Cost-probability relationship 
The relationship between failure consequences and probability is necessarily 
nonlinear. A rational approach can be established by explicitly introducing the cost-
reliability dependence as a nonlinear function where the failure cost strongly 
increases with high failure probabilities; i.e.: 
 
        ffff PPCCE  ,, dXd1d  (14) 
 
where  ff PC ,d  is the failure cost function, which plays the role of penalty function 
when failure rate becomes high. Compared to classical approaches with explicit 
reliability constraint, this penalization can better reflect the human appreciation of 
consequences, as well as indirect cost impact when the failure rate is increased. 
 
3.3.2 Illustrative example 
The idea behind cost-reliability dependence can be illustrated by considering the 
example of the inference model in section 3.3.2: the reliability-independent failure 
cost 
6102
of
C  is now replaced by  a nonlinear function, leading to the expected 
total cost: 
 
  
  
 Rf
ff
f
fRRT mP
PP
C
CmCmC 










0
1
0 /1exp1
0

 (15) 
 
with the acceleration parameter  = 5, the failure probability threshold 410
of
P , the 
basic failure cost 2500
0
fC €/MPa and the extra-cost due to indirect losses is 
01
10 ff CC  . This expression assumes that high-rate failure cost is up to ten times the 
single failure cost. Table III compares the optimal solution, obtained by this cost 
function with classical cost function using constant failure cost. The reliability-
dependent failure cost creates an implicit penalty constraint, as the failure cost 
strongly increases when approaching the probability threshold; the reliability index at 
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the optimum is raised from  = 2.783 (Pf = 2.7x10-3) to  = 3.45 (Pf = 2.8x10-4). As 
illustrated in fig. 6, it is unlikely to get solutions with low reliability levels (i.e. low 
Rm ), as failure cost increases drastically. For high reliability levels (i.e. 30Rm
MPa), the two functions become identical. 
 
 
Figure 6. Total cost with and without reliability-cost dependence. 
 
Table III: Optimal solutions with and without reliability-cost dependence. 
Failure cost Optimum capacity Reliability index Expected cost (k€) 
Reliability independent 24.06 2.783 65.54 
Reliabiliyt dependent 29.25 3.450 79.31 
 
4. Conclusion 
In this paper, it is shown that the expected utility concept is not sufficient to deal with 
catastrophic events, as the solution and cost dispersions cannot be controlled. Robust 
decision-making tools have to be developed in order to set the best compromise 
between cost and safety. The cost-reliability dependence leads to more consistent 
formulation than for classical approaches, with is conformal to engineering practice 
and social risk acceptability. 
With reliability 
dependence 
Without reliability 
dependence 
(MPa)  Rm
Cost
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Abstract 
The assessment of potential threats is an important concern for population, industries 
or decision makers. In order to take the right decisions, stakeholders must base their 
analysis on the knowledge of potential hazards, but also on  intrinsic vulnerabilities 
concerning the surrounding population and territory, in the aim to have a pertinent 
representation of the risk not only based on hazards. The present development 
proposes a global approach to the vulnerability of populations located in the vicinity 
of a potential risk and to the vulnerability of a territory from a functional point of 
view, to help decision makers in their risk management process. To reach this goal, a 
specific methodology has been developed based on land use data and a multi criteria 
decision method (Saaty) to obtain a semi quantitative approach of vulnerability. This 
methodology has been implemented in the MapInfo GIS (Metehor tool) to obtain 
different layers of vulnerability assessment. 
Keywords: Vulnerability, Risk assessment, Industry, Territory, Geographical 
information system  
1. Introduction 
The consideration and assessment of risk is a major concern for our societies, whether 
its origin is natural, industrial or terrorist. The consequences are often significant oe 
even critical for people, environment and stability of our societies. Nowadays this 
assessment is based primarily on a very thorough characterization of the hazard 
(Tixier, 2002), especially through the detailed description of scenarios, assessment of 
the likelihood or impact by quantifying the consequences. The idea proposed in this 
work starts from the premise that this hazard-based approach must be complemented 
by a vulnerability-based one. This will include the advantage of having a 
representation of the intrinsic vulnerability status of a territory in an independent way 
of any specific accident situation and to allow authorities to take into account 
vulnerability as a self-consistent variable. This last point is crucial, since, it is 
impossible to know the exact scenario that may happen. The expert must make 
assumptions and it automatically generates uncertainties on the outcome of the 
evaluation. This approach will enable decision makers to have a critical look at the 
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elements from the quantification of the consequences and the uncertainties induced. 
In this paper, we focus on potential threats due to dangerous substances. In France 
more than 19 450 accidents occurred in the period 1992-2004, and 46 % of them led 
to dangerous material releases in the environment (Barpi, 2005). In order to take the 
right decisions to protect populations after such accidental emissions, the hazard 
generated by the release must be studied. This is generally done by experimentations 
and/or modeling of the phenomena but the surrounding population and the territory 
are rarely accounted for in a vulnerability assessment approach. 
A global a priori vulnerability assessment of the stakes of a territory exposed to 
potential threats could give stakeholders a valuable tool. In this aim a twofold 
approach has been developed to assess vulnerability: 
 a quantitative description of human vulnerability, by population categories, which 
are located in space and time 
 a qualitative and quantitative approach dedicated to assess the vulnerability level 
of specific structures (functions) being a part of the overall stability of a society. 
2. Generalities on vulnerability 
The concept is largely defined by several authors (paragraph 2.2) and its interest for 
risk assessment is pointed out but only few approaches and methods are really 
operational. 
 
2.1 The vulnerability challenge 
The challenge consists in the assessment of the vulnerability of a territory exposed to 
a potential threat, generated for instance by industrial activities like chemical, 
petrochemical sites or others.  
 
 
Figure 1: vulnerability assessment: stating the problem 
 
Figure 1 illustrates the challenge addressed when defining the vulnerability of a 
territory, which may be summarized as follows: is area 1 (on the left), which is 
composed of human, environmental and material stakes, more or less vulnerable than 
area 2 (on the right) also composed of human, environmental and material stakes, but 
in different quantity and of different nature?  
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2.2 Vulnerability definitions 
A preliminary work has collected thirty-seven definitions of “vulnerability” from 
different sources and scientific areas.  
 
Figure 2: Parameters of the vulnerability 
The concept of vulnerability is old (18th century). It derives from the Latin noun 
“vulnerabilis” and the Latin verb “vulnerare”, which expresses the character of what 
can be wounded, exposed. There is not one single definition but several definitions of 
the vulnerability, depending on the discipline of study, and of the culture of the 
authors (Figure 2). The definitions can be sorted according to three principal 
dimensions: the dimension of susceptibility, the dimension of consequences and a 
dimension including the two previous ones. But the definitions of vulnerability can 
also be classified according to their mode of study, which could be a qualitative 
approach, a quantitative approach or a semi-quantitative one. 
For summary, the vulnerability has three aspects:  
 The first aspect corresponds to the character of vulnerability of the stakes and this 
state is influenced by vulnerability factors (qualitative approach).  
 The second aspect of the vulnerability is coupled with the concept of 
consequences. It attempts to study the elements which are likely to be exposed by 
a hazard (quantitative approach) 
 The third aspect of the vulnerability is a composite concept resulting from the 
others. The vulnerability is thus at the same time a character and a consequence 
(semi quantitative approach). 
So, the vulnerability is a concept with the multiple facets and is the subject of many 
approaches, not always consensual. 
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2.3 Classical approaches to assess vulnerability 
Some risk analyses have been developed at a local level. These local studies are 
generally based on a deep analysis of the hazard with a probabilistic approach in 
order to quantify for instance accident rates as a function of the features of a road 
(plane road or not, bridge, ...) (Fabiano, 2002) or by the way of F/N curves and 
impact areas of accident (Bubbico, 2004). Stakes have been generally taken into 
account through an average population density near the area of interest as a function 
of impact area of accident (Bubbico, 2004; Bubbico, 2006). Millazo (Millazo, 2002) 
also used population density and vulnerable centres (as shopping centres, hospitals, 
schools ...) in order to better describe the spatial distribution of human stakes. 
From the presented methodologies, it can be pointed out that the hazard is properly 
taken into account with such a probabilistic approach. Concerning the stakes only the 
concept of average density or specific density at local level are used. It is clearly 
linked to the quality of available cartographical databases. Another important point is 
the fact that only human stakes are taken into account and not natural and materials 
ones. A last point concerns the ranking of vulnerability of specific types of stakes 
which has not been yet attempted in transport risk analysis. 
To overcome these limitations, an original approach is proposed which was 
previously initiated during the European project Aramis (Tixier, 2006) based on the 
ranking of the importance of stakes on the territory in order to assess the vulnerability 
in a more representative way. 
 
3. Objectives and definitions 
 
The idea here developed is to define a vulnerability index applied to all possible 
stakes located in the surroundings of an industrial site (vulnerability mapping) or any 
other potential threat. This would require first to choose the study area and define the 
stakes of interest, then to identify and quantify the stakes into the study area and, 
finally, to assess their vulnerability: this last step needs a specific methodology. In 
this work, two complementary approaches have been developed: 
 The first one is the quantification of human vulnerability by the way of 
a census of selected stakes on the territory completed by a repartition as a function 
of the time of the day (day or night) to obtain a more realistic representation of the 
distribution of the population. 
 The second one is the assessment of functional vulnerability (critical 
networks or elements to maintain the main functionalities of the society). A semi-
quantitative approach to assess the vulnerability is adopted, which is a multi 
criteria decision method (Saaty’s method) based on expert judgments. This 
method allows taking into account both the “status” of a specific stake (qualitative 
approach) and the “census” of that stake (quantitative approach). This approach 
relies on the collection of expert opinions on the relative importance of each 
element which provides a “photography” at a certain time of a situation. This is 
the main difference with an expert system which can provide rules to characterize 
the situation and include a learning step. The main advantage consists in 
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providing a transposable approach in order to compare different types of areas 
exposed to a potential hazard. 
This approach has been conveniently developed in the form of GIS tools (Map Info 
and Open GIS to be defined) in order to assess the vulnerability in the zone of 
interest. 
 
4. Methodology developed to assess the vulnerability of a 
territory 
The vulnerability of a territory is composed of two contributions, one from human 
vulnerability, the second from functional vulnerability. 
 
4.1 Human vulnerability 
4.1.1 Definition  
The human vulnerability assessment has for goal to make a spatial and temporal 
(day/night) census of human stakes by considering people as independent persons. 
 
4.1.2  Typology of human stakes 
It is necessary to propose a set of human stakes to characterize with accuracy the 
territory, while keeping in mind the required transferability of the method and its 
flexibility. Indeed, it is important to find a proper balance between the number of the 
type of human stakes to be accounted for and the limited precision of cartographical 
databases available to describe the territory. [INSEE, 1999, IGN, 2004].  
Here the characterization will be based on four categories of stakes:  
 The site staff: For this type of human stake the potential danger is close to its 
maximum value they are located in an area very close to the source of danger.  
 Local populations: This type of stake allows taking into account population 
distribution according to the variable population density of an inhabited area. A 
distinction of population density may be based on the type of land use, three types 
can be identified:  
o rural Type  
o peri urban Type  
o urban type.  
 People present in public assembly building (ERP). This type of stakes is specific, 
because these establishments have the potential to host an important number of 
people. The ERP taken into account are related to:  
o Transportation: railway station, airport, port,  
o Trade: stores and shopping malls,  
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o Leisure time: restaurant, hotel, pub, multi-purpose hall, summer camp, 
school outdoor and sports facilities,  
o Culture: library, documentation centre, trade mart, museum, religious 
facilities,  
o Health and service: healthcare facility, education institution, banking, 
and business places. 
 Users of communication networks. This type is characterized by a density of 
traffic depending on the type of communication networks:  
o Roads (motorways, national…)  
o Railway lines,  
o Waterways.  
This typology of stakes allows making a census of population in a given territory but 
it is essential to obtain a spatial distribution of these populations. 
 
4.1.3 The spatial distribution of the population 
The first layer of vulnerability information consists in a count of the location of 
human population on a territory. The relevance of this layer will depend heavily on 
cartographic databases used in the study. To illustrate this point, two examples are 
shown below:  
 1st level: the association of the map layer characterizing the limits of districts on 
the territory with the population census of 1999 conducted by INSEE provides a 
macroscopic view of people in private housing in a district with a homogeneous 
distribution (there is no identification of real populated sub-zones).  
 2nd level: on the basis of map data selected for the realization of the first level, a 
characterization function of land use is proposed. The type of land use is 
generally:  
o continuous urban area 
o discontinuous urban area  
o rural area 
From these elements and through the use of factors of population repartition 
according to the type of land use, the result provides a better representation of reality.  
In our approach, the second way is used. 
 
4.1.4  Population distribution as a function of a Day/Night criterion 
Another main point consists in the distribution of the population with day/night 
criterion. On the basis of INSEE studies (which is the French institute making the 
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census of population), the following categories can be proposed (INSEE, 1999; 
INSEE, 2005): 
 Out of school child 
 Schooling children and students 
 Population in professional activities 
 Unemployed population  
 Inactive population 
 Retired population 
On this basis, the more effective distribution of population should be based on the 
area of life (which is the aggregate of a set of districts) but there is no cartographical 
data available to do it this way. So a simplified approach is realized by district where 
the data are the most usually available. The following table (Table 1) summarizes the 
distribution of population at the scale of French districts (day / night location and 
percentage of population based on INSEE Studies). 
 
Table 1: Distribution of the population (day/night) 
Population Day location  Night location  
% of total 
population 
of a district 
Out of school child Family dwelling 
Family 
dwelling 
2,36 
Schooling children 
and students 
Education structures 
Family 
dwelling 
25,07 
Population in 
professional activities 
Establishments 
Family 
dwelling 
40,91 
unemployed 
population 
50% Family dwelling 
50% establishments (culture, population 
services, administration, …) 
Family 
dwelling 
6,01 
Inactive population 
50% Family dwelling 
50% establishments (culture, population 
services, administration, ...) 
Family 
dwelling 
7,48 
Retired population 
50% Family dwelling 
50% establishments (culture, population 
services, administration, …) 
Family 
dwelling 
18,17 
 
The proposed approach allows quantifying the human vulnerability of a territory and 
highlighting population distribution differences between the day and the night time. 
 
4.2 Functional vulnerability  
4.2.1  Definition  
The functional vulnerability has for aim to assess the stability of a society exposed to 
a potential risk. To reach this goal, the critical networks which contribute to the 
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balance of the society must be identified and weighted to assess their relative 
importance, as a function the type of the loss (total or partial) and the duration of the 
loss (small or long). In order to provide a support to decision-makers, there is a 
necessity to set up priorities so the global vulnerability state of a territory could be 
provided and end users can adopt specific measures to reduce the existing 
vulnerability, in the framework of a risk management process.  
In a general way, decision-making is a complex process which is not only based on a 
set of information about a subject, but depends also on the representations of the 
members of the decision group regarding their vision of the reality. Furthermore, 
personal preferences and persuasion can have more importance in the process of 
decision than a clear and rigorous logic. A multicriteria hierarchical method brings an 
organization of information and appreciation which intervenes in the process of 
decision-making.  
 
4.2.2 Multicriteria decision method of Saaty 
The purpose of the Saaty’s method is the assessment of priorities. To this end, the 
first point is to have a consensus on the objective, then in a second time to decompose 
the complex and unstructured situation in its main components. The types of results 
can be a classification, an allocation of numerical values of subjective judgments or 
the aggregation of judgments to determine criteria having the highest priorities. The 
multi criteria hierarchical method allows obtaining a decision-making by a group in a 
consensual way due to a better coherence of judgment. 
The multi criteria hierarchical method of Saaty (Saaty, 1984) is based on four steps: 
 a description of the studied system (some elements and criteria are proposed in 
order to characterize the situation) 
 a construction of hierarchies (to organize elements and criteria to answer the 
problem) ; 
 an assessment of priorities (based on expert judgments); 
 a validation of coherence. 
The construction of a hierarchical structure requires the creation or the identification 
of links between the various levels of this structure. 
 
Each element or criteria of a hierarchical structure takes place at a given level of the 
structure. Its upper level corresponds to the global objective (or dominant element). 
Some binary comparisons are done between all the elements of a given level 
according to the element of the upper level, in order to rank the elements among 
them. The various levels of a hierarchy are, consequently, interconnected. 
A complex situation can be analyzed by a systematic approach with the help of this 
hierarchical structure. The priorities have to be assessed. This process is done by a 
comparison of elements two by two (binary comparison). It gives the ranking of 
elements according to their relative importance. Finally, the logical coherence is 
confirmed on the whole applied process. To do the binary comparisons, it is 
necessary to use a scale based on classic numerical variables or more qualitative 
variables contributing to take into account qualitative aspects. 
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From this definition and from hierarchical structures and the functions of the 
vulnerability index are deduced. The expert judgments are collected by a 
questionnaire for the evaluation of each coefficient of the vulnerability functions. 
 
4.2.3  Methodology to assess the functional vulnerability of a territory  
The assessment of functional vulnerability relies on Saaty’s multi criteria decision 
method (Saaty, 1984). In order to define the vulnerability of a territory in terms of 
critical networks potentially exposed to the consequences of hazards, the first step is 
to describe the territory by the mean of categories of critical networks and criteria to 
assess a specific weight for each of them. So, the territory is described by categories 
of functionality (Lutoff, 2000; MATE 2001). We choose 12 categories: 
 Private dwelling (PD) 
 Governmental structures and administrations (GSA) 
 Structures dedicated to energy and water management(SEW) 
 Structures dedicated to communication services management (SCS) 
 Structures dedicated to transport (ST) 
 Structures dedicated to production (SP) 
 Structures dedicated to healthcare and homeland security (SHS) 
 Structures of cult (SC) 
 Structures of education and research (SER) 
 Structures of culture (SCULTU) 
 Structures dedicated to the population services (SPS) 
 Natural area (NA) 
Two criteria are used to qualify the weight of vulnerability, the type of loss (total or 
partial) and the duration (small or long). 
In a second time, hierarchical structures are built in order to organize the information, 
and the importance of each category is assessed by the way of binary comparison by 
experts as a function of the type of loss and the duration. Then, for each category, the 
importance of the sub-structures is evaluated in the same way (Figure 5). 
From this hierarchical structure, it can be deduced two sets of analytical functions: 
 The value of vulnerability as a function of the relative importance of categories 
 For each category, a function describing the relative importance of all 
functionalities. 
In a third time, it is relevant to complete the characterization of the functional 
vulnerability by a qualification of the type of destruction of each identified type of 
functional stakes in terms of level of loss and in terms of duration before 
rehabilitation. 
For the type loss, two levels are assumed, the total loss (TL) or partial loss (PL), for 
rehabilitation time three levels are retained short-term (ST), medium term (MT) or 
long term (LT). 
These last set of hierarchical structures (Figure 6) will compare the relative 
importance in the case of a partial loss of a category of functionality compared to a 
total loss and the relative importance in the case of a short, medium or long term loss. 
These two criteria are used to correct the functions of vulnerability. 
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From this approach, the matrixes and the functions are derived by combining the 
quantification factors of the stakes and their vulnerability factors to give the 
vulnerability index. After treatment, the following equations are obtained:  
 
 
Figure 5: example of hierarchical structure 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Vfunctional = 0.112 x PDcor + 0.022 x GSAcor + 0.112 x SEWcor + 0.009 x SCScor 
+ 0.023 x STcor + 0.032 x SPcor + 0.192 x SHScor + 0.028 x SCcor + 0.17 x SERcor 
+ 0.069 x SCULTUcor + 0.201 x SPScor + 0.030 x NAcor 
 
With: 
GSAcor= [0.53 x GS + 0,47 x A] x (TLGSA + DLGSA) 
SEWcor= [0.354 x WAT + 0.354 x ELEC + 0.085 x PETR + 0.207 x GAS] x 
(TLSEW + DLSEW) 
STcor  = [0.500 x RON + 0.118 x RAN + 0.089 x WW + 0.293 x AS] x (TLST + 
DLST) 
SHScor = [0.63 x H + 0.37 x PS] x (TLSHS + DLSHS) 
 
At this stage only few persons have been consulted, the objective being to show the 
ability to realize this approach, so the numerical values may be changed with the 
consultation of other experts. Two categories of weights have been obtained: 
Total loss of 
functionalities for 
the long term
Category 1
Functionality 1
…
Functionality j
…
Functionality 1’
…
Functionality j’
Category n
Functionality 1’’
…
Functionality j’’
Category n
PL
ST
MT
LT
TL
ST
MT
LT
Figure 6: generic hierarchical structure 
for evaluating the importance of loss and 
duration before rehabilitation.  
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 a high weight for structures dedicated to the population services (SPS), structures 
dedicated to healthcare and homeland security (SHS), education and research 
institution (SER), Private dwelling (PD), structures dedicated to energy and water 
management (SEW) 
 a low weight for Governmental structures and administrations (GSA), structures 
dedicated to communication services (SCS), structures dedicated to transport 
(ST), structures dedicated to production (SP), structures of cult (SC), structures of 
culture (SCULTU), natural areas (NA) 
Table 2 summarizes the weight for correction factors to take into account the type of 
loss and the duration of loss for each category. 
Table 2: Correction factors in function of the type of loss 
 Total Loss (TL) Partial Loss (PL) 
 Long Term 
(LT) 
Mid Term 
(MT) 
Short 
Term (ST) 
Long 
Term (LT) 
Mid Term 
(MT) 
Short 
Term (ST) 
PD 2 1,179 1,135 1,135 0,372 0,313 
GSA 2 1,200 1,135 1,147 0,384 0,325 
SEW 2 1,194 1,164 1,164 0,569 0,446 
SCS 2 1,147 1,135 1,135 0,541 0,314 
ST 2 1,165 1,111 1,121 0,358 0,299 
SP 2 1,194 1,164 1,164 0,401 0,328 
SHS 2 1,147      1,135 1,111 0,348 0,289 
SC 2 1,200 1,164 1,179 0,585 0,486 
SER 2 1,161 1,135 1,135 0,372 0,299 
SCULTU 2 1,179 1,164 1,164 0,402 0,342 
SPS 2 1,200 1,135 1,121 0,359 0,299 
NA 2 1,237 1,200 1,200 0,532 0,400 
 
The correction factors due to the type of loss are more important for the total loss than 
for the partial loss (about 40% of decrease for long term and about 70% of decrease 
for a mid and short term). For a total loss, almost the same value is obtained if it is a 
short or a mid term duration loss while for a partial loss, it is observed a decrease of 
weight from the long term to the mid term (about 60% of decrease) and from the mid 
term to the short term (about 20% of decrease) of duration of loss. 
From these equations, a spatial vulnerability can be assessed by the use of a 
geographical information system. 
 
5. GIS tool and vulnerability mapping 
 
On one hand, computer science is the domain of scientific, technical and industrial 
activities related to automatic processing of information. On the other hand, 
geomatics covers the discipline of gathering, data-mining, analyzing, and delivering 
spatially referenced information.  Because geomatics is the source of geographic 
information and computer science gives rules for programming methods able to 
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automate complex treatments, the interaction between these domains quickly emerged 
as mandatory in order to develop the final code of vulnerability analysis. However, 
the most widely used GIS software are generalists. They offer a catalog of standard 
tools and are said to be “horizontal software” or “productivity software" because they 
can’t respond directly to specific problems. Adding its own components to a G.I.S. is 
possible and consists in the implementation of packages that are designed for a 
specific application. Then, these specific add-ons make “vertical software”. 
Developing a specific G.I.S. add-on requires a thoughtful approach in users’ 
requirements and technical options of implementation. In particular, the analysis of 
the technical elements such as the software, data and characteristics of the future 
G.I.S. tool, are to be studied (Ayral, 2010). That is why the relations and constraints 
due to this kind of software development will be explained through the following 
steps: what is the study area, which G.I.S. approach was followed, to conclude by 
some examples of maps resulting from analysis. 
 
5.1 Characterisation of the study area 
The Lot is a department of 5,230 km² split in 340 administrative areas, identifiable by 
the presence of a large number of economic, historical, touristic, cultural, and natural 
stakes. Two major rivers and a large regional park contribute to its environmental 
richness. The census conducted in 1999 established the population at 160,097 people. 
The urbanization rate is equal to 33% and the average population density is 31 
inhabitants per km². The following table (table 3) summarizes the distribution of 
population (by age) in this study area compared with France, and indicates that the 
area can be considered as representative of a larger scale territory. 
Table 3: distribution of population 
 Department France 
Under 20 years old 20,3 % 25,9 % 
20 to 59 years old 48,6 % 53,8 % 
60 and older 31,1 % 20,3 % 
The Lot has an economical network composed by many small and medium industrial 
enterprises which can be regrouped in four main activities: mechanical, food 
processing, electrical engineering and electronics. This territory is also an interesting 
study area because it includes a balanced number of functional stakes (see table 4) 
that generate employment: 
Table 4: balance number of functional stakes 
 Services Employees 
 Total % Total % 
Hotels, catering and other accommodations 1045 12.5 1751 6.0 
Transport et communications 428 5.1 1073 3.7 
Financial services and insurance 340 4.1 1458 5.0 
Real estate 186 2.2 188 0.6 
Business Services 1434 17.2 4744 16.2 
Community and personal services 2562 30.8 2548 8.7 
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Education 459 5.5 4249 14.5 
Health and social services 1302 15.6 7056 24.1 
Administration 579 7.0 6219 21.2 
Total 8335 100 29286 100 
 
In order to characterize the study area, the territory will be cut into meshes (by default 
250x250m) by the GIS tool (METEHOR) to provide a pertinent representation of the 
features of the area. 
 
5.2 G.I.S. tool METEHOR 
A specific tool dedicated to the evaluation of the vulnerability (METEHOR) is 
developed in order to implement the methodology of vulnerability evaluation 
described in this paper. METEHOR is the acronym in French of « Module 
d’Evaluation de la vulnérabilité d’un Territoire pour les Enjeux Humains et 
ORganisationnels » which aims to assess human and functional vulnerability and to 
produce cartographical results. It has for goal to automate the vulnerability analysis 
on the MapInfo GIS, by the way of specific steps (Ayral, 2010). The first step 
concerns the configuration of cartographical databases to link the stakes typology of 
commercial databases to the ones defined in our methodology. The second one is 
consist in the creation of a spatial discretization grid (mesh) composed of a number of 
cells. The third one is to assess the vulnerability in each cell automatically. And the 
last one is to visualize the different layers of vulnerability. 
 
5.3 Examples of vulnerability maps 
With the help of the specific tool developed on the MapInfo GIS, different kind of 
vulnerability maps can be obtained. The following example maps (Figures 7, 8) 
concern a map of human vulnerability during the day (Figure 7, left), during the night 
(Figure 7, right) and a map of functional vulnerability (Figure 8) 
 
These maps allow performing a multi scale analysis: 
- at department / region scale to have a global view of the vulnerability state  
- at town or town area scale in order to highlight potential vulnerability spots 
In the example shown below (Figure 7, 8), the global vulnerability of a given area 
was calculated and gave the possibility for the user to visualize both the human 
vulnerability (during day and night) and functional vulnerability. It shows that human 
stakes might be strongly impacted in case of an accident during the day especially in 
cities and on main roads (first map from the left) due to the traffic of workers or 
tourists and goods transportation. But during the night (second map), the vulnerability 
of the same stakes is more homogeneous because there is a diminution of human 
activity and transportation at night. 
One the other hand, it is possible to see on the third map that the functional 
vulnerability is greatly spread on a large proportion of the territory: intuitively, the 
area may be containing sensible or critical stakes able to impact the functional 
balance of the department studied. 
This study allows obtaining a new representation to qualify the territory exposed to 
hazards. For potential accidents with very large consequences, as is it the case of 
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toxic gas dispersion, decision makers will have an integrated vision of the territory 
potentially exposed with: 
 the spatial repartition of people (day or night) and an easy identification of the 
most vulnerable part of the territory,  
 a location of main functionalities on the territory 
These data could be used in order to adapt risk analysis for an industrial site and its 
surroundings. 
 
 
 
 
Figure 7: map of human vulnerability during the day (left) and the night (right) 
 
 
Figure 8: map of functional vulnerability of a French department 
 
6. Conclusions 
 
A structured methodology is proposed to map the vulnerability of territory submitted 
to an industrial accident. This methodology is based on two approaches; the first one 
(quantitative) realizes a census of population following a structured way; the second 
one (semi quantitative) qualifies the vulnerability of stakes which contribute to the 
stability of the society. These two complementary approaches give an answer to the 
problem of vulnerability assessment and on the quantification of the different types of 
territorial stakes within the area. In order to qualify this vulnerability, the Saaty’s 
methodology is used, which is based on the use of expert judgments and hierarchical 
structures. The treatment of experts’ judgments allows obtaining weighting factors 
relative to each type of stakes. The methodology has been implemented within a GIS 
(MapInfo) to make available an operational tool for risk managers, like competent 
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authorities or risks experts to assess the vulnerability maps (human or functional 
vulnerabilities). The required information about the stakes can mainly be extracted 
from commercial databases, and the user is assisted in all the steps from the selection 
of the study area and the grids, to the identification and quantification of the stakes, 
while the vulnerability calculations are completely automated. Using this tool, the end 
users will have a formalized representation of the situation of the vulnerability of the 
territory in order to suitably manage industrial risks. Further developments must be 
considered, namely: 
 accounting for the interaction between networks which is essential to assess the 
functional vulnerability in a more realistic way, 
 defining new geographic levels of analysis named “area of attractivity” which is 
an aggregation of different districts in interconnection. 
 adding other levels of vulnerability, such as psycho-sociological or media related 
ones. 
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Abstract 
 
This paper presents a framework for supporting land use planning decisions around 
hazardous chemical facilities using a Multi-Criteria Decision Analysis (MCDA), 
which incorporates the special needs of the area under consideration. The decision is 
facilitated by a procedure that generates the efficient alternative solutions (land use 
patterns, LUPs) by examining   the consequences associated with each alternative. 
The results are presented on the map of the area, which gives an overview of the 
impact of each alternative. The decision maker (planner) can modify the proposed 
solution according to personal preferences and thus can judge the effectiveness of the 
new alternative.  The proposed methodology has been applied to a case study where 
an expansion alternative of a hazardous chemical facility is considered along with (a) 
existing and proposed uses of land, (b) the expansion necessities of the nearby 
community and (c) the overall environmental and social impact. 
Keywords: Hazardous chemical facilities, land use planning, risk assessment, MCDA. 
1. Introduction 
One possible way for managing the risk around chemical sites is through limiting the 
possible consequences of a major accident controlling the population exposed to the 
risks through appropriate land use planning (LUP) schemes. Member states in the 
European Union having recognized this necessity have undertaken the obligation to 
develop such plans under the so called SEVESO II directive of the European Council 
(1996). Indeed, it has been shown by several studies that protection of public health, 
worker’s health and of the environment can be greatly achieved through sound land 
use and emergency response plans. This problem, however, has not a unique solution, 
as different European Member States apply their own legislation.  There are three 
general philosophies regarding Risk Analysis ranging from a purely “deterministic” 
approach to one exhibiting an, as complete as possible, quantification of the 
uncertainties faced in this risk analysis. The methodology presented here has been 
proposed by the Systems Reliability and Industrial Safety Laboratory (SRISL) of the 
NCSR “DEMOKRITOS” and aimed at facing these problems based on the results of 
an earlier research project named “LAND USE PLANNING AND CHEMICAL 
SITES (LUPACS)” funded by the Commission of the European Union under contract 
No ENV4-CT06-0241 (DG12-DTEE). The present paper is based on a quantified 
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example taken from the industry; namely the establishing of land use decisions in the 
expansion of a stainless steel manufacturing plant is considered taking into account 
the existing and proposed uses of land in the area together with the environmental and 
social impact. 
The rest of the paper proceeds as follows: Section 2 gives a short description of the 
principles of the multicriteria analysis methodology used in the Land Use Planning 
process. Section 3 presents the case study and Section 4 gives the problem definition. 
In Section 5 the results of the case study and discussion on them are presented. Last, 
Section 6 contains the conclusions of the methodology application. 
 
2. The Multicriteria Analysis Methodology 
Decision making in real environments, especially when more than one stakeholders 
are present, becomes complicated by various constrains, such as the negotiations 
among a group of people with different background, the defeasible reasoning of each 
party and the varying level and quality of information, to name few of them. 
Additionally, decision makers have to be proficient in mathematics and have good 
handling of computer tools. 
 
The classical approach to a multicriteria decision problem can be distinguished in 
four steps, as mentioned by Keeney and Raiffa (1993):  
 
1 Determination of alternatives;  
2 Determination of consequences (which serve as decision criteria); 
3 Preference assessment, and  
4 Determination of “best” alternative 
 
The first two steps are common in all MCDA problems. Differentiation occurs in the 
last two, where the specific methodology for assessing preferences and “best 
alternative” may differ among various researchers. In this work the notion of the 
“Efficient Frontier” is used, as explained in Papazoglou et al. (1998 and 2000). The 
steps of the methodology are briefly presented below. 
 
2.1 Step 1, Generation of alternatives 
 
This step includes determination of the available alternative courses of action from 
which one must be chosen. In the land use planning context, alternative uses of land 
around a hazardous site constitute alternative courses of action and hence alternatives 
in the sense of the MCDA paradigm.  On the other hand the use of land around a site 
could be given and fixed and the alternative causes of action could consist in the 
sitting of a new installation or an extension of an existing installation.  In both of 
these cases, however, the changes in the sources of risk must have a geographical 
dimension in order to be characterized as a land use planning alternative.  As a result, 
one might have either only a few alternatives to choose from or a lot.  The developed 
methodology can handle either case but is more useful when there is a great number 
of alternatives to choose from, as the first case is trivial. 
 
The fundamental concept of the proposed methodology is that the area under 
consideration is divided into a number of smaller parts called cells, defining next a 
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number of alternative land development types (LDT) for each and every cell. A Land 
Use Pattern (LUP) is being defined over the area of concern whenever the LDT for 
each and every cell in the area has been determined and represents an alternative 
course of action. The number of possible LUPs represents the number of alternatives 
to choose from.  This latter number depends on two quantities: Firstly on the 
number of cells comprising the area of concern, and Secondly on the number of 
alternative LDTs available for each cell. 
The number of cells of an area depends on the shape and the dimensions of each cell.  
Any shape and dimension is acceptable by the methodology and the particularities of 
each cell are to be determined by the governing concerns of the land-use planners.  
Nevertheless, the developed methodology has considered the following types of cells: 
 Orthogonal Cells of User Defined Size 
This was actually an approach employed in earlier attempts to develop the 
methodology and it is presented here for the shake of completeness.  
 Ring Shaped Cells of Specified Dimensions 
This approach is equivalent to the ‘safety zoning’ concept, where ‘zones’ around a 
hazardous installation are defined in terms of distances. 
 Iso-risk Cells of Any Shape 
These cells are defined as areas characterized by the same level of individual risk or 
by a level of individual risk within a certain range. Individual Risk is defined as the 
per annum death probability of an individual living at a specific distance from the 
hazardous facility, as a result of any accident that might occur in this facility. 
 General Cells of Any Type 
This type comprises any type of shape and size of cells where these characteristics are 
determined by other land-use planning (e.g. existing development patterns), or 
geographical considerations. For this cell type the development of a GIS-based tool 
has proven particularly helpful. 
The second element in the generation of alternatives is the land-development types 
available for each cell.  The methodology accepts in general alternative LDTs that 
may be different for each cell.  Of course similar alternative LDTs for every cell are 
possible.  A fundamental property that an alternative course of action must have in 
order to be meaningful in a decision analysis context is that it must differentiate itself 
in terms of the expected consequences from other alternatives.  For this reason the 
LDT ought to be defined in terms of characteristics that change the consequences that 
are part of the problem.  That is why an alternative approach to the problem set up 
and to the methodology would be to first define the consequences against which the 
alternative courses of action are to be evaluated.  In any event the two stages of the 
methodology i.e. generation of alternatives and consequence assessment are 
interrelated and interactive in nature, so that they ought to be meaningful in the 
context of risk informed land use planning.  For example, two different building 
development types having different economic value but resulting in the same 
population density although of interest from a number of reasons (e.g. employment) 
are not of interest in the context of problem set-up if the set of consequences does not 
distinguish among various economic consequences.  If only a comprehensive overall 
economic consequence is considered the LDT with the best performance will always 
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be better from the other since they will be equivalent from the risk view point (owing 
to the same population density).  Since the developed methodology was mainly 
focused on the risk aspects of the problem, the LDTs considered and developed were 
those that differentiate the risk-related consequences.  
Another aspect of the alternating course of actions is that they refer to the eventual 
steady-state conditions. This means that if a particular LDT is chosen for a cell this 
represents the final state of development.  Present population density might be lower 
but whatever density is implied by the LDT chosen at the end might be achieved 
sometime in the future. 
 
2.2 Step 2, Determination of objectives and of consequences 
 
This step of the methodology consists of the development of the set of attributes that 
are used to evaluate each alternative course of action.  As mentioned in the previous 
step of alternative-generation these two steps are in practice interactive and iterative 
in sequence.  Firstly a hierarchy of objectives is developed.  The hierarchy is such 
that elements at each level represent sub-objectives serving the satisfaction of the 
objectives of the immediate level above.  The development of the hierarchy stops 
when each and every objective at the lowest level of development can be quantified 
by a scalar quantity.  Since our interest was mainly focused on the risk aspects of the 
problem, the set of the objectives developed has been detailed in the risk area and is 
more general in other areas of concern.  An example of the objectives and associated 
criteria or attributes is the following: 
 
Table I: Types of Objectives and associated attributes. 
Objectives Attributes 
Reduce the number of fatalities in the 
general Population (resulting from an 
accident) 
Potential Loss of Life (PLL) (=expected number of 
deaths) 
Reduce the number of fatalities in sensitive 
segments of the population (resulting from 
an accident) 
Potential Loss of Life in sensitive segments (PLLS) 
Reduce the number of injuries (resulting 
from an accident) 
Expected number of Injuries 
Reduce the level of risk at which population 
is exposed 
Number of People exposed to a certain level of 
individual risk 
Reduce the level of noise at which 
population is exposed 
Number of People exposed to a certain noise level (in 
dbs) 
Increase the overall Socio-economic well 
being of the population 
Total Socio-economic Benefit 
 
In order to calculate the consequences, i.e. the value of each attribute for each 
alternative course of action the following are necessary. 
For health and environmental type of consequences two types of information are 
necessary.  First, one must measure the intensity of the potential impact from a major 
accident in the chemical facility over the whole area, i.e. for health impact measured 
in terms of loss of life the individual risk profile is needed.  This profile gives for 
each point in the area of interest (on which a fine rectangular grid has been applied), 
the probability per year that an individual of the general population will die as a result 
of an accident in the chemical facility.  Similar profiles for risk of death for sensitive 
individuals or for risk of injury are necessary for the corresponding attributes.  For 
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environmental impacts other types of profiles as concentration of a particular 
substance at each point of the area of interest is necessary.  Such profiles are obtained 
from detailed quantitative risk analysis. Second, necessary element for attribute 
evaluation is the population profile exposed to the various types of health risk or 
environmental impacts. 
If the location of the hazardous sources is given and invariable for the problem, the 
risk profiles and the environmental impact profiles are given and fixed for each and 
every alternative course of action.  What changes in this case with each alternative is 
the population profile exposed to each type of risk.  If the location of the hazardous 
sources are varying as part of the alternative courses of action and the land use 
patterns are fixed then the population profiles are also fixed, while the risk profile 
ought to be recalculated with each alternative.  Finally, both risk profiles, as well as, 
population profiles are allowed to vary with each alternative. 
 
2.3 Step 3, Generation of the Efficient Frontier 
 
Classical MCDA approaches, after the determination of alternatives and the 
evaluation of each alternative on the set of attributes, involve two final steps: the 
assessment of preferences by the decision-maker and the choice of the most preferred 
alternative.  This in general comprises the assessment of a value function and/or of a 
utility function quantifying preferences among certain and uncertain alternatives, 
respectively, as described in Keeney and Raiffa (1993).  This approach, however, is 
not very practical or useful in a policy context where these decisions are negotiated 
among a number of policy actors.  As a result we have adopted a different approach.  
The corner stone of this approach is the fact that value tradeoffs among highly 
debated issues, as for example, economic benefits and public health consequences are 
not formally set. Such tradeoffs are unavoidable and are always made implicitly or 
explicitly when the final decision is made.  The methodology, we propose aims not at 
making such a decision but rather at creating a platform to facilitate the final choice 
by the appropriate people at the appropriate bodies.  In order to achieve this scope the 
concept of dominance is introduced. 
An alternative (I) is said to dominate another (II), if (I) is either better or equivalent in 
each and every attribute of evaluation and strictly better in at least one attribute.  
Comparison in one attribute is rather easy since it does not involve value tradeoffs.  
For example, if an alternative solution results in 40 deaths on the one hand and 106 
monetary units of benefit on the other, it is definitely preferred to one that results in 
50 deaths and 106 monetary units of benefit. In this case alternative (II) is said to be 
dominated by alternative (I). An alternative is called dominant or efficient, if there is 
no other alternative in the feasible set of solutions that dominates it.  The set of all 
efficient alternatives constitutes the efficient set or the efficient frontier, as described 
in Keeney and Raiffa (1993).   The efficient set is usually a small subset of the 
original set of all possible alternatives.  Determination of the efficient frontier for 
continuous decision variables is achieved with the help of techniques of multi-
objective optimization.  In the proposed approach both the decision space and the 
consequence space are discrete.  A particular mathematical algorithm is adopted that 
allows for the fast determination of the efficient alternatives out of the very large 
number of alternatives under certain conditions, as explained in Papazoglou, Bonanos 
and Briassoulis (2000) and in Papazolglou and Christou (1997). 
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2.4 The GIS-based tool 
 
It is often the case that the types of decisions that are made by public or private sector 
organizations involve geographically related data and information, a large number of 
feasible alternatives, as well as conflicting and incommensurate evaluation criteria. 
The use of a GIS environment offers in this case a solution. Indeed, a GIS application 
gives the decision maker the ability to interact with information from different 
sources. Such sources could be vector or raster maps of the wider considered area, 
information representing the distribution of parameters that will be considered (e.g. 
population), information of specific areas that are more sensitive and more special 
than others (e.g. schools, hospitals, parks, lakes etc.) and finally results of studies or 
models related to the risk induced by the operation of industrial installations like the 
Isorisk Curves. Such a GIS tool has been developed in the framework of this 
methodology and helps a lot in the visualization of information related with the 
decision process of land use planning based on the efficient frontier. 
 The present project has been developed under ESRI’s Arcview. The areas of 
interest (cells) are defined as vector polygons. Pre-calculated individual risk for the 
study area is used to calculate mean risk in each cell. Any other spatial or non-spatial 
data as population distributions, price of land etc. is also incorporated into the project. 
An external module is then invoked which generates the efficient frontier. The user is 
then provided with the following abilities:  
 She/he can select an efficient point in the consequence space and the 
corresponding LUP is presented in the main GIS window, or   
 She/he can create a LUP at will and observe the consequences this LUP invokes 
in the consequences space graph.  
It must be noted here that the visualization of the efficient frontier for more than two 
evaluation criteria (e.g. x1, x2, x3) is presented as its 2-D projects in all the planes 
defined by the criteria axes (e.g. the x1x2 plane, the x2x3 plane and the x3x1plane), 
while in Figure # 4, a screen shot of this tool is presented, where the efficient frontier 
is depicted together with the area digitized map and the LTDs applied. 
 
3. Case Study description and alternative building 
The hazardous installation is a stainless steel manufacturing plant established 
approximately 200 years ago and revamped on several occasions in the meantime. 
Since the early 1990s the company is one of the competing companies in the steel 
world market. The plant is situated north of a city with 8000 inhabitants. The original 
part of the city is built very close to the industrial area (for historical reasons) and 
contains some old wooden houses and the old church, all built in the era of the 
industrial revolution. There were changes since then as the old houses were 
demolished and new two and three storey residential houses were built together with 
a new shopping center, schools and day-nurseries at distances not longer than 900m 
from the plant.  Two small rivers and a canal run through the town stemming from the 
nearby lake. Water supply is of great importance to the factory owing to the steel 
annealing process it applies and is satisfied from this lake. For this reason severe 
environmental monitoring is exercised on the use of lake water, as it can potentially 
be endangered by the plant operation.  On the other hand, along the shores of the lake 
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there are a lot of summer houses, some of which are also used for permanent living, a 
situation which has put pressure on the Land Use Planning authorities and the 
politicians to make decisions about detailed Development Plans of the town and the 
greater area in the early 1970s. 
The dangerous substances handled in the plant, potentially harmful both to humans 
and the environment, are: a) Hydrogen Fluoride (HF) which is stored in a 30 m3 tank 
with a total use of  804 tons per annum; in the form of gas HF is very harmful and can 
be fatal to people, b) LPG ( butane/ propane ) stored in a 200 m3 tank rather close to 
the HF-tank; in the case of a leakage and fire a 20-80 m jet flame can cause severe 
injuries, together with the Boiling Liquid Evaporating Vapour Explosion (BLEVE) 
accident,  and c) Oil stored and used in buildings where there is a potential risk of 
fire; burns and injuries from the fire and suffocation from the smoke could be the 
result. 
In 1976 the company wanted to acquire more land for expansion of the plant (area 1 + 
2, see Figure # 1).  In parallel to the company’s wish to expand, the community was 
also discussing the idea of allowing the building of 110 semi-detached houses for the 
employees on land owned by the company. This plot of land is situated to the west of 
the plant (see Figure # 1). After some debate with the planning authorities a decision 
was made that only half of the area was included in the Development Plan (area 2, see 
Figure # 1).  
 
 
 
The authorities were concerned with the unwanted consequences regarding the 
expansion, which include the following: 
 An accident at the plant with HF or LPG involved could be fatal to people both 
on-site and off-site;  
 An accident while transporting HF or LPG to the plant could be fatal off-site;  
 A breakdown of the sewage system and other safety premises of the plant could 
be disastrous to the environment. 
While the positive impact can be summarized as: 
Figure 1: General view of the installation and surroundings division in regions 
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 New houses offered by the company to their employees;  
 Continuous production at the plant (5 shift schedule) could make it convenient to 
live close to the plant;  
 The company objective to be involved in the LUP-process was deemed favorable 
for the local authorities. 
 
These general concerns and social conflicts have been formulated in an MCDA 
problem setting, resulting in the following alternatives (see also Figure # 1): 
 
1.  Build or not 25-30 houses in Area 1. 
2.  Expand or not the plant in Area 2. 
3.  Build or not 20-30 houses in Area 3. 
4.  Build or not 30-50 houses in Area 4. 
5.  Add or not 250 children to school in Area 5, or remove school from Area 5. 
 
4. Case Study description and alternative building 
The three main steps of the methodology described in section 2 have been applied as 
follows: 
The first step, i.e. the generation of alternatives, is to define the regions for which a 
decision has to be made in the area around the site and the area of the possible 
expansion, as in Figure # 1. Then, according to the methodology alternative Land 
Development Types (LDT) are being defined in each cell reflecting the philosophy 
and the needs of the local or regional planners. However, one should stress that, in the 
case of already existing community plans and regulations regarding 
allocation/position of existing and future land-use patterns (as in this case study), 
there is little freedom in defining new land development types. Possible options are to 
propose restrictions on population densities in the direct vicinity of the plant. The 
economic benefit of both land-use pattern and plant extension has been determined in 
terms of capital gain (net present value). This includes: value of land (mainly based 
on the marked value of houses and industrial estate, which as mentioned in Luttik 
(2000) may be substantially differentiated in relation to their vicinity to the 
installation). As a consequence of that, for each cell one can assign two alternative 
Land Development Types (LDT) in each one of the areas 1,3 and 4 and three in Area 
5. Note that for Area 2 the question raised was not that of alternative LDTs, but rather 
a question that changes the risk profile itself. Each LDT, when applied to a cell, 
defines the population distribution and economic benefit in it, as presented in Table 2. 
In step 2, calculation of consequences, the criteria used in this case study in order to 
measure the consequences of each LUP are the following: a) Potential Loss of Life 
(PLL), which represents the expected number of fatalities among the population 
around the facility owing to an accident in the facility over a period of 50 years (plant 
operation “life-time”), and b) Net Economic benefit, which is calculated as the sum of 
the economic benefits implied by the LDT of each region in the area using the data 
provided by local authorities. 
The second of the criteria is related to the benefit of the land uses and is calculated 
according to the values that are presented in Table 2. Restricted areas, having a use 
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that cannot be changed or areas that are blocked do not affect the calculation of the 
value of the corresponding land. For any other LDT encountered within the problem, 
the decision maker has defined a value for the land that is assigned to the 
corresponding use. For the calculation of the  first criterion (PLL), Individual risk 
along with population distribution implied by each LUP are used through the 
elaboration of two quantified risk assessment (QRA) studies (one for the existing 
condition of Area 2 and one for the plant expansion in Area 2). 
 
 
Table II: Setting of the problem. 
AREA No 
Existing 
population 
Proposed 
population 
Existing benefit 
(monetary units) 
Proposed 
Benefit 
(monetary units) 
Area 1  10 109 10915 26897 
Area 2   Risk Increase 0 Benefit from 
Plant Expansion 
Area 3 115 235 29578 199979 
Area 4  123 323 52795 144070 
Area 5 (school area) 350 600     OR    0 
(2 alternatives) 
64590 129180  OR   0 
(2 alternatives) 
 
Synthesis of the Individual Risk (over an operation period of 50 years) resulted in the 
overall risk profile according to the methodology described in Papazoglou et al. 
(1992, 1996) which is presented in Figure # 2 in the form of isorisk curves of death 
probability of 10-6 to 10-8 per year.  
 
 
 
In step 3, the generation of the efficient frontier, the objectives in this case study were 
formulated as follows: a) Minimize the potential loss of life (PLL), and b) Maximize 
the economic benefit. There are 24 different LUPs for each alternative of Area 2.  
However, of interest is the set of efficient or non-dominated LUPs that is those 
solutions for which there is no other solution that is equal or better in both criteria set.  
Figure 2: Individual Risk Contours owing to plant operation 
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Two efficient frontiers were generated, one for each alternative in Area 2, containing   
eight efficient solutions for the non-expansion alternative and seven for the expansion 
one. These frontiers are synthetically presented in Figure # 3 assuming an expansion 
benefit of 200000 monetary units for the society as a whole. 
 
5. Results and Discussion 
As discussed in Section 4, both options a) non-expanding the existing facility, or b) 
expanding it, are associated with an efficient frontier representing the available land 
use patterns in the general area of the installation, as given in Figure # 3a and 3b. As 
the economic benefit of plant extension is being determined in terms of both of 
capital gain (net present value) and of social gain (employment increase), its value is 
influenced by many factors. Different working assumptions have shown that the 
curve in Figure # 3b is shifted upwards assuming higher values for the economic 
benefit of plant expansion. For the sake of analysis 200000 monetary units of 
expansion benefit have been assumed in Figure # 3b.  Following the constraints set 
forth by the planning team one tries to peruse the efficient frontier calculated for the 
expansion case (Figure # 3b).  Point A in the efficient frontier corresponds to the 
solution with maximum benefit and maximum PLL, with houses built wherever 
allowable. An alternative land use pattern is the one corresponding to point B.   
Moving from A to B means that not a full blown urbanization schema is followed. On 
the other hand if all restrictions in the uses of land are exercised, one is left with point 
E corresponding to the solution with the absolute minimum PLL and economic 
benefit for the expansion case (Figure # 3b).  At this point the efficient frontier can 
form the basis for a discussion on the available alternatives without formally 
establishing value tradeoffs.  For example, it can be argued and easily accepted by the 
various stakeholders that solution (B) would be more preferable than solution (A) (see 
Figure # 3b) since it implies a substantial decrease in PLL while the corresponding 
decrease in benefit might be judged as not equally significant.  Furthermore, it could 
be argued that D is preferred to E since the latter solution implies a large decrease in 
benefit with marginal decrease in PLL.  The whole discussion can then concentrate 
around point C and on whether the gains in PLL from the level implied by point A to 
the level implied by point B justifies the corresponding reduction of benefits.  If the 
answer is affirmative and if, moreover, further gain in PLL from D to E is judged 
marginal,  then any solution around point C might represent an acceptable solution.   
These considerations can be further facilitated by the simultaneous perusal of the 
implied LUP by each point of the efficient frontier on the GIS platform where the 
map corresponding to a chosen point in the efficient frontier is also visualized. In 
Figure # 3c the “superimposed efficient frontier” of the two decision possibilities (i.e. 
expansion – no expansion) in area A is presented, assuming again an expansion 
benefit of 200000 monetary units. Perusal of this frontier shows that this represents a 
synthesis in the decision space, as its lower part contains the efficient solutions of the 
“no expansion” decision, coupled with its upper part which contains points of the 
efficient frontier of the factory “expansion” decision. In other words, as it is common 
in everyday life, land use development decisions are tightly connected with the 
overall gain attributed to them compared to the risk they induce to the public. So both 
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expansion and no-expansion of the company could be interesting for the local society, 
if surveyed from different viewpoints. 
It is noteworthy, that in the efficient frontier of Figure # 3c certain decision couples 
are automatically excluded from the efficient set, as sub-optimal, e.g. expansion of 
facility and increase of school population. A final supportive use of the efficient 
frontier is that of sensitivity analysis where the variation of the most preferred 
solution as a function of the implied value tradeoffs between benefit and potential 
loss of life can be explored, if, for example, linear value functions, that is, a constant 
“exchange rate” between benefit and potential loss of life are assumed (cf. 
Papazoglou et al., 2000). Additionally, the use of the GIS tool, with an external 
module for the generation of the efficient frontier has proven very helpful. 
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Figure 3a: The efficient frontier for the option of non-plant expansion in Area 2 
Figure 3b: The efficient frontier for the expansion option of the plant  in Area 2 
assuming that the expansion benefit is 200,000 MONETARY UNITS 
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Figure 4: Screen shot of the developed GIS tool depicting a point on the efficient 
frontier and the associated LUP. 
 
6. Conclusions 
A framework that supports decisions for land use planning around hazardous 
chemical facilities using the advantages of a GIS environment has been presented. 
The proposed scheme contains all the stages that are necessary for the planner to 
define the problem in detail incorporating also the peculiarities of the area under 
consideration. The decision is supported by a procedure that generates the most 
efficient alternative solutions (LUPs) according to the consequences that each one of 
them causes, so that the decision maker can then choose one or more of them. The 
results are presented on the map of the area giving an accurate overview of the effect 
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Figure 3c: The overall efficient frontier including the expansion option of the 
plant  in Area 2 (expansion benefit is assumed 200,000 MONETARY UNITS). 
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that each alternative will have on the area. The decision maker (planner) can modify 
the proposed solution according to personal preferences or societal needs and thus 
judge the effectiveness of the new alternative. The use of the “efficient frontier” is 
proposed since it provides a platform that can facilitate the discussion between the 
various stakeholders as it removes from the debate a large number of “what if” 
questions by keeping only those solutions that cannot be rejected on “technical” or 
“scientific” arguments. 
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Abstract  
This paper regards the validation procedure of the Italian Guide CEI 31-35 formula, used to 
calculate the hazardous areas extensions in places where explosive gas atmospheres may be 
present. In industrial activity, a typical event which cause explosive atmosphere consists of  
damaging and leakage from unions, gaskets, valves of pipes and vessels. At this purpose, in 
this work it has been taken into account the accidental discharge of flammable gas into a 
quiescent atmosphere through an orifice. Validation has been performed by comparing 
calculated values with experimental data. Two gases have been taken into account: methane 
and hydrogen. Different scenarios have been analyzed, each one differing from the others in 
the gas release cross section and in the vessel pressure. Results show that the formula fits 
well not catastrophic industrial accident situations. 
Keywords: Risk Analysis, Explosive gas atmospheres, Hazardous Areas Extension. 
1.    Introduction 
Object of this paper is the risk assessment in industrial activities as regards releases of 
flammable gases from pressure systems, which can imply the potential for an explosive 
atmosphere. Such releases into the atmosphere can be expected to occur periodically or 
occasionally during normal operation from, for example, relief valves (‘Primary releases’). 
On the other hand, accidental releases, which are not likely to occur during normal operation 
(‘Secondary releases’) are to be taken into account; this kind of releases regards for example 
small leaks from pipe-fittings, joints, flanges, valve glands, seals of pumps. 
In the work here described particular attention has been paid to gases lighter than the air, such 
as hydrogen and methane. 
In order to guarantee the safety and health protection of workers potentially at risk from 
explosive atmospheres in industrial activities, hazardous area classification should be carried 
out as an integral part of the risk assessment to identify areas where controls over ignition 
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sources are needed, as regards construction, installation and use of equipments. Area 
classification is based on the frequency and persistence of the potentially explosive 
atmosphere and on the degree of ventilation provided to ensure that any explosive 
atmosphere does not persist for an extended time.  
The work here described particularly regards the determination of the hazardous area extent. 
The area where the concentration of the considered flammable substance is higher than the 
LEL (‘Lower Explosive Limit’) is, by definition, an hazardous zone; the area outside the LEL 
boundary may be considered a non dangerous zone, if the gas concentration is enough lower 
than LEL. Authors previously had studied a formula to calculate hazardous area extent 
whenever dangerous quantities and concentrations of flammable gas may arise; this formula 
had been analytically found out, based on the diffusion theory of a free turbulent round jet 
and it had been compared both with calculations performed by the analytical software 
‘Effects’ and with numerical simulations carried out with the Computational Fluid Dynamics 
code ‘Phoenics’ [1], [2] [3]. This study had been performed by taking into account: methane, 
ammonia and hydrogen, but also heavier gases as propane and butane. Furthermore the 
formula had been introduced in the Italian Guide CEI 31-35 [4], “Guide for classification of 
hazardous areas”, which, in compliance with the European Standard IEC EN 60079-10 [5], 
regards the classification of hazardous areas, whenever dangerous quantities and 
concentrations of flammable gas or vapour may arise. 
This paper illustrates the validation procedure of the formula, by comparing it with 
experimental data.  
2.  Materials  and  methods 
 
2.1  Method for calculating hazardous area extent 
 
The Italian Guide CEI 31-35 reports eq. (1) able to calculate the extent of hazardous area 
when a flammable gas is discharged into a quiescent atmosphere through an orifice. Looking 
at eq. (1),  the distance dz is the distance from the orifice, along the central axis of the jet, at 
which gas concentration is reduced to the lower explosive limit (‘LEL’) of the gas. 
This equation had been analytically found out by studying the released gas behaviour 
(subsonic or sonic), which depends on the containment vessel pressure value, Pr respect to the 
atmospheric one, Pa. Besides, it had taken into account the relationship among the 
concentration profile of gas, along the axis of the jet, the distance to the orifice and the jet 
discharge diameter. Finally it had to be considered the strong dependence between the 
discharged gas concentration and its density (thus its molecular mass) related to the 
surrounding air [6],[7],[8],[9],[10],[11]. 
 
dz =
5,2
kdz LEL
√Pr(M)
−0,4√S                                                        (1) 
 
where 
- kdz is a safety coefficient applied to the LEL for the calculation of dz 
- Pr is the absolute pressure inside the vessel [Pa] 
- S is the cross sectional area of the outlet [m2] 
- M is the gas molecular mass [kg/kmol] 
- LEL is the lower explosive limit of the gas [% vol]. 
Fig. 1 shows an indoor jet flow of methane computed by the Computational Fluid Dynamics 
software Fluent. Different colours indicate the concentration of methane in air. The parameter 
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dz represents the distance from the source of release at which the gas concentration (Xm%) 
along central axis, related to the gas concentration at the outlet, is reduced to the LEL. The 
area where the concentration of the gas is higher than its LEL is, by definition, an hazardous 
zone; the external area may be considered a non dangerous zone, if the gas concentration is 
enough lower than LEL; in fact, actually, the hazardous area is increased by the safety factor 
kdz (whose typical values range from 0,25 to 0,75 [4]), i.e. the distance dz is calculated at the 
kdz ·LEL boundary.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
       
Figure 1. Hazardous zone around a jet flow of methane 
 
Referring to the distance dz, the hazardous zone can be computed. Fig. 2 shows, as example, a 
gas release from a damaged flange. The explosive volume can be approximately calculated 
by considering the volume of a cone having height dz and depending on the jet direction The 
hazardous zone around the pipe is a sphere resulting from the envelope of all the possible 
explosive volumes. 
 
2.2  Experimental data 
 
In order to assess the validity of the dz formula, shown in eq. (1), experimental tests have 
been considered. The first one consists in natural gas (92% methane) supplied from a vessel 
via a pressure regulator (ranging from  3.5 to 71 bar) to a nozzle whose internal diameter is 
equal to 2,7 mm [7].                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                            
The second configuration consists of hydrogen leak through a circular orifice whose diameter 
is 0,5 mm. Hydrogen comes out from a 19 l vessel. By means of a valve connected with a 
pressurizing system, it is possible to change the storage pressure from 50 to 400 bar [12]. 
 
 
Figure 2. Hazardous zone around a jet flow of gas 
 
 
 
(Xm%<LEL)  (Xm%>LEL) 
LEL boundary 
dz 
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The third configuration consists of hydrogen releasing at 400 bar, through a 0,2 mm nozzle 
[13].    
The fourth configuration consists of hydrogen release, from a tank pressurized to 100 bar, 
through a 3 mm nozzle [14].    
For both methane and hydrogen, gas-air mixture concentrations have been measured along jet 
axis, at different distances from the release source.  
As regards source diameters, they are of the order of magnitude which is typical of small 
leaks. In fact these experimental data are used to validate eq. (1) which had been studied 
referring to releases from small orifices. 
It can be noticed hydrogen pressures are higher than methane ones; this is due to the fact that 
normally hydrogen is stored in gas cylinders at higher pressures than the ones at which 
natural gas is distributed. 
 
3. Results and discussion 
 
Fig.3 shows, for different vessel pressures, both experimental (points) and calculated 
(continuous lines) dz values which are function of methane concentration (% in volume) data. 
Source diameter is equal to 2,7 mm. 
 
Figure 3. Comparison between experimental and calculated dz values for methane 
releases 
Figg.4 and 5 show, for different vessel pressures, both experimental (points) and calculated 
(continuous lines) dz values which are function of hydrogen concentration (% in volume) 
data. Source diameters are equal to 0,2 mm, 0,5 mm and 3 mm.  
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Figure 4. Comparison between experimental and calculated dz values for hydrogen release 
(0,5 mm) 
In order to compare dz experimental data with the ones calculated by eq. (1), LEL has been 
substituted with the measured gas concentration values and kdz has been considered equal to 
1. 
As it regards both methane (releasing from 2,7 mm nozzle) data and the ones regarding 
hydrogen releasing from 3 mm nozzle, it comes out that the maximum percent deviation 
between experimental and calculated values is very low (11%). 
Instead, as it regards hydrogen leak from 0,5 mm nozzle, the calculated dz values are about 
1,7 times the correspondent experimental data and, as it regards hydrogen leak from 0,2 mm, 
the calculated dz values are about 1,1 times the correspondent experimental data. It is 
important to note that all hydrogen experimental dz data are lower than the ones calculated by 
eq. (1). Therefore, eq. (1) is precautionary and it turns to safety advantage, thus it can be used 
in order to assure that, at distances higher than the calculated dz, gas concentration is lower 
than LEL.  
Besides, it has to be taken into account eq. (1) estimates gas outflows without considering 
friction and contraction effects during discharging from the holes. This formula had been 
found out assuming an ideal maximum value of mass flow rate. Actually it has to consider a 
discharge coefficient. Literature [5] suggests discharge coefficient, Cd, values ranging from 
about 0,3 to about 0,9; obviously this factor is as higher as discharge section has lower 
values. Furthermore, the discrepancy between calculated and experimental data could be due 
to the fact that for small jets, there are more fluctuations in the resulting plume, which implies 
lower averaged measurements [15]. 
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Figure 5. Comparison between experimental and calculated dz values for 
hydrogen release (0,2-3 mm) 
4. Conclusions 
The work here described regards the determination of the hazardous area extent in places 
where an explosive atmosphere may occur, whenever sonic releases of methane or hydrogen 
from high pressure sources may arise. At this purpose the formula which had been introduced 
in the Italian Guide CEI 31-35 has been validated by experimental data on axial decay of gas 
from under-expanded methane and hydrogen jets. Results confirm the validity of dz formula 
as regards not catastrophic events where source diameters are of few millimetres. It is to 
understand in greater detail the over prediction for leakages from very small nozzles. 
Future development regards eq.(1) validation against experimental data regarding heavy 
flammable gases as propane and butane.  
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Abstract  
 
Field failures of embedded electronic systems are often caused by fatigue failure 
of the solder joints of the electronics components of their assembly. Solder joint 
fatigue results from thermo-mechanical damage accumulation induced by the 
component operating conditions. Finite element methods are broadly used to 
predict numerically the solder joint fatigue life. However, these simulation tools 
are based on a deterministic approach and thus do not take into account of the 
variability of the input parameters having an impact on the fatigue lifetime. In 
this paper, the probabilistic approach is developed to predict solder joints 
fatigue lifetime by taking account the variability of the input parameters 
Keywords: Reliability, electronic packaging, probability, fatigue, Finite element 
Introduction 
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Today, the European directives forbid to the electronics industry the use of lead 
in the electronic products. Environmental concern and public health have greatly 
encouraged this regulation. However, the leadfree alloys, generally named as 
SAC (SnAgCu) is not yet been fully characterized. A scientific and technological 
challenge should be made in order to conduct the transition of lead to lead-free 
technologies. The use of lead-free in new electronic packaging impact the 
reliability, where thermal loading influences greatly the response of the lead-free 
solder joints. In operation, the electronic components of embedded electronic 
products are often exposed to harsh conditions combining thermal cycling, high 
temperature, power cycling and vibrations. These severe operating conditions 
produce thermomechanical stress on the solder joint interconnects of the 
electronics assembly. The accumulation of stress cycles damage gradually the 
solder joints which leads to product failure. In order to be able to predict the 
reliability of an embedded electronic product, it is necessary to develop a 
rigorous fatigue model of the solder joint interconnects under thermomechanical 
stress.  
Most of failure in electronic packaging is due to fatigue failure of solder joints 
related to the thermomechanical damage mechanisms during the component 
operation life. The finite element method is usually used to modelling the 
physical failure in solder joints subjected to temperature cycling and to predict 
numerically the solder joint fatigue life. Nevertheless, these simulation tools are 
based on a deterministic approach, where the variability of the input parameters 
is not considered. In fact, uncertainties related to design, loading, and operational 
conditions lead to structural behaviour which does not correspond to the 
expected reliability. 
A more rigorous approach for predicting the fatigue life and the reliability of 
electronic packaging should consider the uncertainties arising from the random 
nature of the temperature fluctuations caused by power transients and thermal 
environment changes, the thermal expansion mismatch of the different materials 
of the assembly, the material properties and the fabrication process. In this study, 
a probabilistic model is developed and applied to assess the number of cycles to 
failure of the critical solder joint of a fine pitch package assembled circuit board 
of an embedded electronic product. This model is based on finite element 
modeling and on statistical methods such as Response Surface Method and 
Monte Carlo Simulations. The model takes into account the nonlinearities of the 
solder joint material properties and the uncertainties arising from the variability 
of the geometric and material properties of the elements of the assembly and 
from the thermal fluctuations in use conditions. It shows that uncertainties have a 
significant effect on the lifetime of the electronic packaging. 
 
Finite element modelling 
In order to predict reliability in service, it is a good practice in the mechatronics 
industry to perform a physics of failure approach in order to have a deeper 
understanding of the failure mechanisms. Experience shows that the reliability of 
a electronic assembly is often affected by thermal fatigue damage. For example, 
when damage accumulation in a solder joint reaches a certain critical level, this 
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leads to an electrical or a mechanical failure. The physics of failure approach 
requires models that predict the stress and strains in the packaging materials of 
the assembly when the device is operational and subjected to external 
environmental conditions.  
Several authors have developed sophisticated models based on the finite element 
method and on the failure mechanisms of the electronic package subjected to 
thermal cycling. Finite Element Method (FEM) is often used to predict 
numerically the mechanical solder joint degradation. This degradation evolves 
with repeated thermal and power cycling and ultimately causes solder joint 
cracking, fissure propagation and interconnect failure. Generally, experimental 
studies are performed in order to establish a fatigue failure relationship between 
the inelastic strain deformation and the number of cycles before failure initiation. 
FEM is then combined with this fatigue failure relationship obtained 
experimentally and with various thermal fatigue life measurements. Moreover, 
life prediction modelling of solder joints is used to virtually qualify a package 
without extensive test data.  
In Finite Element Modelling a precise description of the materials behaviour of 
each component of the electronic packaging is critical. FEM of solder joints is 
usually based on a physical model which includes solder viscoplasticity and 
creep behaviour. Generally, in the literature the solder behaviour is dependent on 
strain rate, stress and temperature. Therefore, the deformation of solder is 
described by time dependent viscoplasticity constitutive laws or time dependent 
creep combined with time independent plasticity [1].  
The most commonly accepted models employing the finite element method for 
thermal fatigue predictions are grouped in five categories. The first category uses 
a nonlinear slice model; the second category uses a global model with linear 
super element and nonlinear solder; the third category uses a linear global model 
with non linear submodel; the fourth category uses a nonlinear global model and 
nonlinear submodel and finally the fifth category uses only a global nonlinear 
model with fine mesh. This last category requires more computation time [1]. In 
this study a linear global model with nonlinear fine mesh submodel is used. 
 
Figure 4. Global finite element model of the 256-PQFP 
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 Global finite element model 
The electronic package under investigation is a 256-pin plastic quad flat package 
with 0.5 mm pitch gull-wing leads. Figure 1 shows a perspective view of the 
meshed global model. The model is based on the geometry of the Printed Circuit 
Board (PCB), the component moulding compound and its solder interconnects 
and gull-wing leads. The material properties are assumed to be linear. The PCB 
is the FR-4 and is defined by the orthotropic material properties presented in 
Table 1 and by in plane (x y) and out of plane (z) thermal coefficients of 
expansion.  
All the finite element models of this study are performed wit the commercial 
finite element code ANSYS. The global finite element model contains 117258 
elements and 238884 nodes. The 3-D tetrahedral structural solid finite element 
named SOLID187 with ten nodes is used. To simulate the entire assembly, 
boundary conditions are applied on the screw holes of the circuit board: all nodes 
of the screw holes are constrained to zero displacement in the x, y and z 
directions. The thermal loading defined by the thermal cycle profile given in 
Figure 2 is applied on the global model. This cyclic temperature loading 
alternates between 0°C  and 125°C, as shown in figure 3. The ramp rate is 
15 °C/min and the dwell time is 30 min. 
 
 Finite element submodel 
Calculus of the full model for one thermal cycle has a very high computational 
cost. In order to reduce the computational time, a submodel of the worst case 
solder joint is developed. This submodel is based on the geometry of the full 
model as shown in Figure 3. 
This submodeling technique allows us to model precisely the inelastic strain of 
the solder joints. It consists in describing the worst case solder joint with fine 
mesh elements and in taking into account material nonlinearities. The solder 
material is assumed to have a rate dependent plasticity. This finite element 
submodel is solved for one thermal cycle as shown in Figure 2. Table 1 presents 
the material properties used in this analysis. 
 
 
Figure 5.  Cyclic temperature profile 
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In the thermo-mechanical analysis of the submodel, the moulding compound and 
the Cu materials are assumed to be isotropic and linear. FR-4 PCB material is 
orthotropic and linear. The gull-wing leads are in copper, where is assumed to 
follow a linear behaviour. The SAC (SnAgCu) solder material is assumed to 
follow elasto-plastic-creep behaviour, as creep plays a very important role in 
deformation behaviour of solder joint at homologous temperature [2]. 
In the thermo-mechanical analysis of the submodel, the molding compound and 
the Cu materials are assumed to be isotropic and linear. FR-4 PCB material is 
orthotropic and linear. The gull-wing leads are in copper, where is assumed to 
follow a linear behavior. The SAC (SnAgCu) solder material is assumed to 
follow elasto-plastic-creep behavior, as creep plays a very important role in 
deformation behavior of solder joint at homologous temperature [2].  
 
 
Figure 6.  Finite element submodel 
 Material properties 
In solder joint materials, the development of inelastic strains is dependent on the 
rate of loading. Many authors have studied the response of lead free (SnAgCu) 
and eutectic (SnPb) solder joints during creep and proposed constitutive 
equations. One of the equations developed is Anand's model which incorporates 
viscoplasticity and time-dependent plasticity. Wang et al., [3] proposed a unified 
framework for the viscoplastic behavior of SnAgCu solder materials which are 
referred to the Anand constitutive equations. The Anand model is supported by 
the ANSYS code. The material parameters of the Anand model for SnAgCu 
solders are obtained from experimental results and by the separated elasto-plasto-
creep constitutive relations. These material parameters of SAC solder 
(96.5Sn3.5Ag) are shown in Table 2 as given by [3].The constitutive equation 
for Anand's model is: 
1
exp sinh
Q
m
RT
p A
s

 
 
 
 
  
   
  
      (1) 
where p  is the inelastic strain rate, A the pre-exponential factor, Q the 
activation energy, R the universal gas constant, T the absolute temperature,  the 
tensile stress    is the stress multiplier, m the strain rate sensitivity of the stress 
and s is the deformation resistance. In addition, s  is an internal state variable 
whose evolution is described by: 
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       (2) 
where 0h is the hardening or softening constant, a the hardening or softening 
strain rate sensitivity and  *s is the saturation value of associated with a given 
temperature and strain rate pair and is described by: 
         (3) 
Where is a coefficient for saturation and n is the strain rate sensitivity for . 
Table 1 Material properties and Statistical data of random variables. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 2. Material parameters of viscoplastic Anand model for SAC solder. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Thermal fatigue model 
ˆ exp
n
Q
p RTs s
A
     
 
  
  
sˆ s

A (s-1) Q/R 
(K) 
  m sˆ  
(MPa) 
N h0 
(MPa) 
a s0 
(MPa) 
2.23E4 8900 6 0.182 73.81 0.018 3321.15 1.82 39.09 
Description  Mean 
value 
Distribution COV 
FR4 – Young’s modulus (GPa) 
Ex = Ey  
Ez  
 
17 
7.45 
 
Lognormal 
Lognormal 
 
5 
5 
FR4 – Poisson ratio 
xy 
yz = xz 
 
0.10 
0.39 
 
Deterministic 
Deterministic 
 
- 
- 
FR4- Shear Modulus  (GPa) 
Gxy     
Gxz = Gyz 
 
3 
2.4 
 
Deterministic 
Deterministic 
 
- 
- 
FR4 – CTE (m/C°) 
xy 
z 
 
18.23 
58.72 
 
Lognormal 
Lognormal 
 
10 
10 
Molding Compound – Young’s modulus  
(GPa)  
11.7 Lognormal 5 
Molding Compound – Poisson ratio  0.05 Deterministic - 
Molding Compound - Shear Modulus ( GPa) 3.5 Deterministic - 
Molding Compound – CTE  (m/C°) 
xy 
z 
 
23 
80  
 
Lognormal 
Lognormal 
 
10 
10 
Lead (Cu) – Young’s modulus (GPa) 113 Lognormal 5 
Lead (Cu) – Poisson ratio 0.31 Deterministic - 
Lead (Cu) - Shear Modulus  (GPa) 44 Deterministic - 
Lead (Cu) - – CTE (m/C°) 17 Lognormal 10 
SnAgCu solder –Young’s modulus (GPa) 51.3 Lognormal 5 
SnAgCu solder – Poisson ratio 0.35 Deterministic - 
SnAgCu solder -- Shear Modulus (GPa) 18.32 Deterministic - 
SnAgCu solder – CTE (m/C°) 20 Lognormal 10 
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Solder joint fatigue life prediction involves combining finite element simulations 
with a thermal fatigue model. The fatigue model is generally obtained by using 
experimental data and accelerated testing. This model is used to determine the 
number of cycles that a package can sustain before failure.  
The models proposed to predict fatigue life may be classified into five 
categories: stress-based, plastic strain-based, creep strain-based, energy-based, 
and damage-based. Generally the stress-based approach is used in the high cycle 
fatigue where it is applied to vibration, shock and stressed components. On the 
other hand, plastic strain-based and the creep strain-based approaches are used in 
low cycle fatigue. The thermal fatigue-induced strains from CTE mismatch fall 
under this category. The plastic strain-induced fatigue is based on plastic 
deformation derived from the time-independent plastic material behaviour. 
While, creep-strain-based approach is based on the creep deformation derived 
from the time dependent effects. The energy-based fatigue models are based on 
the calculation of the overall stress/strain hysteresis energy, where the damage-
based fatigue models are based on computing the accumulated damage caused by 
crack propagation and fracture mechanics [4]. Since plastic strain is a dominant 
parameter that influences low-cycle fatigue, this study uses the Coffin–Manson 
type equation classified into the plastic strain-based approach. The inelastic 
strain is computed by nonlinear finite element simulation with unified 
viscoplasticity Anand model, which combines plastic and creep deformation. 
The Coffin-Manson fatigue model is the most widely used approach, where the 
number of cycles to failure Nf depend on the inelastic strain amplitude p, 
generally given as the following equation: 
 2
2
cp
fa N

          
    (4) 
Where, a is the fatigue ductility coefficient and c the fatigue ductility exponent. 
A variety of strain life engineering data is available on most of the solders used 
in electronic packaging [5].  For SnAgCu Solder, this law is identified by [6], 
where a = 3.0685 and c = –0.73. 
 
Probabilistic methodology  
The probabilistic approach aims at considering the uncertainties arising from the 
random nature of temperature fluctuations, geometry dimension of packaging 
assembly, material properties and thermal expansion mismatch. The 
mechatronics product assembly may fail if these uncertainties are ignored. So 
far, probabilistic methods are used to improve design robustness and to estimate 
the impact of parameter uncertainties on the system response. Moreover, 
combining probabilistic methods to the finite element simulations does not only 
enable one to establish the scope and the limits of usual deterministic approaches 
but improves on it by providing more information and effective utilization of 
empirical data. 
The probabilistic structural methods consist in determining the probability of 
failure of given structural systems. This approach is an extension of the 
deterministic analysis where the input parameters are not considered as 
Land Use Planning and Risk-Informed Decision Making   
116 
 
 
deterministic value in the mechanical model but as random variables. Monte 
Carlo simulations (MCS) are widely used to characterise the random response 
and the probability density function (PDF) of the response [7]. 
 
Monte Carlo simulation 
Monte Carlo simulation is a method which is widely used in the probabilistic 
approaches. MCS consists in generating a set of random samples. The 
mechanical model is run for each of these samples. The obtained results are then 
used to compute estimators of the response.  
However, to bring accurate results MCS needs a large set of samples. In the 
context of thermomechanical nonlinear finite element simulation, the 
computational cost makes the MCS impracticable. For this reason, the solution 
consists in building an explicit function which can approximate the finite 
element response. Such an explicit function can be obtained with the response 
surface method (RSM). The RSM explicit function is then used in MCS [8]  
 
Response surface method 
The response surface method allows the construction of a detailed mathematical 
model of the response [9]. RSM surfaces are built from numerical experiments 
that are carried out according to a numerical design of experiments (DOE). The 
surface method consists in approximating the finite element response, in this 
work the inelastic strain of solder joint. Quadratic response surfaces are 
considered to approximate the inelastic strain. This approximation is the best 
solution because it includes a possible calculation of curvatures and avoids 
possible oscillations of higher order polynomials. The approximation can be 
written as: 
1 1 1
n n n
p i i ij i j
i i j
c b x a x x
  
            
   (5) 
where c,  bi  and aij  are coefficients of this response surface to be obtained by 
regression, n the number of random variables and x is the realisation of the 
random variables. 
 
Numerical results  
The effect of uncertainties on the solder joint thermal fatigue lifetime is 
investigated. Material properties are given in Table 1. Geometric dimensions and 
temperature loading which are considered as random variables are given in Table 
3 and showed in Figure 4. 
Three cases are considered. The first case considers only geometric dimensions 
and temperature fluctuation as random variables. The second case considers only 
material properties and temperature cycling as random variables. The third case 
considers material properties, thermal loading and geometric dimensions as 
random variables. 
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Sensitivity analysis 
Monte Carlo simulation combined with the response surface give a useful tool to 
investigate the impact of the random variables into the fatigue lifetime. The 
Input/output Pearson correlation coefficients measure the effect of each input 
variables by the correlation coefficient. The partial correlations coefficients are 
based on results of regressions of the model on all input variables expect one. 
These coefficients are useful to measure the effect of her input variable on the 
response variable.  
 
 
Figure 7. Geometric dimension of the packaging in the x-y plane 
 
Table 3. Geometric dimension and thermal loading 
Description  Lower 
value 
Upper value Distribution 
TF : temperature C° 105 145 Uniform 
BRCH_L 1 : Joint length (mm)  0.5 0.7 Uniform 
Joint cross section 
BRCH_H (mm) 
BRCH_B  (mm) 
 
0.22 
0.17 
 
0.27 
0.22 
Uniform 
BRAS_EP : solder thickness (mm) 0.1 0.15 Uniform 
FR4_THICKNESS: PCB thickness (mm) 1.5 1.6 Uniform 
COMP_THICKNESS: component 
thikness (mm) 
3.1 3.3 Uniform 
 
 
Figure 5 to 7 show the sensitivity analysis of the three cases, where the impact of 
uncertain parameters on the inelastic strain response is showed. The impact of 
dimension uncertainties is clearly observed. In the first case, Figure 5 shows the 
impact of temperature fluctuations, which is mainly the principal source of 
increasing inelastic strain, as well as reduces the fatigue lifetime. The scope of 
this analysis consists to observe that increasing the length joint plays a 
significant role in reducing the inelastic strain, in this way increasing the fatigue 
lifetime, the same remarks are observed with the component thickness and the 
solder thickness. 
It is clear, that increasing the thermal coefficient expansion of the copper joint, 
of the FR4 and of the moulding compound increases the inelastic strain, because 
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of the CTE mismatch is increased. Figure 6 shows that increasing the Young’s 
modulus of the FR4 in the plane x-y plays a worst role on the fatigue lifetime, 
where it accrues the inelastic strain. This observation can be explained 
mechanically by the composite formulation of the FR4, where increasing the 
Young’s modulus in the plane increases the hardness of the material leading the 
solder to more stress arising from the temperature deformation. However, 
increasing the Young’s modulus in the z plane reduce the inelastic strain. Figure 
7 shows that when geometric dimension uncertainties are considered with 
material properties and thermal loading the sensitivity of uncertain parameters 
changes significantly, where the influence of the temperature fluctuations is 
slightly reduced.  
 
 
 
Figure 8. Sensitivity analysis of the inelastic strain in the first case 
 
 
 
Figure 9. Sensitivity analysis of the inelastic strain in the second case 
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Probability distribution of the response 
The inelastic strain distributions for these three cases are shown in figures 8 to 
10. The inelastic strain can be fitted by normal distribution. The Chi-square 
goodness-of-fit test is used in order to find the best fitting probability 
distribution. Tables 4, 6, 8 show that the normal distribution give a good fitting 
to the probabilistic distribution of the inelastic strain response, where the 
probability that the assumption of the null hypothesis can’t be rejected are 0.85, 
0.82 and 0.70 respectively. The probabilistic distribution of the number of cycles 
before failure initiation is showed in figures 11 to 13. The mean value of the 
fatigue lifetime varies between 2721 (when geometric dimension only are 
considered as random variables) to 4093 cycles (in the case when only material 
properties are considered as random variables). Similar results are given 
experimentally by [10] for 0.4mm pitch 256 pin QFP with SnPb leaded solder 
and using different temperature profile, where the dwell time at maximum 
temperature cycling  (125°C) were 20mn and the dwell time at minimum 
temperature (-40°C) were 4mn. Lau et al. 1996 shows that the 20 percent 
cumulative failure point occurred at approximately 5310 cycles. Tables 5-7-9 
show that the lognormal distribution with the parameters ( and ) and the 
Frechet distribution known as the generalized extreme value distribution with 
three parameters (shape parameter , scale parameter  and location parameter 
) can be used to modeling the fatigue lifetime. 
 
 
Figure 10. Sensitivity analysis of the inelastic strain in the third case 
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Figure 11. Inelastic strain distribution of the third case 
 
 
 
Figure 12. Number of fatigue cycles distribution in the first case 
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Figure 13. Number of fatigue cycles distribution in the second case 
 
 
Figure 14. Number of fatigue cycles distribution in the third case 
 
Table 4. Fitted probability distributions of the inelastic strain in the first case 
 Mean Stdv P Null 
hypothesis 
Normal 1.26 10-2 3.82 10-3 0.85 Ok 
Lognormal  
= -4.42  and  = 0.339 
1.27 10-2 4.45 10-3 0.48 Ok 
Weibul 
a =  0.014 and b = 3.66 
1.26 10-2 3.84 10-3 0.85 Ok 
Generalized extreme value 
(Frechet)  =  -0.27,   = 0.0037 
and   = 0.0112 
1.26 10-2 3.77 10-3 0.77 Ok 
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Table 5. Fitted probability distributions of the fatigue lifetime 
 Mean Stdv P Null 
hypothesis 
Normal 2683 1392 0 No 
Lognormal 
= 7.79  and  = 0.426 
2657 1187 0.007 No 
Weibul 
a =  3.042103 and b = 2.053 
2695 1375 0 No 
Generalized extreme value (Frechet) 
 =  0.32,   = 6.97102 and   = 
1.99103 
2721 1830 0.24 Ok 
 
Table 6. Fitted probability distributions of the inelastic strain in the second case 
Table 7. Fitted probability 
distributions of the inelastic strain in 
the second case 
Mean Stdv P Null 
hypothesis 
Normal 9.1110-3 1.5310-3 0.82 Ok 
Lognormal 
= -4.71  and  = 0.174 
9.1110-3 1.6010-3 0.70 Ok 
 
Weibul 
a=  0.0097 and b = 6.71 
9.1010-3 1.5910-3 0.69 Ok 
Generalized extreme value (Frechet) 
 =  -0.35,  = 0.0015 and   = 
0.0086 
9.1010-3 1.5110-3 0.65 Ok 
 
Table 7. Fitted probability distributions of the fatigue lifetime in the second case 
 Mean Stdv P Null 
hypothesis 
Normal 4094 1099 0 No 
Lognormal 
= 8.28  and  = 0.255 
4091 1062 0.41 Ok 
Weibul 
a =  4.51103 and b = 3.7 
4072 1224 0 No 
Generalized extreme value (Frechet) 
 =  0.01,   = 8.52102 and   = 
3.59103 
4093 1108 0.23 Ok 
 
Table 8.  Fitted probability distributions of the inelastic strain response in the third 
 Mean Stdv P Null 
hypothesis 
Normal 1.16 10-2 3.31 10-3 0.70 Ok 
Lognormal 
= -4.49  and  = 0.28 
1.16 10-2 3.42 10-3 0.66 Ok 
Weibul 
a =  0.0128 and b = 3.78 
1.16 10-2 3.43 10-3 0.68 Ok 
Generalized extreme value (Frechet) 
 =  -0.116,  = 0.0029 and   = 
0.0102 
1.16 10-2 3.26 10-3 0.64 Ok  
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Table 9. Fitted probability distributions of the fatigue lifetime in the third case 
 Mean Stdv P Null 
hypothesis 
Normal 3060 1241 0.0001 Rejected 
Lognormal 
= 7.94 and  = 0.39 
3061 1257 0.36 Ok 
Weibul 
a =  3.45103 and b = 2.639 
3068 1250 0.01 Rejected 
Generalized extreme value (Frechet) 
 =  0.096,  = 8.96102 and   = 
2.45103 
3062 1329 0.23 Ok 
 
 
Conclusion 
In this study a nonlinear thermomechanical finite element analysis is used to 
predict the reliability performance of the solder joint of an embedded electronic 
system. This approach reveals that the uncertainties related to the variability of 
the geometry and of the material properties such as Young's modulus, thermal 
expansion coefficient mismatch as well as thermal loading fluctuations have a 
strong effect on the lifetime of the electronic package. This efficient probabilistic 
approach ensures more design robustness. A possible extension of this work is to 
investigate the effect of solder voids and residual stresses induced in the solder 
joint during thermal processing due to the mismatch in thermal 
expansion/contraction of the constituents, which can have more impact on the 
lifetime of the electronic packaging. A spectral method also known as stochastic 
finite element method can be used in order to represent the complete randomness 
of the fatigue life in a more efficient way.  
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Abstract 
 
The objective of this paper is to detect and isolate the presence of sensor faults 
and in dynamical systems. Observers based on Kalman filter are used. This type 
of observers is then used to generate residuals based on the DOS observer 
architecture (Dedicated Observer Scheme). This diagnosis strategy is applied on 
the double-feed induction generator (DFIG) in wind turbines. The structure of a 
DOS is used for detection and isolation of multiple sensor faults. The approach 
is validated using signals obtained from a simulated DFIG system. The main 
contribution of this paper is the modelling of induction generator for wind 
turbines and the use of observers to detect faults in current sensors. The 
simulation model of DFIG is developed using MATLAB.   
Keywords: Diagnosis, Kalman filter, Observer DOS, DFIG, Sensors faults 
1. Introduction 
In recent years, environmental issues play an increasingly important role in our 
daily lives. This is particularly due to an awareness of the renewables energy, 
about the consequences of some pollution on the environment and climate 
conditions. This work aims to improve safety, reliability and performance of 
wind turbines and to predict the evolution of the mode of degradation in order to 
improve the availability of the system [1], [2]. Our main objectives are to detect 
and locate faults and to determine the origin of abnormalities (i.e. failure of 
sensors or actuators, system malfunctions).  
With the increasing size of wind turbines [3], there is a need to improve 
diagnostic techniques to detect the occurrence of faults. Several works have been 
oriented to the detection of faults and their isolation in the wind turbines. In [4] 
an observer was set up to detect sensor faults in the turbine hub. Reconfiguration 
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has been proposed in [5]. An observer with unknown inputs has been proposed 
[6], [7].  
In this paper, we are interested in the detection and isolation of current sensor 
faults. For example the inside faults in the DFIG are caused by the component of 
the generator (rotor and stator magnetic circuits, stator windings, mechanical air 
gap). The generator is often exposed to perturbation as the origin of the noise 
from the environment of the generator, the uncertainties of measurements, 
sensors faults or actuators; these perturbations have adverse effects on the 
normal behavior of the generator and their estimation. The construction of the 
observer is knowledge-based for the model of the generator to observe. In this 
paper observers are used as well [9].  The faults are considered as unknown 
inputs which should be estimated. This can be done by introducing internal fault 
models. Other examples of observers can be found in the litterature. An unknown 
input observer based scheme was proposed in [3] to detect such faults in a wind 
turbine. The proposed technique enables to detect and isolate multiple faults of 
current sensors and with DOS bench observer. Stator and rotor currents are 
measured by using four sensors in phases d and q. The application of DOS is 
possible if the system is observable. 
 
 
Figure 1. Structure of Observer DOS 
 
1.1 Energy Production of the DFIG System 
The double feed induction generator (DFIG) is one of the most used wind 
generator [8], Figure 2. Several recent papers, confirmed by industrial 
realizations, demonstrate the viability of this device in a wind system. The 
bidirectionality of the rotor converter authorizes hyper and hypo synchronization 
and control of power factor in the network. 
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Figure 2. DFIG structure with PWM converters 
The presence of a PWM converter may result in large variations of the rotor 
voltages with high frequencies. Rectifiers and inverters are used to solve this 
problem. Wind energy captured by the turbine is converted by the DFIG and is 
transmitted to the network by the rotor and the stator windings. The guidance 
system of the blades is used in order to adjust lift of the blade to the wind speed. 
Consequently power generated by the generator is limited. With such a system, 
the blade is controlled by a system called "pitch control". The blade pitch angle 
control system is designed for each blade. This independent regulation provides 
more degrees of freedom [9].  
2. Model of the DFIG  
 
2.1 Park Transformation 
The Park transformation is defined by the rotation matrix of the rotating field. It 
consists in the projection of the three phase coordinates (a, b, c), in frame (d, q) 
[10]. In this frame, the d-axis is chosen to coincide with the stator axis at t = 0 
and q axis is lagged by 90 degrees with the d axis of the rotation direction. The 
model of the DFIG is shown in eq. (2). 
 
[𝑃(𝜃)] = √
2
3
 
[
 
 
 
 
 cos (𝜃) cos (𝜃 −
2𝜋
3
) cos (𝜃 −
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3
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2𝜋
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) −sin (𝜃 −
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1
√2
1
√2
1
√2 ]
 
 
 
 
 
                                                  (1) 
 
The model of the DFIG is described in the frame (d, q). The following equations 
describe the global modeling of the generator. 
𝑉
 
 𝑉𝑑𝑠 = 𝑅𝑠𝑖𝑑𝑠 +
𝑑∅𝑑𝑠
𝑑𝑡
− 𝑤𝑠∅𝑞𝑠  
𝑉𝑞𝑠 = 𝑅𝑠𝑖𝑞𝑠 +
𝑑∅𝑞𝑠
𝑑𝑡
− 𝑤𝑠∅𝑑𝑠 
𝑉𝑑𝑟 = 𝑅𝑟𝑖𝑑𝑟 +
𝑑∅𝑑𝑟
𝑑𝑡
− 𝑤𝑟∅𝑞𝑟 
𝑉𝑞𝑟 = 𝑅𝑟𝑖𝑞𝑟 +
𝑑∅𝑑𝑠
𝑑𝑡
− 𝑤𝑟∅𝑑𝑟 
∅𝑑𝑠 = 𝐿𝑠 𝑖𝑑𝑠 +𝑀𝑖𝑑𝑟 
∅𝑞𝑠 = 𝐿𝑠 𝑖𝑞𝑠 +𝑀𝑖𝑞𝑟 
∅𝑑𝑟 = 𝐿𝑟 𝑖𝑑𝑟 +𝑀𝑖𝑞𝑟 
∅𝑞𝑟 = 𝐿𝑟 𝑖𝑞𝑟 +𝑀𝑖𝑞𝑠                                                (2) 
 
where V stands for voltages (V), I stands for current (A), R stands for resistors 
(Ω), ∅  stands for flux linkages (V·s). Indices d and q indicate direct and 
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quadrature axis components respectively while s and r indicate stator and rotor 
quantities respectively. 𝑤𝑠  and 𝑤𝑟  are respectively the stator and the rotor 
frequency [13]. 
2.2 Input Observation 
 
A state-space representation of the DFIG could be stated as follow: 
 
?̇?(t) = Ax(t) + Bu(t) + Ds(t) 
y(t) = Cx(t) + Ef(t)      (3) 
 
x(t) = [ids  iqs  idr  iqr]T 
 
  u(t) = [Vdr  Vqr]T 
 
s(t) = [Vds  Vqs]T 
 
y(t) = [y1  y2  y3  y4]T 
 
     f(t)=[f1  f2  f3  f4]                     (4) 
 
where x(t) is the state vector, u(t) is the control input, s(t) is the external know 
input, y(t) is the output vector and f(t) is the vector of fault [11]. The matrices A, 
B and D are detailed in eq. (5) and their parameters are given in Table V, 
therefore C=I4 is unity.  
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σ : is the coefficient of Blondel  
 σ =  1- 
2
h
L
Lr Ls
      (6) 
 
In our work, a discrete state-space representation of the DFIG is used (7): 
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xk+1 = Ad xk + Bd uk +Dd sk 
yk = Cd  xk + Ed fk     (7) 
 
The matrices Ad, Bd, Dd, Cd and Ed depend on the sampling time (Te= 0.001 s). 
For brievity, the discretization method is not detailed in this paper. 
3. Diagnosis based on a kalman filter bank 
 
3.1 Kalman Filter 
 
The Kalman filter was proposed by Rudolf E. Kalman in 1960 [13]. The filter 
uses the dynamical model, the input and the output measurements to estimate the 
state of the system. The Kalman filter is widely used in system theory and signal 
processing as a mathematical technique to extract a signal from noisy 
measurements. It’s nearly used in various applications in control [14]. The 
Kalman filter addresses the general problem of estimating the state x ∈ Rn, of a 
discrete-time controlled process that is governed by the linear stochastic 
difference eq.(8):       
  xk+1 = Axk + Buk + wk     (8) 
 
In addition, the relationship between the process state and the measurements is 
usually represented with the linear expression (9). [14] 
 
zk = Hxk + vk     (9) 
 
A, B and C are matrices of appropriate dimensions, y ∈ ℜ m is the measurement. 
The matrix H in the measurement equation eq. (9) relates the state to the 
measurement zk. The random variables wk and vk represent respectively the 
process and measurement noise. They are assumed to be independent of each 
other, and with normal probability density functions: 
 
𝑃(𝑤)     ̴    𝑁(0, 𝑄) 
                             𝑃(𝑣)    ̴    𝑁(0, 𝑅)                          
(10) 
In practice, the process noise covariance Q and measurement noise covariance R 
matrices may change with time. However, here, we assume that they are 
constant. 
We define ?̂?𝑘
− ∈ Rn as a priori state estimate at step k given knowledge of the 
prior process to step k, and ?̂?k ∈ Rn as the a posteriori state estimate at step k 
given measurement yk and prediction H ?̂?𝑘
−. 
 
?̂?𝑘 = ?̂?𝑘
− + 𝐾(yk  - H?̂?𝑘
−)      (11) 
The implementation of Kalman filter can be divided in two steps. 
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 Prediction step 
- Project the state ahead 
 
?̂?𝑘
−= A ?̂?k-1+Buk           (12) 
 
- Project the error covariance ahead 
 
𝑃𝑘
−= APk-1 AT+Q     (13) 
 
𝑃𝑘
− : is the a priori estimation error covariance  
 Correction step  
- Compute the Kalman gain 
 
Kk=𝑃𝑘
−HT( H 𝑃𝑘
−HT+R ) -    (14) 
 
- Update estimate with measurement zk 
 
?̂?k= ?̂?𝑘
−+Kk (zk - H?̂?𝑘
−)    (15) 
 
The matrix Kk in equation (15) is the gain, which minimizes the a posteriori error 
covariance Pk. 
 
Pk =( I - Kk H )𝑃𝑘
−     (16) 
 
The residual rK is determined by (17): 
 
rk= zk –H ?̂?𝑘
−      (17) 
 
zk and ?̂?𝑘
−are respectively the measurement and the estimate priori at step k.  
 
3.2 Filter Bank for DFIG 
The state observer for fault detection and isolation is a well-known problem. To 
handle this problem, a filter bank can be used to estimate the dynamical 
behaviors of the system in order to detect them to isolate the fault. The first kind 
of filter bank is the Dedicated Observer Scheme (DOS) proposed by R. N. Clark 
in 1978 [15], [16] and [17]. The second one, is the Generalized Observer Scheme 
(GOS) proposed by P. M. Frank in 1987 [18]. Each filter bank is composed of a 
number of observers, which are supplied with all inputs and different subsets of 
outputs. The observer which receives a faulty measurement provides a bad 
estimate of the variables, while the estimation of other observers converges to 
the measurements of corresponding outputs, except the output error. This scheme 
holds even in the case of multiple simultaneous faults. 
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In the structure of observers GOS, the principle is to synthesize a number of 
observers. Each one is insensible to a special fault. If a fault appears, all 
estimates will be incorrect except those of the observer insensitive to this fault. 
This scheme offers more degrees of freedom for the design of the observer and 
increases robustness.  
4. Simulation Results 
 
4.1       Residual Generation 
 
The generation of residuals, is a fundamental step in designing a diagnosis based 
on models. The generation of residuals is based on observers through, the 
reconstruction of the system outputs from the measurements and on the 
comparison with the signals measurements. In theory, a residual should be zero 
in the absence of fault and significantly different from zero in the contrary case. 
In practice, this condition is not exactly satisfied because signals are affected by 
noise. This is why it’s necessary to introduce detection thresholds to avoid false 
alarms. These thresholds can be set by the user from a statistical analysis of 
residuals and taking into consideration the uncertainties of modeling. The 
structuring of residuals can accomplish the detecting and isolation of the faults 
[7]. A structuring consists of constructing residuals so that each one is sensitive 
to a subset of faults and insensitive to the others. One way to reach this structure 
is to replace the use of one observer by using a set of observers, each of them 
being driven by some available information. A structure of residuals, in order to 
detect defects in the sensor, can be done using dedicated observers following a 
DOS scheme [7]. In this case, the ith observer is controlled by the ith output of the 
system and all inputs. The Figure 1, shows the DOS architecture. The defects of 
sensors affecting measurement y(t) are denoted f1(t), f2(t), f3(t) and f4(t). Observer 
1 is driven by the output y1, observer 2 by the output y2, observer 3 by the output 
y3 and observer 4 by output y4. We note later rDOSi,j(t) the fault indicator signal 
(residual) calculated from the difference between the ith system output and the ith 
output estimated by the ith observer. 
The table of signatures uses binary values: "1" when the fault affects the 
residuals; "0" in the contrary case. The observer 1 reconstructs the model output 
using only the output y1 and all inputs of the system. If the output has a defect 
then there is a bad estimate of the state and residual rDOSi,1 may be affected. In 
this section, the detection of current sensor faults by the Kalman filter will be 
treated. Then, the isolation of the fault will be addressed. For this purpose, the 
following fault scenario will be used: 
The first scenario is to introduce a fault only in y1(t). The fault was injected at t = 
0.3 s and disappears time t= 0.4 s, the fault consists of a step of constant 
amplitude equal to 15% of the maximum amplitude of the output (Table I). 
Table I: Faults Scenario I 
 Event Number Fault number Starting time (s) 
1 f1(t) 0.3 ≤  t  ≤ 0.4 
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The observer 1 reconstructs the model output using only the output y1 and all 
inputs of the system. This output has a fault, then there is a poor estimate of the 
state and residuals rDOS1,1, rDOS1,2 rDOS1,3  and rDOS1,4 are away from zero in Figure 
5. The failure of y1 is detected and isolated as shown in Figures 4 and 5. 
 
 
Figure 3: Rotor currents and stator current, Idr presents a fault 
  
 
                Figure 4: Detail of residuals rDOSi,1 obtained from the for observer 1, 2, 3 and 4 
 
 
Figure 5: Detail of residuals rDOS1,i obtained from observer 1 
 
The logical rules of the decision unit allow the detection and isolation of the 
fault. The threshold is chosen equal to 3𝜎 (𝜎 is the standard deviation of the 
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signal).In this figure, we present the fault detection (Deti) the four residuals 
rDOS1,1, rDOS1,2, rDOS1,3 and rDOS1,4. 
 
Figure 6: Single fault detection 
 
The signature of fault f1 is given in Table II.  
Table II:  Signature of fault f1  
 Obs1 Obs2 
 𝑟1,1 𝑟1,2 𝑟1,3 𝑟1,4 𝑟2,1 𝑟2,2 𝑟2,3 𝑟2,4 
𝑓1 1 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 
 Obs3 Obs4 
 𝑟3,1 𝑟3,2 𝑟3,3 𝑟3,4 𝑟4,1 𝑟4,2 𝑟4,3 𝑟4,4 
𝑓1 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 
 
According to this table, the signatures rDOS1,j= [1 1 1 1] , rDOS2,j= [1 0 0 0], 
rDOS3,j= [1 0 0 0] and rDOS4,j= [1 0 0 0] correspond to the fault f1, presented in 
Figures 4 and 5 and in Table I. It is possible to conclude the fault f1 appears in y1 
. 
The second scenario consists to introduce multiple faults in the outputs y1 and y3, 
the following fault scenario will be used, see Table III. 
 
Table III:  Fault scenario II  
Event Number Sensor fault  Starting time (s) 
1 f1 (t)  0.9 ≤  t  ≤1 
2 f3(t) 0.9 ≤  t  ≤1 
 
It should be noted that in the simulation a measured noise is added to the output 
of the DFIG (here, a random signal with zero mean and variance equal 1). Fault 
detection and isolation of the sensor are made by analyzing the residuals rDOSi1, 
rDOSi,2, rDOSi,3, and rDOSi,4, according to the table of signatures (Table IV). In the 
absence of sensors faults, the residuals are statistically zero. This information is 
confirmed by other observers. It is possible to conclude that the fault f1 appear in 
the output y1 in interval 0.9(s) ≤ t ≤ 1(s), and that the fault f3 appear in the output 
y3 in interval 0.9(s) ≤ t ≤ 1(s). 
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                             Figure 7: Rotor currents and stator current, Idr and Iqr 
                             present a fault (second scenario)   
 
 
                                 Figure 8. Multiple fault detection  
The residuals rDOS1,j and rDOS3,j match the signature of faults f1 and f3 on the 
output y1 and y3. This information is confirmed by the residual (rDOS1,2 ,rDOS3,2)  
in observer 2 and observer4 (rDOS1,4 ,rDOS3,4). Applying a similar reasoning, one 
can conclude that the two faults occur simultaneously on the 2 outputs. Table IV 
presents the signatures of the different faults. 
Table IV Signatures of the Faults 
 Obs1 Obs2 Obs3 Obs4 
 𝑟1,1 𝑟1,2 𝑟1,3 𝑟1,4 𝑟2,1 𝑟2,2 𝑟2,3 𝑟2,4 𝑟3,1 𝑟3,2 𝑟3,3 𝑟3,4 𝑟4,1 𝑟4,2 𝑟4,3 𝑟4,4 
𝑓1 1 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 
𝑓2 0 1 0 0 1 1 1 1 0 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 
𝑓3 0 0 1 0 0 0 1 0 1 1 1 1 0 0 1 0 
𝑓4 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 1 1 1 1 
 
Table.V Parameters of the DFIG 22kW Stator : 400 V 41 A, Rotor 255 V 53A [3]: 
Parameters Values Meaning 
Lh 45.8  mH Mutual inductance 
Ls 46.8   mH Stator inductance 
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Lr 46.8  mH Rotor Inductance 
Rs 0.1315 Ω Stator resistor 
Rr 0.1070 Ω Rotor resistor 
P 2 Pairs of poles 
 
5. Conclusion 
 
In this paper, the problem of current sensor fault detection and isolation, for 
double-fed induction generator driven by a wind turbine application has been 
addressed. An observer scheme and a statistical detection algorithm have been 
used as residual generation and decision system, respectively. The approach has 
been validated using simulated signals of a double-fed induction generator for 
wind turbine. Through simulations, it has been demonstrated that multiple 
current sensor faults for rotor and stator have been correctly detected and isolated 
with a DOS observer scheme. The results obtained show the effectiveness of this 
technique, if one makes a good choice of the detection threshold. The future 
extension of this work is to improve the performance of observers and 
insensitivity on measurement noise, in a test bank in real time. We are interesting 
in the FDI problem for other sensors of wind turbine (voltage, wind speed). The 
FDI problem for time varying rotational speed of the rotor will also be studied. 
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Abstract. 
 During their duty cycle, embedded mechatronic systems are subjected to 
vibration loading that may cause solder joint failure. The estimation of expected 
life for this type of systems relies heavily on a sound knowledge of the dynamic 
properties of involved materials. In this paper we present how to fit a  
probabilistic model of the mechanical behavior of a mechatronics product with 
experimental data obtained by laser Doppler vibrometry (LDV) measurements. 
Moreover, the inverse probabilistic problem allows  to quantify the uncertainty 
on material properties for a better assessment of the random response of the 
numerical model 
Keywords.  Mechatronic, Stochastic, Identification, Optimization. 
 
1 INTRODUCTION 
Embedded mechatronics systems are used in industrial equipment, 
automobiles, medical equipment, and various portable devices. In service, these 
mechatronics systems are submitted to mechanical (shock, vibration) and thermal 
(temperature variations) loading that may cause solder joint fatigue failure. The 
estimation of expected life relies heavily on a good knowledge of the dynamic 
properties of the involved materials. 
   Numerical simulation is often used to describe the mechanical behavior of 
these systems.However, the challenge of the numerical simulation in 
mechatronics is the complexity introduced by the multi-physical loads applied on 
the mechatronics system (mechanical, thermal, electrical, magnetic, etc.). Further 
complexity is due to the miniaturization of the system and to the high 
heterogeneity of the materials involved. 
In this paper we present a numerical simulation of the vibration behavior of a 
surface mount electronic board using ANSYS finite element code (ANSYS 
Guide 2011). We start with a comparison between the numerical simulations of 
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our Finite Element Model (FEM) and the experimental results obtained by an 
optical non contact measurement technique. Afterwards, we determine the elastic 
parameters (i.e., Young's modulus, density, etc.) of the materials used for the 
electronic structure.  
However, the knowledge of the mechanical properties is imperfect, due to 
inherent measurement uncertainty. Uncertainties on the geometry, material 
properties, border conditions or the applied load, play an important role in the 
validation of the finite element model. The following approach aims to assess the 
randomness of the response of the numerical model in order to obtain a good 
match between the experimental and numerical results.  This approach is split 
into two stages.  
The first stage consists in a deterministic parametric identification method in 
order to find the numerical values of the different material parameters. This 
parametric identification problem is formulated as an optimization problem in 
order to minimize the gap between the experimental and the simulated results. 
Two families of algorithms can be used to solve this type of problem:  
• Exploratory algorithms, requiring only the assessment of the cost functions, 
• Gradient-based algorithms, requiring the assessment of the cost functions as 
well as the evaluation of their gradient regarding the parameters.  
In this work the genetic algorithm and the Levenberg-Marquardt algorithm 
are combined, in order to exploit the advantages of each method and to find a 
global optimal solution with a reduced calculation time. 
The second stage in this work consists in a new approach for defining the 
confidence interval of the PCB materials parameters, based on the Inverse 
Reliability Strategy. This method is applied to a FEM and its performance is 
compared to the Monte Carlo method.  
 
2. EXPERIMENTAL MODAL ANALYSIS  
The experimental study was carried out in the C.E.V.A.A (Automotive 
Vibration and Acoustics Testing Centre of Rouen). The main purpose of this 
study was to confront experimental results to numerical ones. The experimental 
setup uses a Laser Doppler Vibrometer (LDV) - a non-contact velocity 
transducer (Pryputniewicz et all, 1989), based on the analysis of the Doppler 
Effect on a laser beam emerging from a solid surface. This measurement 
technique has the following major advantages: 
 Avoids mass or stiffness loading (absence of a mechanical contact) 
 Allows for remote measurement 
 Measurement of moving components or structures 
 Able to measure on high or low temperature surfaces  
The experimental results obtained for the first ten eigen-frequency modes, are 
presented in Figure 4. 
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Figure 1: Example of solder joint failure (the most frequent type of 
failure under vibration loading). 
 
3. VALIDATION OF THE NUMERICAL SIMULATION 
MODEL  
 
Modal analysis is a method that allows determining the dynamic behavior of 
structures. In other words, the dynamic behavior can be represented by a number 
of reduced modal parameters: eigen-frequencies, damping factors and eigen-
modes. The dynamic behavior of mechanical structures can be represented by the 
following matrix equation: 
)(tfKuuCuM                                                     (1) 
where M, C, K are the mass, damping and stiffness matrix, respectively. u ,u , 
and u are the acceleration, velocity and displacement vectors, respectively. 
Eigen-modes and eigen-frequencies are calculated by solving equation (1) of the 
conservative system associated defined by  
0 KuuM                                                        (2) 
Numerical modal analysis was performed on a PCB of 170 mm × 130 mm × 
1.6 mm, fixed to its casing by five screws (four in each corner and a fifth central 
one).  The simplified model of the studied structure is shown in Figure 2.  
The PCB is composed of several layers of copper and composite material 
(FR4). A shell element type is used to modeling the PCB, where SHELL181 type 
is predefined in ANSYS software. The shell finite element is well suited for the 
modeling of composite materials. The deterministic simulation was performed by 
using mean values of the initial (before identification) characteristics of the PCB 
materials, these values are detailed in Table 1. The simulation results of the 
eigen-frequencies and the eigen-modes are presented in Figure 3, which are 
compared to the experimental results obtained by LDV. As we can see in Figures 
3 and 4, we obtain a good agreement between the experimental and the 
numerical results. We obtain a maximum relative error of 7% between the 
numerical and experimental eigen-frequencies. 
 
Land Use Planning and Risk-Informed Decision Making   
140 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2: a) Finite element mesh of the PCB and the main component b) cross-sectional area of 
the PCB 
 
Table 1: Statistical description of random variables 
 
Description and units Variables Mean Standard deviation Distribution 
Young's modulus of FR4 [Gpa] EX_FR4 17 1,7 Log-Normal 
Young's modulus of copper [Gpa] EX_CU 110 11 Log-Normal 
Shear modulus of FR4 [Gpa] GX_FR4 3 0,3 Log-Normal 
Shear modulus of copper [Gpa] GX_CU 40 4 Log-Normal 
Poisson’s coefficient FR4 PRX_FR4 0,14 0,014 Uniform 
Poisson’s coefficient FR4 PRX_ CU 0,35 0,035 Uniform 
Density of FR4 ([kg/m3] DENS_FR4 1900 190 Normal 
Density of copper [kg/m3] DENS_ CU 8930 893 Normal 
 
 
  
195 Hz 719 Hz 
 
 
a) b) 
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1354 Hz 
 
Figure 3: Simulated Eigen-modes 
 
4.    STOCHASTIC SENSITIVITY ANALYSIS  
Mechanical modeling of the PCB must take into account the propagation of 
uncertainty by relying on probabilistic modeling of fluctuations in the input 
parameters. This approach is often called “mechanical-probabilistic modeling”; it 
aims to establish the impact of uncertainties on the mechanical response.  These 
uncertainties are mainly composed of the inherent random input parameters (i.e. 
the geometrical dimensions, loading and the properties of the materials) and the 
uncertainties of modeling. In our study we take into account the randomness of 
the input parameters.    
 
 
Figure 4: Experimentally and initial numerically eigen-frequencies 
 
There are several approaches to analyze the propagation of uncertainties in 
the structural response (Helton and Davis, 2003). We use the Monte Carlo 
method to calculate the first statistical moments of the response. To do this, we 
assume that all the variables are random, and their probabilistic characteristics 
(i.e. mean, standard deviation) are given in Table 1. The statistical moments of 
the ten first frequencies, shown in Table 2, are estimated from 10 000 samples.  
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Table 2:  Statistical moments of the first ten eigen-frequencies of the PCB 
 
 experimental result simulated  result 
Mode Frequency[Hz] Mean[Hz] Standard deviation [Hz]  
1 146.9 147.1 (0.1 %) 6.89 
2 218.8 203.8 (6.0 %) 9.34 
 
The sensitivity analysis is carried out from the results of Monte Carlo 
simulations, using the Latin Hypercube sampling method based on the 
calculation of the coefficients of linear correlation (Nistor et al. 2003) (or 
Pearson’s correlation coefficients). These coefficients allow classifying the 
model input parameters based on their importance. The results are presented in 
Figure 5. This sensitivity study allowed us to take into account the parameters 
that affect the simulation model and minimize the gap between the simulated 
and experimental results. 
5.    NUMERICAL PARAMETRIC IDENTIFICATION 
The objective of this phase of the study is to estimate the numerical values to 
be assigned to the various parameters of the printed circuit board materials, in 
order to obtain a better match between the experimental and simulated results.  
The parametric identification problem is formulated as an optimization 
problem. To do this, the reduction of the number of variables allows accelerating 
and ensuring convergence. This parametric identification procedure is carried out 
by taking into account only the most influential parameters detected by the 
sensitivity analysis.     
 
 
Figure 5:  Sensitivity of the first eigen-frequency 
 
The objective function of the optimization problem is expressed by the 
discrepancy between experiment and simulation results for each eigen-frequency 
mode:  
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Where fnum,i is the simulated frequency, fexp,i is the experimental frequency and x 
is the vector of parameters to identify. To solve the optimization problem, we 
have proposed to combine genetic algorithm and a gradient-based algorithm, 
like the Levenberg-Marquardt algorithm (Perrin 2008) in order to find a global 
optimal solution in a reduced calculation time. The main steps of this approach 
are:  
1. Data initialization  
2. Finding a local optimum using the genetic algorithm 
3. Refining the search by Levenberg Marquardt algorithm, 
using the coarse solution provided by the genetic algorithm as the 
initial point. 
 
Figure 6 shows the estimation of the first ten eigen-frequencies of the PCB by 
using identified material parameters given in Table 3. 
 
Table 3: Identified parameters of the printed circuit board (PCB) 
Description and unit Parameters initial value identified value 
Young's modulus of FR4 [GPa] EX_FR4 17 17,43 
Young's modulus of copper [GPa] EX_CU 110 145,3 
Density of FR4 ([kg/m3] DENS_FR4 1900 1881 
Density of copper [kg/m3] DENS_ CU 8930 8939 
 
 
 
Figure 6: The first ten eigen-frequencies of the PCB before and after identification 
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6. MODELING THE VARIABILITY OF MATERIAL 
PROPERTIES 
Generally, a finite element analysis program starts with a set of input data 
such as geometric parameters, material parameters, loads and boundary 
conditions. The program then generates output data for the analyzed component 
such as temperatures, displacements, stresses, strains, voltages and/or velocities. 
Almost all input parameters are subjected to scatter due to either natural 
variability or inaccuracies during manufacturing or operation. In a probabilistic 
approach, the uncertainties on the input side are described by statistical 
distribution functions. Therefore, it is necessary to estimate the accuracy of the 
statistical characteristics using confidence intervals or limits. In this section we 
propose a new approach for defining the confidence interval of the PCB material 
parameters, this method is applied to a FEM and its performances are compared 
to the statistical procedures obtained by Monte Carlo simulations. 
 
6.1 Statistical procedures 
 
This step concerns the use of statistical procedures to quantify the true 
statistical moments of the probability distribution that was previously determined 
for each of the mechanical parameters. In this discussion, a two-sided confidence 
interval is referred to as a confidence interval, and a one-sided confidence 
interval is referred to as a confidence limit. The width of confidence intervals is 
characterized by the probability of falling inside or outside the confidence 
interval. The probability of the statistical characteristic of the sampled data 
falling outside the confidence interval is usually denoted with the symbol α. 
Consequently, the probability of the statistical characteristic of the sampled data 
falling inside the confidence interval is 1-α.  
The statistical analysis of sample data is based on some assumptions. One key 
assumption is the independence within the samples or, in other words, the 
observations are independent. This means that the results of one sample do not 
depend in any way on the results of another sample.  
 
Mean Value 
 
An estimate for the mean value of a random variable X derived from a sample 
of size n is:  



n
i
ix
n
x
1
1
                                             (4) 
The estimate of the mean value is a random variable itself and it converges to 
the true mean value m of the random variable X if the sample size n tends to 
infinity. By virtue of the central limit theorem, the distribution of the estimate of 
the mean value can be assumed as a Gaussian distribution. Hence, the 1 - α 
confidence interval is: 
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where:  
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 1nt   : inverse cumulative distribution function of the Student's t- 
distribution with n - 1 degrees of freedom. 
s: the estimate for the standard deviation of the sample data as given by (6). 
The confidence interval should be interpreted as follows: “There is a 1 - α 
confidence that the estimated interval contains the unknown, true mean value m” 
(5). 
 
Standard Deviation 
 
An estimate for the standard deviation of a random variable X derived from a 
sample of size n is:  
 
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n
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i xx
n
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2
1
1                 (6) 
 The estimate of the standard deviation is a random variable itself and it 
converges to the true standard deviation σ of the random variable X if the sample 
size n tends to infinity. The 1 - α confidence interval is:  
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where: 
 1
2 1


n  : Inverse of the cumulative distribution function of a chi-square 
distribution with n-1 degrees of freedom. 
The confidence interval should be interpreted as follows: “There is a 1 – α 
confidence that the estimated interval contains the unknown, true standard 
deviation σ” (Ang and Tang 1975).  
For n = 5000 and the confidence interval to 95% (α=0.05), we obtain the true 
statistical moments of the probability distribution that was previously determined 
for each mechanical parameters, this results are recapitulated in the Table 4. The 
material parameters of the Table 4 represent the equivalent parameters of the 
stratified PCB, for example the Young Modulus of the PCB represents the 
equivalent module of elasticity of the stratified PCB, where is composed on the 
FR4 and copper layers. 
 
Table 4: Confidence interval of the PCB equivalent material parameters 
Description and units Mean [GPa] Standard Deviation [MPa] 
min estimation max min estimation max 
Young's modulus of the PCB 
(GPa) 
27.277 27.381 27.485 2.6748 2.7462 2.8216 
Shear modulus of the PCB (GPa) 3.245 3.255 3.267 0.312 0.321 0.330 
Poisson’s coefficient of the PCB 0.1777 0.1781 0.1785 0.01 0.0102 0.0105 
Density of the PCB (kg/m3) 1696.9 1700.1 1703.3 82.721 84.930 87.262 
 
 
Minimum and Maximum Values 
 
The minimum and the maximum values of the set of observations are:  
 
 nyyyy ,,min 21min   
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 nyyyy ,,max 21max   
This means that the minimum and the maximum of a sample of size n taken 
from a population Y are also random variables. For the minimum value, only an 
upper confidence limit can be given and for the maximum value only a lower 
confidence limit can be derived. Since the Y1, Y2, ..., Yn are statistically 
independent and identically distributed to Y, the upper confidence limit of the 
minimum value and the lower confidence limit of the maximum value are:  
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Where FY is the cumulative distribution function, ymax is the upper confidence 
interval; ymin is the lower confidence interval,   is a constant and )%1(100   
represents the confidence interval. Obviously, the evaluation of the confidence 
limits requires the computation of the inverse cumulative distribution function of 
the random variable Y based on sampled data. This is explained in inverse 
cumulative distribution function, where it is assumed that the true cumulative 
distribution function FY is unknown, but can be approximated by the empirical 
cumulative distribution function derived from the set of observations (Figure 7). 
This method is applied to the PCB for calculate the upper and lower 
confidence interval of the first eigen-frequency. The confidence interval was 
selected to be 95%, the results is shown in Table 5. 
The values of the confidence interval bounds depend on the probabilistic 
characteristics (distribution type and distribution parameters) of each parameter, 
the disadvantage with statistical procedure that the distribution is unknown and is 
approximated by the empirical cumulative distribution function derived from the 
set of simulation samples; this can be influenced on the credibility of the 
obtained results. So there is a strong motivation to develop a new technique that 
can overcome both drawbacks.  
 
 
 
Mode 1 
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Mode 2 
 
Figure 7: Histograms and probability density functions estimated for the first and second 
eigen-frequency  
 
6.2 Inverse Reliability Strategy  
 
In this section we propose a new approach based on the Inverse Reliability 
Strategy for defining the confidence interval of the PCB materials parameters. 
The objective is to find the upper and lower confidence interval, the evaluation 
of the confidence limits requires finding the mean point ym, where ym that 
verifies the equality of reliability indices level relative to both sides of the 
confidence interval. The reliability index βc is evaluated by the Inverse FORM 
approximation: 
 
 fc P1                                                  (10) 
                                                                                     
Where Ф ( ) is the standard gaussian cumulated function and Pf is the failure 
probability corresponding to the confidence interval )%1(100 
     
 
Implementation of the new Approach 
 
The new algorithm case can be expressed by the three following steps (three 
sequential optimization steps) as shown in the flowchart of Figure 8: 
- Compute the numerical values to be assigned to the various parameters y
of the PCB materials, in order to obtain a better match between the 
experimental and simulated results. The parametric identification 
problem is formulated as an optimization problem. The resulting solution 
of this problem, as illustrated in Figure 9, is considered as a mean point 
ym. 
- Compute the lower confidence interval bound maxy of the PCB materials: 
the objective of this phase is to minimize the eigen-frequency 
corresponding to the mean point y in order to satisfy the required 
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reliability levels βc. 
 min :
: 0
m
c
frequency y
subject to   
 
 
- Compute the upper confidence interval bound miny of the PCB materials: 
the third optimization problem is to maximize the frequency subjected to 
satisfy the required reliability levels βc 
 max :
: 0
m
c
frequency y
subject to   
 
 
The reliability index is evaluated by:  
  niu
n
i
i ,...,1     
1
2
 

  ;   Or ui is the normalized variable µ. 
 
Figure 8: Implementation of the new approach 
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Table 5 shows the results of the new approach. This method requires less 
computational effort than the statistical procedures; allowing also an easier way 
to define the confidence interval. 
 
Table 5: Confidence interval of the PCB material parameters 
 
Frequency  
mode  
Statistical procedures with MCS New Approach 
Min [Hz] Mean [Hz] Max [Hz] Min [Hz] Mean [Hz] Max [Hz] 
1 127.50 147.01 166.52 130.59 147.01 161.20 
2 173.06 202.72 232.40 179.06 202.72 224.32 
3 291.80 344.34 396.88 298.57 344.34 385.27 
4 319.92 372.98 426.04 324.71 372.98 422.51 
5 373 434.67 495 391 434.67 443 
6 528 629.74 730 539 629.74 718 
7 617.12 715.44 813.17 631.12 715.44 797.17 
8 629 735.78 842 648.43 735.78 823 
9 787 933.69 1080 809 933.69 1067 
10 902 1059 1216 925 1059 1195 
 
 
7. CONCLUSIONS 
In this paper we presented the identification of the elastic parameters for an 
embedded electronic system under vibration stress. An experimental modal 
analysis was performed by means of LDV. The numerical simulations of the 
frequencies and the eigen-modes of the electronic board were validated from the 
experimental results. Stochastic sensitivity analysis was used to identify the role 
of the uncertainties of each input parameter in the simulation of the dynamic 
structural response. This analysis allowed eliminating the less influential 
Figure 9: Results for storage modulus Shear (left) and 
storage Young modulus (right) with their frequency 
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variables on the response, in order to achieve the deterministic and probabilistic 
parameter identification.  
A new identification strategy was proposed in order to minimize the gap 
between simulation and experimental results; as well as to determine the best 
statistical moments of the law of probability associated with the settings. Finally, 
a new method based on the inverse reliability strategy was proposed for defining 
the confidence interval of the PCB materials parameters. This method is applied 
to a FEM for quantifying the true statistical moments of the probability 
distributions and its performance is compared to the statistical procedures with 
Monte Carlo Simulations. 
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Abstract  
This paper presents a methodology and tool based on electro-thermal finite 
elements modeling intended to analyze the sequence of the events after 
emergence of defects in Power Microelectronic Devices. Finite element modeling 
of power device and its nearby environment is detailed. Such modeling is useful 
to Study the effects of delamination and bonding wire lift off on device transient 
electro-thermal behavior, then to optimize the  structure design and to guarantee 
a longer lifespan  of the bonding were. 
 
Keywords: Power module, Finite Element Simulation, Thermal Electric, 
Reliability, FORM,  Fatigue. 
 
Introduction 
Power microelectronic devices have a role increasingly growing up in transport: 
electric and hybrid vehicles, trains and aircraft. For these applications, security 
and reliability are a critical point, where the reliability of the power modules 
should be optimized. In other words, the packaging of power microelectronic 
device involves a reliability challenge. Generally, power modules contain several 
semiconductor dies and microelectronic components soldered into Aluminium 
substrate. These power devices are often exposed to severe operational 
conditions combining thermal cycling, temperature fluctuations caused by either 
power transients or environmental changes, along with the resulting thermal 
expansion mismatch between the various package materials, results in time and 
temperature dependent creep deformation of solder [1-4]. This deformation 
accumulates with repeated cycling and ultimately causes solder joint cracking 
and interconnect failure[5]. To minimize development costs and maximize 
reliability performance, advanced analysis is a necessity during the design and 
development phase of a microelectronic package[6]. This requires the utilization 
of a life prediction methodology that is based on the damage mechanisms 
experienced in a field operation environment.  The paper discusses the analysis 
methodologies as implemented in finite element simulation software tool and the 
corresponding results for the solder joint fatigue life. Simulated accelerated 
temperature cycling is performed to obtain the plastic work due to thermal 
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expansion mismatch between the various materials. Accumulated plastic strains 
were incorporated to predict the fatigue life [7-10]. 
Finite element methods are broadly used to predict numerically the 
thermomechanical behaviour of power modules. However, these simulation tools 
are based on a deterministic approach and thus do not take into account the 
variability of the input parameters having an impact on the response of the 
model. In fact, uncertainties due to variability in design, loading, and operational 
conditions lead to structural stress which does not correspond to the expected 
one. In this paper, a probabilistic approach to the reliability prediction is 
proposed by considering uncertainties related to material properties, temperature 
fluctuations caused by power transients and Thermal environment changes, 
thermal expansion mismatch of the different materials of the assembly. The 
structural reliability theory provides an appropriate approach to take account for 
uncertainties. The probability of failure of a power module is estimated, where 
limit state function is defined by the thermal failure mode. The ANSYS Finite 
Element Analysis software is used to solve the heat transfer problem response 
[16].   
The first stage of this work uses a numerical simulation to describe the electro-
thermomechanical behaviour of power microelectronic module to predict the 
chip junction temperature of this power module. A numerical 3D finite element 
model of the power device is presented by taking into account material 
nonlinearity properties. A coupled electro-thermal finite element (FE) analysis 
and thermal–mechanical  FE analysis is performed to analyze the mechanical 
behaviour of power module under steady and transient loading.  
The second stage focuses on the viscoplastic finite-element simulation to predict 
the solder fatigue life. three different architectures of solder were evaluated. A  
half symmetry model of stacked flash package are generated using ANSYS 
APDL script. The life cycle of the resulting packages were simulated under 
accelerated temperature cycling conditions (-40C to +125C, 15min ramps/15min 
dwells). Darveaux’s methodology is used in this study to predict the solder life 
of the power device [10-11]. 
The third stage aims to describe the probabilistic coupling methods to compute 
the failure probability and the Finite Element model of the IGBT module and the 
boundaries conditions. a parametric study of the thermo- mechanical reliability 
of wire wedge bonds by nonlinear finite elements analysis (FEA) is conducted in 
order to establish a tool to optimize the thermo-mechanical performance of wire 
bonds for high temperature applications.   
 
Finite element modelling 
Conventionally, high power electronic packages are of stack configuration. The 
silicon chips are soldered onto insulating substrates typically made of a ceramic 
layer (Al2O3or AIN) sandwiched between two thin copper layers, and the entire 
assembly of the die and the direct copper bonded (DCB) is soldered to a copper 
baseplate. Aluminum wire bonds and copper busbars interconnect the die, 
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substrate and module terminals. Typical example of this technology is the IGBT 
module. Schematic drawings of the module construction are given in Figure.1. 
Power device model is achieved with Ansys software using a 3D 
electrothermomechanical element type that has three degrees of freedom, 
voltage, temperature and displacement (Figure.2). This element solves the Ohm 
law and the heat conduction law for a static or transient analysis and takes into 
account the heat generated by Joule effect as well as material non linearity with 
temperature. Thermal conductivity and heat capacity of silicon are important 
parameters that can significantly influence power device cooling by increasing 
the thermal capacitive behavior of the silicon die with respect to the heat. 
 
 
Figure 1. (a) Schematic cross section of conventional multilayer structure; (b) IGBT module; (c) 
Solder fatigue; (d) Bonding wire failure. 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2. Schematics of electro-thermomechanical modeling with Ansys software 
 
The purpose of the FEM analysis is to  find the stress–strain distribution in the 
model under cyclic thermal loading. Since Pb/Sn eutectic and near eutectic 
solders are highly viscoplastic in nature, a nonlinear viscoplastic material is used 
for solder in the analysis, whereas the silicon chip, aluminum substrate and 
copper heat sink are considered to be elastic. Due to the CTE mismatch of 
laminated materials, under the cyclic thermal loading, the stress and strain 
development in the free edge of the solder layer will be the main concern in the 
design and fabrication of semiconductor device packaging [6]. 
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The viscoplastic model used in this study is Anand’s model implemented in 
ANSYS general purpose FEA program.  Viscoplasticity is defined as unifying 
plasticity and creep via a set of flow and evolutionary equations where a 
constraint equation is used to reserve volume in the plastic region[1]. A 
viscoplastic model which can be incorporated into commercially available 
software packages is proposed by Anand [12]. This model comprises of single 
scalar internal state variable "s", called the deformation resistance, to measure 
the isotropic resistance offered by the solder to the plastic flow. In this model, it 
assumes no explicit yield condition and no loading/unloading criterion used. 
Instead, it assumes that plastic flow occurs at all non-zero stress values. 
Therefore, Anand's model characterized the inelastic strains with an Arrhenius 
term for the temperature dependency and the stress and strain rate dependency of 
the Garafalo form. The constitutive equation is the flow equation as prescribed in 
Equation1. 
 
 𝜀?̇?  = 𝐴 𝑒𝑥𝑝 (−
𝑄
𝑅𝑇
) [𝑠𝑖𝑛ℎ (𝜉
𝜎
𝑠
)]
1 𝑚⁄
                                                                 (1) 
 
where 𝜀?̇?  is the inelastic strain rate,  A is a pre-exponential factor, Q is the 
activation energy, R is the universal gas constant, T is the current absolute 
temperature, ξ is a multiplier of stress, σ is the current tensile stress, m is the 
strain rate sensitivity, and s is the internal state variable (deformation resistance) 
and the evolution equation is: 
 
𝑠∗ = 𝑠 ̂ [
?̇?𝑝
𝐴
 𝑒𝑥𝑝 (
𝑄
𝑅𝑇
)]
𝑛
                                                                                         (2) 
 
wheres ?̂? is a coefficient for deformation resistance saturation value, and n is the 
strain rate sensitivity for s saturation. Anand’s model has been shown to provide 
reasonable results when compared to a combination of plasticity and creep model 
[13]. To model the material behavior of solder, nine material constants are 
needed which are: A, Q, ξ, m,h0 , ?̂?,n, a, plus the initial value of the deformation 
resistance. 
Simulation begins with creating the model geometry and appropriate mesh using 
the pre-processor PREP7 within the Ansys FE program. Figure.3 shows the 
meshed structure corresponding of the entire module. Note that heat stink 
components are excluded. model loading condition include volumetric power 
dissipation of 6W/mm3 applied to the active die area. 
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Figure 3. 3D model used in the ANSYS simulations 
 
Figure.4  shows the temperature distribution over the chip surface and metalized 
of the solder layer interface. as expected the highest temperature is located at the 
chip centre corresponding to the highest heat flux density predicted DC thermal 
resistance values are derived from the model output according to the equation : 
 
𝑅𝑡ℎ(𝐷𝐶) = (𝑇𝑗 − 𝑇𝑐 )/𝑃𝑑                                                                                   (3) 
 
where Tj  is the maximum temperature at the chip level,  Tc is the case 
temperature  
(25 °C) and Pd is the applied power dissipation.  
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Figure 4. Temperature swing near the location of maximum value in IGBT surface. 
 
As a result, the temperature evolution during a complete cycle for a point near 
the location of maximum value at the chip surface is given in Figure.4. At the 
end of power injection phase, temperature reaches 96 °C. At this time, we can 
see the temperature map within a DCB substrate in Figure.5 which shows a high 
coupling effect between dies. The temperature hollow at the center corresponds 
to the gate pad. It can be seen unequal heat flux density distribution is observed 
in the silicon chip area just above the region where most of the crack are 
concentrated. as expected the maximum temperature (Tj= 96°C) is reached at the 
lower chip and concentrated in a relatively small spot. the thermal resistance 
being almost double than that before cracking at that the point. this is because the 
heat generated by the power dissipated above the crack layer must first flow 
around the crack adding and additional thermal resistive path. Thus increasing 
the thermal resistance and so the temperature and at that location. 
 
Thermal modeling of effects of thermal fatigue 
 
This study focuses on viscoplastic finite-element simulation to predict the solder 
fatigue life of different solder configuration. Three different solder architectures 
were evaluated. A half symmetry model of stacked flash package are generated 
using ANSYS as a finite element solver. Models are simulated under accelerated 
temperature cycling conditions (-40C to +120°C, 15min ramps/15min dwells).  
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Figure 5. (a)Temperature map (°C) in DCB and IGBT dies; (b)Temperature along a central path 
on IGBT. 
 
 
Figure 6. Thermal Cycle Profile used for Analysis 
 
By measuring the crack growth rate of actual solder, Darveaux was able to 
establish four crack growth correlation constants (K1 through K4) along with two 
equations by which finite element simulation results could be used to calculate 
thermal cycles to crack initiation along with crack propagation rate per thermal 
cycle[10-11].  
Land Use Planning and Risk-Informed Decision Making   
158 
 
 
The layer of elements having maximum plastic work density is included in the 
calculation of the weighted average plastic work density, Wave  
 
Δ𝑊𝑎𝑣𝑒  =
∑ Δ𝑊𝑖  ∗𝑉𝑖
𝑒𝑙𝑒𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡
𝑖=1
∑  𝑉𝑖
𝑒𝑙𝑒𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡
𝑖=1
                                                                                    (4) 
 
where Wi designates the plastic work density in the ith element and Vi is the 
volume of that element.  A thermal cycle to crack initiation “No” is given by: 
 
 𝑁0 = 𝐾1(∆𝑊𝑎𝑣𝑒)
𝐾2                                                                                             (5) 
 
Crack propagation rate per thermal cycle “da/dN”: 
 
 𝑑𝑎/𝑑𝑁 = 𝐾3(∆𝑊𝑎𝑣𝑒)
𝐾4                                                                                     (6) 
 
Here Wave is the element volumetric average of the stabilized change in plastic 
work within the controlled eutectic solder element thickness. K1, K2, K3, and K4 
are crack growth constants, which depend on geometry, loading, and the finite 
element analysis method. Crack growth correlation constants K1, K2, K3, and K4 
are respectively 56300 cycles/psi, 1.62, 3.34E-07, 1.04. The characteristic solder 
joint fatigue life “α” (number of cycles to 63.2% probability of failure) can be 
calculated by summing the 
cycles to crack initiation with the number of cycles it takes for the crack to 
propagate across the entire solder joint pad diameter “a”. α is given by: 
 
 𝛼 = 𝑁0 + 𝑎 ⁄ (𝑑𝑎/𝑑𝑁)                                                                                      (7) 
 
It is acceptable to simplify the 3-D laminated microelectronic structure to 2-D 
plane strain problem. It should be pointed out that a more accurate stress analysis 
would require modeling the assembly with plate and 3-D interface elements. The 
boundary condition is that the nodes at the base are  fixed in both X and Y 
directions. Due to the symmetry of the structure and load, we only analyzed half 
of the structure. The points in the symmetric plane are  fixed in X direction and 
free in Y direction. 
After successive thermal load cycles, maximum plastic work/volume information 
were documented along with the stress strain information for solder. Figure.7 
below shows the accumulated plastic work in the solder from the finite element 
analysis. 
 
 
Model (1)                                  Model (2)                           Model (3) 
Figure 7. Accumulated plastic work in the different solder configurations 
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Finite element analysis results indicate that the outer edge element is the critical 
point for delimitation initiation. It is observed that there is significant plasticity 
in the solder layer mainly Table.1 indicate the detailed simulation results. 
Fatigue life calculated and also the plastic work accumulated in the different 
solder configuration. 
 
Table 1. Detailed Simulation Results 
 
 
Plastic strain accumulation and the worst solder location vary with various 
design configurations (figure.8). The stresses in various solder configuration also 
varies and the worst case found with the model (3). This means that the form 
geometry has an impact on solder plastic work and the fatigue life. 
 
 
Figure 8.Temporal evolution of the shear stress and strain in the solder joint 
 
4.      Modeling of thermomechanical stresses in bonding wire  
One of the most basic failure mechanisms of power device comes from bonding 
wire lift off. The root cause of this failure is the differences in coefficient of 
thermal expansion between silicon and aluminum that induces a high level of 
thermo-mechanical stress each time the power is undergoing a temperature 
variation. Such repeated thermomechanical stress generates plastic deformation 
between source metallization and bonding wires and leads at the end to bonding 
wire lift off. Therefore, it is meaningful to create a numerical tool to assess the 
stress levels in wirebonds of various materials and bond structures/methods in 
order to optimize the thermal reliability of wirebonds through minimization of 
the thermal stress. this tool would help us to design the geometry of the wire-
span, select the bond format, select the substrate and wire materials, and stress 
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the reliability of the optimized wire bonds. we described the probabilistic 
coupling methods to compute the failure probability and the Finite Element 
model of the IGBT module and the boundaries conditions. After that, a 
parametric study of the thermo- mechanical reliability of wire wedge bonds by 
nonlinear finite elements analysis (FEA) is conducted in order to establish a tool 
to optimize the thermo-mechanical performance of wire bonds for high 
temperature applications   
 
FEA Model 
 
Figure .9 shows the layered structure of the materials used in the model. This 
model contains a slice of the device along the wire and uses periodic boundary 
conditions to represent the effect of the array of wires. In order to further reduce 
the model size, mirror plane symmetry of the structure is taken so that only half 
of the model and the surrounding structure need to be included. Elastic plastic 
material properties are used for Cu and Al. Creep laws used for SnPb solder.  
 
 
Figure 9. The layered structure of the wirebond heel 
 
The temperature distribution and stress in model is shown in figure 10. For the 
Al wire, the stress concentrates at the wire die interface and at the ankle of the 
wire bond. 
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Figure 10. (a) Temperature distribution in wirebond; (b) Stress distribution in wirebond 
 
Probabilistic design method 
 
The probabilistic structural approach consists in determining, with a 
mathematical model, the probability of failure of  IGBT model [14]. Indeed, 
when we build a traditional finite element model, all the model’s input data are 
considered as fixed values and don’t take into account the natural scatter of the 
parameters. The solution to consider the natural variability and uncertainties of 
the input parameters on the model is to treat the input data as random variables 
defined by a law and its associated parameters. All relevant uncertainties 
influencing the probability of failure are then introduced in the vector X of basic 
random variables. In addition, the failure of the system is modeled by a 
functional relation G(X), called limit state function. 
 
Failure probability 
 
To evaluate the failure probability with respect to a chosen failure scenario, a 
limit state function G(x) is defined by the condition of good functioning of the 
structure. In Figure.11, the limit between the state of failure G(x)<0 and the state 
of safety G(x)>0 is known as the limit state surface G(x)=0. The failure 
probability is then calculated by: 
 
  
 
  n
xG
Xrf dxdxxfxGPP 1
0
0                                                         (8)                        
Where Pf is the failure probability, fX(x) is the joint density function of the 
random variables X and Pr [.] is the probability operator. The evaluation of the 
integral in (8) is not easy, because it represents a very small quantity and all the 
necessary information for the joint density function are not available. For these 
reasons, the First and the Second Order Reliability Methods FORM/SORM have 
been developed. They are based on the reliability index concept, followed by an 
estimation of the failure probability [15]. Who proposed to work in the space of 
standard independent Gaussian variables instead of the space of physical 
variables. 
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Figure 11. Physical and normalized spaces 
 
The transformation from the physical variables y to the normalized variables u is 
given by:  
   uTxandxTu 1                                                                         (9)                                                     
 
This operator T (.) is called the probabilistic transformation. In this standard 
space, the limit state function takes the form: 
    0 xGuH                                                                                                  (10)                                                                             
 
In the FORM approximation, the failure probability is simply evaluated by:   
 fP                                                                                                       (11)                                                                       
 
Where Ф(.) is the standard Gaussian cumulated function. For practical 
engineering, equation (11) gives sufficiently accurate estimation of the failure 
probability. 
 
Reliability evaluation 
 
For a given failure scenario, the reliability index β is evaluated by solving a 
constrained optimization problem (Figure. 11). The calculation of the reliability 
index can be realized by the following form: 
 
    0,min  uxHtosubjectuuT                                                       (12)                                          
 
The solution of this problem is called the design point P*, as illustrated in 
Figure. 11. When the mechanical model is defined by numerical methods, such 
as the finite element method, the evaluation of the reliability implies a special 
coupling procedure between both reliability and mechanical models. 
 
Random variable and limit state function 
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From the mechanical failure, we consider as random five variables defined with 
their density function. The parameters distribution type and value are listed in 
Table. 2. 
 
Table 2. Variable and law type 
 
                     
The limit state function, relating the thermo-mechanical failure of the wirebonds 
, is written to consider that the system falls into the failure field if the equivalent 
stress von mises at a potential failure does not reach a target value (equation 13). 
 
𝐺(𝑋) = 𝜎𝑡𝑎𝑟𝑔 − 𝜎𝑐𝑎𝑙𝑐                                                                                                
(13) 
 
σalc  and σtarg are respectively the number of the equivalent stress von mises 
computed by the finite element code and the objective stress that the system does 
not have to reach. In this initial configuration, the reliability index is equal to 
4.09 (which is equivalent  to a probability of failure Pf = 0.9591) with the fixed 
upper temperature Tmax = 100°C. 
 
For ameliorate the reliability level a wirebond interconnection, we used an 
optimization procedure minimizing the stresses at potential failure locations. The 
optimization problem of the wire bond interconnection can be formulated as: 
minimize the stress:  σ (x) = f (x1, x2, x3, x4, x5) 
subject to the constraints of upper and lower limits:  
                         𝑥𝑖
𝑙 ≤ 𝑥𝑖 ≤ 𝑥𝑖  
𝑢 .                                                                                     
(14) 
where x1, x2, x3, x4, x5 are the design variables as defined in Figure. 9.  
 
Table 3. Optimization results 
 
 
The table 3 shows the optimization results, the wire bending stress is minimized 
For ameliorate the reliability level  of the model. the figure.12 presents  the 
initial and  optimized design of the wire bond system. 
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(a) Initial Design                                             (b) Optimum Design 
Figure 12. Stress distribution in initial and optimum design of the wire bond 
  
5.     Conclusion 
The F.E. model studied in this paper is used to investigate  electro-thermal 
coupling effects within a power chip and its environment. Thus, all dissipated 
powers are considered (wires, metallization,and chip). Two kinds of model are 
used:  a ‘‘3D model” that only takes into account the The bonding wires, this 
model is developed in order to understand the solder degradation in IGBT 
modules, and a ‘‘simplifed  model” that  takes into account  the material 
nonlinearity properties of the chip and the viscoplastic behavior of the solder, 
this last is used to predict the solder fatigue life and to estimate the reliability 
level of the bonding wire. Such modeling is useful  for a parametric study of the 
thermo- mechanical reliability of wire wedge bonds, also conduct to establish a 
tool to optimize the thermo-mechanical performance of wire bonds for high 
temperature applications . 
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The risk of the hazardous freight transportation chain 
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LV-1002, Riga, Latvia 
 
Summary 
 
The transportation of hazardous freight is a significant part of Latvian economy. 
The potential risk presented by the operation of many facilities within the 
hazardous freight transit infrastructure is comparable to the danger presented 
by the SEVESO II objects; however, the legislation of the European Union does 
not currently stipulate any demands regarding the endorsement and control over 
the operation of such facilities that would be adequate to the danger represented 
by these objects. 
The legislative acts of the European Union effective to date do regulate the 
operation of every single object within the hazardous freight transport chain 
separately, with no regard to the integrated operation of such facilities within a 
common risk chain.  The new objects are approved for construction, despite the 
resulting increase in risks within the realm of their integrated operation. 
The approach to applying the results obtained during the risk evaluation in land 
use planning varies greatly in different major European countries. Currently, 
there are no common documents effective in the European Union that would 
regulate the issues of applying the results obtained during risk evaluation in land 
use planning.  
 
Keywords: risk assessment, dangerous freight, acceptance criteria, land-use 
planning 
The flow of hazardous freight within the territory of Latvia 
There are a total of about 50 high-risk objects in operation throughout the 
Latvian territory that are subjects to the provision of the SEVESO II directive. 
Most of them are port terminals located within the three major Latvian seaports – 
in Riga, Ventspils and Liepaja. These mostly manage the transfer of hazardous 
materials en route from Russia and other CIS countries to the Western Europe. 
The intensity of the hazardous freight transit flow through the Latvian territory is 
very high. Approximately 50 million tons of various freights are being shipped 
yearly through Latvian territory, from east to west. Most of this volume consists 
of the freight that is classified as hazardous. The largest share of its nomenclature 
is oil products, ammonia, acrylonitril, LPG and ammonium nitrate.  
In accordance with the data displayed in Table I, most of the hazardous freight is 
transported to Latvian ports by rail. Earlier transmission pipelines were used to 
handle a significant portion of hazardous freight transit. However, after the crude 
oil supply pipeline was shut down in 2006, the volume of hazardous freight 
being piped within the territory of Latvia has decreased drastically. At the 
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moment, there is one oil product supply pipeline what operates in Latvia, which 
is used to pump diesel fuel from Belarus to Ventspils.  There is situated 
4 million. m3 large underground gas storage at Incukalns, where the natural gas 
supplied from Russia is being stored. Latvian transmission pipeline system is 
linked into a common Baltic network, which handles the supply of natural gas 
from the underground storage at Incukalns to Estonia and Lithuania.  
 
 
 
 
Figure 1. The map of SEVESO II objects and railroad infrastructure. 
 
Table I: Freight flow, thousand tons,  adapted from [ 1 ]. 
Year Transported by rail Piped 
2004 51058 19409 
2005 54861 20259 
2006 48731 14543 
2007 52164 6497 
2008 56164 5033 
2009 53679 3771 
2010 49164 5635 
 
The hazardous freight business is a considerable part of Latvian economy, but it 
also represents a potential risk, what has to be taken seriously. The Latvian risk 
matrix for risks of state importance, displayed in Figure 2, assigns the position of 
the highest industrial risk in Latvia to the transportation of hazardous freight by 
rail. This is due both to the large amount of hazardous freight being transported 
and to the railroad accidents involving spillage of hazardous substances that have 
happened within the last 20 years. The Latvian risk matrix for risks of state 
importance was developed in 2011 on the initiative of the State Fire and Rescue 
Service of Latvia with the participation of the representatives of ministries 
Oil product objects 
Chemical objects 
Liquefied gas objects 
Natural gas objects 
Explosive substance objects 
Railway layout 
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responsible. The development of this risk matrix was methodically supported by 
the experts from PSI „Risks un audits” LTd. 
 
Consequences 
Figure 2. The risk matrix in Latvia for risks of state importance. 
Elements of the hazardous freight transit risk chain 
The diagram shown below displays a hazardous freight transit risk chain which is 
typical for Latvia and includes railroads, railroad junctions, and stationary 
dangerous objects, ports and sea shipping lines. The dotted line in the diagram 
separates those elements of the risk chain which are usually operated within 
urban areas and thus may be subjects to additional safety requirements. 
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One of the objectives of this study is to characterize and demonstrate the 
importance of complex risk evaluation being applied to the system of such 
facilities in general rather than confining oneself to evaluating the danger 
presented by separate facilities taking the Latvian case as an example. 
 
 
Figure 3. Hazardous freight transit risk chain 
Safest elements of the hazardous freight transit risk chain in Latvia are the 
stationary dangerous objects. This is due to the adequately arranged legislation in 
effect and the effective control. The SEVESO II directive has been implemented 
in Latvia since 2001. Companies what have applied this directive are obliged to 
assess the risk of their operations and to reduce it, if necessary. During the 
implementation of this directive, lots of companies that manage hazardous 
substances have upgraded their technical equipment and improved the process 
control.  
In order to describe the improvement of risk situation, the table shown below 
sums up the information on the decrease in the probability of serious accidents in 
the largest oil product terminal in Latvia „Ventspils nafta” terminal”, Ltd. which 
operates within the port of Ventspils. The oil products are delivered here both by 
rail and through a pipeline. The current capacity of the terminal reservoirs is 1 M 
m3. The terminal operates 3 railway tank unloading facilities and 9 pump 
stations. The data is acquired from the regular risk assessments gathered during 
the company’s modernization process. The upgrade itself was generally aimed at 
the replacement of the old technological equipment left from the Soviet times 
and at the automation of the process control and the safety system. 
Due to the provision of the SEVESO II directive, the stationary object control 
system in Latvia is also improved and currently ensures the operation of these 
facilities in compliance with the safety requirements. The control is maintained 
by both state and municipal authorities. At the state level, it is maintained by the 
Environmental State Bureau, which assesses the Safety reports and Risk 
reduction policies submitted by the companies. The State Environmental Service 
curries out complex inspections with the participation of the representatives of 
the State Fire and Rescue Service of Latvia and the Consumer Rights Protection 
Centre, what controls the operation of hazardous machinery. The hazardous 
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freightage 
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facilities 
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URBAN INFRASTRUCTURE 
Ship 
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facilities are subjects of control by municipalities exercised through the relevant 
environmental departments. 
 
Table 2: The probabilities of the worst accident scenarios at the „Ventspils nafta „terminal”, Ltd. 
adapted from [ 2 ]. 
Risk objects Assessment of 
1996 
Assessment of 
2001 
Assessment of 
2006 
Unloading facility  1.1 x 10-3 3 x 10-5 1.8 x 10-5 
Pump station 3.5 x 10-3 6.2 x 10-5 1.3 x 10-5 
Valve unit 6.6 x 10-4 3.5 x 10-5 3.3 x 10-7 
Tank park 2.3 x 10-5 1.4 x 10-6 5.7 x 10-7 
 
Despite the number of railroad accidents in Latvia what have decreased  over the 
past 7 years (see Table 3), the rail transport can surely be referred as to the 
weakest link of the hazardous freight transit chain in Latvia. There have been 4 
serious railroad accidents in Latvia where hazardous substances were involved in 
past fifteen years. The first was in 1998 near Vecumnieki. The wheel axle box on 
one of the railroad tanks got overheated, which caused the axle box and the axle 
to weld together. It resulted in the derailment of 14 tanks loaded with diesel fuel. 
810 tons of diesel fuel were spilled out and ignite.  The photos below show the 
rescue operations initiated in the aftermath of the accident. 
 
 
Figure 4. Photos from the site of the Vecumnieki railroad accident. 
In two years, the second accident of similar scale occurred near the Livberze 
station. This one was caused by a collision of a car with the train. The resulting 
derailment of 10 railroad tanks caused 770 tons of diesel fuel spilled out and 
ignites. The third accident occurred in 2008 at the Ventspils 2 railway station, 
when the engine driver drove through a red light and crashed into another train 
standing at the station. As a result, 13 tanks were ruptured and the spilt petrol 
ignited. The fourth accident, in 2012, was caused by a rail defect. 17 tanks were 
derailed, but the oil products that spilled out did not ignite this time.  
The load of the railroad in the Latvian transit corridor is so intensive that it might 
be compared with “a pipeline on wheels”. When tankers can not be loaded in 
ports due to the wind, the ever-incoming trains carrying hazardous freight are 
parked to stand by not only at the large railway junctions, but also at small 
stations throughout the whole transit corridor. Large amounts of hazardous 
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freight may be stationed at such small stations for days, in spite of the fact that 
these stations have neither the specialists, nor the technical equipment required to 
deal with the consequences of a possible leak of hazardous materials. Even the 
amount of hazardous freight carried by a medium-sized train loaded with petrol 
exceeds the lowest qualifying limit set by the SEVESO II directive.  
Table 3: Statistics of railroad accidents in Latvia, adapted from [ 3 ]. 
  Number of railroad accidents 
Year 2004 2005 2006 2008 2009 2010 2011 
Total 70 70 63 61 30 41 35 
collisions (except for the collisions at 
the railway crossings) 0 0 0 1 1 1 0 
derailment 1 1 1 0 0 0 1 
accidents at the railway crossings 12 12 10 10 8 10 8 
accidents involving people and the 
rolling stock on the move 57 57 52 45 19 27 26 
fire in the rolling stock 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Of the total number of railroad traffic  
accidents – those, which involved the 
transportation of hazardous freight 0 0 0 1 2 2 2 
Of which – accidents that involved 
the spillage of hazardous freight 0 0 0 1 0 2 2 
 
The accident that occurred at the Ventspils 2 station is a fine example of risk 
potential that such seemingly minor railroad infrastructure objects may present. 
In the morning of December 20th, 2008, the train carrying petrol tanks crashed 
into another petrol-loaded train which stood at the 2nd track of Ventspils 2 
station. As it is shown in the scheme of the accident in Figure 4 at the moment of 
the incident, four of the five tracks within the territory of the station were 
occupied by trains carrying hazardous substances. The direct collision damaged 
the locomotive and 8 tanks of both trains, and the spilt petrol ignited. Three 
burning tanks with petrol were pushed off the track and the large territory was on 
fire. The heat radiated by burning railroad tanks of the 2nd track, soon caused 
another 6 railroad tanks located on the 3rd track catch the fire. Thanks to the 
efficient action of the rescue teams, the escalation of the accident was stopped. 
They towed away tanks loaded with heavy oil products standing on the 4th track 
and acrylonitril tanks standing on the 5th track. The petrol fumes exploded twice 
while the fire was being extinguished, throwing the flame up to the height of 60 
metres.  
One of the weak points within the Latvian railroad infrastructure is the 
abundance of railroad lines only consisting of a single track. Of the overall 
length of the railroad lines, which is about 2000 km, only 320 km have two or 
more tracks. The fact that an intensive traffic is being organized in both ways on 
a single track proves that the safety of railroad transport in Latvia heavily 
depends on the traffic control.  
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Figure 4. Scheme of the train crash in Ventspils 2 railway station, adapted from [4]. 
 
Figure 5 shows the photos of the train engulfed in flames and the blaze of fire 
caused by the explosion. 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 5. Photos of the accident at the Ventspils 2 railway station 
 
Trains carrying hazardous freights are being marshalled and serviced at two 
marshalling yards, in Riga and Rezekne, and at four railroad depots in the cities 
of Jelgava, Ventspils, Daugavpils and Liepaja. All these railroad junctions are 
situated within the territory of large cities and surrounded by densely populated 
urban areas with multi-storey buildings. An examination of the Jelgava railroad 
junction can contribute to the better understanding of risk potential presented by 
such facilities. The Jelgava railroad junction is located in the very centre of the 
city with a population of about 65 000. There are over 30 tracks at the station, 
where there may be trains loaded with oil products, ammonia, acrylonitril and 
LPG may be stationed. The amount of hazardous substances  that might be 
within the territory of the Jelgava railway station at a given moment is 3 times 
bigger than the upper level qualifying amount of hazardous substances are stated 
by the SEVESO II directive. In the SEVESO ll directive context such big 
stationary objects as Jelgava railroad junction needs to have the Safety report 
prepared, risk assessment made and adequate risk management system 
59 cisterns with gas oil, diesel fuel, petrol 
Wheel pairs derailed on impact 
Burnt cisterns 
61 cisterns with petrol 
30 cisterns with petrol 
34 cisterns with gas oil 
43 cisterns with acrylnitril 
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implemented. Regretfully the SEVESO II directive does not apply to dangerous 
goods transportation. 
The risk assessment of the Jelgava Railroad junction was the initiative of the 
Jelgava Municipality. The results of this risk assessment [ 5 ] have shown that 
the probability of accidents in Jelgava railroad junction is quite high. 
Probabilities of ammonia and petrol accidents is with the rank 10-4 [ 5 ]. That is 
due to the immense flow of hazardous freight. The zones affected by the 
probable consequences of such accidents are quite large, too. A complete 
destruction of just one tank loaded with ammonia may cause the substance in 
lethal concentrations to spread over a distance of 450 meters (see Figure 6.), 
covering an urban area with multi-storey buildings and numerous commercial 
centres. One of Jelgava’s hospitals was also situated within this area just a short 
time ago. To make things worse, the overall risk situation at the Jelgava railroad 
station is greatly affected by the intense passenger traffic at the station, which 
greatly increases the social risk at this object.  
 
 
 
 5000ppm spreading area  
 IDLH spreading area 
Figure 6. The area what would be affected by the toxic influence of ammonia fumes in case of a 
railway tanks being destroyed at the station, adapted from [ 5 ]. 
Despite the results obtained by the risk assessment, the Jelgava Municipality 
does not have any legal instruments that could limit the operation of the Jelgava 
railroad junction. On the other hand, according to the Civil Defence Law of the 
Republic of Latvia, the municipality of Jelgava is responsible for rescuing the 
inhabitants within its territory in case of an emergency, railroad disasters 
including. The situation is pretty much the same with the other cities in Latvia 
where the marshalling and servicing of trains carrying hazardous freight takes 
place.   
The operation of the ports themselves as the elements of sea transport 
infrastructure is one of the elements within the risk chain of hazardous freight 
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transit, and its safety must be looked at both separately and within the general 
flow of hazardous freight.  
The operation of Latvian ports in the last 20 years might be considerate as quite 
safe. Several chemical leaks are registered each year at the major Latvian ports, 
but these usually are insignificant and have not been of any considerable risk to 
date. So far just one serious accident has been registered. It occurred in the 
Ventspils port in 1967, when a tanker loaded with oil products exploded near a 
pier and its debris were thrown all over at a distance of over 500 metres. But we 
can say it was a long time ago.  
The most recent accident was chemical leak that occurred in July 2009 at the 
Baltic Container terminal of the Riga Port. There were five 20-ton containers in 
the port, loaded with acetone cyanohydrins, which is a highly flammable and an 
extremely toxic substance. The pressure started to grow inside of one the 
containers, which caused its safety valve to open, releasing a small amount of 
toxic fumes into the atmosphere. The rescue team of the State Fire and Rescue 
Service, which was summoned at the site, has first tried to cool the container 
down, but then it was decided to evacuate the residents from the vicinity. There 
was a significant risk of an explosion. As estimated by the State Fire and Rescue 
Service, in case of an explosion the lives of people within the area of 300 m 
would be threatened. The investigation showed that the reason of the emergency 
was the transportation of hazardous substance in a container which was not 
cleaned properly beforehand. This has caused a chemical reaction, due to which 
the temperature and the pressure inside the container started to increase. The 
accident at the Baltic Container terminal has revealed yet another fault in the 
control over the facilities handling hazardous substances. In accordance with the 
license it had received, the Baltic Container terminal is not considered a 
dangerous object. Thus, it has neither the adequate safety systems implemented, 
nor the trained staff who could react properly in case of a chemical leak. 
The hazardous materials from the Latvian ports are then shipped across the 
Baltic Sea. According to the HELCOM data [ 6 ], the frequency of accidents 
involving ships in the Baltic Sea is comparatively high. Over the period of 2004-
2010, there was an average of 116 ship-related accidents happening yearly, 8% 
of which involved environmental pollution. The typical types of accidents and 
incidents involve ships collision and grounding. Even though the shipping 
conditions near the shores of Latvia are complicated enough and the maritime 
traffic is quite intense, the accidents involving ships quite rarely occur within the 
Latvian territorial waters. According to the data provided by the Maritime 
Administration of Latvia (see Table 4), there is an average of 14 maritime 
accidents and incidents per year happening within the territorial waters of Latvia, 
3% of which cause environmental pollution. The most significant sea pollution 
of the past few years was in 2007, when a dry cargo ship „Golden Sky” ran 
aground not far from the Ventspils Port. The volume of the resulting spillage into 
the Baltic Sea was about 13 tons of oil products and 1500 tons of potassium 
chloride. 
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Table 4: The statistics of maritime accidents and incidents within the territorial waters of Latvia, 
adapted from [ 7 ]. 
Year 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 
Number of 
accidents/incidents 
11 25 14 15 14 13 10 
 
Applying the results obtained during risk assessment in land use 
planning.  
Despite the numerous attempts to amend the relevant legislation of Latvia with 
the acceptable risk standards, no legislative act that would stipulate the 
conditions of territory usage according to the acceptable hazard levels to the 
inhabitants has yet been confirmed at the state level. The common argument 
behind this is the assertion that Latvia can not simply adopt the relevant 
legislation of some certain country, and a directive of the European Union is 
awaited instead. As a remedy for the absence of such regulation, several 
municipalities of Latvia have developed or is currently working on their own 
regulatory acts regarding the land use planning. 
The greatest experience with risk management is accumulated in Ventspils, 
which is the most significant hazardous freight transit port in Latvia. The City 
Council of Ventspils has had the standards for individual and social risk and the 
environmental licensing procedure introduced by the Council Resolution dating 
as far back as the year 1994. The Dutch legislation within the realm of risk 
management effective during that period was used as a legislative basis. One of 
the objectives of environmental licensing was to reduce the risk presented by 
existing facilities and to prevent the founding of any new business within the city 
that might exceed the acceptable risk levels.  
The interest of the Ventspils Municipality regarding the risk assessment was 
caused by the concern expressed by the scientists and the society in regard to the 
operational safety of the liquid ammonia transfer terminal. The facility in the 
Ventspils Port was built in the 1970-s in accordance with all the construction 
standards effective at that time. The technology includes the railway tanks 
unloading facility, two isothermal ammonia reservoirs, each with a capacity of 
30,000 m3, a compressor shop, a ship loading berth and the technological 
pipelines. Due to the fact that the ammonia reservoirs are situated virtually in the 
very centre of the city, the failure of one reservoir would cause the lethal 
concentrations of ammonia to cover almost one third of the urban territory, 
where 40,000 people dwell, in just a few minutes. The risk assessment for this 
liquid ammonia transfer terminal was done with the participation of Dutch risk 
management experts, who did the first quantitative risk assessment in Latvia in 
1991. The individual risk isolines in Fig. 8 show the true danger to the residents 
of Ventspils during that time. Ever since the environmental licensing procedure 
has been established, Ventspils has made essential achievements in risk 
reduction. 
The municipalities of the cities of Jelgava and Jekabpils, which are located 
within the hazardous freight rail transit corridor, have raised the issue of 
protecting their residents against such threats with the state authorities for several 
times over the last 20 years, though with no progress to date. The risk 
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calculations done on behalf of these cities show that the danger that the 
inhabitants of areas near the railroad infrastructural objects are exposed to is very 
high. Such course of action would never be allowed in most European countries. 
Regretfully, the extent of these municipalities’ influence on rail freightage and 
the operation of railroad infrastructural facilities, which are considered as objects 
of national importance in Latvia, are very limited.  
In turn, the Development Department of the Riga Municipality was pushed to 
amend the rules regulating the usage of the city’s territory with acceptable risk 
criteria by the resolutions of several state and municipal authorities, which were 
only based on safety requirements stipulated within the construction standards. 
 
 
Figure 7. The individual risk isolines for Ventspils ammonia terminal in 1991, adapted from [2]. 
As an example, it is worth to mention the decision to allow an intense harbour 
activity in the immediate vicinity of a large LPG terminal. The Riga LPG 
terminal, operated by „Latvijas propana gaze”, Ltd. was built during the 1960-s 
and its technological equipment remains virtually the same ever since. It is used 
for transfer of liquefied petroleum gas exported by Russia and other CIS 
countries to Western Europe. LPG is delivered by rail and then forwarded to the 
next destination by sea. The facility houses 53 over ground tanks for the storage 
of LPG, each one with a capacity of 175 m3.    
Considering its location, the risk potential of this facility was ascertained well 
back in the Soviet times. It was built on the outskirts, near the mouth of river 
Daugava. The nearest inhabited area was located at a distance of more than 500 
meters from the facility. After the implementation of SEVESO II directive, the 
risk assessment for this facility showed, that there was a high probability of a 
large-scale accident at this object. And the potential hazardous consequences of 
such accident would affect the lives of people within the range of 800 meters [8]. 
Despite the risk assessment results that clearly indicated both the high 
probability of an accident and the very large areas exposed to the subsequent 
damage, the responsible state and municipal authorities allow actions in the 
immediate vicinity of the objects that can increase its already high risk level. In 
that case the timber terminal was built near the LPG object. The situation that 
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has developed is best illustrated by the photos shown below. One of the pictures 
shows stockpiles of wood along the fence of the facility, just tens of meters away 
from the LPG reservoirs. In the other picture, there is a pipeline flyover for 
loading ships, which has been already obviously hit by loaded timber lorries for 
several times. 
 
 
Figure 8. The areas exposed to the explosive concentrations, adapted from [8]. 
 
 
 
 
Figure 9. Photos from the vicinity of the Riga LPG terminal operated by „Latvijas propana 
gaze”, Ltd. 
Another argument that motivated the Development Department of Riga 
Municipality to develop the rules of using the city’s territory is the ambiguous 
information on the danger presented by the other SEVESO II objects obtained 
from the state control authorities.  
The current limitations for usage of the territory around the SEVESO II objects 
in Riga and several other cities of Latvia rely on the information about the 
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danger of such objects provided by the Environment State Bureau. The 
Environment State Bureau of Latvia is a competent authority that organizes the 
evaluation of Safety reports and the Risk reduction policies for the SEVESO II 
objects and passes a resolution on the operation of the object. As long as there 
are no unified methods and no unified acceptable risk criteria in Latvia, the risk 
assessments for the SEVESO II objects contain a great deal of variations 
regarding the accident probability assessment, the extent of harmful influence of 
such accidents and the calculations of the areas impacted by such.  
By request of the Riga Municipality, the experts of PSI „Risks un audits” Ltd. 
have assessed the statement for usage limitations concerning the areas around the 
dangerous objects situated in Riga. The main conclusions of this assessment are 
as follows: 
 Similar limitations for usage of territory are set for different areas with 
different exposure to the harmful consequences of various accidents, 
 The probability of an accident has not been taken into consideration 
while setting the limitations for usage of territory 
Developing the advice on the mandatory rules for usage of territory in Riga, one 
has to state that there are no unified criteria in the European Union for applying 
the results of risk assessment in land use planning [ 9 ], [ 10 ]. The research on 
the approach implemented within this realm by the leading countries of the 
European Union reveals the essential differences in the acceptable risk levels and 
in the conditions for usage of territory, depending on the extent of danger [ 11 ], [ 
12 ].  
The absence of unified understanding for the application of risk criteria in land 
use planning in the European Union prevents smaller countries from adopting 
such standards into the national legislation and commencing the modern practice 
of planning the territorial development.  
The activity of Latvian municipalities that develop their own mandatory rules for 
the usage of territory, on one hand, indicates that such standards are necessary. 
On the other hand, if this initiative remains at the municipal level, other 
problems are to be expected. If every municipality shall apply their own 
mandatory rules, using different acceptable risk criteria, then for Latvia this 
would mean that the rail freight operators would have to apply different safety 
requirements for the same service at different points of Latvia.   
Conclusions 
The analysis of hazardous freight transit chains done herein indicates that the 
safety limits of the carrying capacity of Latvian railroads are by far exceeded, 
however, more and more new hazardous freight transfer terminals are being built 
in Latvia. Seven new SEVESO II objects have been built in Latvia over the past 
10 years, with even more similar facilities waiting for approval at the moment. 
These new stationary facilities are going to benefit from the modern 
technological equipment and the implementation of modern safety solutions. 
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Thus, these objects themselves are safe enough and the state regulatory 
authorities have no legal reason to object to the construction of such facilities. 
The example of Latvia shows the reason of including certain restrictions in 
relevant legislation concerning the associated risks caused by new facilities.  
The European Union should legally pass a bill stipulating the minimal acceptable 
risk criteria that every EU member state would have to meet, with each state 
reserving the right to apply more strict criteria within its boundaries. The absence 
of such regulations leaves the inhabitants of some EU member states exposed to 
an unacceptable high risk. 
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Abstract  
 
Many kilometers of roads have adjacent rock slopes that are prone to rockfall. 
This rapid mass movement can be dangerous for human infrastructure and 
property, sometimes with dramatic consequences. The fulfillment of safety 
requirements for roads in mountainside areas is a multidimensional concept that 
includes socio-economical and technical perspectives, thus leads to issues that 
are simultaneously characterized by a high degree of conflict, complexity and 
uncertainty. Multicriteria Analysis (MCA) is an effective approach that can deal 
with these kind of issues. Three different rockfall protection devices are 
compared through the Analytic Network Process technique, in a specific geo-
environment, to show the feasibility of the method and how it can be a valuable 
tool for public and private decision maker. 
Keywords: Road management, Rockfall protection devices, Multicriteria 
Analysis, ANP, Decision making process. 
1. Introduction  
Transportation corridors in mountainous regions are often susceptible to major 
hazards, namely shallow landslides such as rockfalls. The analysis of risks 
associated with these types of instability is a complex operation requiring the 
precise assessment of hazard and vulnerability. The effects of rockfall events on 
a road can include damage to vehicles, injury or death of passengers and 
pedestrians, as well as economic losses. Engineering design of protection devices 
should aim to minimize risk, taking advantage of the most advanced 
technologies. Public and private decision makers (DMs) should be equipped with 
the instruments which allow them to choose the best solutions.  
The fulfillment of road safety is a multidimensional concept and thus it is 
characterized by a high degree of complexity and uncertainty. Multicriteria 
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Analysis (MCA) is a very efficient approach to deal with these kinds of issues. It 
is a family that includes a series of evaluation techniques that are able to consider 
simultaneously several criteria, in order to support the Decision Maker in making 
comparative assessments through a rational approach of alternative projects and 
solutions.  
This paper presents the application of MCA to rockfall risk management through 
the development of an Analytic Network Process (ANP) model. Three different 
protection devices, usually used for rockfall road protection (embankment, 
shelter and tunnel) were taken into account. A focus group with experts in geo-
engineering was organized in order to identify and weigh the elements of the 
model. The ANP technique was applied using the Super Decisions software. An 
examples of application is proposed and discussed. The approach was applied to 
a test site located in the north-western Italian region of Piedmont. 
It is important to emphasize that the model framework was developed to be 
applied in a standard way, while the sub-criteria and the respective weights were 
calibrated for the case study under analysis. 
 
2. Research objectives and description of the case study 
The process of making the best decision in the evaluation and management of a 
rockfall event encounters many obstacles due to the lack of information on the 
specific natural phenomena and to the heterogeneity of the available information 
sources. Therefore it is important that decision-makers, as well as public 
administrations and designers are able to evaluate different rockfall hazard scenarios 
and possible protection devices using specifically designed tools. The evaluation 
tool must take into account the different aspects involved in the interaction 
between rockfall and road, considering both tangible aspects (such as economy 
or design) and intangible aspects (social or ethical aspects). Moreover, the 
technique must allow an objective, transparent and traceable decision-making 
process. 
In order to tackle this delicate problem, an application of Multicriteria Analysis 
model (specifically an ANP approach) for the comparison of different rockfall 
protection devices was proposed with the aim of choosing the most suitable one 
to ensure road safety.  
The model developed was applied to a real case: a stretch of the SP165, in 
Vintebbio (Sesia Valley, Piedmont region, Italy) (Figure 1). The SP165 is an 
important part of the road network of the Sesia Valley, because it connects the 
cities at the top of the valley with the highway at the bottom  
The road layout is very tortuous following the contour of the rockside. The road 
is characterized by a variable width that in some stretches doesn’t allow the 
simultaneous passage of vehicles travelling in opposite directions. Considering 
that alternative routes to support mobility are limited, it can be argued that the 
SP165 is a strategic road due to the high movement of vehicles throughout the 
year.  
Part of the rockside was made safety in the past using wire mesh in adherence 
and a precast shelter (Figure 2), while the remaining part is still prone to rockfall 
hazard.  
The territory crossed by the SP165 road is characterized by rocky outcrops of 
Permian volcanic rock, lavas and pyroclastic rocks formed during a series of 
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volcanic episodes occurred 270 million years ago. Sometimes they are 
interrupted by fragments ripped from the crystalline basement metamorphic 
rocks (schists of the Lakes) and merged during an eruption in the pyroclastic 
flow.  
Several on site surveys have been performed together with an analysis of the 
historical catalogue in order to identify rock block size (this has been found to be 
0,5 - 2m3). 
 
                         Figure 1: Map of the studied territories, the arrow indicates the SP165. 
 
       
Figure 2: On the left an example of road path; on the right the rockfall protection shelter. 
 
The rock block energy is high and the falling process is widespread along the 
road. Taking into account the geotechnical characteristics of the rock face it is 
possible to assume that the road is not under imminent threat, therefore urgent 
interventions are not required.  
 
3. Rockfall risk and protection devices 
Rockfall phenomena is one of the most dangerous phenomena affecting roads in 
mountainside area, from the phenomenological point of view, this rapid 
movement is induced by the detachment of a rock block from a rock slope and 
down slope movement. Although the typical size is small in comparison to other 
landslide, rockfall is among the most destructive mass movements because the 
falling blocks move at high speed (Corominas et al. 2005; Bunce et al. 1997; 
Evans and Hungr 1993, Varnes 1984). 
Vintebbi
o 
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In order to minimize the rockfall hazard on a road, different types of 
technological solutions have been developed.The main factors that influence 
protection device design as well as construction techniques are: site morphology 
and topography; geological and geotechnical condition; surface water and 
groundwater conditions; surface constraints; environmental constraints; safety 
aspects during the construction phase; work site location and construction times.  
Protection interventions against rockfall can be classified as active or passive: 
the aim of an active system is to prevent instability from occurring, whereas 
passive system is design to mitigate the effects of a previous movement by 
intercepting and stopping falling rock blocks. The alternatives (shelter, 
embankment and natural tunnel) took into account in the development of the 
model, are the passive type.  
Shelter is a precasted concrete structures, covered by an absorbing layer made up 
of ground in order to dissipate the energy resulting from the rock blocks impact, 
the structure is often topped by net fences (Montani et al., 2004; Chiaves, 2004). 
When blocks have volumes or speeds, great enough to break through the 
maximum resistance of traditional net fences, ground embankments are the best 
technical solution.An embankment is a massive artificial ground barrier and it is 
steady with different kinds of reinforcements, such as geotextiles or geogrills, 
metallic wire stripes or nets (Peila at al., 2007; Peila and Mignelli, 2010).  
At least natural tunnel avoid the risk of falling rocks in the prone road, but it is 
also necessary adequately design the entrances, where the problem of falling 
rocks persists (Peila and Pelizza, 2002; Montani et al., 1996). 
 
4. Methodological approach  
4.1 The Analytic Network Process  
The Analytic Network Process (ANP) is a decision support tool, belonging to the 
Multicriteria Analysis family, that has recently gained popularity. Developed by 
T.L. Saaty (2005) as the generalization of dependences and feedbacks of the 
more well-known Analytic Hierarchy Process (AHP) (Saaty, 1980), the ANP 
represents a theory of relative measurement on absolute scale of both tangible 
and intangible criteria based both on the judgement of experts and on existing 
measurements and statistics needed to make a decision (Saaty, 2005; Saaty and 
Vargas, 2006). By freeing us from 
the burden of ordering the components in the form of a directed chain as in the 
AHP 
hierarchy, the ANP represents any decision as a network and allows the structure 
to develop more naturally. The ANP therefore represents a better way to 
faithfully describe what can happen in the real world and is gaining merit as a 
useful tool to help technicians make their decision processes traceable and 
reliable. By including dependences and feedbacks and by cycling their influence 
by means of the supermatrix approach, the ANP is more objective and more 
likely to capture what happens in the real world, thus providing effective support 
for the kind of decisions needed to cope with the future (Zoffer et al., 2008). 
From the methodological point of view the ANP is based on five fundamental 
steps (Saaty, 2005): (i) structuring of the decision-making problem; (ii) clusters 
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and nodes weighting by means of pairwise comparisons; (iii) supermatrices 
formation; (iv) elicitation of final priorities and (v) sensitivity analysis.  
A very large amount of well-established literature concerning the ANP exists in 
different fields. Mention can be made of applications in the sphere of waste 
management (Aragonés-Beltrán et al., 2010; Bottero and Ferretti, 2011), 
strategic policy planning (Ulutas, 2005), environmental impact assessment of 
territorial transformations (Bottero and Mondini, 2008; Liu and Lai, 2009), 
market and logistics (Liang and Li, 2008), economics and finance (Niemura and 
Saaty, 2004) and civil engineering (Neaupane and Piantanakulchai, 2006). For a 
detailed and comprehensive overview of the various applications in the 
environmental field, in which this methodology has attracted increasing 
attention, it is possible to refer to the classification of literature proposed by 
Huang (2011). 
 
5. Model development  
5.1 Construction of the network  
As far as the problem structuring phase is concerned, the ANP approach involves 
identifying groups or clusters constituted by various elements (nodes) that 
influence the decision. All the elements in the network can be related in different 
ways since the network can incorporate feedbacks and complex inter-
relationships within and between clusters, thus providing a more accurate 
modelling of complex settings. The network construction represents an important 
and very creative phase in the problem-solving process.  
In the present application the model has been developed according to the simple 
network structure illustrated in Figure 3. It also possible to structure the decision 
problem according to the complex network structure (Saaty, 2005) which is 
usually based on four sub-networks: Benefits, Costs, Opportunities and Risks. 
These sub-networks allow all dimensions of the decision problem to be 
considered. 
In particular, the problem has been divided into five clusters (namely: economic 
aspects, environmental aspects, social aspects, transport aspects and urban 
planning aspects) that have been organized according to the network model. 
With reference to the alternative options previously described (section 3), the 
general objective of the analysis is to rank the alternative scenarios according to 
their overall performance. Table I provides a description of the elements which 
constitute the clusters established in the network.  
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Figure 3. Decision network of the problem. 
 
5.2 Weighting of the elements  
 
With reference to ANP methodology, the next step of the analysis consists of 
pairwise comparisons in order to establish the relative importance of the different 
elements, with respect to a certain component of the network.  
The comparison and evaluation phase is divided into two distinct levels: the 
cluster level, which is more strategic, and the node level, which is more specific 
and detailed. In pairwise comparisons, a ratio scale of 1-9, namely the Saaty 
fundamental scale, is used to compare any two elements. The numerical 
judgments established at each level  
of the network make up pair matrixes. The priority of each element is determined 
by the normalized eigenvector of the pairwise comparison matrix. 
With the objective of establishing the importance of the criteria of the analysis, a 
focus group was organized with experts in the field of geo-engineering in order 
to discuss the general aspects of the problem and to weight the decision 
elements. 
At the cluster level, the result of this phase is represented by the so-called cluster 
matrix. At the node level, once all the pairwise comparison matrices were 
compiled, all the related vectors together formed the unweighted supermatrix. 
Finally, according to ANP methodology, the cluster matrix was applied to the 
unweighted supermatrix as a cluster weight. The result was the weighted 
supermatrix, which was raised to a limiting power to obtain the limit 
supermatrix, where all columns were identical and each column gave the global 
priority vector. This phase represents the 
progressive formation of the three supermatrices, the initial or unweigthed, the 
weighted and the limit matrix. As an example that illustrates this phase, Table II 
shows the pairwise comparison matrix at the cluster level with the alternatives as 
parent node for the comparisons. Table III represents the cluster matrix showing 
the priorities of the elements previously compared in Table II. 
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Table I: Brief description of the considered elements of the network.  
Environmental aspects 
Landscape impact 
The negative impact generated by the protection device on the 
‘‘urban and territorial values’’ of the area, caused by the 
construction site and the final building 
Impacts due the construction phases 
– dust  
The dusts emitted into the atmosphere by the building site 
involved possible disturbances for the inhabitants of the area with 
reference to worsening of air quality 
Impacts due the construction phases 
– noise, vibration  
Noise and vibration produced by the construction site, by the 
transport, by the excavation, by the handling loads, etc,  
Impacts on water, air, soil, due to 
noise vibration and dust during the 
life time 
Impact of the constructed protection device on the natural 
environment during the operating phase (lifetime of the building). 
Economic aspects 
Direct construction costs 
Cost of the material for the project execution, labor cost, design 
cost,  transport costs, equipment cost, etc.t 
Management and maintenance cost, 
without rock block collision 
Routine maintenance and routine management of the device 
Management and maintenance cost, 
with rock block collision 
Extraordinary maintenance works if the device is damaged by 
rock block collapse (i.e. partial recovery of the embankments, 
maintenance of soil above the artificial tunnel) 
Costs of safety during the operating 
phase 
Cost associated with the realization of security tools in the 
operational phase (i.e. emergency lights, speed detectors) 
Indirect construction cost – waste 
disposal 
The possible cost of waste disposal 
Indirect construction cost –roadway 
recovery and traffic variations cost 
The indirect costs are the expenses for materials, machinery and 
works not directly related to the construction phase (i.e. recovery 
cost of the roadway cost of traffic variation) 
Design aspects 
Project's complexity, skills of 
design staff, safety management 
The selection of excavation techniques, the management of job 
site space, the design time, the skills and abilities of design staff,  
Preliminary investigations  
( number, quality, type, 
accessibility to the site) 
Difficulty in the realization and interpretation of preliminary 
geotechnical investigations, taking into account the access to the 
site, number and type 
Geo-residual risks related to 
excavation and work site 
Residual risks in the execution phase and construction phase 
Waste management and 
construction material supplying 
Landfill disposal, storage and handling of excavated material 
(technical and legal problems) 
Worksite complexity  
Worksite organization, work site design and worksite spaces 
management 
Transport aspects 
Improvement of the road layout Decrease in average travel times, improving the road layout  
By pass during the construction 
phase 
Partial or complete closure of the road during execution phase, 
and consequential deviation of traffic flow on alternative routes 
Increase of travel time during 
construction 
Increase of the average travel times and volume of traffic on 
alternative roads 
Social aspects 
Social acceptance Impact of the device on the local community opinion 
Project not shared by the 
community 
The local community, does not approve the work 
Times of realization 
The discomfort due to the traffic bypass, the social cost of the 
work and the exposure time to the hazard increases on 
proportional way to the increasing of the realization time   
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This example at the cluster level represents a step of the evaluation process less 
based on technical expertise but more political decision-making. These 
assessments are arbitrary and different choices can therefore be made. In this 
application, the evaluation was performed giving great relevance to the economic 
and design aspects which characterized the problem under analysis. 
Table II: Pairwise comparison matrix at the cluster level. 
ALTERNATIVES 
Design 
aspects 
Economic 
aspects 
Environ. 
aspects 
Social 
aspects 
Transport 
aspects 
Priorities 
Design aspects 1 1/3 5 3 5 0.260 
Economic aspects 3 1 7 7 5 0.519 
Environmental aspects 1/5 1/7 1 1 3 0.086 
Social aspects 1/3 1/7 1 1 2 0.082 
Transport aspects 1/5 1/5 1/3 1/2 1 0.053 
Table III: Cluster matrix. 
 Alternat. 
Design 
aspects 
Economic 
aspects 
Environ. 
aspects 
Social 
aspects 
Transport 
aspects 
Alternatives 0.000 0.500 1.000 0.500 0.500 0.500 
Design aspects 0.260 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Economic aspects 0.519 0.500 0.000 0.000 0.500 0.000 
Environmental aspects 0.086 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Social aspects 0.082 0.000 0.000 0.500 0.000 0.500 
Transport aspects 0.053 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
6. Results of the model 
 6.1 Priority list of the alternatives  
As previously mentioned (section 5.2), in the last phase of the elicitation of the 
final priorities, the weighted supermatrix is raised to a limiting power in order to 
converge and to obtain a long-term stable set of weights. Each column of the 
limit supermatrix provides the final priority vector of all the elements being 
considered (Table IV).  
Table IV shows the final ranking of alternatives according to the judgments 
established during the pairwise comparisons. Analysing the results normalized 
by cluster, it appears that the embankment is the most suitable rockfall protection 
device 
with 60% of importance, followed by the natural tunnel, with 24% of importance 
and the shelter, with 16% of importance. 
In rapid analysis, the embankment is the preferable solution because the building 
costs are cheap, the design stage is fairly simple and the device has less social 
impact. However, it could be a natural barrier for wildlife and for water flows. 
Moreover it does not produce any improvement for traffic. The results of the 
ANP model highlight that the most important elements in the decision problem 
are: i) direct construction costs for the economic aspects (0.480); ii) the social 
acceptance for the social aspects (0.477); iii) the geo-residual risk for the design 
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aspects (0.448); iv) the landscape impact for the environmental aspects (0.470) 
and v) the improvement of road layout for the transport aspects (0.747). 
Table IV: Final priorities of the elements of the model. 
Element  
Normaliz- 
ed by cluster 
Limiting Element 
Normaliz- 
ed by cluster 
Limiting 
EMBANKMENT 0.60247 0.28804 Geo-residual risk 0.44847 0.05576 
SHELTER 
0.15856 0.07581 
Project’s 
complexity 
0.17648 0.02194 
NATURAL TUNNEL 
0.23896 0.11425 
Worksite 
complexity 
0.09051 0.01125 
Direct construction 
costs 
0.47980 0.13095 
Preliminary 
investigations 
0.11595 0.01441 
Indirect construction 
costs – roadway 
recovery 
0.06420 0.01752 
Waste 
management 
0.16860 0.02096 
Indirect construction 
costs – waste disposal 
0.14485 0.03953 
Dust-construction 
phase 
0.13071 0.00535 
Management, 
maintenance costs 
 – with collision 
0.15455 0.04218 
Noise, vibration-
construction phase 
0.11024 0.00451 
Management, 
maintenance costs 
 – without collision 
0.04705 0.01284 
Impacts on water, 
air, soil, noise, 
vibrations due to 
operation phase 
0.28863 0.01183 
Safety costs 0.10954 0.02989 Landscape impact 0.47042 0.019284 
Project not shared by 
the community 
0.41095 0.02400 
By pass during the 
construction phase 
0.11937 0.00301 
Realization time 
0.11208 0.00654 
Improvement of 
the road layout 
0.74706 0.01883 
Social acceptance 
0.47698 0.02786 
Increase of travel 
time 
0.13357 0.00336 
 
6.2 Sensitivity analysis  
After obtaining a ranking of the alternatives, a sensitivity analysis was performed 
on the final outcome of the model in order to test its robustness and verify the 
stability of the final results based on variations in the input by changing the 
criteria weights. A sensitivity analysis is concerned with a “what if” kind of 
question to see whether the final answer is stable when the inputs (judgments or 
priorities), have been changed. It is of particular interest to see whether these 
changes modify the order of the alternatives.  
In this application several scenarios were simulated varying the cluster weights 
which represent the fundamental aspects involved in the decision-making 
process. First of all, the five clusters were considered as having the same 
importance. Then, the weights were changed and one cluster at a time was given 
a weight of 60%, thus considered as being much more relevant than the other 
clusters which were attributed the same importance. Table V shows the 
sensitivity analysis results. The left-hand column shows the cluster weights 
established in the different scenarios, and the right-hand column shows the final 
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priority of the three alternatives for each scenario. The analysis performed shows 
that the model can be considered stable because the embankment is the most 
preferable alternative in each scenario. 
Table V: Sensitivity analysis. 
Cluster weights Alternative ranking 
S
ce
n
a
ri
o
 1
 Design aspects 0.200 
 
 Economic aspects 0.200  
Environmental aspects 0.200 
Social aspects 0.200 
Transport aspects 0.200 
S
ce
n
a
ri
o
 2
 
Design aspects 0.600 
 
 Economic aspects 0.100  
Environmental aspects 0.100 
Social aspects 0.100 
Transport aspects 0.100 
S
ce
n
a
ri
o
 3
 Design aspects 0.100 
 
 
Economic aspects 0.600  
Environmental aspects 0.100 
Social aspects 0.100 
Transport aspects 0.100 
S
ce
n
a
ri
o
 4
 
Design aspects 0.100 
 
 
Economic aspects 0.100  
Environmental aspects 0.600 
Social aspects 0.100 
Transport aspects 0.100 
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 5
 
Design aspects 0.100 
 
 
Economic aspects 0.100  
Environmental aspects 0.100 
Social aspects 0.600 
Transport aspects 0.100 
S
ce
n
a
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o
 6
 
Design aspects 0.100 
 
 Economic aspects 0.100  
Environmental aspects 0.100 
Social aspects 0.100 
Transport aspects 0.600 
 
 
7. Conclusions 
This paper illustrates the application of the complex ANP method to support the 
choice among different rockfall protection devices. The parameters of the model 
were set for a very busy mountain road, and embankment, natural tunnel and 
shelter cover by rockfall barrier were the analyzed protection devices 
(alternatives of the model). 
The ANP technique allows the most important elements of the decision problem 
to be highlighted through a transparent and traceable decision-making process 
thus facilitating deliberation. Moreover, the technique supports communication 
with the DMs and grants a mutual understanding. The results of the analysis 
performed show that the  ANP model is suitable to represents a real world 
problem. The technique in fact provides the means of performing complex trade-
offs on multiple evaluation criteria, while taking the DM’s preferences into 
account. 
The main disadvantage in the practical application of the ANP is a consequence 
of the complexity of the decision making problem that to be analysed. To this 
end, the ANP prescribes a high number of comparisons that occasionally become 
too complex to understand for DMs who are not familiar with the method. 
Hence, a great deal of attention should be devoted to the elaboration of the 
questionnaires and the comparison process must be helped by a facilitator 
(Aragonés-Beltrán et al., 2010; Bottero et al., 2011).  
For expanding the analysis and validating the obtained results it would be of 
scientific interest to apply this conceptual model to a different real case study in 
order to test and assess the usefulness of this tool and to implement and improve 
the model. 
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In conclusion, the methodology adopted was successful in structuring the 
complex decision context related the interaction between rockfall events and 
road protection device decision.  
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1. Introduction 
Container freight transport has grown over the last two decades, about 9-12% per 
year (Crainic and Kim, 2007). This trend confirms that the multi-modality 
feature of container transport is an important factor, among others, that 
contributes to its growth (any container has a standardized load unit that is 
suitable also for truck and train transportation). In this framework, container 
terminals are crucial connections between modes: a bottleneck in terminal 
operations may affect both inbound and outbound traffic. 
Increasing number of intermodal operators make that competitiveness becomes 
crucial issue to survive in the market. New objectives and performance measures 
need to be identified and employed to evaluate the performance of a container 
terminal. Clearly defined measures allow adopting decision support systems that 
optimize objective functions based on such indicators. There can be 
distinguished at least two main classes of factors (Vacca , Bierlaire and Salani 
M, 2007 ): 
1. Service-oriented: they measure the service levels provided to clients and are 
usually expressed by the turn-around time of both ship liners and outside trucks. 
This class of indicators needs to be developed in order to take into account 
competitiveness. It includes berth service time (i.e. vessel turn-around time in 
hours; vessels time to berth; vessels berthed on time; etc.) and gate service time 
(i.e. truck turn-around time at the gates; trucks still on terminal over 1 hour; etc.). 
2. Productivity-oriented: they measure the volume of containers’ traffic managed 
by the terminal, such as TEU volume growth (TEUs per year), crane utilization 
per crane), crane productivity (moves per crane, per hour), berth utilization 
(vessels per year, per berth), land utilization (TEUs per year, per gross acre), 
storage productivity (TEUs per storage acre) and gate throughput (containers per 
hour, per lane). 
In both types it is require understanding logistics chain (even simple operation) 
to know factors background. Dependability issues are also important in context 
of service optimization. Container terminal operations and their optimization 
have received increasing interest in the scientific literature over the last years. 
For an overview of terminal operations, it can be mainly refer to Vis and de 
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Koster (2003) and Steenken et al. (2004). Vis and de Koster (2003) illustrate the 
main logistics processes which take place in container terminals (arrival of the 
ship, loading and unloading operations, transfer and stacking of containers) and 
provide a review of relevant literature. Steenken et al. (2004) provide an 
exhaustive overview of methods for the optimization of container terminal 
operations. 
Many of the contributions are mainly dedicated to sophisticated models for 
single decision problems at container terminals. Some authors (Moccia, 2006; 
Sammarra, 2007) are specializing the quay crane scheduling problem Moccia. 
Imai, Nishimura, Hattori and Papadimitriou (2007) investigate the berth 
allocation problem under different scenarios. 
Kim and Bae (1998), Kim and Kim (1999), Kim and Kim (2002), Kim and Park 
(2003), Kim and Hong (2006), Kim and Lee (2006), Watanabe I. (2009) present 
and describe yard operations presenting optimizations of selected operation. 
Gambardella et al. (1998) presents the container terminal as a whole system and 
optimize the flow of containers. 
 Many of papers concerning on preparing and monitoring container terminal 
points. However there is lack of information about correlation between 
availability, productivity and land use in context of chosen transshipment 
technology. The aim of article is to compare two the most important machines 
used in inland terminal taking into account its availability, productivity and 
required land use. 
 
2. Base information on container terminal technologies and 
surface 
There are different methods of assesig container terminal surface. Most of them 
is based on designer experience. There is applied method in Poland, which was 
used in 70’-80’, when intermodal transport was introduced in Poland. 
The rules are quite simple, but take into account only one type of transshipment 
machine – gantry crane. Nowadays very often reachstrackers can be seen on 
inland terminal (figure 1). Total surface of container terminal is linked with 
storage place: 75% of total surface is storage yard. There is role taken from 
experience, that at least 1/3 of yard should be out of storage (due to operational 
needs). In addition container field capacity is described by TEU, not number of 
containers. 
However key point of terminal land use is transshipment technology. As it was 
mentioned before, there are two main types of machines: gantry cranes and 
reachstrackers.  
Gantry crane is meant as machine used in older of greater terminals. Example of 
gantry crane on figure 2 is presented. Typical crane based on two pillars on 
width of 4 meters can operate over 30 - 35 containers per hour, modern machines 
digitally controlled even more. What is really important container cranes use 
reliable and efficient electric motors, wheatear condition proofed. However the 
price for medium size machine is 3-5 Meuro, depending on motors, weight, 
operating line. 
About 10 time cheaper solution is reachstracer. Although transshipment ability is 
little lower than crane (25 container per hour), the machines are very sensitive on 
Proceedings of the 43rd ESReDA seminar, France, October 21-23, 2012 
 
215 
 
whether conditions. During the winter availability decrease from summer 0.99 to 
even 0.8. Main problem is oil in lifting pistons. Another difference is land 
reservation. Crane needs only space for its pillars and gap to first row of 
containers (in Polnad at least 1.65m). Reachstracer need usually 20m to operate 
safe.  
Reachstraces are meant as modern and cheap solution for container 
transshipment. However the problem is not stable level of availability, in 
consequences not stable value of productivity. 
 
 
  
Figure 1. Reachstracker under operating 
 
 
Figure 2. View of ganty crane 
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3. The case. 
This section will show difference in space required for container terminal 
depending on availability and type of machine.  
Calculation assumptions are as follows: 
- total terminal capacity is 2000 TEU (50% of 20’ and 50% of 40’),  
- total capacity in number of containers is 1500, 
- required operational capacity is 2/3 of storage yard, means 1000 
containers, 
- turnover daily is ¼ of operational capacity, 250 boxes, 
- terminal operate 10/24h, 
- transit path for lories under the crane takes 4m. 
 
Two different machines will be taken to calculation: gantry crane and 
reachstracer. In comparison we have different values of availability, especially 
for winter and summer seasons.  
Let’s assume, that crane can operate 35 containers per hour and 25 for 
reachstracker in excellent conditions (availability equal to 1).  
Table 1. presents results of computations. Rb and Rc machines are reachstrackers 
respectively in the summer and winter. Ra column presents values for perfect 
reachstracer.   
 
Table 1. Results of calculating 
 Ra Rb Rc Crane 
Availability (season) 1 0.99 0.8 0.99 
Theoretical hour productivity  [cont] 25 24.75 20 34.65 
Practical hour productivity [cont] 25 24 20 34 
Practical day productivity [cont] 250 240 200 340 
No. of required machines 1 1.04 1.25 0.73 
SURFACE  
Storage height [cont] 3 3 3 3 
Number of rows [cont] 6 6 6 6 
Number of slots in line [cont] 55 55 55 55 
Number of transits ways 2 2 2 1 
Transit way widht [m] 20 20 20 4 
Storage surface [m2] 26 928 26 928 26 928 9 108 
Total surface [m2] 36 352.8 36 352.8 36 352.8 12 295.8 
 
As it is visible there are huge differences between winter and summer season in 
reachstracker operation ability. When availability is close to 1 practically there is 
no point to be aware of productivity. In case of crane stable value of availability 
gives excellent results. Buffer of productivity gives possibility to operate even 
more that 350 container per day.  
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Terminal land use is clearly visible when compare different transshipment 
technologies. Container warehouse can be three times smaller that serviced by 
reachstrackers. Investment in crane results smaller expenses on container yard. 
However during founding new terminal usually it is not clear if the business 
promises profitable future or is not worth crane installation.  
 
4. Conclusion 
Many of papers concerning on preparing and monitoring container terminal 
points. However there is lack of information about correlation between 
availability, productivity and land use in context of chosen transshipment 
technology. 
Like it was presented in section 3, reachstraceks, meant as modern and cheap 
operating terminal lifting machines, are not as productive as traditional gantry 
cranes. Additionally reachstracers are sensitive on whether conditions, what 
makes availability values different for different seasons. The problem is in 
operating cycle and maintenance problem with frozen oil in lifting pistons. 
Electric motors in cranes give leading point.  
Cranes are know from expenses associated to buying and installation. On the 
other hand are more reliable, have longer life time and are cheaper in operating. 
Land use requirements are much lower in case of cranes.  
However the managing problem is to estimate what more profitable: unstable 
work conditions and cheaper machine, or long term investment and cheap and 
effective transshipment. 
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Abstract 
Urbanization is seen as a rapid process covering new areas and suburbs. 
Industrial areas are usually placed not far from cities to provide fast 
transportation of workers and goods. Urbanisation spreads over these areas and 
the space between factories, logistic centres, and warehouses is often taken for 
residential estates, parks or shopping centres. Inhabitants may face very often to 
the problem of vehicles transporting goods and even dangerous goods through 
the area of high dense population or protected natural environment. The aim of 
the paper is to propose a model of risk assessment concerning road 
transportation of dangerous goods through the areas of various objects exposed 
to hazard brought about the transportation process. Vehicle transporting 
dangerous goods produces moving risk due to dangerous loads moving through 
areas of different exposures what gives at any point of the road changeable value 
of the risk. Model is based on the concept of road risk profile which takes into 
account road segments of various population densities, natural environment and 
engineering installations.  
Paper provides an example of calculation of proposed risk profile for a given 
road segment and a tanker. 
 
Introduction 
Daily observed hazard dealing with a moving mass (kinetic energy) is nowadays 
fully accepted as hundreds of vehicles are around visible. 40 tons truck, moving 
about 40 km/h has a kinetic energy equivalent to explosion of 0,5 kg of TNT 
(trotyl). Much more dangerous is a vehicle with dangerous goods. Heavy track 
carrying dangerous material, like a tank of 30 tons capacity of petrol, carries 
considerably more undesired events not only due to mechanical energy but also 
chemical or thermal ones. Energy stored in 30 tons of petrol is equivalent to 300 
t of TNT. We are familiar with large number of tankers passing through 
residential or park area going from refineries or stores to gas stations. There are 
also other dangerous goods (poisonous, corrosive, etc.) transported every day to 
chemical companies. All land transportation tasks dealing with procedure, 
documentation, permissions, technical and law requirements should be fulfilled 
according to international agreements described precisely in ADR, RID or ADN, 
but despite of it, we still observe accidents and less or more severe consequences 
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due to transportation of hazardous materials. The idea presented in the paper is 
based on observation of landscape through the car window and assessment of 
possible losses due to release of dangerous goods carrying by the truck. Paper 
concerns a method of risk assessment due to transportation of dangerous goods 
through the areas of different exposure to hazards arisen from releasing 
flammable liquids, poisoning gases etc. It is assumed that risk is evaluated 
according to route segments, so that finally one may get a road risk profile at the 
transportation route [Cassini]. The problem stated above was previously analysed 
and some data in specific cases is available [3, 5, 8]. 
 
Analysis of transportation system 
Risk analysis in technical system is based on general algorithm [6] and starts 
with description and identification of all factors influencing safe operation. 
Looking at goods transportation, it is distinguished transportation system and 
process. Transportation process describes changes of elements’ states in time and 
takes place in the specific infrastructure. Transportation system is a set of 
elements which consists of: means of transport with operator, surroundings like 
technical infrastructure and natural environment. One of the most important roles 
in transportation process takes a human being operating and managing process. 
To identify hazards in goods transportation it is necessary to identify sources of 
hazards and potential objects exposed to hazards since consequences depends on 
relation hazard – exposure [3]. From the safety point of view transportation 
system should be divided in two sets of objects containing: sources of hazard 
(hazardous active) and objects being exposed to hazard (hazardous passive):  
One may also distinguish in the transportation system roughly static and dynamic 
elements. Change of descriptive parameters of static elements is very slow 
regarding time of vehicle movement (road dimension, distances among 
buildings, population density, etc.). Dynamic elements are represented for 
instance by parameters characterizing: vehicle movement, traffic, walking 
people, animals, wind, rain/snow, etc. Static elements describe surroundings 
potentially affected by active elements, though static elements can also be active 
in the sense of hazard (slippery or rough road, curved or sloped road, broken tree 
branch close to the road, etc.). 
Road is divided in segments [5] taking into account possible exposed objects 
like: people, natural environment, technical infrastructure. In general, road as 
main static element is described by: 
- road parameters (dimensions, structure, surface, conditions,…), 
- road infrastructure parameters (pavements, roadside, bus/tram stops, 
bridges, crossroads, railway crossings,…), 
- road neighbourhood parameters: 
- inhabited area (type of houses, density of buildings, barriers/traffic 
lights, population density,…), 
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- uninhabited area (flora, fauna,…). 
 
Model assumptions 
Transportation is defined as a set of transportation system and process: 𝑇𝑅 =
〈𝑇𝑅𝑆, 𝑇𝑅𝑃〉 . Transportation system represents material objects while process 
describes distribution of object’s state in time. Adopting system definition from 
system theory [2, 10, 12] it is assumed that transportation system create set of 
elements, it attributes and relations linking attributes to elements:  
𝑇𝑆 = 〈𝐸,𝑊(𝐸), 𝑅𝐸𝑊〉 
where: 𝐸 = {𝑒𝑖}, 𝑖 = 1,2, … , 𝑛 – set of elements, 
𝑊(𝐸) = {𝑤𝑖𝑠}, 𝑖 = 1,2, … , 𝑛, 𝑠 = 1,2, … ,𝑚𝑖 – set of attributes, 
REW – set o relations. 
It is assumed that any undesired event originates from basic event of some 
system element. In the system there are defined sets of elements called active EA 
and passive elements EP: 𝑇𝑆 = {𝐸𝐴, 𝐸𝑃}.  
EA and EP are defined respectively as:  
𝐸𝐴 = 〈𝐸𝐴,𝑊(𝐸𝐴), 𝑅𝐴𝑊〉, 
𝐸𝑃 = 〈𝐸𝑃,𝑊(𝐸𝑃), 𝑅𝑃𝑊〉.  
Attributes W(EA) describe such features of elements that can possibly fail and 
therefore start chain of undesired events. Attributes W(EP) characterize attributes 
describing failure modes or losses due to given dysfunction of finally affected 
elements. 
An event during operation making abnormal, undesired state of EA elements 
initiates a chain of events resulting finally in losses of EP. 
Hazard is defined as an event which may potentially transform into undesired 
event i.e. event causing losses. Amount of losses depends on development 
scenarios which is a process of change of element attributes. 
Source of hazard is concentrated in dangerous goods and since it is moving, also 
hazard moves, making at given road segments various risk. 
Let us assume for simplicity that road regarding neighbourhood safety has three 
types of segments  𝑆 = 〈𝑠1, 𝑠2, 𝑠3〉 : segment passing uninhabited field S1, 
segment passing uninhabited forest or park S2, segment passing inhabited area S3. 
Deeper analysis may show more types of segments if necessary data is provides.  
Having defined types of road segments entire route of length L may be divided in 
m segments described by its length and type: 𝐷𝐿 = {𝑑𝑘(𝑙𝑘, 𝑠𝑗)}, where dk is k-th 
route segment of length lk, of type sj and 𝐿 = ∑ 𝑙𝑘
𝑚
𝑘=1 . 
 
Hazard identification 
Regarding transportation process of carrying dangerous goods by heavy truck we 
should include into analysis: vehicle (tanker), operator (driver), fright, road, 
roadside, road and neighbourhood infrastructure, traffic, type of land 
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development (compact/dispersed settlement, uninhabited, recreation ground, 
forest, park, field, river, lake, etc.), flora and fauna, weather conditions and 
process like accelerating, breaking, turning, driving up or down etc. In the 
system and process having such differentiated elements and states it is difficult to 
find out all or the most possible hazards. It is proposed systems approach to 
identify hazards.  
Transportation system is described by attributes. Any undesired state of 
attributes may cause an accident having losses observed at various objects and 
various modes. That analytical part of hazard identification is supported by 
inventive methods like HAZOP, FMECA, Cause-Consequence Analysis and the 
other [6, 9]. 
Hazard identification is done by the analysis of matrix of relations between 
distinguished attributes. Let’s denote hazard as a source event (failure, mishap, 
mishandle, external failure, etc.) consisting in causing losses. Losses are 
considered as excessive costs or undesired states of the system not included in 
ordinary repair. Active object initiates a chain of events and finally, passive 
object suffers losses. All relations among active and passive attributes are 
elements of Cartesian product 𝑊(𝐸𝐴) ×𝑊(𝐸𝑃). If analysis of such relations 
reveals losses of passive element than the basic event is identified as hazard in 
transportation system. 
Denote couple of attributes according to cause – consequence relation:  
𝜔𝑖𝑗 = 𝑤(𝑒𝑎𝑖) → 𝑤(𝑒𝑝𝑗), what means, that eai acts “dangerously” on epi.  
𝑊(𝐸𝐴) ×𝑊(𝐸𝑃) = [
𝜔11 ⋯ 𝜔1𝑛
⋮ ⋱ ⋮
𝜔𝑛1 ⋯ 𝜔𝑛𝑛
]  
Using techniques appropriate for peculiar character of couples 𝜔𝑖𝑗 and available 
in risk analysis [60300] we select meaningful and important relation having at 
the end losses to the system. Each couple in the matrix 𝑊(𝐸𝐴) ×𝑊(𝐸𝑃) is 
valued 0 or 1 if an influence of active object on passive one exists:  
𝑣 (𝑤(𝑒𝑎𝑖) → 𝑤(𝑒𝑝𝑗)) = 𝑣(𝜔𝑖𝑗) = {
1 if 𝐸𝐴 acts on 𝐸𝑃
0 otherwise           
 
Then we get matrix directing couples important for hazard identification:  
𝑣(𝑊(𝐸𝐴) ×𝑊(𝐸𝑃)) = [
𝑣(𝜔11) ⋯ 𝑣(𝜔1𝑛)
⋮ ⋱ ⋮
𝑣(𝜔𝑛1) ⋯ 𝑣(𝜔𝑛𝑛)
] 
Hazards correspond to all events connected to attributes of EA where: 
𝐻(𝑊(𝐸𝐴)) = {𝑊(𝐸𝐴): 𝑣(𝜔𝑖𝑗) = 1}. 
 
Result of this step is a set of attributes of all active elements of transportation 
which may generate losses due to passive element. 
Risk evaluation requires estimation likelihood and consequence magnitude due 
to each hazard. Likelihood corresponds to active objects EA, while consequences 
to passive ones EP. 
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Each active element is described by vector of failure likelihood:  
𝑙(𝑒𝑎𝑖) = [𝑙(𝑒𝑎𝑖1) … 𝑙(𝑒𝑎𝑖𝑖) … 𝑙(𝑒𝑎𝑖𝑛)] 
and for all 𝑣(𝜔𝑖𝑗) = 1, likelihood of the failure is: 𝑙(𝑒𝑎𝑖𝑗) > 0. For all active 
elements we get the likelihood matrix with regard to passive elements:  
L(𝐸𝐴) = [𝑙(𝑒𝑎𝑖𝑗)] 
 
In similar way we should determine vector of consequences corresponding to 
passive elements as a result of failure of active element. 
𝑐(𝑒𝑝𝑖) = [𝑐(𝑒𝑝1𝑖) … 𝑐(𝑒𝑝𝑖𝑖) … 𝑐(𝑒𝑝𝑛𝑖)]
𝑇 
For all passive elements we get the consequences matrix regarding active 
elements as basic cause:  
C(𝐸𝑃) = [𝑐(𝑒𝑝𝑖𝑗)] 
Each single hazard caused by active element produces risk as:  
𝑟(𝑒𝑖𝑗) = 𝑙(𝑒𝑎𝑖𝑗) ∙ 𝑐(𝑒𝑝𝑖𝑗). 
Finally we get for entire system a risk matrix as a Hadamard product:  
RS = L(𝐸𝐴) ∘ C(𝐸𝑃) = [(𝑙(𝑒𝑎𝑖𝑗) ∙ 𝑐(𝑒𝑝𝑖𝑗))] = [𝑟(𝑒𝑖𝑗)], 
where r(eij) is risk associated with i-th element with consequences sustained by j-
th element, 
In fact in some cases it may be i=j, what means that the failure of i-th element 
has serious consequence for itself. 
Having matrix RS we may observe value of risk originated from failure modes of 
each element directed to other objects RS(E). Assuming independence of all such 
relations it allows for summation of risks and obtaining risk vector for all 
elements. 
RS(𝐸) = [𝑟(𝑒𝑖𝑗)] = [∑𝑟(𝑒𝑖𝑗)
𝑗
]
𝑇
= [𝑟(𝑒𝑖)]
𝑇 
Risk profile 
In order to describe a risk profile of the road segment 𝑑𝑘(𝑙𝑘 , 𝑠𝑗) we have to select 
system elements corresponding to the given road segment dk: 
⋀ ((𝑊(𝑒𝑖) ∈ 𝑊(𝑑𝑘)) ⟹ 𝑟(𝑒𝑖))𝑒𝑖 . 
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Details of the analysis depend on knowledge about the system and data. 
Available data usually doesn’t concern specific problem and only rough 
assessment is possible. Valuation of possibilities and consequences depends on 
scenarios of events development. The main variables influencing valuation 
derives from: parameters of exposure to hazards caused by dangerous materials, 
propagation of flame or poisonous cloud due to material density, wind speed, 
humidity, instant or postpone effect for passive element. For detailed analysis 
some data is available for instance in [8]. For preliminary analysis it may be 
applied PHA requiring relative data and giving provisional assessment of risk [9, 
11]. 
 
Illustrative example 
It is assed route of transportation of petrol from general store to gas station. The 
route takes place through five various road segments (Fig. 1).  
 
Fig. 1. Layout of the route divided in 5 segments 
 
There are identified six elements of the transportation system: vehicle, driver, 
road shoulder, tree, pedestrian, residential house. Cause consequences analysis is 
omitted here since it is another extensive work. Only example relations among 
active and passive element are shown in Table 1. As exemplification of these 
relations it is given for instance: tanker due to brakes failure may cause an 
accident and set vehicle in fire, death, house destruction or break a tree. Another 
relation: tree at the road shoulder may be broken by stormy wind, fall down and 
cause an accident involving other vehicle or pedestrians. In the example, tanker 
failure, leakage, driver mishap and collision with other vehicle may take place at 
each segment, while collision with pedestrian only in segments 3 and 4. 
Tab. 1. Cause-consequence relation matrix among active and passive elements 
N
o. 
           Object       Passive 
Active  
Tanker Driver 
Other 
vehicle 
Pedestrian 
1 Tanker failure 1 1 1 1 
2 Tank leakage 1 1 1 0 
3 Driver mishap 1 1 1 1 
4 Other vehicle collision 1 1 1 0 
5 Pedestrian stormed into 1 0 0 1 
 
 
 
Segment 1 
S1 type 
l1=3 km 
 
 
 
Segment 2 
S2 type 
l2=2 km 
 
 
Segment 
3 
S3 type 
l3=2 km 
 
 
Segment 4 
S3 type 
l4=3 km 
 
Segment 5 
S1 type 
l5=2 km 
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road 
 
Assume a scale of likelihood and consequences [1, 11]. 
Tab.1b . Five grade likelihood scale 
very unlikely remote occasional probable frequent 
1 2 3 4 5 
Tab.1c. Four grade scale of consequences 
minor major critical catastrophic 
1 2 3 4 
 
Then there are formulated matrices of likelihood and consequences as it is shown 
in one combined Table 2. Final result i.e. risk calculated for each hazard and for 
elements is placed in Table 3. 
 
Tab. 2. Likelihood (L)/Consequences (C) matrix 
Object      Passive 
Active  
Tanker Driver 
Other 
vehicle 
Pedestrian 
 L C L C L C L C 
Tanker failure 4 2 2 2 2 3 3 4 
Tank leakage 3 3 1 2 1 2 0 0 
Driver mishap 3 3 2 2 1 3 1 3 
Other vehicle 
collision 
2 1 1 1 2 3 0 0 
Pedestrian stormed 
into road 
2 1 1 1 0 0 3 4 
 
Tab. 3. Risk matrix for identified hazards 
Object      Passive 
Active  
Tanker Driver 
Other 
vehicle 
Pedestrian 
Total risk  
for element 
Tanker failure 8 4 6 12 30 
Tank leakage 9 2 2 0 13 
Driver mishap 9 4 3 3 19 
Other vehicle 
collision 
2 1 6 0 9 
Pedestrian stormed 
into road 
2 1 0 12 15 
 
Risk assessment for the exemplary transportation system is done in two phases: 
individually for each identified hazard and as a whole for each element of the 
system. 
PHA risk matrix 4x5 (Table 5) shows that hazards assessed as more than 6 and 4 
(high consequences) are the most severe and should be unaccepted. 
Tab. 5. PHA risk matrix 
Likelihood 
Consequences 
1 2 3 4 5 
1 1 2 3 4 5 
2 2 4 6 8 10 
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3 3 6 9 12 15 
4 4 8 12 16 20 
 
The list of these unaccepted hazards is as follows: 
Cause: Tanker failure → Consequence: Truck damage; (Risk: 8), 
Cause: Tanker failure → Consequence: Bodily harm of pedestrian; (Risk: 12), 
Cause: Tank leakage → Consequence: Truck damage; (Risk: 9), 
Cause: Driver mishap → Consequence: Truck damage; (Risk: 9), 
Cause: Pedestrian stormed into road → Consequence: Bodily harm of pedestrian; 
(Risk: 12), 
Other risk assessment, referred to elements shows just rank of primary causes 
invoking largest hazard. Here there are no acceptation criteria but the order of 
events attracting attention to be analysed in first turn. The rank is: 
1. Tanker failure (Risk: 30), 
2. Driver mishap (Risk: 19), 
3. Pedestrian stormed into road (Risk: 15), 
4. Tank leakage (Risk: 13), 
5. Other vehicle collision (Risk: 9). 
Tab.6. Assessment concerning road segments shows risk in segments: 
Risk: 71 Risk: 71 Risk: 86 Risk: 86 Risk: 71 
Segment S1 Segment S2 Segment S3 Segment S4 Segment S5 
Conclusions 
The developed model shows the frames of systemic approach to the risk analysis. 
It is shown system decomposition with respect to elements causing hazard and 
elements being exposed to consequences. That split analysis allows for precise 
selection of basic hazardous events and finally their assessment in entire system. 
In transportation system method clearly divides causes and consequences. 
Respectively to available data analysis may be done quantitatively or 
qualitatively applying for instance PHA method.  
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Abstract 
 
The goal of this work was to develop a pragmatic analysis to evaluate risk and 
propose suitable protection gear for pharmaceutical industries, thanks to a 
computer tool. 
In an attempt to comply with legislations and ergonomics, we took into account 
the process, the industrial tasks and the properties of the Active Pharmaceutical 
Ingredient (API) and solvents. 
Protection must be defined according to body parts concerned by the chemical 
risk. Consequently, five qualitative and quantitative approaches are put forward. 
Collective protection is determined by the type of ventilation according to the 
confinement of the process. Eye protection is based on a logical tree. 
Respiratory system protection and hand protection approaches are explained 
thanks to a logical and mathematical reasoning. Finally, body protection 
approach enables to match a class of risk with labcoats and overalls. 
Keywords: Collective protection, Hand protection, Eye protection, Respiratory 
system protection, Body protection. 
1. General Methodology and collective protections 
1.1 Introduction 
 
In front of a chemical risk, means of protection must be implemented. Although 
collective protection equipment (CPE) is privileged, it is also necessary to 
implement Personal Protection Equipment (PPE). It is therefore necessary to 
identify at first, the risks an operator can be exposed to. Following a risk 
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assessment, the type of CPE and PPE will be determined. Depending on the type 
of PPE, the methodology developed will be different.  
 
The following flowchart illustrates the general methodology. 
 
API Task
ChemicalsTasks
Risks evaluation
Methodology
Eye protection
Methodology
Respiratory system 
protection
Methodology
Body protection
PPE 
recommended
Hazards 
identification
Methodology
Hand protection 
Methodology
Collective 
protections
Collective 
protections 
recommended 
 
Figure 1. General flowchart of the methodology 
 
1.2 Hazards identification 
The first step is to set up two comprehensive inventories of used products and 
operating conditions in order to identify hazards in which the operator may face. 
 Tasks: this inventory lists the utilization conditions in which an operator 
of the company faces (e.g.: the process and its confinement, the involved 
chemicals, the duration, the frequency of the task...). 
 Products: this inventory lists all the used chemicals in the company and 
their physicochemical properties (e.g.: the name, the references of the 
products, the references, the risk phrases, the pictograms…). 
 
1.3 Risks evaluation 
1.3.1 Determination of collective protections.  
The aim of CPE is to protect employees against risks that may threaten their 
health or safety. The collective protections permit to limit risk or confine it and 
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they are always implemented primarily to PPE. The methodology focuses only 
on ventilation systems since it seems to be the only collective protection 
applicable to chemical hazards. 
In a company, different types of ventilation can be set up like surrounding 
catchment, effective local ventilation, general ventilation. 
To choose the most suitable collective protections, it is necessary to look at the 
containment of the process. Thus, a relation between containment and 
recommended collective protections is made. 
The use of the collective protections will allow the employees to reduce the 
strain on the respiratory protection. Indeed, when surrounding catchment or use a 
capture effective local ventilation (e.g.: hood), the level of respiratory protection 
will be reduced immediately below the protection level of efficiency.  
 
1.3.2 Determination of individual protections.  
The methodology determines the protective equipment that an operator must 
wear to protect themselves from chemical hazards (collective protections but also 
PPE). 
Taking into account exclusively the chemical risk, only the following protections 
are analyzed: Eye protection, face protection, respiratory protection, hand 
protection and protection of the body. 
 
2. Body protection 
 
2.1 Introduction 
In pharmaceutical industry, wearing a body protection like protective clothing is 
an obligation. This methodology is made to help the Safety and Security 
Manager to choose the rightful equipment. 
The objective of this methodology is the determination of a protection level an 
operator has to be submitted according to the conditions of use (like product, 
quantity, task…). This methodology is based on an already-existing method from 
INRS (National Institute of Research and Safety) [1] 
A type and a category of protective clothing will be associated to the protection 
level. 
 
2.2 Method 
2.2.1 Exposition class. 
The determination of quantity class is made on a daily basis and considers the 
consumed quantity of Active Pharmaceutical Ingredient (API) compared with the 
most consumed API in the whole plant. The frequency class enables to 
differentiate the products that are used occasionally in comparison with the most 
often used product. 
A matrix combining the quantity class with the frequency class determines the 
exposition class. 
 
2.2.1 Hazard class. 
This class permits the consideration of the intrinsic properties of the API. 
Hazards class can be determined either by the risk phrases on the MSDS, or by 
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the Observable Effect Level (equivalent to French’s VLEP). The chosen hazard 
class is the one obtained with the highest level of class. 
 
 
API Task
Type of clothing
Quantity class Frequency class
Exposition class
Potential risk 
score
Hazard class
Category 2 Category 3Category 1 Task
Type of clothing Type of clothing
 
 
Figure 2. General flowchart for the body protection 
 
2.2.3 Potential risk score. 
This score allows the determination of the products requiring a priority and 
detailed the chemical risk evaluation. 
 
The objective of this part is to determine three risk levels, each one 
corresponding to a clothing category as recommended by regulation. 
The combination of the hazard class and the potential exposition class gives the 
potential risk. It allows the risk to be organized into a hierarchy of three levels. 
After having ranked the risk and made a category of protective clothing 
correspond to this risk, a type of protective clothing is determined. This type is 
defined by European standards according to the risks of exposition dependent on 
the nature of the chemical and on the type of contact with this one (spatter, 
suspension, jet, fog). 
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For a major risk (Category 3), different types of protection clothing are 
determined by European standards. Six types of protection’s clothes of category 
3 are determined according to the following table (Table I). 
For an intermediate risk (Category 2), Type 6 protection is preconized. This 
enables the operator to be protected against the spatter. 
For a minor risk (Category 1), a basic clothing protection is preconized. No type 
is defined. 
 
Table I [2] 
 
Type 6 
Protective clothing against liquid chemicals (Limited protective 
performance) 
NF EN 13034 
Type 5 Protective clothing for use against solid particulates (aerosol). NF EN 13982 
Type 4 
Protective clothing against liquid chemicals (Pulverization 
protection) 
NF EN 14605 
Type 3 
Protective clothing against liquid chemicals  (Liquid protection 
and limited gas protection) 
NF EN 14605 
Type 2 
Protective clothing against liquid and gaseous chemicals, 
including liquid aerosols and solid particles (non-gas tight) 
Equipment assuring a partial protection against gas. 
Breathable air’s alimentation. 
NF EN 943-1 
Type 1 
Protective clothing against liquid and gaseous chemicals, 
including liquid aerosols and solid particles (gas tight) 
Equipment assuring a complete protection against gas. 
Breathable air alimentation. 
NF EN 943-1 
NF 943-2 
 
2.2.4 Case of a major risk (Category 3). 
The objective is to correlate each task with a type of cloth (Table II). 
Each task is assigned to an installation. That is why it is useful to understand the 
functioning of each installation to determine the elements enabling us to 
determine which type of clothing to use. 
 The physical state of dangerous chemicals; 
 The kind of contact (spatter, suspension, jet, fog); 
Table II 
Task Possible physical state 
Kind of 
contact 
Type of 
clothe 
preconized 
Grinding Solid particle Suspension T5 
Calibration Solid particle Suspension T5 
Compaction Solid particle Suspension T5 
Covering 
Solid particle 
Liquid 
Jet T3 
Granulation Solid particle Jet T3 
Assembly 
Solid particle 
Liquid 
Jet T3 
Weighing Solid particle Suspension T5 
Sieving Solid particle Suspension T5 
Mixing Solid particle Jet T3 
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Liquid 
Loading/Unloading 
Solid particle 
Liquid 
Jet T3 
2.3 Results 
Opposite to the others, this methodology cannot be tested. In fact, determining a 
category and a type of protective clothing needs to introduce data concerning the 
quantity of product and frequency of the task. Consequently, it is impossible to 
compare the result obtained with the recommendation issued by the supplier’s 
data. 
 
3. Hand protection 
3.1 Introduction 
An operator does not always have to wear protection gloves. It depends on the 
task which is carried out and the used chemical. First, a preliminary step is to 
know if the use of gloves is compulsory. Then, the type of gloves, that’s to say 
the material of the gloves, is determined by means of matrix calculations 
according to the chemical families present in the API. The following chart 
indicates the global method of determination of hand protection: 
 
3.2. Method 
 
3.2.1 Are gloves compulsory? 
The protection gloves are more or less convenient for the operators. To 
determine if gloves are compulsory, many steps must be followed for the 
chemicals (API and solvent if necessary): 
 Check of risk phrases: 
Wearing protection gloves is compulsory if at least one risk phrases’ dealing 
with skin contamination is present in the Material Safety Data Sheet (MSDS) of 
the chemicals. Those are H300, H301, H302, H304, H310, H311, H312, H314, 
H315, H317, H340, H341, H350, H351 (lethal, toxic, harmful if swallowed, in 
contact with skin, risk of cancer…). If the data of the used products does not 
include those phrases, gloves are not compulsory. 
 Accessibility of chemicals: 
If the chemicals bring a skin contamination, it is useful to know if the operator is 
exposed to dangerous products during a task. If the chemicals are accessible 
during a task, hand protection is highly recommended. 
 Body part exposure during the task: 
If the API and the solvent are accessible and if the hands are exposed to 
hazardous substances, it is necessary to wear chemical protection gloves. 
 
3.2.2 Which type of gloves wear? 
Before having the result of the choice of gloves types, various stages and 
calculations must be done: 
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 Chemical families and gloves materials: 
To determine the material of the gloves to wear, it is proposed to use the 
composition of the chemical mix (or the API alone) according to a list of the 
chemical families. 
The chemical families and their number i (line) are the following: 
1: aromatic, 2: ketone, 3: halogenated group, 4: ether, 5: acid, 6: amino group, 7: 
alcohol, 8: heterocyclic group, 9: sulphur, 10: ester, 11: amide, 12: sulfoxide, 13: 
nitro, 14: alkene, 15: sulfonamide, 16: aldehyde, 17: nitrogenous group. 
following: 
1: rubber, 2: nitrile, 3: neoprene, 4: PVC, 5: butyl. 
 Resistance matrix (A): 
A resistance matrix of gloves types against the chemical families named A has 
been established thanks to literature. Let A(i,j) represent its coefficients. 
 
API
Are risk phrases 
concerning hands 
mentionned in 
MSDS? 
YES NO
No hand 
protection
Is the chemical 
accessible?
YES NO
Are body parts 
concerning the wear of 
gloves mentionned?
Task
YES NO
Chemical families 
making the 
chemicals
Type of protection 
gloves
Solvent
YES NO
Are risk phrases 
concerning hands 
mentionned in 
MSDS?
Is the chemical 
accessible?
YES NO
 
Figure 3. General flowchart of hand protections 
 
The most used gloves in pharmaceutical activities and their number j (column) 
are the  
The signification of their value is the following: 
A(i,j)=0 : prohibited, A(i,j)=1 : lowly advised, A(i,j)=2: advised, A(i,j)=3: highly 
advised. 
The resistance matrix is the following: 
 Composition column vector (X): 
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Let X represent the composition vector of the mix in column, X(i) its 
coefficients, with i the number of the chemical family. 
If one family i is present in one chemical (API or solvent), then X(i)=1; if it is 
present in both of the two chemicals, then X(i)=2; X(i)=0 if not. 
 Compatibility matrix (S): 
Let S represent the compatibility matrix and S(i,j) its coefficients. The matrix 
corresponds to the product of A by X. Indeed, with this multiplication, some type 
of gloves could be eliminated because of the chemical composition of the mix or 
the API when S(i,j)=0. 
 
A =
(
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
0 1 0 0
2 0 2 0
0
3
2 3 3 0
0 2 0 2
2 2 2 2
0 2 0 0
0 2 2 2
1 1 1 0
0 2 0 3
0 2 2 0
1 1 1 1
1 1 1 1
0 2 2 0
1 1 1 1
1 1 1 1
1 1 1 0
1 1 1 0
1
0
3
0
3
0
2
2
1
1
1
1
1
1
1)
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 Transfer matrix (T): 
Let T represent the transfer matrix, and T(i,j) the matching coefficients as 
following: 
 
{
 
 
 
 
i ∈ [1; 17], j ∈ [1; 5]
T(i, j) = 1 if ∑S(i, j)
5
j=1
= 0
T(i, j) = S(i, j) else
 
 
3.3. Results 
 
3.3.1 Multiplication scores. 
At this point, a vector R of multiplication scores is calculated, R(j) corresponds 
to the multiplication score of the type of gloves number j: 
 
R(j) =∏T(i, j)
17
i=1
, j ∈ [1; 5] 
Eventually, the gloves which obtained the best score are preconized. However, 
for some API, it appears that all R(j)=0. In this case, this score is given up and 
the method proceeds to the calculation of addition scores. 
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3.3.2 Addition scores. 
If all R(j)=0, then a vector R’ of addition scores is determined: 
R′(j) =∑S(i, j)
17
i=1
, j ∈ [1; 5] 
As before, the gloves which obtained the best score are preconized. However, 
this vector of addition scores is only used if multiplication scores are not picked. 
 
3.3.3 Choice of protection gloves. 
The types of gloves protection to wear are classify by decreasing scores, R(j) or 
R’(j) according the case: the higher is the score, the better is the rank of the type 
of gloves. If a score is null, then the type of glove is not recommended. 
 
3.3.4 Validation by comparative results. 
This part of the methodology is validated by comparing the results of the 
methodology on APIs used in Ethypharm with the MSDS. If the type of gloves 
recommended in the MSDS of a chemical product match with the results 
obtained by the method, the method is valid for this API. This method reached of 
coherence. 
At the end, 95.45 % of tests are in accordance with the recommendations of the 
MSDS. Therefore, the method is valid. 
 
4. Respiratory System Protection 
4.1 Introduction 
Using a respiratory system protection is necessary when an operator is facing the 
risk of affecting his or her health by inhalation of air loaded with polluting gas, 
toxic vapour, dust or spray. Consequently, the use of a respiratory system is not 
systematic and it is useful to develop a method in order to help the choice of the 
type of respiratory system. 
Before developing the method, it is important to define what a respiratory system 
protection is. It exists two categories of respiratory system:  
 Filtering face mask; 
 Heavy breathing protection or self-contained breathing apparatus. 
In our case, we need to make three cases according to the mixture used to 
determine the respiratory system protection: 
 Solid mixture; 
 Liquid mixture without ethanol as solvent; 
 Liquid mixture with ethanol as solvent. 
4.2 Method 
4.2.1 Solid mixture. 
First, it is necessary to study risk phrases linked with the API selected by the 
user. Indeed, if none of the following sentences is mentioned in the API’s 
MSDS, the user will not need to wear a respiratory system protection. The risk 
phrases concerned are : H330 / H331 / H332 / H334 / H335 / H336 / H340 / 
H341 / H350i / H351 / H360 / H360FD / H361 / H361FD / H362 / H371 / H373. 
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If the test on risk phrases is positive, the methodology keeps to be followed. 
Then, each filter is associated to one or more chemical families. A matrix is 
created in order to match the compatibility of each filter (K, E, P) with the 
chemical families spotting in the list of API present in Ethypharm. The filters 
compatible with the API are obtained by multiplying the matrix by the 
composition vector (explained in 3. Hand protection). After determining the type 
of filters, their efficiency must be chosen. The toxicity of the chemicals defined 
by pictograms enables to specify the efficiency on a scale going from 1 to 3.  To 
finish, the type of system (filtering or insulating) is specified thanks to the 
containment of the process used. The correspondence is writing in Table III 
Table III  
Containment of the process Pictograms Efficiency Respiratory system 
Dispersive Without 1 Filtering 
Open Without 1 Filtering 
Closed but open regularly Without 1 Filtering 
Always closed Without 1 Filtering 
Dispersive SGH 07 
SGH 08 
3 Filtering 
Open SGH 07 
SGH 08 
3 Filtering 
Closed but open regularly SGH 07 
SGH 08 
2 Filtering 
Always closed SGH 07 
SGH 08 
2 Filtering 
Dispersive SGH 09 / Insulating 
Open SGH 09 3 Filtering 
Closed but open regularly SGH 09 3 Filtering 
Always closed SGH 09 3 Filtering 
 
4.2.2 Liquid mixture without ethanol as solvent. 
As for the solid mixture, a first test is realised on the risk phrases of the solvent 
and API. 
Then the toxicity of the solvent and API is looked after. Indeed, if the mixture is 
not toxic, this is no need to wear a respiratory system protection. 
At this point, the wear of a respiratory system is aborted if the saturation vapour 
pressure is higher than the used pressure. 
After this step of tests, the type of filter (A, Ax, B) the user must wear is 
determined. That’s why the organic characteristic of the solution is studied. If the 
solution is organic, the type of filter preconized is A or Ax. Otherwise, B filter is 
advised. According to the boiling temperature, a A type filter is choose if it is 
higher than 65 degrees. Otherwise, the Ax filter is kept.  
To finish, the efficiency and the type of system are determined thanks to the 
containment of the process (Table IV). 
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Table IV  
Containment of the process Efficiency Respiratory system 
Dispersive 3 Filtering or insulating 
Open 3 Filtering or insulating 
Closed but open regularly 2 Filtering 
Always closed 1 Filtering 
 
4.2.3 Liquid mixture with ethanol as solvent. 
When ethanol is used, the user needs to wear a respiratory system with a filter A 
such as the recommendations of the MSDS of the ethanol. The efficiency and the 
type of system are determined like the liquid mixture without ethanol, i.e. with 
the containment of the process (Table IV). 
 
4.2.4 Reduction with the use of efficient collective protection. 
If the operator use a collective protection like a local efficient ventilation or a 
surrounding catchment, the efficiency of the respiratory system is reduced by one 
(Table V). 
Table V 
Efficiency and system without collective 
protection 
Efficiency and system with collective protection 
System Efficiency System Efficiency 
Insulating  Filtering 3 
Filtering 3 Filtering 2 
Filtering 2 Filtering 1 
Filtering 1 Nothing  
 
4.3 Results 
 
In order to confirm the methodology, tests are realized. They consist in checking 
that the respiratory system mentioned in the MSDS of the API is the same that 
what we have obtained with our method (help of the computerized tool). 
At the end, 95 % of tests are in accordance with the recommendations of the 
MSDS. 
Therefore, the method is accepted. 
5. Eye protection 
5.1 Introduction 
In the pharmaceutical industry, safety glasses are obligatory during all the tasks 
in which the operator can be exposed to API.  
 
5.2 Method 
This method is based on a flowchart. The first step is to check if an insulating 
respiratory system protection is used. If yes, safety glasses are no used because 
this kind of respiratory protection already protects the eyes. If not, safety glasses 
should be advised.  
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In this aim, the second step is to check if the risk phrases H314, H318 or H319 
are mentioned in the MSDS of the API (Table VI).  
Table VI: Risk phrases relative to eye protection. 
Risk phrases number Risk phrases description 
H314  Causes severe skin burns and eye damage 
H318 Causes serious eye damage 
H319 Causes serious eye irritation 
 
If one or more of those risk phrases are mentioned, safety goggles or a full face 
mask is advised to protect efficiently the operator. If not, safety glasses are 
advised by default. 
 
5.4 Results 
 
Thanks to this method, the operator can determine the most suitable eye 
protection according to the API used and the industrial task done.  
6. Conclusion and Limits 
Each chemical and pharmaceutical plant needs a method of chemical risk 
analysis to determine the most suitable protection equipment which is essential 
to ensure operators’ safety. 
Taking into account the API, its physical and chemical properties and the 
industrial task, this method is a global way to determine the adequate protection 
equipment in chemical activities. These factors are essential in the choice of the 
equipment since a collective or an individual protection has to be adapted to the 
risk. 
However, it should be stress that this method does not take into account the 
accidental case. Furthermore, the user has to take other considerations, such as 
the equipment’s costs or the operator’s comfort. 
Moreover, it has to be pointed out that this method only enables to give 
indications about which kind of protection equipment wear. Indeed, the 
employees’ protection is linked to their behaviour and only a risk awareness 
campaign could reduce accidents at its root. To conclude, the final decision has 
to be taken by the person in charge of safety of the firm. 
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Abstract 
 
This paper is based on the involvement of its author in a French Haut Conseil de 
la Santé Publique (HCSP) working group whose aim was to write 
recommendations for realising Zone Risk Assessments (Z-HRA) inside areas 
polluted by local industries. Although this new approach appears for sure as a 
better one than the mono-sites impact studies, which at present are compulsory 
in France, this paper shows a series of difficulties to set it up, which originate 
from three different categories, a scientific one, a pragmatic one, and a political 
one. The each time first question for example, of fixing the boundaries of the 
polluted zone inside which a Z-HRA should be launched, is simultaneously 
linked to these three categories of difficulties and to their entanglement. Other 
similar questions which rose inside the working group are related in this paper 
and demonstrate both the usefulness and the complexity of Z-HRA approach, as 
a new risk assessment and risk management tool.  
 
Keywords: Health Risk Assessment, public debate, decision making process 
Introduction 
Health Risk Assessment (HRA) is a regulatory procedure which has become 
mandatory in France since the 1996 Air Act. It was required since 1979 from 
industrial entities that they provide “impact studies” to the administration when 
they ask authorisation to operate a new facility, introduce new equipments, or a 
new industrial process. But the 1996 Air Act added the obligation for industrials 
to take into account possible effects of their activities on the surrounding 
population health and for this purpose to conduct risk assessments on the model 
codified by the American National Research Council (1983) [1]. Thus, when 
examining each HRA study, the French environmental administration will check 
in particular that the pollutants generated by the project do not produce an 
“excessive” health risk for the surrounding populations or will impose that the 
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concerned industrial entity set up additional equipment in order to abate or 
suppress these risks.   
Although this procedure, - the “site” HRA regulatory approach -, has been 
implemented since 15 years, it is increasingly criticized for two reasons. The first 
one could be summed up as following. As companies are often located near each 
other and also near other activities, one must recognize that the pollutants and 
nuisances generated by industrial plants and by other sources (such as vehicles 
for instance) tend to accumulate within “zones” which would include several 
polluting sources. Furthermore, even if each individual company complies with 
its regulatory requirements, - each emitted pollutant of each industrial plant 
staying under and admissible level-, it cannot be excluded that the local 
populations be subjected to above regulatory threshold concentrations of one 
pollutant or the other, or to harmful combinations of them. Hence the idea, 
according to which it would be sanitary and scientifically better to implement 
“zone” assessments, rather than “sites” ones, began to come through since the 
beginnings of the 2000s.  
The second critique addressed towards the “site” HRA regulatory approach and 
the implementation of 1996 Air Act concerns the decision making process and its 
lack of transparency. Number of problems had occurred in France during the 
phase of results communication to the population, after conducted HRAs in the 
framework of the setting up of new facilities (refuse incinerators for instance). In 
some cases, concerned populations had demonstrated their refusal to new 
polluting facilities, although these new facilities had been authorized by 
environmental administration and public authorities. These problems slowly lead 
to the idea, largely advocated in the international literature, of a substantial and 
early involvement of the concerned populations and representatives of 
environmental associations, in procedures that needed to be invented.  
Meanwhile, a few experiences that could be gathered under the name “Zone 
Health Risk Assessments” (Z-HRA) had been conducted in France, on an 
experimental and pragmatic basis. They were initiated for diverse reasons, and 
gave rise to process and results that were themselves contrasted, but generally 
positively judged.   
According to this general background, the French ministries in charge of health 
and the environment requested the Haut Conseil de la Santé Publique (HCSP) to 
draft a report on the interest and the conditions for conducting risk assessments 
studies in the context of activity basins. More precisely the HCSP was mandated 
to report on two linked subjects: “the development of a methodology regarding 
health risks in the context of zone studies”, and “helping interpret the results of 
risk assessments conducted in the framework of impact studies”. In order to fulfil 
this mission, the HSCP established a multidisciplinary working group made up 
of (French) experts of various institutions. The group met from September 2009 
to October 2010, held about ten meetings, hearings or work sessions, and at the 
end produced a recommendation report that was accepted by HSCP in January 
2011, and published on its website. I was one of the participants of this working 
group, as one of the two social sciences representatives inside it, the other 
members of this group mostly being representatives of health and environmental 
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“harder” scientists (epidemiologists, toxicologists), some of them ( 8 ) having 
taken part to previous experimental Z-HRAs.  
 
The purpose of this paper is to report some of the difficulties we met, and some 
of the controversies we had when discussing and writing our recommendations. 
The difficulties we met were of different origins. Some of them were related to 
scientific problems or uncertainties; I will not lie down on those first ones, 
because I am not the most qualified one to do so. But some of them were 
technical or pragmatic difficulties; and some of them were linked to political 
considerations. As a social scientist, I will mainly report on these pragmatic and 
political problems.  
Last point to say before entering into these questions: inside the HSCP working 
group, everybody was at once convinced that the recourse to Z-HRA should 
anyway be a better solution than the existing one. Taking into account health 
risks inside “zones” was for each of us on one hand a much better way of 
assessing the “real” risks for the concerned populations and on the other hand a 
powerful tool for opening debates and imagining diverse solutions for reducing 
risks inside each “zone”. Succeeded examples of this second advantage had been 
reported to us: for instance we learnt that, in some cases, the setting of a new 
plant by a new industrial entity, inside an industrial zone, had lead to discussions 
between the different industrial-polluters of the zone, and to a lowering of the 
emissions of certain pollutants (benzene for instance) by the “older” polluting 
industrials entities, so that globally, the level of the given pollutant staid below 
the authorized thresholds, inside the zone.   In such cases, diverse stakeholders, 
this time mainly the concerned industrial entities and the State environmental 
inspectors, succeeded  when revisiting their respective contributions in  a 
pollutant emissions, so as the global level of these emissions would be 
acceptable for the surrounding population. 
Thus, we were in favour of Z-HRA, for sanitary and democratic reasons and we 
wanted to emphasize both aspects with our recommendations. But problems 
were going to rise, when coming to details and trying to imagine and write the 
good recipes for conducting Z-HRA. 
 
What is a zone? 
The first problem we met was unexpected. Although all of us were theoretically 
putting forwards the advantages of a zone approach in place of (multiple) mono-
site HRA(s), we realised that we did not know how to define the concept of 
“zone”, in a generic way, so this definition could be helpful for future and 
various stakeholders. In fact, the zone concept was blurry due to the large range 
of activities that had to be considered: industrial plants of course, but also 
farming, road transport, wastelands… all these activities are possible 
contributors of cumulative pollution and then of risks for the population health; 
additionally, the zone concept was not so clear according to its possible 
perimeter: as we were aware of the fact that emissions into the atmosphere or 
                                                        
8 Those ones mainly were Civil Servants originating from the Cellules InterRégionales  en 
Epidémiologie (CIRE); the CIRE used to be part of the Directions Régionales des Affaires 
Sanitaires et Sociales, and are now part of the Agences Régionales de Santé (ARS).  CIREs also 
gather in a network driven by the Institut National de Veille Sanitaire (INVS). 
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into water environment barely have any limits, should we engage our work when 
considering a zone as a vast territory, that would include a large series of 
activities and also a big amount of inhabitants and other stakeholders?  
For pragmatic but rather non scientific reasons, we quickly decided, as a first 
step, that a “zone” should not be too big. In order to go further towards a 
definition of the zone, we reviewed different facets it should take into account. 
The first of them could be called the triggering factor which in our view could be 
threefold: a zone approach, and then the delimitation of a zone, has to be 
considered when either particular environmental problems have been detected 
inside a given area, or when specific heath risks inside a given population seem 
to be detected (and a fortiori if this population, or local environmental 
associations are claiming on this subject), or, third possible triggering factor, 
when a new polluting plant or a new polluting process is about to increase 
polluting emissions in a given and already polluted area.  So the zone should be 
drawn around the geographical origin of one or the other of theses diverse 
warning “signals” or points of entry in the process. In order then to draw the 
boundaries of a zone, we added several intertwined other facets, an economic 
one, a political one, a population one, and an environmental one.  The three first 
of these ones were rather pragmatic and political: a zone should be a kind of 
“solidarity area” where people work and (or) live, and anyway are interested in 
its economic development, and a zone should concern only a few major polluting 
sources and a few local authorities territories, so as collective decisions could be 
discussed. Of course, the last facet stayed the more important one: a zone should 
also be delimited by environmental considerations, that is to say significant 
spatial differences between polluting emissions concentrations, between the 
inside and the offside. 
At the end, we proposed the following definition of a zone, in the Z-HRA 
framework. It is “a solidarity area, in terms of economics, physical attributes and 
population, where a range of economic activities (industries, transportation of 
people or goods, agriculture…) took place, are taking place or will take place, 
contributing significantly to the emission of potential hazardous agents in the 
environment, that may, alone or when combined, affect health in the short or 
long term, given the way that the diverse populations occupy the area” [2, p 14]. 
 
Involving stakeholders 
The second issue we had to face was the setting up of an organizational 
framework which could allow the involvement of the diverse concerned 
stakeholders, in the Z-HRA process. The international literature which had been 
examined on this question [3] is almost unanimous. Although the involvement of 
stakeholders in HRAs or quasi equivalent of Z-HRAs, all over the industrial 
world, brings new complexities and may at once appear as a waste of time for 
deciders, this involvement appears in the long run as a source of multiple 
benefits. The process of the assessment is generally at the end of a better quality, 
the results are at least better understood by the concerned populations, and the 
decisions stemming from the analysis are most of the time better accepted in this 
case. Furthermore, most of the recent academic articles on this subject stress that 
these results are better achieved when stakeholders are invited to participate in 
the process as early as possible [4]. 
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We had a lot of discussions in our HCSP working group on the best 
organizational way of involving stakeholders in Z-HRA. On this point as on 
others, we mainly agreed on and shared the above opinion: diverse stakeholders, 
and if possible, all the concerned stakeholders of a given zone, should be invited, 
as soon as possible, that is to say even before boundaries of the zone were to be 
drawn up, to take part in the Z-HRA process that would treat of “their” zone. 
But, in the details, the problem was also a pragmatic one. 
To put it schematically, we first worked on the setting up of a local and 
democratic organization which would be in charge of the “political” conduct of a 
given Z-HRA, once this action had been locally decided, and once the zone had 
been precisely defined. In this view, we advocated for the establishment of a 
Steering and Monitoring Committee (COS (9)), that would be in charge of the 
choice of a research department which would lead scientific investigations on 
cumulative pollutants emission inside the zone, and of organizing discussions 
between the stakeholders, mainly on the basis of  these scientific investigations. 
We imagined that stakeholders would belong to 6 different colleges, in order to 
cover the different gathered interests. So, we recommended that one would find 
inside a COS representatives from local (political) authorities such as mayors of 
the concerned communes or districts, from the State, government agencies and 
institutions, from employers of companies or facilities located in the concerned 
territory, from employees of the same companies or facilities, from the civil 
society (environmental associations, neighbourhood committees), and from 
qualified individuals. The president of the COS should be as independent as 
possible and be appointed by the Committee members, his main task being to 
conduct open debates, and the secretariat should, to be pragmatic, be held by 
state representatives.  
More accurately, the COS’ missions could be split into three phases: 
- the starting one would be to induce a shared vision of the problem 
between stakeholders, to decide whether a Z-HRA is needed, and to 
precise the boundaries of the relevant zone. 
- The second phase, once a Z-HRA has been decided, would be to write 
draft specifications for its conduct, with the help of a chosen service 
provider (research firm or any other competent body); then the COS 
should choose, after a call for applications, another research firm or 
competent body for conducting the scientific part of the Z-HRA  
- During the third phase, the COS would accompany the scientific work, 
analyse its results and disseminate them; it also may formulate 
recommendations pertaining to risk management measures. Once 
arbitration has been made by the competent authorities, and once the 
decided risk management measures should be enacted, the COS would 
follow this implementation and assess its impacts. 
We had a lot of discussions, inside our HCSP working group, on the functioning 
of this COST, on its composition, and on its supposed role inside the decision 
                                                        
9 COS (Comité d’Orientation et de Suivi)  in French. 
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making process. We did not always agree but had to make some compromises. 
For instance, on the question “are all the stakeholders, inside a given COS, 
equal?” the response is inevitably complex. A pure democratic vision would 
suggest that the 6 above mentioned colleges representatives should be equal in 
the COS discussions, but de facto, some stakeholders have a different status than 
others: the State representatives may impose at any time existing regulations, the 
companies’ employers or owners will be asked by the States representatives to 
pay at least for the scientific work done during the conduct of Z-HRAs and 
eventually to participate to consequential risk management measures, although 
other colleges’ representatives would not have these prerogatives or duties (10). 
Hence, the involvement of the diverse COST stakeholders in the decision 
process, after the Z-HRA had been achieved, is a problem I will come back later.  
But let us go back for a while, in the implementation of the whole process. What 
is above related refers to a constituted COS, with its proper difficulties as its 
appointed members meet, discuss, exchange. When relating deliberately on the 
propositions we made and on their difficulties, I skipped another and anterior 
problem, which is the constitution of the COS itself. Yet, a COS cannot rise from 
nowhere and it need itself to be settled. This is why we had to distinguish a 
preliminary phase, before the COS three here above described ones. Once an 
environmental, sanitary, or regulatory problem linked to the implantation of a 
new polluting plant has been detected in an area, we proposed that the State 
representatives engage a preliminary assessment of this problem, inside a 
preliminary delimitation of the concerned area. This first assessment, which in 
our view should need a light scientific assistance, should be engaged through 
State funds. If this preliminary exam seems to lead to further needed ones, that is 
to say the constitution of a COS and the conducting of an Z-HRA, the State 
representatives would just have in charge the previous impulse. Once a COS is 
on the way, States representatives should withdraw of their de facto first leading 
position in the process. 
 
The decision making phase 
Another subject of discussion, inside our HCSP working group, has been about 
decision making, once Z-HRA has been finished, and specifically on the role of 
the COS with regards of this last phase. To be schematic, two positions opposed 
each other. Some of us would defend, as a way of pushing as far as possible 
democratic procedures, the idea that the COS should be empowered in the 
decision making phase. Stating that there is a general tendency, in industrial 
countries so that stakeholders whose advices are not taken into account exit more 
and more local and democratic procedures, some of us would tend to say that, if 
the COS could propose risk management propositions in response to the Z-HRA, 
then, those propositions would have to be considered as legitimate by the 
competent authorities. Others had a very different position and maintained the 
COS in a strict role of a proponent and of an adviser; risk management decisions 
would only rely in the competent authorities’ hands, - that is to say mainly in 
                                                        
10 Stating that stakeholders are in fact different, we proposed that one of the first task a 
constituted COST should be to write a  (local and appropriated) « code of conduct » of the 
diverse stakeholders themselves. 
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France the State local representatives-, which may take into account, or not, the 
COS propositions. In the report, we cut the discussion, rather in favour of this 
second position; but we proposed a way between these two positions in an article 
we wrote afterwards (11). 
 
Imposing Z-HRA as a new regulation? 
The last discussion we had I would like to relate is linked to the previous point. 
As already said, if we did not always agreed on the details, all of us believed in 
the general superiority of Z-HRAs with regards of mono-sites HRAs, which are 
at this date compulsory inside French law. Thus, the question whether we should 
recommend that Z-HRAs be compulsory, beside mono-sites HRAs or instead of 
them, stemmed naturally. Two series of arguments were facing on that point. On 
one hand, some of us were stressing the fact that, till now at least, the most 
interesting cases of Z-HRAs that had been achieved were conducted on a 
voluntary basis: these ones had been successfully led because some stakeholders, 
mainly facility owners, inside a given area, had realised that an experimental 
zone procedure should be a better solution for everybody than a series of 
regulatory site ones; so, these stakeholders decided themselves, with the public 
authorities approval, to experiment locally a kind of Z-HRA. Thus, for some of 
us in our working group, imposing the Z-HRA procedure as a new regulation 
could appear as a paradox and at the end be counterproductive (12); that is why 
those ones inside our working group would prefer not to impose Z-HRA as a 
regulation, but to leave local actors make their choice. On another hand, some 
others of us stressed the idea that Z-HRA, notwithstanding the fact it was 
obviously a better procedure than mono sites HRA, was indeed a long, difficult, 
and time consuming procedure, at least for its main leaders. This is why, -some 
of us said-, if this complex procedure were not made compulsory, local actors 
would generally choose to avoid it, and rely on old mono sites approaches, which 
now is a routine procedure, comparatively easy to implement. In this matter as in 
others, we had to cut our discussions and to write a compromise: we globally 
pronounced in favour of promoting the use of Z-HRA inside a regulatory 
framework, but which had to be, “ at the very least, both prescriptive and 
flexible, adaptable to various local situations,…” [2, p 17]. 
 
Conclusion 
In this communication, I have tried to report on some of the difficulties we met, 
as a multidisciplinary working group in charge of formulating recommendations 
for the implementation of Z-HRAs in France. I reported mainly on what I have 
called pragmatic, technical or political problems, and I have left aside more 
                                                        
11 This multidisciplinary article is not yet published. To be short on that point, we argue that 
there were two hypotheses: if the competent authorities agree with the COS propositions, 
there is not any problem; if they disagree, competent authorities have to argue and explain the 
reasons of this divergence with the COST, before imposing their will. See Fourniau JM [5], who 
advocates, in the general French context, that public decisions must respond to the lessons 
drawn by public debate. 
12 How to involve for instance, on a voluntary way, the various colleges of stakeholders in the 
COS, if the process itself is compulsory? 
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scientific (“hard science”) ones. Yet, some of those ones are as acute as the 
others I mentioned. Pollution inside a “zone” for instance is mainly due to local 
industrial pollutant emissions, but also to a “back ground noise” composed of car 
traffic emissions and also of a global pollution generated at a larger level than the 
concerned zone but affecting it. The COS and the stakeholders of the zone have 
to and may only work on the lowering of the locally generated pollution but not 
on its background noise. But scientific apparatus would measure the whole, 
although a distinction between both is needed if one wishes to appreciate 
everybody’s contribution and responsibility in the pollution.  Another scientific 
problem is to appreciate pollutants combinations inside a zone and their possible 
effects on health for the inhabitants.  
Scientific problems are not only difficult by themselves because of uncertainty or 
lack of measures; in this case, some of their difficulties become entangled with 
political or pragmatic problems. For example, if we go back to one of the initial 
question I spoke on in the Z-HRA framework, -delimiting the zone-, one can say 
that a zone is simultaneously but sometimes with contradictions defined through 
scientific considerations (a quick exam of the effect of a chosen tracer, for a first 
delimitation), but also administrative or geographical ones, and also political 
ones.  
The bunch of difficulties we met is not specific to our task. As far as I know, all 
over the industrialized world, nobody has found the “good” solution to solve all 
the problems raised by the implementation of Z-HRAs or equivalent. Even in the 
USA, the “old” risk assessment model is criticised (13) but not easily replaced by 
an as strong one as the Red Book’s model which could solve all the dilemmas of 
our complex world. 
These considerations lead to the general feeling I personally have now, after a 
while, about the work we made in this working group. On one hand, I still have 
no doubt on our aims and  approach: the Z-HRA procedure we tried to shape and 
recommend is for sure a better way for dealing with local industrial pollution 
than the mono site HRA approach for a series of  already developed reasons. But 
on the other hand, I have to recognize the procedures we imagined and 
recommended, for dealing with these both scientific and political problems, have 
a global tendency to be time, - and sometimes money-, consuming for 
stakeholders, and that the pursuit of our multiple objectives (better health for the 
concerned populations, better scientific knowledge in that purpose, incorporating 
local democracy inside decision making processes) inevitably brings or increases 
complexity all along the processes.  This is maybe the reason why the 
recommendations we officially made one year and a half ago have not yet been 
namely been operated: as far as I know, not any Z-HRA in France has been 
conducted, with reference to our report, since this report was published on the 
HCSP website; and I have not heard either that public French authorities would 
have impose as a new regulatory tool   the Z-HRA procedures we described. But 
I will not be too pessimistic with this statement. Nevertheless, new ideas or new 
ways of dealing with public problems need some time, and a lot of adjustments 
                                                        
13  See recent official comments on the initial model: « The committee recommends an 
important extension of the Red Book model to meet today’s challenges better – that risk 
assessment should be viewed as a method for evaluating the relative merits of various options 
for managing risk rather than as an end in itself », [6]. 
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with theoretical considerations, to be implemented. So that we, as social 
scientists, have to go on paying attention to those fascinating problems, 
processes, an locally imagined solutions to treat them,  these solutions  be called 
Z-HRAs or not.   
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Abstract 
In this paper the changes when introducing Integrated Operations in a drilling 
company is analyzed. The changes include the establishment of a support center 
for drilling in 2004/05 and also the use of video conference equipment. In this 
study data from this establishment and also from a follow-up in 2012 is used to 
analyze the development in the company. The theoretical framework has been 
based on a capability platform where stacks of the capabilities technological 
solutions, people, processes and organization/governance are used for 
enhancing safety. The capability theory emphasizes customers and that changes 
are initiated from the outside of the company in contradiction to the socio-
technical approach most commonly used in the field of safety management. 
Important findings are that changes implemented to be competitive advantages 
were developed internally and changing the internal processes in the company. 
The result is an iterative process where improvements are implemented 
throughout the company and as such improving the safety in an ongoing process.  
 
Keywords: Safety, Capability Platform, Integrated Operations, Management of 
Change, Petroleum Industry. 
Introduction 
"Integrated Operations" is a term for a change process that has been taking place 
and still is taking place in the oil and gas industry, commonly Integrated 
Operations (IO) are defined as “The vision of the Digital Oil Field is one where 
operators, partners, and service companies seek to take advantage of improved 
data and knowledge management, enhanced analytical tools, real-time systems, 
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and more efficient business processes." (Edwards et al., 2010) As we can see 
from this definition, the emphasis is on technology and progress has primarily 
been technology-driven; a stepwise development from remote support, via 
remote monitoring to remote control of certain operations. The final step is to 
remote control of all operations (Johnsen et al., 2005) where more of the control 
of offshore installations is transferred from offshore installations to onshore 
operation centers. Edwards et al. (2010) describe three items that are central to 
recognizing operations as IO:  
1. A move to a real-time or near real-time way of working. 
2. The linking up of one or more remote sites or teams to work together.  
3. A move to more multidisciplinary ways of working.  
Traditional work processes and organizational structures are challenged by more 
efficient and integrated approaches to offshore operations. As a contribution to 
the development of IO in the petroleum industry, we introduce the following 
definition of IO: "Integrated Operations (IO) is an organizational form in the 
petroleum industry that facilitates the interaction between organization, 
leadership, technology and work processes at all levels and functions, between 
land, sea and partners, to develop resources and logistical chains adapted to the 
organization's intention" (Steiro & Torgersen, 2012). These new approaches are 
taken into use to overcome traditional obstacles – whether they are geographical, 
organizational or professional – to efficient decision making (Skjerve & Basio, 
2012). 
 
Table 1. IO and new ways of working in petroleum companies (Skjerve & Basio, 2012). 
 
Traditional way of working Integrated Operations way of working 
Serial 
Single discipline 
Dependence of physical location 
Decisions made based in historical data 
Parallel 
Multi discipline 
Independence of physical location 
Decisions are made based on real- time data 
Reactive Proactive 
Continuous relationships with team mates More fragmented relationships with team mates 
The collaboration activity will have a 
higher degree of informal exchange 
The collaborative activity will be more formal 
Lower degree of technology-mediated 
teamwork and use of groupware 
technology 
Higher degree of technology-mediated teamwork 
and use of groupware technology 
Static work processes Dynamic work processes 
 
This study is a case study in a drilling company that has implemented 
collaboration tools and established support centers for their rigs in their onshore 
offices. The aim of establishing these centers is to transfer some of the offshore 
functions to these support centers – making them operational centers. They have 
implemented many of the IO ways of working as listed in Table 1 and moved 
from the more traditional ways of working. 
Safety is crucial in this process as sources of information might be lost when 
functions and ultimately people are moved from their proximity to the hazards 
where they are able to observe, perceive and sense early warning signals 
(Leveson, 2004), the land centers must be organized in a manner ensuring 
utilization of all the relevant competence, experience and knowledge present. 
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Moving of functions can cause different interaction patterns. Distances may 
create negative interaction patterns as seen from the Longford accident in 
Melbourne in 1998 where engineers were moved away from the plant and daily 
interaction with operators disappeared (Hopkins, 2000). Also prior to the 
Deepwater Horizon accident in 2010 there had been organizational changes 
where roles and responsibilities had been changed and failure to adequately 
delineate roles and responsibilities for key decisions were found (The Bureau of 
Ocean Energy Management, Regulation and Enforcement, 2011). 
The capability platform theory enables us to analyze the relevant factors for 
safety in terms of the interaction between technology, people, process and 
governance as well as the interactions between them. Capability logic flows from 
outside to in, never inside out because business value is always defined in the 
eyes of an ultimate costumer. This way of thinking is different from other 
approaches in the field of safety management where a socio-technical system 
approach is more used (Hollnagel & Woods, 2005; Rasmussen, 1997; Perrow, 
1984). This approach emphasizes the increasing complexity of these systems and 
the interactions and implications on actors from other actors and systems, the 
actors being authorities, companies, the employees and other stakeholders. The 
capability platform approach focuses on the customers and is closely related to 
offering services that customers are willing to pay for. The difference in these 
approaches has led us to wanting to use the capability platform approach to 
discover if the result from such analysis would give highly different results than 
more traditional analyses in the field of safety management. The aim of this 
paper is to utilize the capability platform approach related to safety and to 
identify which capabilities are essential in maintaining or increasing the safety 
level during an organizational change process. 
We have collected data in the drilling company in two different time periods. 
The first period was as they started the establishment of support centers in 2004 
and 2005. At this time, they had huge centers covering all the support personnel 
at an office location (Ose and Steiro, 2012). The analysis was performed by 
doing observations in the support center, in depth interviews and examination of 
documentation. Over time, they have tried different solutions and the second 
period for our data collection was in the spring of 2012. At this point, the drilling 
company had much smaller support centers at their different office locations. The 
center we visited, were supporting two rigs, but it was possible to use glass doors 
to separate both the different rigs and the different disciplines in a flexible 
manner.  
In Section 2 we describe the theoretical basis for our analysis where the 
capability platform theory is directed into the field of safety. Section 3 gives the 
material and methods that have been used in this study. In Section 4 the case is 
described in more detail and in Section 5 the results from the observations and 
interviews are summarized and also discussed. In Section 6 the conclusions are 
given in terms of the case company that is studied in this paper, directions to 
further work in using the capability platform theory related to safety and some 
concluding comments as to differences between the capability platform approach 
and the more traditional socio-technical system approach in safety. 
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Theoretical basis 
 
A capability platform is described as a stack, in which technology solutions form 
the base of the platform with people, process and organizational elements 
making the upper layers (Teece et al., 1997). Organizations exist in a networked 
setting with heterogeneous resources. One key characteristic of the platform 
concept is that innovation and change occur from outside to inside (Henderson et 
al., 2012). Dynamic capabilities can be defined as; "The firm´s ability to 
integrate, build, and reconfigure internal and external competences to address 
rapidly changing environments" (Teece et al., 1997: 516). Leonard- Barton 
(1992) writes that dynamic capabilities reflect an organization´s ability to 
achieve new and innovative forms in order to gain a competitive advantage. This 
definition has two key elements. First, the value of a capability is defined in a 
manner that explicitly impacts a business outcome. While internal costumers 
may be involved, business value is always defined in the eyes of an ultimate 
customer. Secondly, a capability is the synthesis of people, process, technology 
and governance. No single dimension is more important than another. Values 
arise from the synergy of the four dimensions. Each dimension must be 
understood in the context of the transformation effort. Capability thinking 
requires a continuous iteration among the four dimensions to be sure that the true 
complexity and conditions for success of the process are understood (Henderson 
et al., 2012). 
In order to build a capability platform for safety, we can address the safety issues 
at all the levels in the stack: 
1. Technology Solutions 
2. People 
3. Process 
4. Organization/Governance 
Technology is an enabling device for people, processes and governance 
(Henderson et al., 2012). In a safety perspective, technology solutions act as an 
enabler for creating safety values for the customer in the sense that it both 
capture experience in terms of safety critical information and that it serves as a 
foundation for people, process and organization/governance to ensure safety. 
People are the center of value creation for most organizations. The concept of 
core competencies is a testament to the value embedded in culture, knowledge 
and creativity of people (Henderson et al., 2012). For safety, this means that the 
competences in safety as well as the actions are important and that safety has to 
be prioritized in the organization. A consequence of the capability platform 
theory's emphasize on customer value, is that safety must be prioritized in a 
degree that demonstrates the prioritization in the customer organization in the 
sense that is reflecting how much they are willing to pay for safety. 
Processes create both the efficiency and reliability that is vital to grow 
(Henderson et al., 2012). For the safety aspect, this means that the processes as 
described by the organization must reflect safe processes. In order for the 
processes to be vital for growth, they must apply through the organization and 
reflect best practice and as such be easily implemented if the organization gain 
new and similar tasks. 
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Governance brings both the tension between local and global goals and the issue 
of ownership. Local versus global goals is a traditional tension between the 
corporate interest and the edge of the organization where performance demands 
may conflict with global goals (Henderson et al., 2012). For safety, the 
governance capability brings the aspect of safety being a local goal as well as a 
global goal in the sense that the actual performance reflects the global safety 
goals of the organization. 
A capability perspective focuses on the transformation of core competences that 
truly define value in the eyes of the customer. It uses this focus to find ways to 
deal with increased complexity. It also requires an iterative approach. There are 
many ways to implement this iterative approach but the key is to make sure that 
the process is driven by customer value. The process also involves strategic 
learning in terms of a platform that allows for rapid development and 
deployment of new products and services. This platform will evolve and serve as 
an efficient engine for execution of the capability while also allowing for 
continuous innovation from outside – in. Generativity is a key feature that must 
be taken into this process (Henderson et al., 2012). 
Materials and Method 
Data collection was done in two different periods of time; in 2004/05 and in 
2012. In the first period, a project group of four researchers studied the Support 
Center and the company. Written material and oral presentations from the 
drilling company were used as background information before the interviews. 
Thirteen interviews were held with the 34 employees in the Support Center; each 
lasted for approximately an hour. At least three researchers were present at each 
interview, and it was decided that reports checked by the researchers involved 
were an adequate record of the data collected. The interviewees were selected 
from different disciplines in the Center. A longer interview was held with the 
manager responsible for implementing the Center, and finally a videoconference 
with the manager, his own immediate manager and an ICT manager.  
In the second period of data collection, two researchers did the observations and 
interviews. In this phase, 9 persons of the total 13 persons working with the 
support of the two rigs were interviewed using a pre-developed interview guide. 
In addition, we observed how the work was done in the Center for two days and 
also had some informal conversations with the employees.  
The interviews were conducted as open-ended interviews with an interview 
guide (Yin, 2004, Kvale, 1996). The areas covered centered on changes in the 
employees’ personal work situation concerning cooperation, their experiences of 
the change process and any advantages and disadvantages they experienced, and 
possible scenarios for the future development of the Center. Additional questions 
to produce more concrete answers and make situations more specific were asked 
when possible. 
After both periods of data collection, memos were written summarizing the most 
important findings from the data collection. The summary memos distributed to 
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the company also gave the drilling company the opportunity to correct eventual 
misunderstandings and wrong assumptions made by the researchers.  
Dijkstra (2006) questioned the notion that information on safety should be 
gathered only from safety personnel, and our data were gathered from all 
disciplines and could thus contribute to a wider perspective on safety and risk. 
This is important since we see safety as a multidisciplinary phenomenon. The 
data collected were also discussed amongst the researchers as recommended by 
Yin (2004), for instance, in order to limit the individual researcher’s 
interpretations of the data.  
Description of case – changes in the Center from 2004/05 to 2012 
The case used in this paper is a drilling company that established a Support 
Center based on the onshore support teams assigned to supporting its drilling rigs 
and floaters in 2004/05. Before the Support Center was set up, the location of the 
onshore offices was somewhat arbitrary and not closely matched to ether the rig 
or the discipline of the employee. All rig support personnel were located on the 
same floor but in separate offices in the same area. After the establishment of the 
Support Center, the various disciplines were brought together in an open 
landscape in which all the support personnel were located. The relevant 
disciplines comprised operations, maintenance, drilling support, economy, 
quality, health, safety and environment (QHSE), and human resources (HR). 
Typically six persons are involved in the support of one installation, some of 
whom are assigned to two rigs or floaters 
This area designated to the Support Center in 2004/05 was about 600 square 
meters and is the prime working area for 34 employees. In addition to standard 
office facilities, the area included a room for videoconferences, two rooms with 
large screens for displaying data in real time. One of the rooms was also the 
emergency preparedness room. There were also two silent rooms in which staff 
can hold sensitive or private phone calls or meetings. The most significant 
change in working conditions in the Support Center did not concern 
technological changes, but rather changes in office arrangements. In total, 8 
drilling rigs and floaters were supported from the Center. 
The personnel in the Center said in 2004/05 that they had a lot to do and that 
they worked long hours and also took tasks home at night. Especially tasks 
where concentration was needed, was done at home after the working hours 
because they did not find that it was quiet enough to do these jobs in the Center. 
There was also a constant focus on how the establishment of the Center could 
lead to increased efficiency and lead to reducing the number of personnel 
working to support each rig. They also found the Center to be a stressful 
environment with a lot of noise and unnecessary interruptions during the day. 
Many of the persons in the Center also found that they did not have the time to 
update themselves on all the main activities for all the rigs that were supported 
from the Center; they had more than enough to do just doing their own job. 
The Center that we visited in 2012 was much smaller in size than the Center in 
2004/05 and only 2 rigs were supported from the Center. Also, the personnel 
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categories were different; Operation Manager, Operational Advisor, 
Maintenance Manager and Operational Planner have their primary work space in 
the Center. Health, Safety and Environment Advisor, HR, Economy and 
Procurement are located in offices close to the Center. The video conference 
equipment is integrated in the Operational Advisor's primary work space and 
glass doors are used to separate the personnel supporting the different rigs and 
also the Operational Advisors from the Operational Planner that is supporting 
both rigs and the Operation Managers. There are extra work places in the 
Operational Advisors' offices that are used by the other staff when they are 
participating in video conferences. The Maintenance personnel are located in 
another room separated by a door that is mostly kept open. Video conferences 
are held with both the rig and the Operator Company and internal meetings in the 
drilling company across rigs and office locations. These arrangements enable 
them to both cooperate in the Center as a whole and to cooperate in smaller 
groups.  
In the Center a new way of working has been established where they use the 
video conferences actively and often. The personnel working directly in the 
support of the offshore rigs usually start their work day at 7 AM in the morning 
and use the time prior to the morning meetings at 8 to update themselves on the 
activities that have taken place since they went home the day before, provided 
there have been no major incidents, then they would have been informed and on 
duty when needed. On normal days, there are different video meetings with 
different participants from different locations and organizations in the time 
before lunch at 11. The participants on the video meetings are the customer, 
internal meetings in the drilling company both for the different disciplines and 
for the personnel supporting a rig and also there are meetings with suppliers 
when needed. The drilling company has the responsibility to plan and execute 
maintenance related to drilling and wells. After lunch it is quiet in the Center 
allowing the personnel to have local discussions, phone calls and work separately 
on their own tasks. Usually, when there is not something critical that is going on 
related to the rigs, the personnel in the Center are finished with their tasks and 
can go home around 3 PM. We observed and did the interviews in a period the 
informants termed normal and quiet.  
Results and discussion 
Our case company is very customer-focused and willing to adapt to customer 
requirements, and this is also an important aspect of the capability platform, 
where capabilities are described as being developed in ecology as a virtual, 
increasingly global and network-based model. In 2004/05 we found that the 
drilling company was developing capabilities with its customers rather than 
internally in their own company. For instance when it was adapting its 
technological systems, their processes and organization to individual customers, 
its own platform as a company was weakened and fragmented. The 
establishment of the Support Center was a step towards closer internal 
collaboration, but as we found, it needed to be followed by internal processes. In 
2012 the company has developed internal processes and uses the technologies 
that were implemented for competitive purposes to improve the internal 
processes in their own company. 
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Regarding Technology Solutions the drilling company was implementing new 
solutions such as equipment for video conferencing in 2004/05 as a competitive 
advantage. They had some difficulties regarding this equipment due to fire walls 
and some problems related to starting to use the equipment. In 2012 the use of 
this equipment is integrated in the normal operations and there is no threshold for 
starting video conferences. They use the equipment several times a day and in 
addition to using as the customer requires, they also use it to have internal 
meetings for personnel assigned to the same rig and located in the support center, 
offshore and with the customer. In addition, they use the equipment to have 
internal meetings in the different disciplines at different office locations. The 
drilling company has also decided to have their own Information and 
Communication Technology (ICT)-system in addition to the system they are 
obligated by the customer to have in order to gather experience internally. 
The people are through the interviews reported the most important asset of the 
drilling company as it also was in 2004/05. They have a lot of experience in 
drilling. In 2004/05 little effort was put into developing the internal drilling 
competence and little time was used on this. In 2012 the emphasis on developing 
internal teams and sharing experience is regarded as important in the company. 
Effort and time is put into having arenas for internal discussions. There are 
planned video conferences three times a week for each rig with the personnel 
that are located at different locations. In addition, there are bi-weekly meetings in 
the different disciplines that are located at different office locations. An internal 
identity is built in the drilling company. 
In 2004/05 there were different contracts both for the different customers and 
also for the same customer. This made it difficult to collaborate internally in the 
drilling company. In addition, the support center was so large that it was not 
possible to get an easily overview of all the activities related to all the different 
rigs that were supported there. In 2012, only two rigs were supported from the 
center and all the personnel were informed about all the main activities for both 
the rigs. From a safety perspective, this enables them to be able to support one 
another if something critical was to happen. 
Regarding governance, in 2004/05 there was agreement on all the levels in the 
organization that the objective of establishing the center was cost savings and 
reducing the number of employees. In 2012 the emphasis was put on that this 
was a good way to work and on important leanings and experience. They 
received positive feedback from their customer regarding safety and were 
encouraged to have a safety focus and to utilize the customer’s systems and also 
the internal meetings for safety discussions. 
Table 2. Summary of important findings related to the capabilities from both 2004/05 and 2012. 
 
Capability Findings in 2004/05 Findings in 2012 
Technology 
Solutions 
Different technology solutions such 
as video conference equipment were 
being implemented.  
There were some difficulties due to 
fire walls. 
The implementation of new 
The uses of technologies such as video 
conferences are a natural part of the work and 
being used several times a day. The equipment 
is used both to improve cooperation with the 
customer and to improve cooperation internally 
in own company. 
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technology is done to get a 
competitive advantage. 
The drilling company uses their own program in 
addition to the program used by the customer to 
gather experience internally. 
There are plans to increase the use of the 
costumer’s ICT-system. 
People There was a lot of drilling 
experience in the company. A lot of 
the persons in the support center 
have offshore experience. 
Little effort to develop the drilling 
competence internally in the drilling 
company, focus is on the customers. 
The use of technology such as video 
conferencing to develop the competence 
internally in own company. They have a drilling 
engineer with the customer permanently. Effort 
is put on building the internal identity both for 
the personnel located offshore, in the center and 
with the customer. Internal meetings three times 
a week that are not required by the customer.  
Processes Different contracts with different 
customers and also with the same 
customer. 
Too large support center for the 
personnel to get an overview of all 
the activities. 
One customer and one standard contract enable 
the drilling company to develop unified 
processes in the company. 
Two rigs supported from the center and the 
personnel were informed of all the main 
activities. They were also able to support one 
another. 
Organizati
on/Govern
ance 
The drilling company was 
surprisingly unified on the different 
levels where they all said that 
savings and reducing the number of 
personnel were the objectives of the 
establishment of the support center. 
Safety was mostly as the customers 
decided. 
At this time the emphasis was reported not on 
cost savings but more on learning and changing. 
The center represented a good way of working. 
The drilling company received good feedback 
from the customer regarding their safety focus. 
As an overall finding from the case company, they have moved from the 
customer focus into utilizing the technological solutions and possibilities firs as a 
competitive advantage and into also using them for internal purposes. This may 
very well be a competitive advantage that they will profit from in the next round 
– being more proactive, valuing learning and sharing experience and building 
internal arenas for these purposes. The drilling company has proved to be able to 
conduct an iterative process where improvements and changes are developed and 
used on improving the processes throughout the company.  
 
Conclusion 
This analysis shows how a drilling company has developed its capabilities over a 
period of time. It shows how they used the changes brought about by the 
introduction of Integrated Operations first as a competitive advantage and later 
as an iterative process to improve the internal processes in the company. They 
used what was learned in relation to their customer to also build an internal 
identity and internal arenas for sharing experiences. This enables them to 
develop their processes further and in the next round that will represent a 
competitive advantage. This shows that capabilities can be of value to the 
customer even though they are not specified in the contracts and they do not get 
directly paid for it. It is, however, not identified if this is being valued by the 
personnel handling the contracts.  
How this drilling company is able to take the changes that are initiated from the 
outside and incorporate them in their own processes, are being shed light on by 
using the capability platform theory. It is, however, internal processes in the 
Land Use Planning and Risk-Informed Decision Making   
262 
 
 
drilling company that manage to decide to be proactive regarding the 
implementation of the changes initiated by Integrated Operations and also 
deciding and nurturing a company where safety is regarded important and where 
the personnel give one another positive feedback when they do their jobs well. 
Utilizing the capability platform theory, gives the analysis a very strong 
customer focus. This may create a vulnerable company with a too strong 
customer focus and too few internal processes and strategies. For instance, 
adapting the capabilities of one customer makes the company dependent of this 
customer and if this customer decides to use another supplier, the company will 
find it difficult to adapt to the capabilities of another customer. The drilling 
industry may serve as a good example of this as this industry is characterized by 
relatively short-term contracts and the presence of harsh competition. It may, 
however, be profitable for the company in the long run to have some strategic 
processes initiated from within own company in terms of specifying what their 
core competences and also values should be emphasized and developed in the 
company and not leave the entire development to the customers.  
Further work on capability platforms on safety should be to detail the safety 
aspects of the capabilities further and analyze how they can be developed. It 
would be of great interest to look at the capabilities both from the drilling 
company’s and from their customer’s points of views. Utilizing the theory of 
capability platforms, however, may make it possible to compare different studies 
in different companies that have use the same theoretical framework. 
The customer focus that the capability platform approach gives is different than 
the socio-technical system approach most commonly used in safety management. 
The results from an analysis where customers are the only stakeholders that are 
valued because they are ultimately giving value to the company, is different and 
narrower than the socio-technical system approach. Implicitly in the capability 
platform approach, there is also a view that "the customer is always right" 
because a company's strategy should evolve around requirements from 
customers. What is normally the view of safety management is that customers 
are giving both positive and negative implications for safety and also in the last 
round; authorities are securing a minimum of safety through legislation. Hence, 
authorities and legislation should be included in the capabilities for safety. This 
is also essential because the legislation vary in different parts of the world even 
with the same customer showing that they do not want to pay for more safety 
than they have to. 
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Abstract 
 
Quantitative Risk Assessment (QRA) is used in the Netherlands and the UK for 
site permitting and land-use planning around industries with dangerous 
substances. For example, individual risk contours resulting from a QRA 
determine where houses and other types of constructions may exist. Both 
industry and regulators ask for models and data that are up to date. Key 
components are failure scenarios and frequencies. In the past, one-time 
investigations were carried out that were time-consuming and costly. The 
current paper describes a systematic approach for the derivation of failure 
scenarios and frequencies that was initiated by HSE and RIVM. All accidents in 
the UK and the Netherlands that must be reported to the Labour Inspectorate are 
analyzed with the Storybuilder method. In this way, underlying failure causes at 
operational and management levels can be investigated and stored in a 
structured database. For the derivation of frequencies, various paths to obtain 
information on the size of the equipment population were explored. The ambition 
is to continue the project for a long period, making the inputs for the QRA more 
reliable. 
 
Keywords: Major hazard accidents, Storybuilder accident investigation, failure 
frequency, risk calculation, equipment population. 
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1. Introduction 
 
The Seveso II Directive is aimed at the control of major-accident hazards [i]. It 
was adopted after the accident releasing a toxic cloud of dioxins at a chemical 
plant in Seveso, Italy, in 1976. The directive states land-use planning 
implications of major accidents should be taken into account in the regulatory 
process. 
In the Netherlands, the Seveso directive has been implemented in the “Major 
Accidents Risks Decree” [ii].  This regulation (amongst others) states that the 
risks for third parties should be calculated using Quantitative Risk Analysis 
(QRA). The “External Safety Decree on Establishments” defines how the QRA 
must be performed and how outcomes for individual risk and societal risk should 
be used for land-use planning and site permitting processes. For instance, no 
housing is allowed at locations where the individual risk exceeds 1 x 10-6 yr-1. 
The software package Safeti-NL is used to perform the risk calculation, while a 
manual gives guidelines for the input data [i]. Safeti-NL uses several input 
parameters, amongst which the failure frequencies of scenarios are prominent. 
As the risk calculations have significant consequences for land-use planning and 
site permitting, industry asks that models and data are updated to the latest 
insights. An example is the fairly recent development of legislation for natural 
gas production sites. For this, RIVM has been asked to derive failure frequencies 
and scenarios for aboveground gas pipelines [iii].A new project had to be started 
to investigate what information is available in international literature and public 
or proprietary databases. If there is a lack of data for the equipment under 
investigation, analogies to equivalent equipment must be sought. In the example 
of the natural gas pipelines an analogy was sought between buried pipelines and 
above-ground pipelines, while scenarios and frequencies for flanges were based 
on data from the Dutch gas industry. Investigations like these are costly, time-
consuming, and deliver a one-time set of answers to questions studied. 
RIVM and the UK Health and Safety Executive (HSE) joined in a project to 
investigate if it is possible to update failure scenarios and frequencies in a more 
systematic and continuous way [iii] HSE further desired to see if Storybuilder 
could be used to update information on underlying failure causes (as was 
requested by the industry after the Buncefield accident in the UK in 2005). The 
Storybuilder software package was developed to analyze occupational accidents 
(in order to calculate occupational risks) and is a versatile instrument. It is also 
used by the Dutch Labor Inspectorate to analyze the major hazard accidents of 
the past few years. This is part of an ongoing project at the Labor Inspectorate to 
draw lessons from major hazard accidents and direct the inspection program 
toward relevant hazards, barriers and underlying causes. 
 
2. Collection of data 
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To derive new failure frequencies, two sources of information are needed: the 
number of failures (accidents) per selected scenario and the total number of 
experience years for the equipment at stake. As a feasibility study, we restricted 
the information gathering to equipment populations for pressure vessels and pipe 
work. The accident analysis with Storybuilder served multiple purposes and was 
not restricted to specific equipment types. 
The scope of the analysis was limited to top tier Seveso II companies. Accidents 
of relevant size occurring at these companies are reported to the Labor 
Inspectorate, which then investigates and reports the details of the accidents. 
These reports were used for the accident analysis in Storybuilder. Seveso II 
companies are also required to produce a Safety Report and carry out a 
Quantitative Risk Analysis. These sources of information were – among others – 
used for the analysis of the equipment population. 
 
2.1 Accident Investigations: the Storybuilder Method 
Storybuilder was developed in a project to quantify occupational risks [iii, iv]. It 
is a software program that combines a database with a graphic user interface that 
can be used to input and depict accident paths. Accidents are analyzed by 
answering the questions what, where, how and why the accidents have happened. 
By answering these questions for many accidents, a bow-tie structure gradually 
arises that shows common causation mechanisms for the distinguished types of 
accidents. Examples of accident types for occupational risk are “fall from ladder” 
and “hit by flying object”. 
The Loss of Control event forms the centre of the bow-tie. The left-hand side of 
the bow-tie contains various levels of prevention barriers and the right-hand side 
includes levels of mitigation barriers. Each barrier is associated with a Safety 
Barrier Task and each task is connected to the Management Delivery System. 
For each accident, the status of these barriers is analyzed along with the status of 
the barrier tasks and the management delivery system. This information is stored 
in a structured and flexible database where extra information on influencing 
factors associated with barrier failures can be added. Furthermore, new accident 
scenario paths can be added at all times. 
If many accidents of the same type are analyzed, common accident routes (or 
paths) can be identified. Moreover, the database also shows why the relevant 
barriers failed, both at an operational level and from a management perspective. 
An example of the graphical interface of Storybuilder is given in figure 2. 
For the current project we used two data sets from the Netherlands and the UK. 
In the Netherlands, major hazard accidents must be reported to the Major Hazard 
Control (MHC) unit of the Labor Inspectorate. Major hazard accidents are those 
where an uncontrolled development leads to a release of specified dangerous 
substances and causes serious risk to human health or the environment. The 63 
accidents that occurred in 2008-2010 (and were investigated and finalized with a 
report) were analyzed with Storybuilder for the Labor Inspectorate [v].. With this 
analysis the Labor Inspectorate wishes to determine trends in causes and effects 
that can help direct future inspection programs. 
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For the current project we used two data sets from the Netherlands and the UK. 
In the UK, the Reporting of Injuries, Diseases and Dangerous Occurrences 
Regulations (RIDDOR, 1995) ensures that incidents resulting in injuries (or 
workplace related diseases) are reported to the HSE. HSE investigates these 
incidents and reports to the MARS database those incidents that meet the Seveso 
criteria (or COMAH, Control Of Major Accident Hazards in the UK). In the UK, 
there are about 1000 COMAH sites and the HSE has analyzed accidents that 
occurred at COMAH sites since 1991 with Storybuilder as well [v]. 
Both datasets were used to assemble information related to pressure vessels and 
pipe work. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 1.Screen Capture of Storybuilder with an Example of Paths Going 
through IDDR (Indicate, Detect, Diagnose, Respond) Barriers 
 
2.2 Equipment Population in the Netherlands 
In order to determine failure rates both the number of accidents and the total 
number of equipment experience years (equipment population) must be known. 
This section focuses on the equipment population in the Netherlands. 
Various routes for determining the size of the equipment population can be 
imagined. A list of the data sources used is given in table 1. Other data sources 
were investigated, but were considered not useful at the time: 
 Queries to be sent by the Dutch chemical industry branch organisation (not 
feasible within the time constraints of the project) 
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 Lloyd’s Register – Stoomwezen (in charge of testing pressure vessels in NL) 
(not the data needed) 
 Engineering Design Companies (not the data needed) 
 Dutch Labor Inspectorate (not feasible within the time constraints of the 
project) 
 Permits (not the data needed) 
Eventually five sources were used to gather information on (pressure) vessels 
and pipe work. With these sources, the size of the equipment population at 20 
top-tier Seveso companies was estimated: 
 One LPG bulk storage facility 
 One steel manufacturing company 
 Two companies producing industrial gases 
 Two refineries (with associated bulk storage of fuel) 
 Seven companies storing bulk liquids (four fuel and three fuel and toxic 
chemicals) 
 Seven chemical manufacturing companies  
Table 1. List of Data Sources for Estimating the Size of the Equipment Population 
Source 
 
Comment 
Safety Reports/ 
Notifications/QRA 
A substantial amount of information was retrieved from Safety Reports 
and Notifications. Note: Notifications are documents in which 
companies inform the competent authorities that the amounts of 
substances at the site exceed the thresholds for Seveso II. These 
documents therefore contain detailed information on the amounts of 
substances present at the site. In the Safety Reports companies report 
the identified hazards and the measures taken to reduce these hazards. 
These reports contain more detailed information on the type of 
equipment used and some further technical data. 
Google Earth This source was used to count the larger equipment types and visible 
pipelines. Indoor equipment and equipment within congested plants 
obviously can not be identified with Google Earth.  
Direct contact with 
companies through 
existing contacts with 
employees 
Some information was collected through existing contacts at industries. 
These data were used to determine the reliability of the data retrieved 
from other sources. 
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Source 
 
Comment 
RRGS ( Dutch Risk 
Register Dangerous 
Substances)  [iii] 
RRGS is a data source that contains information on various types of 
companies that handle, manufacture and transport dangerous 
substances. It is used to inform the general public and (therefore) does 
not contain detailed equipment data.  This information source was 
mainly used to determine the risk contours and site boundaries and 
check other sources. 
Internet Additional general information was gathered through internet, in 
particular, the age of installations and the number of employees. 
An important issue is that there must be a match between the equipment for 
which accidents are reported and the equipment for which the size of the 
population is investigated. If, for example, releases from pipelines with a 
diameter smaller than two inches will never result in a reportable accident, such 
pipelines should not be included in the equipment population count either. 
 
3. Results and Discussion 
3.1 Accident Analysis 
Analysis of the UK incident data (975 incidents) is described in detail in an 
article by Lisbona et al. [9].Some general conclusions that bear the most 
relevance to this project are given below: 
 Among containment related barrier failures, containment condition/material 
failure (259 incidents), isolation failures (170) and equipment connection 
failures (83) are the most frequent barrier failures. 
 The 259 incidents regarding containment condition/material failure can be 
further characterized by influencing factors. These factors were mainly 
related to mechanically damaged equipment (68 %), design errors (14%) 
and the use of inadequate/wrong equipment (10%) 
 The mechanically damaged equipment (68%) was influenced mainly by 
corrosion/erosion, which accounted for half of the incidents in this subset. 
 Underlying causes in the management system can be discerned with 
Storybuilder; each of the barrier failures is a result of task failures (failure 
to provide, use etc.) and these, in turn, fail due to a management delivery 
system failure (failure in plans/procedures, communication, ergonomics 
etc.). For the incidents regarding containment condition/material failure, 
the failure to provide (e.g. no plans, no equipment or no availability of 
operators) was the most important factor. “Plans and procedures” was the 
most common management system delivery failure. 
 Storybuilder can provide a lot of information on incidents that can be used by 
companies and competent authorities to focus their attention on the right 
factors to improve safety performance and develop inspection plans. 
 
For the pressure vessels and pipe work category, the following findings were 
reported: 
 A total of 44 pipe work/vessel failures were identified in the data, of which 
23 were associated with mechanical failure. The 23 mechanically-related 
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failures could be broken down into four failures of pressure vessels and 19 
pipe work failures.  
 The HSE has also reported 23 incidents to the MARS database and from 
these no pressure vessel failures were found, but six pipe work failures 
were identified. Of the six pipe work failures, three were related to 
corrosion/erosion failures. 
The analysis of the Dutch incident data (63 incidents in 2008-2010) is described 
in detail by Mud et al. [8]and a later survey on 118 incidents from 2006-2010 in 
an article by Bellamy et al [xi]. The conclusions from many incidents: 
 Most importantly, there was a general failure to recover from process 
deviations. If these are detected and acted upon in an early phase, many 
incidents could have been prevented. 
 In many incidents, incorrect materials were used for installation parts. 
 There was a general inadequate control of process streams. 
 Proper preparation of plant items prior to maintenance (Lock-Out/Tag Out, 
LOTO) was inadequate. 
 Many errors occurred in assembly of components (i.e. there were loose 
connections). 
 Many incidents were related to opening of containment with direct links to 
the atmosphere (containment is by-passed but does not fail structurally). 
 Regarding the barrier tasks, maintenance was the most important factor, in 
about 50% of the incidents. Inadequate delivery of equipment was the most 
common management system delivery failure. This is different from the 
UK data and is discussed in  possibly UK inspectors are more focused on 
plans and procedures, while the Dutch focus more on management system 
deliveries for equipment. 
For the pressure vessels and pipe work category, the following findings were 
reported: 
 There were no recorded pressure vessel body failures in the incidents 2008-
2010. 
 There were six recorded pipe body failures: one was a full bore rupture, two 
were ruptures over 1/3 of the diameter, one was a small hole of 5-25 mm 
and two were of unknown size. A distinction into full bore rupture versus 
leaks (relevant for failure frequencies) can thus be made as 1/6 versus 5/6 
(with more data this can be substantiated further). 
 For the six pipe work failures, three were associated with corrosion, one with 
fatigue, and two with high temperature and high pressure deviations in 
operating conditions. For this group, it could be concluded that corrosion 
causes 50% of the failures. 
The above conclusions, from the different accident analyses, show that 
Storybuilder can deliver information on incidents that can be used for focusing 
attention to frequent failure modes and subsequent improvement plans. It can 
discern what management tasks and delivery systems are most likely to fail for 
different barriers so that inspection plans can act upon this information. 
Information on different failure scenarios and direct causes can be used to 
calculate failure frequencies and to discern the most important contributing 
factors. 
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3.2 Equipment Population in the Netherlands 
The results of the data collection are presented in table 2. Apart from these data, 
site characteristics such as area size, mass of substances, number of employees 
and age of installation were collected as well in order to investigate possible 
correlations. 
Taking the experiences with both pipe work and pressure vessels into account, 
the following can be concluded on the routes to gather information: 
 Safety Reports do give a reasonable amount of data. They mainly focus on 
information for determining risks to employees or third parties and thus 
will likely give more information on larger types of equipment. Thus, it is 
not surprising that a thorough investigation of process descriptions 
revealed a large amount of process pressure vessels that were not visible in 
plant overview diagrams. As a result, if the desire is to derive failure 
frequencies for many different types of equipment, Safety Reports are still 
not sufficient as the only source of information. 
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Table 2. List of Data Assembled on 20 Top-Tier Seveso Sites 
 Chem. 
manuf. 
Chem. 
manuf. 
Prod. of 
ind. gas 
Refining Bulk fuel 
storage 
Meters pipework      
Google Earth ND (DTD) ND (DTD) 6,000 72,000 35,000 
QRA of Safety Report NISR 2,890 1,000 NISR NISR 
Direct info from companies      
Nr of press. vessels &  
press.  storage tanks 
     
Google Earth 6 0 1 9 0 
QRA of Safety Report NISR 2 5 68 0 
 Bulk fuel 
storage 
Chem. 
manuf.  
Steel 
making 
Chem. 
manuf.  
Chem. 
manuf.  
Meters pipework      
Google Earth 36,000 650 ND (SBU) ND (DTD) ND (DTD) 
QRA of Safety Report NISR NISR NISR SRI NISR 
Direct info from companies  500    
Nr of press. vessels &  
press.  storage tanks 
     
Google Earth 6 0 SBU 14 5 
QRA of Safety Report 6 4 7 SRI 5 
Direct info from companies  10  29  
 Chem. 
manuf.  
Prod. of 
ind. gases 
Bulk fuel 
& tox. 
storage 
Bulk fuel 
storage  
Chem. 
manuf. 
Meters pipework      
Google Earth ND ND (SBU) 7,000 30,000 5,500 
QRA of Safety Report NISR NISR 2,700 NISR NISR 
Direct info from companies      
Nr of press. vessels &  
press.  storage tanks 
     
Google Earth 0 SBU 0 0 0 
QRA of Safety Report NISR NISR 3 0 5 
 Refining  Bulk fuel 
& tox. 
storage 
Bulk fuel 
storage 
Bulk fuel 
& tox. 
storage 
LPG bulk 
storage 
Meters pipework      
Google Earth 30,000 
(PSA) 
40,000 2,500 ND ND 
QRA of Safety Report 5,360 1,000 NISR NISR 15,500 
Direct info from companies      
Nr of press. vessels &  
press.  storage tanks 
     
Google Earth 17 3 0 0 6 
QRA of Safety Report 17 1 0 0 6 
DTD = Difficult To Determine (large sites), ND = Not Determined, NISR = No Information in 
Safety Report, PSA = Part of Storage Area, SBU = Site Boundary Unclear, SRI = safety Report 
Incomplete 
Land Use Planning and Risk-Informed Decision Making   
274 
 
 
 Google Earth: At a first glance, Google Earth can deliver quite reasonable 
information for large equipment types situated outside. These data 
correlate reasonably with information given in Safety Reports and by 
contact from companies. For pipe work, quite some more guesswork is 
involved - but for the larger pipes situated outside, the information is at 
least useful for a rough estimate. However, failure scenarios for pipe work 
are generally split up into diameter ranges, and thus more work needs to be 
done to obtain information on diameters. Another disadvantage for using 
Google Earth is that it is not possible to discriminate between equipment 
containing hazardous substances and equipment that does not contain 
hazardous substances (for example substances used for utilities, such as 
fire fighting water or cooling water). Furthermore, it is not possible to 
determine if equipment is in use or out of commission. Lastly, specific 
details about the instrumentation and safeguards present in equipment 
cannot be derived with Google Earth. Therefore, Google Earth is only 
useful to obtain a rough estimate for large equipment types, but cannot be 
used for detailed analyses. 
 Direct contact with representatives of the companies involved will likely 
give information with the highest quality. However, if the desired level of 
detail of the information is high, the amount of effort required to supply the 
data is correspondingly high. In addition, the outcomes of the work are 
uncertain. It will supply better insight in failure mechanisms (which is in 
everyone’s interest) but the updated frequencies might have undesirable 
consequences for site permitting. It is, therefore, not expected that 
industries will put a large amount of effort into filling a public database. 
The data could be used on a collection of companies to “calibrate” other 
data sources however. 
3.3 Failure Rate Calculation 
The small number of companies in table 2 does not allow making any 
statistically sound estimations of failure rates at present. However, an example 
calculation will be given to illustrate the method and determine how much data is 
needed to develop statistically sound failure rates. For an example calculation, it 
is assumed that the 20 companies are representative for the Seveso companies in 
the Netherlands. As there are currently around 420 Seveso companies in the 
Netherlands, the size of the equipment population determined for the 20 
companies would have to be multiplied accordingly. In these examples, for now, 
we overlook the fact that the accumulated accident data was derived for all 
Seveso sites while the equipment population data was gathered for top tier sites 
only. Once the feasibility is demonstrated, a further distinction of accident data 
into top- or lower-tier sites can be made. 
In this paper we define the failure frequency as the 50% percentile value of a 
Poisson interval, derived from the number of accidents that occurred and the 
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number of equipment experience years. This approach is slightly more 
conservative than taking the mean value, but it has the advantage that 
frequencies can be derived even if zero accidents occurred. Another advantage is 
that the 50% percentile value does not fluctuate as much as the mean value, 
which is an important advantage if the impact of failure frequencies for land-use 
planning and site permitting is considered.  
Pipe Work Example 
If we take the highest number of pipe work found, either by Google Earth, Safety 
Reports, or direct contacts in table 2, we have an average of 22 km of pipe work 
per company. This leads to 420 * 22 km ≈ 9,000 km of pipe work and 27,000 
km-years for three years of accident investigations. With six recorded pipe body 
failures in three years a failure rate (50% percentile) of 2.5*10-7 m-1 yr-1 then 
results. The current failure rates used in the Netherlands for pipelines with a 
diameter of over 150 mm are 1*10-7 m-1 yr-1 for a full bore rupture and 5*10-7 m-
1 yr-1 for a leak at 10% of the pipe diameter. Thus, the calculated value is in the 
region of what is used already. As discussed in the results of the accident 
analysis of the Dutch incidents, one out of six incidents resulted in a full bore 
rupture.  This can be used to make further distinctions into the failure 
frequencies. Also, the causes for these failures can be divided into 50% for 
corrosion-related failures versus others as shown in the incident data. As this is 
only an example, we cannot draw any further conclusions on failure rate 
calculations. We think it is apparent that the approach (so far) is feasible, and 
that more accurate values can be obtained in time when more accident data and 
more accurate equipment population information become available. 
4. Conclusions 
Storybuilder is a useful and versatile tool for analyzing accidents in the process 
industry. It can identify common accident scenario paths and deliver quantified 
information. This includes the most frequent barrier failures and the management 
delivery causes underlying these failures. 
The equipment population size cannot be estimated to the desired level of detail 
with simple methods and will, therefore, be a challenge. Different information 
sources must be used and combined, and only parts of the desired data can 
reasonably be gathered each year. Key conclusions of the work: 
1. Safety Reports generally do not have the level of detail needed for an 
accurate estimation of population data. Safety Reports focus on the larger 
installations and, therefore, details about smaller equipment are not 
available.  
2. Google Earth gives an accurate estimation of large pressurized storage 
vessels and only roughly gives an estimate of the amount of pipe work 
between storage tanks and process plants. More information from 
companies might reveal the exact accuracy of these estimations. 
3. Information obtained directly from companies is most reliable but requires a 
substantial effort from these companies if all information must be delivered 
on short notice. 
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By combining the data described above, updated failure frequencies can be 
derived for different types of equipment that take into account underlying causes, 
barrier failures and safety management system delivery failures.  
 
5. Prospects 
In order to come to a reliable database of failure scenarios and frequencies for 
use in a quantitative risk analysis, it is decided to continue the data gathering in a 
follow-up project. Storybuilder has proven to be a useful and versatile tool for 
analyzing accidents in the process industry. In the follow-up, Storybuilder will 
be used to analyse accidents over a larger period of time, thus increasing the 
number of incidents in the database over time. To get a better estimation of the 
equipment population size, it is shown that simple methods such as the use of 
Safety Reports or Google Earth don’t provide all the information required, and 
therefore, detailed information obtained directly from chemical industries is 
needed. To limit the amount of work, the following approach is adopted to 
survey the total equipment population size in the UK and the Netherlands: 
1. Chemical plants are classified in a limited number of categories (plant 
types), such as LPG bulk storage, refinery, or storage facility of bulk 
liquids. 
2. For each plant type, two or three companies will be selected for a detailed 
analysis of the size of the equipment population. This analysis is carried 
out in a collaboration between the project team and the industry involved. 
Along with the equipment count, a limited set of plant characteristics is 
recorded, e.g. the substance contained. 
3. Modifying factors for the number of equipment per plant type can be 
defined, e.g. based on process type or annual throughput. 
4. The equipment count per plant type may be verified with independent 
institutions such as certifying bodies and plant designers. 
5. Seveso sites in the UK and the Netherlands are divided in separate plants 
using the Safety Reports. For each plant, the plant type is determined.  
6. The total number of the equipment population size is now calculated by 
multiplying the typical number of equipment for each plant type with the 
number of plants assigned to this plant type.  
The result of the survey will give the total number of equipment within the 
population of Seveso sites in the UK and the Netherlands.  
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Abstract 
 
Floods are part of nature and they may affect all aspects of our lives. Recent 
changes to the urban system and its environment caused by rapid urbanization 
and climate change increase both the flood probability and the impact of 
flooding. Consequently there is a need for all cities to adapt to climate and 
socio-economic changes by developing new strategies of flood risk management. 
Following the paradigm shift from traditional to more integrated approaches, 
and considering the uncertainties of future development, one of the main 
emerging tasks of flood managers become the development of resilient cities. 
Urban resilience is a concept from which it is possible to reduce the 
consequences of urban system disturbances, and even consider these 
disturbances as an opportunity for urban development in a more sustainable 
way. This paper describes different methods, tools, and methodologies, existing 
today in the context of our research. We then discuss and analyze the usefulness 
of these methods and tools according to the main objectives of our research.   
 
 
Keywords: urban system, flood risk, resilience, methodology, urban design 
Introduction 
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Urban floods are increasing worldwide and are likely to become even more 
damaging in the future [34]. This is particularly the case for cities which are the 
most vulnerable because of the concentration in these areas of people, their 
possessions and their economics activities which are all subject to floods. Recent 
changes in urban systems and their environments caused by rapid urbanization 
and climate change increase both the probability and the impact of flooding. 
About 75% of flood damages would be identified in urban areas [10]. Moreover, 
there exist a high number of interdependencies between the individual 
components of the urban system that make cities even more vulnerable to floods. 
During the last decade extremely damaging floods have occurred all over the 
world: New Orleans 2005, Central Europe 2009, Chine 2010, Thailand 2011, etc.  
Increasingly it is recognized that the use of large infrastructures alone to tackle 
these kinds of disasters has the risk for technological failures and is likely to be 
less effective than integrated approaches to manage flood risks [16]. 
Consequently, it highlights the necessity for a new and a different approach to 
urban design, planning and building to cope with urban flood risk. To make it 
happen, flood risk management needs to be better integrated into planning, urban 
retrofitting and development processes [15]. However, there are many barriers to 
integrate flood risk in urban planning and design because urban planning and 
design set out to integrate different needs and requirements at a range of spatial 
and temporal scales. In this, flood risk management is not normally considered to 
be the most important of the various utility and service needs and opportunities 
[49]. Thus, there is a need for all cities to adapt to climate and socio-economic 
changes by incorporating urban resilience strategies into overall city planning.  
We focus our research on how flood risk can be integrated in urban development 
by means of the concept of resilience. Indeed, urban development and 
regeneration present windows of opportunity to increase flood resilience that are 
still not taken advantage of. Urban resilience is a concept from which it seems 
possible to reduce the consequence of urban system disturbances, and even 
consider these disturbances as an opportunity for urban development in a more 
sustainable way [41]. Thus, in our research we accept the non-equilibrium view 
of uncertainty and unexpected change among the fundamental characteristics of 
the urban system, and then disturbances become accepted. Urban resilience is 
based upon a systemic approach and an understanding of multiple spatial and 
temporal levels of the urban system and the interactions within and between the 
different levels. The main goal of our research is to provide guidance for urban 
planning and design in order to improve flood resilience of cities in a more 
systemic and integrated manner.  
This paper describes different methods, tools, process and methodologies, 
existing today in the context of our research. We then discuss and analyze the 
usefulness of these methods and tools according to the main objectives of our 
research. Finally, we present and justify which of them seem suitable to use or to 
adapt for our ongoing research.  
 
Research goals 
1.1. Urban growth, climate change and flood risk 
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Floods are part of nature and they may affect all aspects of our lives. Today, 
there are several causes making urban flood risk management really complicated. 
Since 2007, half of the world population lives in cities [45]. Moreover, the total 
urban population is expected to double from two to four billion over the next 30 
to 35 years [46]. This rapid urban development is usually accompanied by an 
important urban sprawl generating risk itself. On the one hand, this leads to build 
the city in areas where hazards are stronger; on the other hand, the urban 
networks are no longer adapted and under dimensioned for the collection and 
evacuation of the stormwater [21]. 
Furthermore, climate change is avowed and it generates a number of 
uncertainties according to the scenarios of temperature rise proposed by the 
experts of the IPCC.  But whatever the scenario chosen, impacts on the 
frequency and severity of rainfalls are expected. Similarly, more intense periods 
of drought will alternate with these higher rainfalls [28]. Droughts will have a 
direct effect on soil sealing. Thus, more intense rainfalls on impermeable soils 
will increase the risk of flooding. Moreover, other sources of flooding coming 
from the sea level rise can be expected. Also, other uncertainties related to the 
reliability of data, their acquisition and then their exploitation complicates the 
management of flood risk [2]. It is on the basis of these uncertain, incomplete 
and imprecise data that the flood forecasting models are produced as well as the 
design of protective systems.  
Thus climate change, combined with the concentration of people and properties 
in urban areas, suggests terrible events for the coming years. Flood risk is 
expected to increase significantly: the economic cost of flood risk is expected to 
reach around the world the value of 100 billion euros per year at the end of the 
century [14].   
Therefore, in this context where the world becomes increasingly uncertain, there 
is a need for all cities to develop new strategies of flood risk management to 
anticipate flood scenarios that probabilistic models consider them as extreme or 
rare [55]. These strategies should incorporate this multitude of exacerbating 
factors such as urban development, climate change and the different sources of 
flooding in the city [5], which complicates the management of flood risk. 
Currently, some strategies are evolving but they are still often reactive rather 
than proactive, and they are generally isolated. They generally emphasize 
structural measures (dikes, dams…) and adopt a sectoral approach to cities. Yet 
other strategies may exist, among them resilience which provides a systemic 
approach. Rebuild our modes of managing risk by means of the concept of urban 
resilience requires creative thinking and innovations that profoundly modify 
existing strategies to anchor in a dynamic and integrated approach that considers 
all dimensions of the urban system and its interactions, in an organized manner 
and across the different spatial and temporal levels. 
 
1.2. Resilience concept 
Several researches have led to the development of the resilience definitions, 
general as well as specific to particular fields. The following table (Tab. I) 
summarizes the literature review of [18]. 
Land Use Planning and Risk-Informed Decision Making   
282 
 
 
Recently, resilience has increasingly been applied to linked social-ecological 
systems [20]. The reason for extending the use of resilience to socio-ecological 
systems is that any delineation between social and ecological systems is seen as 
artificial and arbitrary [4]. Social-ecological resilience has been defined as: “the 
capacity of a system to absorb disturbance and reorganize while undergoing 
change so as to still retain essentially the same function, structure and feedbacks, 
and therefore identity, that is, the capacity to change in order to maintain the 
same identity” [19]. According to this approach, resilience is not only about 
being persistent to disturbance. It is also about the opportunities that disturbances 
open up in terms of recombination of evolved structures and processes, renewal 
of the system and emergence of new trajectories [18]. Thus, the concept of 
resilience in relation to social-ecological systems incorporates the idea of 
adaptation, learning and self-organization in addition to the general ability to 
persist disturbance [18]. 
 
Table VIII : Major definitions of resilience [18] 
Definitions Characteristics Focus on Context 
Engineering 
resilience 
Return time, efficiency Recovery, constancy Vicinity of a stable 
equilibrium 
Ecological/ 
ecosystem resilience, 
social resilience 
Buffer capacity, 
withstand shock, 
maintain function 
Persistence, 
robustness 
Multiple equilibria, 
stability landscapes 
Social-ecological 
resilience 
Interplay disturbance and 
reorganization, 
sustaining and 
developing  
Adaptive capacity, 
transformability, 
learning, innovation 
Integrated system 
feedback, cross-
scale dynamic 
interactions 
 
Indeed, it appears in this approach that resilient systems are systems that can 
adapt to disturbances [13, 17, 23]. Resilience is not a concept just related to the 
time of crisis and post crisis (as suggested by some other definitions [30]), but a 
concept derived from a learning process [6, 11, 23], where the disturbance is the 
developer of underlying capabilities of the system. 
 
1.3. Holistic and systemic approach of the research 
A city or more generally, the urban issue, can be conceived as a complex system. 
According to the problem studied, the urban system considered will not be 
necessarily the same. There is not only one possible urban system, but as many 
systems as problems exist [7]. 
Urban flooding cannot be managed in isolation, so it is essential to any approach 
to address the different spatial levels of the urban system. Indeed, an 
understanding of the interactions and relationships across different levels of the 
urban system and the impact they have on the resilience of the city, is very 
important. However, anybody does not know too much about these interactions 
and relationships, and how they may affect the resilience of cities [54], which 
makes the task very difficult. 
A challenge for our research is to define a flood resilient urban system, 
identifying furthermore the goals or purposes of the system, the components of 
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the system and their functions and the interactions between its different spatial 
and temporal levels. The use of a systemic approach will allow us to design our 
complex problem as a whole, a set of elements making system. 
In this system, humans are an important component that will have to be 
considered. Indeed, to understand and to design for resilience, the role of the 
humans needs to be understood. Whereas humans may be a major source of 
accidents, designers of most modern systems recognize that the adaptability of 
humans makes them an essential component for resilience. 
In short, it comes to understanding the urban system complexity by means of 
systemic analyzes in order to succeed the design of flood resilient cities. 
 
1.4. Urban resilience and sustainable urban development 
The resilience approach from social-ecological studies is applied in this research 
with respect to the urban system. Resilience concept applied to the urban system 
is known as urban resilience.  
Urban resilience is a concept from which it is possible to reduce the effects of 
disturbances that can affect the urban system, and even considering the 
disturbances as an opportunity for a more sustainable urban development [41]. 
According to this characteristic, the disturbance is not necessarily a negative 
event but rather an important part in the urban system operation. In this 
perspective, risk management will not consist to resist, based on the idea that 
there is only one equilibrium situation for the system, but rather, to create other 
viable situations which allow the urban system to continue operating. Indeed, the 
idea is not to create an optimal state for the urban system but rather the selection 
of solutions that are more likely to succeed under an increasingly uncertain 
future.  
Nowadays, the application of flood urban resilience concept is basically 
translated into the design of buildings, constructed in order to suffer the least 
damage as possible. But in the same way, we can also identify other important 
urban components in a city. Thus, it comes to understanding the urban system 
complexity by means of systemic analyzes in order to succeed the design of 
flood resilient cities. Indeed, the urban system is made up of a set of elements 
interacting with each other and optimizing the behavior of each individual 
component does not guarantee that the global system is itself optimum. 
To the extent that the existing physical/built form of a city is limiting or 
problematic, urban planning and design can articulate policy and physical/spatial 
solutions to address the problems. More innovative urban planning and design is 
possible in large-scale ecocity projects where ambitious goals for multiple 
aspects of sustainability can be adopted  to guide and focus the design process, 
including: a sustainable urban hydrology model, zero net energy use, a mix of 
urban uses, inclusion of biodiversity, and providing a healthy environment for 
people [35]. Thus, several aspects of sustainable development are concerned by 
these objectives. However, to date there have been no references on urban 
resilience to floods guiding the process of urban planning and design in order to 
contribute to sustainable development of  cities. 
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Urban resilience is a new way of thinking about sustainable urban development, 
rather than specific set of guidelines, instructions, or checklists. Urban resilience 
is more strategic than normative, because, to be effective, resilience must be 
explicitly based on, and informed by, the environmental, ecological, social, and 
economic drivers and dynamics of any particular place, and it must be integrated 
across a range of linked scales [39].  
Cooperation between urban resilience to floods and urban planning and design 
does not yet exist, from both a theoretical and a practical aspect. There is no 
systemic and efficient theory or urban planning and design strategy that takes 
urban resilience to flood into account. Otherwise, urban planning and design is 
inherently a strategic process in that it attempts to understand and proactively 
manage the elements and forces that are the cause of change, rather than 
employing tactics to respond to the change themselves [1, 42]. For urban 
planning and design to be strategic, it requires integration of interdisciplinary 
knowledge to define strategic goals consistent with political expectations, 
economic factors, and the reality of the existing landscape condition [35].  
 
1.5. Research goals 
The purpose of this research is to formalize useful knowledge for decision 
support in order to design flood resilient cities. Indeed, we focus our research on 
the integration of the flood risk in the urban planning and design by means of a 
resilient approach. The main goal is to provide guidance on urban planning and 
design in order to improve the flood resilience of cities. We expect to define 
under what urban, technical, morphological, programmatic and social 
configurations a resilient urban system to flood is possible to be designed. As a 
result, an urban design strategy that holistically considers all areas of the urban 
water cycle as well as its linkages to other components of the urban system 
should be determined for a particular urban area. The idea is not to create an 
optimal state for the urban system but rather the selection of solutions that are 
likely succeed under an increasingly uncertain future. Applying the strategy, 
urban planners, architects, engineers, as well as project managers should be able 
to propose appropriate urban design actions improving the overall resilience of 
the city. 
Finally this research does not aims to offer an overall assessment of resilience 
but it seeks to define the actions to be implemented to achieve, by the evolution 
of urban components, a desired level of flood resilience of the urban system.  
 
Review of the existing methodologies, methods and tools… 
To achieve our research goal and given the context previously developed, an 
indispensable prerequisite is to develop a multidisciplinary methodology 
allowing to integrate flood resilience in urban planning and design. This 
objective can be achieved if we are able to measure objectively the level of 
service provided by the urban system as a whole. Furthermore this assessment 
will have to be used to provide an effective decision support process to different 
stakeholders in order to determine the best urban planning and design strategy to 
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improve the level of urban system resilience to flood. Thus, our research aims to 
be a part of a participative decision process in urban planning and design. 
Based on these needs, we conducted a literature study on the methodologies, 
methods and tools that ongoing researches on natural hazards and resilience have 
developed. Because our research is also in the context of sustainable urban 
development, we then also investigated in other urban fields on methods and 
tools developed which could be interesting.  
1.6. Concerning researches on natural hazards and resilience 
 
During the recent years, a growing interest for resilience has been expressed in 
the natural disaster mitigation and especially in the flood related events. The 
European Union, under the Seventh Framework Programme (FP7), has initiated 
several research initiatives in order to explore this concept especially for the 
urban environments. Among them, we investigate projects about vulnerability 
(MOVE (www.move-fp7.eu), ENSURE (www.ensureproject.eu)), floods 
(IMPRINTS (www.imprints-fp7.eu), CORFU (www.corfu7.eu)), storms 
(MICORE (www.micore.eu)), landslides (SafeLand (www.safeland-fp7.eu)), 
droughts (Xerochore (www.feem-project.net/xerochore), DEWFORA 
(www.dewfora.net), DROUGHT-R&SPI (www.eu-drought.org)), social sciences 
(CapHaz-Net (www.caphaz-net.org), ConHaz (www.conhaz.org), emBRACE 
(www.embrace-eu.org)), earthquakes (SHARE (www.share-eu.org), REAKT 
(www.reaktproject.eu)), volcanoes (MIAVITA (www.miavita.brgm.fr), 
VUELCO (www.vuelco.net)), forest fires (FUME (www.fumeproject.eu)), 
multi-risk/risk prevention (KULTURisk (www.kulturisk.eu), MATRIX 
(www.matrix.gpi.kit.edu), CATALYST (www.catalyst-project.eu)), and others 
(SMARTeST (www.floodresilience.eu), FIRESENSE (www.firesense.eu), 
NIKER (www.niker.eu), PERPETUATE (www.perpetuate.eu)). 
We identified several projects with the very similar purpose and goal, the same 
methodology or means to achieve it and similar final outcomes. So we classified 
and described all projects according to these criteria.  
Thus, some of the projects intend to develop tools in order to predict possible 
impacts of the negative event or just to provide information on it. The main 
objective of them is to provide guidance for the stakeholders which will have to 
propose possible future scenarios. Then, we define another group of projects 
whose purpose is to create frameworks, methods or tools in order to asses and 
quantify vulnerability or risk. They use existing methodologies as basis of their 
work and the goal is to develop a handbook which will outline the different 
frameworks, methods and tools most appropriate for vulnerability or risk 
assessment and qualification. Other projects are working not to create knowledge 
about the specific hazard or disaster, but rather to identify and share information 
about best practices, identify gaps, and strengthened and extend existing 
networks. The goal that most of them achieve is to provide some guidelines for 
the best practices of the specific hazard or disaster, both before and after such 
disaster occurs. Another set of projects intend to develop frameworks or methods 
for the provision of early warning and response in order to increase the event 
preparedness and, identify and implement appropriate risk reduction measures. 
The goal achieve is to provide guidance of preparedness and adaptation to risk 
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and elaborate strategies and recommendations for activities. The last group of 
projects defined intends to develop tools to mitigate risks from various hazards in 
order to the real time risk mitigation methods. The means to achieve their 
purpose is developing conceptual framework, indicators and models which will 
allow the projects to finally provide guidance in the definition and 
implementation of strategic options for risk mitigation management and 
governance. 
Among all these analyzed projects, nine of them introduce the concept of 
resilience. Concretely, the concept appears in the projects related to 
vulnerability, floods, droughts and social sciences. Within them, a central idea of 
resilience can be retained which is “recovery”. Indeed, resilience is often 
considered as the opposite of vulnerability in such a way that reducing 
vulnerability is the means to increase resilience. Thus, for most of the projects, 
the level of resilience depends on post-event recovery options. It will be the 
result of the effectiveness of event mitigation measures; those mitigation 
measures aimed to reduce vulnerability.  
Particularly, projects related to vulnerability and droughts, define resilience as 
the capacity to recover effectively after a disturbance in such a manner that pre-
event vulnerability will be reduced. Nevertheless, they don’t consider resilience 
only as the opposite of vulnerability. Resilience enters in these projects also as a 
dynamic concept that it addresses the capacities to innovate and the ability to 
strategically orient complex process. For these projects, resilience is a concept 
related to time of crisis and post crisis, it is a process during and following a 
disturbance. Then, the projects related to floods consider resilience as a new 
approach to urban flood management. It will be the means to guide strategies in 
order to improve the quality of urban flood management and reduce flood risk. A 
new idea of resilience is introduced by the projects related to social sciences 
where resilience is considered as a long-term process. Particularly, it is defined 
as a concept underling the need to live with change and uncertainty, and to 
permanently learn. So it is a resilience which takes the learning and the 
adaptation against risk into account. 
In Europe there are several urban development practices exsting today that 
sought to integrate flood risk. Concretely, projects which we deeply investigated 
are the FloodResilienceCity (www.floodresiliencity.eu), FloodProBE 
(www.floodprobe.eu) and LifE (www.lifeproject.ino) projects. The 
FloodResilienceCity project is an EU-funded project which enables responsible 
public authorities in eight cities in North West Europe to better cope with floods 
in urban areas. This will be done through a combination of transnational 
cooperation and regional investments. In this project the concept of resilience is 
introduced in a general framework which is based on four sets of thematic 
activities, each one with detailed action programs, based on “4-A approach” 
(Awareness, Avoidance, Alleviation, Assistance). Otherwise, the FloodProBE is 
a European research project with the objective of providing cost-effective 
solutions for flood risk reduction in urban areas. It aims to develop technologies, 
methods and tools for flood risk assessment and for the practical adaptation of 
new and existing buildings, infrastructures and flood defences leading to a better 
understanding of vulnerability, flood resilience and defence performance. The 
Proceedings of the 43rd ESReDA seminar, France, October 21-23, 2012 
 
287 
 
issue of the protection systems performance against floods is integrated in the 
assessment of the urban resilience assessment, resilience evaluated in terms of 
resistance, recovery and absorption ability [30]. 
The LifE project aims at identifying ways in which the means of managing flood 
risk can be integrated within development sites to meet objectives for zero 
carbon, high quality, and sustainable developments at minimum cost. Thus, LifE 
is a holistic approach to design that integrates sustainability, flood management 
and development. It is based on social and environmental longevity, maintaining 
functionality during flooding and finding economic efficiencies through and 
integrated approach to design. The LifE Principles are: provide space for the 
river, provide space for rain, create space for amenity, integrate with community 
needs, design to be adaptable, reduce car dependency, provide space for energy 
and provide backups. 
In order to implement strategies which are based on mixed approaches between 
protection (levees) and adaptation of the city (urban technical networks) to 
design the resilient city to flood, some researches have been yet developed with 
the purpose of defining methods to assess urban resilience . Among them, [30] 
developed methods to assess the resilience of the urban networks. He defined 
three essential abilities to study and assess resilience: resistance ability, 
absorption ability and recovery ability. Operational safety methods, graph theory 
methods and the Geographic Information Science were used respectively to 
analyze theses different abilities. Moreover, specific indicators were developed 
to assess the absorption and the recovery ability.  
Another research ongoing is focused on the design of support decision tools in 
order to improve the urban resilience. [50] developed a decision support system 
spatially referenced for the resistance of levees. His goal is to establish a research 
on the assessment of levee performance to improve the process of urban 
resilience based on the protection. Otherwise, in the same area of research [44] 
developed a diagnostic with the purpose of raising awareness about the 
consideration of the disruptions and interdependencies between the urban 
networks. This diagnostic will be the base for the support of discussions about 
the interrelationships between the urban networks managers. A second step in 
her research to improve the resilience of a city will be to design a tool to support 
the governance of the urban networks. This tool will be based on systems of 
information spatially referenced. Thus, managers of urban networks will be 
provided with the necessary data to design resilience at the level of their 
networks, coordinating their actions with the whole of the network managers 
[41]. 
Other researches are ongoing about resilience and climate change adaptation. 
Many methods and tools for assessing climate change impacts, vulnerability and 
adaptation options, focusing on the water sector, have been developed [32]. 
According to the Fourth Assessment Report of the Intergovernmental Panel on 
Climate Change (IPCC AR4) [8], a number of approaches for climate impact and 
adaptation assessment are available to succeed the (quasi-)stationary approach. It 
distinguishes (at least) four approaches: cause-base (or: impact); effect-based (or: 
vulnerability); top-down; and bottom-up (or: adaptation). Cause-based versus 
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effect-base describes weather the climate impact and adaptation assessment 
looks forward or backwards, respectively, in time from a given reference time. 
This influences the direction in which the cause and effect chain is followed in 
the reasoning [20]. In the area of climate change research and policy a top-down 
approach is usually followed. This classical approach has been called the 
“predict-optimize-act” approach, thus the methods and tools within this approach 
take climate change scenarios as their starting point. From a different 
perspective, a bottom-up approach may address the reality of decision-making at 
local, regional and sectorial levels more directly than the climate-centered top-
down approach [32]. This approach doesn’t depend on the ability to project 
climate change and its impacts into the future. 
[32] makes a further distinction between the static and the dynamic approach for 
climate impact and adaptation assessment. In his work, the dynamic approach is 
termed the resilience approach which is founded on the understanding that the 
state of a system is subject to change. Any one approach (or combination of 
approaches) can accommodate a variety of different methods as to how it is 
delivered [32]. Following his specific understanding of resilience, [32] 
conducted a literature study on the methods that can be used within the resilience 
approach. He examined four methods in detail: Adaptive Policy Making (APM), 
Real-In-Options (RIO), Adaptation Tipping Point (ATP) and Adaptation Tipping 
Point-Adaptation Mainstreaming Opportunity (ATP-AMO). Actually, a larger 
range of methods can be applied within the resilience approach, but these were 
selected in order to cover a range of different approaches in combination with 
resilience approach [32]. As an example, Table II presents some recent case 
study experience with the above methods, including the reason for selecting the 
method. 
Table IX : Recent experiences with the methods in practical cases [32] 
Case study 
description 
Method 
selected 
Reason for selecting the 
method 
Source 
Water management in 
the Netherlands 
ATP 
It identifies the most urgent 
effects of climate change and 
accelerating sea level rise and 
when these effects will occur 
Kwadijk et al. 
(2010) 
Coastal management 
in the Netherlands 
APM 
It embeds the analysis process 
in an institutional framework; 
it considers different types of 
uncertainty 
Rahman et al. 
(2008) 
Defence raising for the 
Thamesmead area in 
the Thames Estuary 
RIO 
It identifies the "optimal" set 
of static adaptive strategies in 
response to advances in 
knowledge about climate and 
socio-economic change 
Woodward et al. 
(2011) 
Defence raisinf for the 
Rotterdam area in the 
Rhine-Meuse Estuary 
ATP-AMO 
It identifies where and when 
to incorporate defence raising 
with "normal" investment 
projects, such as for urban 
regeneration and renewal 
Boer (2012) 
 
1.7. Concerning sustainable urban development 
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In the context of urban water management, several decision-support tools have 
been developed with the purpose to achieve a sustainable urban water 
management.  
A decision process usually consists of different steps. This process requires that 
the decision is not limited to a simple choice but it is built progressively. The 
decision process basically consists of two phases: the problem setting (phase of 
intelligence, i.e. the problem formulation and the construction of the 
motivations) and the problem solving (phases of comparison of decision 
alternatives, choice and retrospective analysis) 
[22] identified eight major projects on urban water management which 
developed a decision support process using several methods and tools: 
DAYWATER, Triple bottom line, SWITCH, SUDS-BMP-LID, SWARD, 
RERAU and INDIGAU, ECOPLUIES, CARE-S. Among them, he distinguished 
two important types of decision support tools: those at the structure level which 
doesn’t have a holistic vision of the system, and the tools at the urban water 
system level. Within this last kind of decision support tools, it is found the 
SWITCH project (www.switchurbanwater.eu), which we explored in detail.  
SWITCH project (2006 to 2011) involved innovation in the area of sustainable 
urban water management often also referred to as integrated urban water 
management (IUWM). It looked towards water management in the ‘city of the 
future’. The main goal of SWITCH was finding new solutions to increase the 
efficiency of urban water systems. To achieve this goal, SWITCH developed 
strategies for particular places, based on visioning and scenario building. In this 
context, the main aims of strategy development are to [3]: 
- develop robust adaptable strategy that has the potential to achieve a shared 
vision under a whole range of different scenarios; 
- encourage stakeholders to take the leading role in an IUWM strategy 
development process. 
Strategy development based on visioning and scenario building is also consistent 
with a project cycle management (PCM) approach to IUWM and, more 
specifically, to the emphasis that PCM puts on social and institutional learning.  
Project Cycle Management (PCM) was introduced by the European Commission 
in the early 1990’s to improve the quality of project design and management and 
thereby to improve aid effectiveness [25]. The PCM principles can be 
summarized as: structured and informed decision-making; involvement of 
stakeholders in decision-making; incorporation of aspects of sustainability; use 
of the logical framework approach; and an integrated approach [3] defined for 
the SWITCH project, a set of generic steps that can be used to develop an overall 
strategy that are based on visioning and scenario building. They highlight that 
the exact sequence of steps, number of iterations and the tile that might be 
needed will depend on the context. 
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Figure 15. An example of an IUWM project management cycle [3] 
. 
The 9 steps are the following: 
1. Identify components of an overall strategy; 
2. Evaluate each strategy component; 
3. Identify specific risks and constraints; 
4. Link strategy components to relevant parts of the vision; 
5. Evaluate the utility of strategy components against the disaggregated 
vision under all scenarios; 
6. Refine strategy components; 
7. Combine strategy elements to produce versions of an overall strategy; 
8. Select and refine and overall strategy; 
9. Start the planning process. 
 
Finally, the methodology of the strategic planning process for IUWM with a 
long-term strategy developed for the SWITCH project was the one shown in the 
following figure (Fig. 2). 
Otherwise, in other researches, a social learning framework is also proposed to 
integrate urban planning and flood risk management: Learning & Action 
Alliance (LAA) [20, 49. 3] defined a Learning Alliance as “a group of 
individuals or organizations with a shared interest in innovation and the scaling-
up of innovation, in a topic of mutual interest”, and add the word Action to 
highlight both its learning and also its delivery aspects. [49], described and 
evaluated a new framework to organize social learning to support collaborative 
planning, drawing on theories on social learning, development planning [48] and 
decision making [26, 43]. In the context of [49] research, Action refers to the 
integration of flood risk management in urban development planning projects. 
The main output of LAAs is knowledge [52]. Complex decision making – as 
integrated planning – requires applicable knowledge [31]. Knowledge needs to 
feed into planning and land-use decisions and is the basis of any flood resilient 
city [53]. Thus, the organization of a LAA should enable the development, 
exchange and application of knowledge [49].  
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Figure 16. Methodology of the strategic planning process for IUWM (SWITCH project) 
Anyway, in a decision support process, before defining the strategy, i.e. solve the 
problems, it is really important to properly formulate the problems to solve. 
Indeed, in a decision-support process the problems are not given a priori but they 
are built progressively [29]. Thus, the identification and formulation of the 
problems is one of the most important phases, especially when the problems to 
be considered are multiples and complex and perceived differently by the 
stakeholders involved in the decision [12].  
With this purpose, we analyzed two methods which have been used to well 
understand the operation of the urban system and the problems that might be 
caused during a flood. Among them, the Functional Analysis (FA) [30] and the 
Source-Pathway-Receptor (SPR) model [16]. 
The Functional Analysis (FA) is an operational safety method analysis for 
complex system modeling. It is a systemic method to understand and to describe 
how a system works. It provides with a complete analysis of the system’s 
components and their interactions with each other and the outside world and 
consequently the functions they provide. Indeed, it is based on the functions of a 
system to understand its operation. Indeed, the functional analysis is an approach 
consisting in to identify, classify, characterize, prioritize and/or enhance the 
functions of a system. This analysis has been applied in different fields such as 
construction products of buildings [27], dams [38], roads [47], water facilities 
inside buildings [9], and levees to protect against flooding [40]. More recently, 
the Functional Analysis has been applied for urban networks modeling [30]. [30] 
determined the functions performed by the components of the different urban 
networks in the particular case of flood risk (ensure continuity of service, resist 
hydraulic flows, provide with water flows, resist mechanical pressures, allow the 
proper functioning of other system components). 
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The Source-Pathway-Receptor (SPR) model is used to characterize flood risks in 
terms of the Source-Pathway-Receptor [16]. The sources are weather events or 
sequences of events – such as heavy or sustained rainfall and marine storms – 
that may lead to flooding. Pathways are the mechanisms that convey flood 
waters that originate as extreme weather events to places where they may affect 
receptors. Pathways, therefore, include fluvial flows in or out of the river 
channels, overland urban water flows, coastal processes and the failure of fluvial 
and sea defences or urban drainage systems. Finally, receptors are the people, 
properties, industries and built and natural environments that flooding may 
affect. This model is useful to understand and characterize the flood risk and it 
can be applied at different urban system levels. At the more detailed scale of 
individual urban areas, a different set of flood mechanism and issues should be 
considered [16]. For example, intra-urban flooding could be caused by intense 
rainfall which could overwhelm the urban drainage system. The model is used to 
propose responses to flood risk which aim often to modify the pathways or 
receptors of flooding [16]. 
 
Discussion  
Following the desired shift in urban flood management from traditional to 
integrated approaches, and considering the uncertainties of future development 
due to drivers such as climate change, one of the main emerging tasks of flood 
managers become the development of flood resilient cities. Our research aims at 
providing guidance on urban planning and design in order to improve flood 
resilience of cities. 
To achieve our research goal and given the context previously developed, an 
indispensable prerequisite is to develop a multidisciplinary methodology based 
in a support decision process, allowing to integrate flood resilience in urban 
planning and design. After reviewing several studies ongoing or already finished 
on urban resilience, we verified that cooperation between urban resilience to 
flood and urban planning and design does not yet exist, from both a theorical and 
a practical aspect. Indeed, no methodology framework has been developed 
allowing the design of flood resilient cities.  
The main outcomes of the studies on urban resilience carried out so far are 
methods and tools to assess urban resilience. However, some of these tools such 
as indicators [30] can be applied in one of the phases of a support decision 
process. The LifE project is the only one who gives some ideas of how flood 
management could be integrated in urban design. Even if some interesting urban 
design principles were defined in the project, they were not identified with the 
purpose to improve urban resilience to flood. 
Concerning researches on other urban fields, we have seen in the SWITCH 
project that the development of a strategy based on visioning and scenario 
building is also consistent with a project cycle management approach to IUWM. 
This is an interesting result because a strategy was defined developing a 
methodology where urban water management was integrated. Thus, applied to 
our research, urban resilience to flood could be integrated. Moreover, that the 
methodology is also consistent with a project cycle management is an important 
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point because urban planning and design strategies, that we aim to develop to 
improve flood resilience, will be transformed at some time in actions on urban 
areas, i.e. urban projects. Two stages of this methodology previous to the 
definition of the strategy are the visioning and the scenario building. First, 
visioning is the process of developing a vision of a desired future state. We could 
thus reflect the priority issues and then turning them into a desired state. To 
achieve this purpose the Functional Analysis and the Source-Pathway-Receptor 
model could be adapted. Even if there are many tools of urban flood modeling 
which exist today, they have to be applied in a particular urban area to identify 
issues under flooding conditions. On the contrary the FA and de SPR model 
allow a conceptual modeling of the problem. 
Scenario building is a plausible and internally-consistent description of a 
possible future situation. We are not agree with this stage of the methodology 
because even if it is possible to develop several scenarios trying to represent all 
possible futures, the uncertainty will never be zero so the system could be wrong 
dimensioned. Furthermore, scenarios are often developed by means of 
experiences of the past even if today the urban system is evolved of that of the 
past and it is evolving every day.  Scenarios are developed in order to develop 
strategies based on these scenarios and then assessing if the vision defined is 
achieved or not. Thus, some methods and tools could be applies in this stage to 
substitute scenarios. For example, the methods examined by [20], which can be 
used within a resilience approach for climate impact and adaptation assessment. 
Among them, the ATM-AMO (Adaptation Tipping Point – Adaptation 
Mainstreaming Opportunity) is likely the best to adapt in our research because it 
is within a resilience approach and at the same time within a bottom-up approach 
allowing to cope with the uncertainty of the future. Indeed, ATM-AMO method 
does not depend on the future situations, but rather it examine whether and for 
how long, current strategies will continue to be effective under different negative 
events. So, the starting point of the method is the current situation of the system. 
However, this method has never been applied to the whole urban system and it 
should to be analyzed if it is possible.  
Finally, for the development of the strategy a Learning and Alliance Action 
approach could be applied. In the same way that it was proposed to integrate 
urban planning and flood risk management, it could also be applied to integrate 
urban planning and design and flood resilience. It could provide us with the 
necessary knowledge for our complex decision support process. Indeed, 
knowledge needs to feed into planning and design decisions and is the basis of 
any flood resilient city. Nevertheless, in this stage the collaboration of a 
multidisciplinary group of stakeholders will be necessary.   
 
Conclusions 
Flooding is a major natural hazard affecting millions of people every year, 
claiming the lives and causing global economic losses annually. As result, it is 
essential that all urban areas seek to manage the risk flooding in an effective and 
appropriate way. Nowadays, considering the uncertainties of future development 
due to drivers such as climate change, one of the main emerging tasks of flood 
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managers become the development of flood resilient cities. Urban resilience is a 
concept from which it is possible to reduce the consequences of urban system 
disturbances [33, 37] and even consider this disturbance as an opportunity for 
urban development. 
The first stage of our work consisted of defining the main goal of our research, 
which is to formalize useful knowledge for decision support in order to design 
flood resilient cities. We then demonstrated that to achieve it and given the 
context previously developed, an indispensable prerequisite is to develop a 
multidisciplinary methodology based in a support decision process, allowing to 
integrate flood resilience in urban planning and design.  
According to this purpose, the next stage consisted of a literature study on the 
methodologies, methods and tools that ongoing researches on natural hazards 
and resilience have developed. In terms of results, based on this study, we have 
determined that no methodologies, methods or tools have been developed so far 
in order to introduce flood resilience in urban planning and design. The main 
outcomes are methods and tools which focus on the assessment of urban 
resilience. Consequently, we also explored other urban fields such urban water 
management. In this context we identified several decision-support tools which 
have been already developed with the purpose to achieve a sustainable urban 
water management. Specifically, we were interested on the methodology used by 
SWITCH project, which is based on visioning and scenario building in order to 
define a strategy. We then identified different the Functional Analysis and de 
Source-Pathway-Receptor model as adapted tools to develop the vision. Instead 
of the scenario building we proposed to use other methods and tools used within 
a resilience approach for climate impact and adaptation assessment [20]. 
Especially, we considered the ATM-AMO (Adaptation Tipping Point – 
Adaptation Mainstreaming Opportunity) the best adapted for our research 
because it is a method which does not depend on the future situations.  
Finally, a perspective of our research is to continue the literature study in order 
to well define the particular methodology that we are going to use for our 
research and to determine all its stages and the methods and tools that will be 
developed within each one. 
 
References 
Ahern, J. (2002) Greenways as Strategic Landscape Planning: Theory and 
Application. Doctoral Dissertation. Wageningen Agricultural University, 
Netherlands. 
Barroca, B. (2006) Risque et vulnérabilités territoriales - Les inondations en 
milieu urbain. Thèse de doctorat, Université de Marne la Vallée. 340 p. 
Batchelor, C. and Butterworth, J. (2008) Scenario building. SWITCH learning 
alliance briefing. Note 9. 
Berkes, F., Folke, C. and Colding, J. (2000) Linking social and ecological 
systems: management practices and social mechanisms for building 
resilience, Cambridge Univ Pr. 
Blanksby, J., Ashley, R. and Serre, D. (2009) A user focused portal for 
awareness raising and knowledge dissemination for flood risk 
Proceedings of the 43rd ESReDA seminar, France, October 21-23, 2012 
 
295 
 
management. In International Conference on Urban Flood Management, 
Road map towards a flood resilient urban environment Session, 8. 
UNESCO, Paris. 
Brand, F. S. and Jax, K. (2007) Focusing the meaning (s) of resilience: resilience 
as a descriptive concept and a boundary object. Ecology and Society, 12, 
23-23. 
Cambien, A. (2008) Urban Modelling: emergence of a systemic approach of 
urban development. In 7th Systems Science European Union Congress 
Proceedings, Lisboa, Portugal, December 17-19 2008.  
Carter, T. R., Jones, R., Lu, X., Bhadwal, S., Conde, C., Mearns, L., O’neill, B., 
Rounsevell, M. and Zurek, M. (2007) New assessment methods and the 
characterization of future conditions. Climate Change 2007: Impacts, 
Adaptation and Vulnerability. Contribution of Working Group II to the 
Fourth Assessment Report of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate 
Change, Parry, M.L., Canziani, O.F., Palutikof, J.P., van der Linden, P.J., 
and Hanson, C.E., Eds., Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, UK, 
133-171. 
Correc, O. (2005) Approche probabiliste de prédiction des risques de dégradation 
des réseaux de distribution d'eau à l'intérieur des bâtiments. Thèse de 
doctorat, Université de Marne la Vallée. 
COST22 (2008). Prof. Richard Ashley, Dr. Andreas Vassilopoulos, Prof. Erik 
Pasche, Prof. Chris Zevenbergen, UNESCO: Advances in Urban Flood 
Management. 
Davidson-Hunt, I. J. and F. Berkes. (2003) Nature and society through the lens 
of resilience: toward a human-in-ecosystem perspective. In Navigating 
Social-Ecological Systems: Building Resilience for Complexity and 
Change, ed. C. U. Press, pp. 53-82. Cambridge: In F. Berkes, J. Colding 
and C. Folke (eds.). 
Desthieux G. (2005) Approche systémique et participative du diagnostic urbain. 
Processus de représentation cognitive du système urbain en vue de 
l'élaboration d'indicateurs géographiques. Thèse de Doctorat Ecole 
Polytechnique Fédérale de Lausanne. 237p. 
Dovers, S. R. and Handmer, J. W. (1992) Uncertainty, sustainability and change. 
Global Environmental Change, Vol 2, pp.  262-276. 
EEA. (2008) Impacts of Europe's changing climate - 2008 indicator-based 
assessment European Environment Agency. 
ECTP (2005) Strategic Research Agenda for the European Construction Sector. 
Achieving a sustainable and competitive construction sector by 2030. 
Available at www.ectp.org, last accessed 15 June 2012. 
Evans, E.P., Ashley R.M., Hall J., Penning-Rowsell, E., Sayers, P., Thorne C., 
Watkinson, A. (2004) Foresight. Future Flooding Vol II – Managing future 
risks. UK Office of Science and Technology. April, London, UK. 
Fiksel, J. (2003) Designing resilient, sustainable systems. Environmental science 
& technology, 37, 5330-9. 
Folke, C. (2006) Resilience: the emergence of a perspective for social-ecological 
systems analysis. Global Environmental Change, 16, pp. 253-267. 
Folke, C., Carpenter, S. R., Walker, B., Scheffer, M., Chapin, T. and Rockström, 
J. (2010) Resilience thinking: integrating resilience, adaptability and 
transformability. Ecology and Society, 15, 20. 
Land Use Planning and Risk-Informed Decision Making   
296 
 
 
Gersonius, B. (2012) The resilience approach to climate adaptation applied for 
flood risk. Doctoral Dissertation. Delft University of Technology and of 
the Academic Board of the UNESCO-IHE Institute for Water Education. 
The Netherlands 
Gourbesville, P. (2008) Challenges for integrated water resources management. 
Physics and Chemistry of the Earth, Parts A/B/C Integrated Water 
Resources Management in a Changing World, Volume 33, pp. 284-289. 
Granger, D. (2009) Méthodologie d’aide à la gestion durable des eaux urbaines. 
Thèse de Doctorat. Institut National des Sciences Appliquées de Lyon. 
Gunderson, L. H. and C. S. Holling. (2002) Panarchy: Understanding 
Transformations in Human and Natural Systems. Washington DC: Island 
Press. 
IPCC (2007) Summary for Policymakers, 4th Assessment Report. 
ITAD, Lion House, Ditchling Common Industrial Estate, Hassocks, West Sussex 
(1999) Project Cycle Management Training Handbook. European 
Commission. 
Kingdon, J.W. (1984) Agendas, alternatives, and public policies. Boston: Little, 
Brown and Company. 
Lair, J. (2000) Evaluation de la durabilité des systèmes constructifs du bâtiment. 
213. Thèse de doctorat, Université Blaise Pascal - Clermont 2. 
Lamarre, D. (2008) Climat et risques, changements d'approches, Lavoisier. 
Le Moigne J. L., (1990) La modélisation des systèmes complexes, Dunod, Paris. 
Lhomme, S., Serre, D., Diab, Y. Laganier, R. (2010) Les réseaux techniques face 
aux inondations ou comment définir des indicateurs de performance de ces 
réseaux pour évaluer la résilience urbaine. Bulletin de l'association des 
géographes français, pp. 487-502. 
Lindblom, C. E. and Cohen, D.K. (1979) Usable Knowledge: Social Science and 
Social Problem Solving. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press. 
Ludwig, F., Swart, R. (2010) Tools for climate change adaptation in water 
management. Inventory and assessment of methods and tools. KFC report 
027, Knowledge for Climate research project. 
Mileti, D. (1999) Disasters by Design. Washington, DC: Joseph Henry Press 
Munich, Re. (2009) Topics geo, Natural Catastrophes 2008: Analyses, 
assessments, positions. Munich: Munich Reinsurance Group. 
Novonty, V., Ahern, J. and Brown, P. (2010) Water centric sustainable 
communities. John Wiley & Sons, Inc., Hoboken, New Jersey, pp. 135-171 
OECD Environmental indicators (2005) Environment at a balance OECD 
Environmental Indicators  
Pelling, M. (2003) The Vulnerability of Cities: social resilience and natural 
disaster. London. 
Peyras, L. (2003) Diagnostic et analyse de risques liés au vieillissement des 
barrages, développement de méthodes d'aide à l'expertise. 199. Thèse de 
doctorat, Université Blaise Pascal - Clermont 2. 
Picket S. T. A., Cadenassso, M. L. and Grove, J. M. (2004) Resilient cities: 
meaning, models, and metaphor for integrating the ecological, socio-
economic, and planning realms. Landscape and Urban Planning 69 (4), 
pp. 369-384 
Proceedings of the 43rd ESReDA seminar, France, October 21-23, 2012 
 
297 
 
Serre, D., Peyras, L., Tourment, R. and Diab, Y. (2008) Levee performance 
assessment: development of a GIS tool to support planning maintenance 
actions. ASCE, Journal of Infrastructure System, Vol. 14, pp. 201-213. 
Serre D. (2011) La ville résiliente aux inondations, Méthodes et outils 
d’évaluation. Habilitation à Diriger des Recherches. Université Paris-Est. 
Sijmons, D. (1990) Regional Planning as Startegy. Landscape and Urban 
Planning. 18 (3-4), pp. 265-273 
Teisman, G.R. (2000) Models for research into decision-making processes: on 
phases, streams and decision-making rounds, in: Public Administration, 78, 
4, pp. 937-9556. 
Toubin, M., Serre, D., Diab, Y. and Laganier, R. (2011) Improve urban resilience 
by a shared diagnostic integrating technical evaluation and governance. In 
European Geoscience Union (EGU). Vienna, Austria. 
UN-Habitat (2007) Sustainable urbanization: local actions for urban poverty 
reduction, emphasis on finance and planning. In 21st Session of the 
Governance Council, 482. Nairobi, Kenya: UN Habitat. 
UN. (2006) World population prospects: The 2005 revision. United Nation 
Population Division. Department of Economic and Social Affairs, United 
Nations, New York. 
Valadas, E. (2003) Identification des scénarios de dégradations des chaussées 
bitumineuses épaisses. 148. Mémoire présenté pour l'obtention du diplôme 
d'ingénieur en génie civil, CUST, Université Blaise Pascal Clermont 2. 
Van Buuren, A. (2006) Competente besluitvorming: het management van 
meervoudige kennis in ruimtelijke ontwikkelingsprocessen. Centraal 
Boekhuis. ISBN 9059314794. 
Van Herk, S., Zevenbergen, C., Ashley, R., and Rijke, J. (2011) Learning and 
Action Alliances for the integration of flood risk management into urban 
planning: a new framework from empirical evidence from the Netherlands. 
Delft University of Technology, Delft. 
Vuillet, M (2012) Performance et aptitude au service des digues de protection 
contre les inondations. Thèse de doctorat. Cemagref – Université Paris-Est, 
Aix en Provence, France. 
Wheater H., Evans E. (2009) Land use, water management and future flood risk. 
Land Use Policy, 26S, S251-S264. 
Wenger, E. (2000) Communities of practice and social learning systems. 
Organization 7:225-246. 
White I. (2008) The absorbent city: urban form and flood risk management. 
Proc. ICE Urban Design and Planning. Vol. 161, December 2008, Issue 
DP4, pp. 151–161. 
Zevenbergen, C., Veerbeek, W., Gersonius, B. and Van Herk, S. (2008) 
Challenges in urban flood management: travelling across spatial and 
temporal scales.Journal of Flood Risk Management, 1, pp. 81-88. 
Zevenbergen, C., Cashman, A., Evelpidou, N., Pasche, E., Garvin, S. L. and Ashley, A. 
(2011) Urban Flood Management. London, UK: Taylor and Francis Group 
 
 
 
 
 
Land Use Planning and Risk-Informed Decision Making   
298 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
(This page has been intentionally left blank) 
 
 
 
Proceedings of the 43rd ESReDA seminar, France, October 21-23, 2012 
 
299 
 
Criteria for Sustainable Land Use Planning – analogies 
from the fields of regional water resources and flood risk 
management 
 
Beatrice Hedelin 
Karlstad University, Centre for Climate and Safety,  
SE-651 88 Karlstad, Sweden.  
beatrice.hedelin@kau.se 
 
 
Abstract 
In order to make land use planning sustainable, new planning and decision-
making procedures need to be developed. In this presentation a set of useable 
normative criteria for the assessment and development of such procedures is 
proposed. The criteria are concerned with integration of knowledge and values 
into the planning process, and with the generation of commitment, legitimacy or 
acceptance for the resulting plan. The criteria were originally derived as a 
response to the lack of deductive approaches in the evaluation of planning 
procedures used in the fields of regional water and flood risk management, 
making it possible to highlight their potential for sustainable development. The 
assumption made here is that the deductive criteria can be a valuable 
contribution also to the broader and related field of land use planning. The 
ESReDA seminar has provided a good starting point for an extended discussion 
of the use of the criteria as a tool for operationalizing the concept of sustainable 
development in the field of land use planning.  
 
Keywords: Land use planning, planning procedures, assessment, participatory 
planning, sustainable development 
1. Background 
In order to make land use planning sustainable, new planning and decision-
making procedures need to be developed. Here, a set of useable normative 
criteria for the assessment and development of such procedures is proposed. The 
criteria were originally derived as a response to the lack of deductive approaches 
for the evaluation of participatory planning procedures used in the fields of 
regional water and flood risk management, making it possible to highlight their 
potential for sustainable development. The assumption made here is that the 
deductive criteria can be a valuable contribution also to the broader and related 
field of land use planning. This assumption is based on the fact that the character 
of the criteria is very general, and that the criteria are based on the twin concepts 
of participation and integration, which function as well-established dimensions 
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of sustainable development in relation to water and flood risk management as 
well as in relation to land use planning.  
Defining the meaning of the concepts of integration and participation in relation 
to planning procedures require a multidisciplinary approach, which makes use of 
knowledge from a wide range of scientific disciplines and fields, e.g. several 
fields of natural sciences, political science, psychology, organizational theory, 
planning theory and political economy. Having recognized this, the criteria were 
derived through a very broad literature review and synthesis. The work was 
inspired by thoughts of grounded theory, not because there was a lack of theories 
within the broad spectrum of scientific fields, but because there was a lack of 
theoretical frameworks that combined the huge amounts of theoretic and empiric 
knowledge of relevance for the studied issue. 
The criteria were first intended for application to regional water resources 
management, where they have been used for assessing planning practices and a 
legal framework that steers planning practice (the EU Water Framework 
Directive, WFD). The assessments made showed that the criteria have great 
practical potential, as they could provide important and practicable 
recommendations for making both planning procedures and their legal contexts 
better in relation to sustainable development. Recently, a study has been 
conducted to transfer the criteria framework to the field of natural risk 
management, with a focus on floods. Twelve key researchers were interviewed, 
collectively capturing the broad spectrum of knowledge concerned (Hedelin, 
forthcoming)The results indicate that the criteria are transferrable to the adjacent 
field, and that no changes are in fact needed for applying the criteria to the new 
field. The main reason given was that the criteria are sufficiently general in 
character. A natural question stemming from that result is then to what other 
fields of research and practice are the criteria valid? The ESReDA seminar 
provides an opportunity to present to and propose the use of the criteria in the 
field of land use planning, which in many ways is closely related to, and partly 
overlapping with, the fields of water resources and natural risk management. 
 
2. Proposed criteria for sustainable land use planning 
The criteria cover issues of integration of knowledge and values into the 
planning process and with the generation of commitment, legitimacy or 
acceptance for the resulting plan. See Table 1 for an outline. In this section, the 
proposed criteria are presented very shortly. See Hedelin (2007) for a thorough 
presentation of the criteria and of how they were derived. 
The deductive criteria were derived through a review and synthesis of the 
theoretical and empirical literatures on issues of integration and participation in 
relation to planning. Criteria A to E stem from the concept of integration. 
 
Table 1: The table outlines the criteria framework. The twelve criteria are derived from the 
concepts of integration or participation. For proper use of the criteria, a broad understanding of 
the meaning of its components and connections is vital. (The table was first published by Hedelin 
2007.) 
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Sustainability 
dimension  
Structural 
component 
Criteria 
Planning processes for sustainable 
river basin management must include, support, 
or promote:  
Integration …across 
disciplines 
A  integration of knowledge from all relevant disciplines. 
B handling of different views of knowledge (e.g., positivist, 
relativist). 
C handling of different kinds of uncertainty. 
… across 
values 
D identification of the most relevant values in relation to the 
current issue. 
E rational argumentation based on the identified values, 
by relating them to alternative choices in the planning 
process. 
Participation … 
contributing 
to the 
process 
F inclusion of knowledge owned by relevant actors. 
G inclusion of the ideological orientations represented by 
relevant actors. 
H participation in the most critical phase(s) of the process. 
… 
generating 
commitment
, legitimacy 
or 
acceptance  
I a procedure for defining the actors that should be involved. 
J handling of power asymmetries. 
K procedures that ensure that ideological orientations are not 
suppressed (for consensus-based approaches). 
L learning. 
 
They are structured based on the idea that integration can be obtained across 
disciplines (A–C) and across values (D and E) (Jepson 2001). Criteria A say that 
disciplinary knowledge must be integrated in the process. For doing so, the issue 
of interaction between persons and knowledge fields that have different 
knowledge views is vital (B). It also says that in relation to this, the issue of 
uncertainty needs to be handled in a systematic way (C). Criteria D and E say 
that values need to be integrated in the process. The first step then is to identify 
the most relevant values (D) so that these can be explicitly related to during the 
course of the planning process (E).  
Criteria F to L are closely linked to participation, and much influenced by current 
thoughts on deliberative democracy. The criteria are structured according to the 
main aims related to participation – increasing the quality of decisions, and 
generating the necessary commitment, legitimacy or acceptance (Hemmati 
2002). Criteria F and G are mainly derived through looking at the first aim while 
criteria H to L mainly relate to the last one. Criteria F to G say that the 
knowledge owned, and ideological orientations represented, by the concerned 
actors need to be included in the process (F and G respectively). Value systems 
or ethics are other terms used in similar meaning as ideological orientation. 
Criteria H to L say that the participatory efforts in the process should be 
connected to the most critical phase or phases of the process (H). In general, 
concerned actors (other than those directly responsible for the carrying out of the 
formal process) come in too late in the process, making it difficult for them to 
influence the fundamental direction of the decision rather than its details. These 
criteria also say that one must have a systematic approach for identifying which 
actors that should be involved (I). They further states that issues of power 
asymmetries are vital for establishing a democratic process (J, K). Also learning 
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(L) is a key aspect in relation to democracy, since those involved need to have a 
good deal of understanding of the complex issue at hand. 
Stemming from a synthesis, the criteria are linked in various ways; e.g. the 
integration of knowledge and values (A to E) is of cause dependent on the 
involvement of concerned actor´s knowledge and values (F and G), and in order 
to meet criterion L, almost all of the other criteria have to be fulfilled. 
Furthermore, arguments behind one criterion also support other criteria, and 
accordingly several of the criteria are often needed to fulfil such an underlying 
argument. Some examples are as follows. Criteria A to C, F and G are highly 
relevant in providing high quality information for the process. Criteria E to L are 
necessary for participants to effectively influence the planning process. Criteria 
H to K (and perhaps also E) are central to the issue of accountability and 
legitimacy. Criteria F, G and J to L concern the development of shared visions 
and goals among the participants. 
 
3. Examples of earlier use of the criteria 
 The criteria have been used by the current author for assessing planning 
practices in Sweden, which are a response of the implementation of the WFD 
(for a full presentation of the study, see Hedelin and Lindh 2008). Here, 
interviews with responsible water directors and planners showed important 
deviations between the planning practices and the normative criteria, and the 
assessment made it possible to formulate practicable recommendations. One 
example is that the interviews reviled that important information on uncertainties 
in baseline data were in fact systematically hidden by the way the data was being 
handled. In the cases where lack of data made it uncertain if a water body should 
be classified as having “good” or “moderate” status, some planners decided to 
classify the water body as having good status. In that way one would not place 
any demands for environmental measures in relation to that water. The argument 
provided was that the WFD would result in regulatory demands for taking so 
many measures that the following costs would be unreasonable from a societal 
perspective. Here, the planners (consciously?) prioritized measures on waters 
with higher rates of degradation over waters with lower rates of degradation. 
Whether that is a good priority is an interesting question in itself. In relation to 
the criteria however, the main issue is that in order to encourage rational 
discourse and democratic and participatory planning processes, issues 
concerning the level of resources and the strategies for water conservation (the 
key issue for the planning processes) should be handled in the open, making it 
possible to explicitly define possibilities and drawbacks, and to discuss ways of 
prioritizing. Planners should thus not focus on how to spend the taxpayer’s 
money, but rather on the issue of how prioritizing should be handled 
methodologically. Based on this, the recommendation made was to raise the 
awareness among planners, of their role in the political process that water 
planning actually is. 
Another example comes from a case where the criteria were used to assess the 
WFD (see Hedelin 2008b for a full presentation of the study). Here, a barrier for 
attaining sustainable management practices were actually identified, since the 
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main occasion for making value trade-offs prescribed by the directive is 
connected to the making of exceptions from the directive’s general objective 
(generally defined as good status). Instead of being about prioritizing between 
the main values involved, the defining of objectives is prescribed as a purely 
natural scientific procedure, which according to my own experience colours 
much of the work with related to the WFD. Admitting that water management is 
political however, makes it illogical to connect the value trade-offs to the making 
of exceptions. The recommendation made was to adjust the WFD so that the 
meaning of the term environmental objective would include the granting of 
exceptions. This change also would require that the main aim of the WFD is 
changed from preservation and protection of water to sustainable use of water 
(which would certainly imply protection and preservation of many waters).  
 
4. Possible future outcomes 
The examples provided show that the criteria can be useful for identifying 
shortcomings and to formulate practicable recommendations for how (water) 
planning can become more sustainable. In regard of future outcomes, besides of 
the possible growing of scope to include land use planning as an area of 
application, the criteria are also intended to be used as a basis for direct 
development of planning practices. Using the criteria as a basis for shaping a 
specific planning process probably requires larger efforts than using them for 
assessment, since the necessary level of detail becomes higher. Making proper 
decisions on forms for involvement of concerned actors, on tools for handling of 
data, and on methods for structuring a rational discourse that explicitly relates to 
the main values involved, requires a good understanding of the specific planning 
context, in addition to the theoretical knowledge represented by the criteria. 
Here, participatory or action based research approaches could be promising, 
since they seriously engage in the task of creating solutions that are based on 
both academic (more general) and practical (more context specific) knowledge. 
A basic assumption made is that both kinds of knowledge are vital for making 
long term effective changes in practice. See van Herk et al. (2011) and Ribarova 
et al. (2011) for recent examples of participatory research within the fields of 
flood risk and water resources management. 
Another possible way to use the criteria for development of planning practice 
could be to transform the framework into a tool that could be used directly by 
practitioners themselves. As the criteria currently are formulated and presented, 
with academic and sometimes quite abstract  terms, many respondents pointed 
out that it might be difficult to grasp the fundamental meaning of the criteria for 
someone not knowledgeable within the academic fields that the criteria cover. 
One way of transforming the framework to a practitioner’s version could be to 
simply suggest a revised version, and then to assess the result of its use. Another 
way, perhaps more effective, could be to develop the framework in collaboration 
with practitioners. 
 
5. Application of the criteria to the field of land use planning 
 As mentioned in the background section, the recently completed study that 
aimed at transferring the criteria framework to the area of natural risk 
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management showed that the criteria are sufficiently general to be transferred to 
the adjacent planning field even without making any changes (Hedelin, 
forthcoming). One respondent expressed the general character of the criteria as: 
“It [the criteria framework] is general. … It is almost like when you read the 
Bible. The Golden Rule of life … the Ten Commandments …”. Another 
respondent pointed to another reason for the criteria being transferrable: “They 
are context independent since they concern the procedure”. The conversations 
held pointed to the fact that the level of generality of the criteria framework 
might in fact make it applicable to a range of adjacent physical (and non-
physical?) planning fields. 
To propose that the normative criteria might be just as valid for processes of land 
use planning as for processes of water planning or natural risk management is by 
no means meant to claim that there are no fundamental differences between the 
fields that must be considered when shaping planning practices. For example, 
during the interviews of the study on the transfer to the natural risk field, two 
differences between the fields of water and of natural risks were discussed – one 
related to the character of the (bio)geophysical processes involved, and the other 
related to the engagement and organizational structure of the concerned actors. 
Without going in to these differences, the point here is that even if such 
differences do not call for changes within the criteria framework, knowledge on 
such differences in planning contexts is vital for successfully turning the criteria 
into practice. 
One important difference between the fields of water and land use planning that 
comes to my own mind is that the main professionals engaged have different 
educational backgrounds, which is an important determinant for world-views and 
professional culture (e.g. see Hedelin and Lindh (2008) for a discussion of the 
world-views of the water planners in Sweden). Issues of water are often handled 
by persons with various natural scientific backgrounds (mainly biologists and 
chemists). The group of professionals involved in land use planning mainly 
consist of architects and physical planners. To my experience this difference (as 
one among other reasons) very roughly makes water planners to focus on nature 
preservation, while land use planners focus more on development. Much 
simplified, amongst water and environmental planners the value of preserving 
nature is elevated in priority, while amongst land use planners, nature 
preservation is seen as one out of many values, and their job is to find an 
acceptable balance between these values. When using the criteria framework for 
developing planning practice or for analysing assessment results, the world-
views, attitudes and cultures of the practitioners is indeed important to consider. 
To make the criteria framework a better tool for handling these issues, an on-
going study is currently engaged with widening the scope of the criteria to 
include organizational and institutional aspects. This forthcoming extension of 
the framework might be possible to make with regard to all the three fields – 
land use planning, water planning and natural risk management. 
  The ESReDA seminar has provided an opportunity to present to and propose 
the use of the criteria in the field of land use planning, which in many ways is 
closely related to, and partly overlapping with, the fields of water planning and 
natural risk management. In that way, the seminar has been a good starting point 
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for an extended discussion of the use of the criteria as a tool for operationalizing 
the concept of sustainable development in the field of land use planning.  
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Abstract 
 
Land-use planning with respect to major accident hazards needs to deal with 
high-consequence low-probability (HILP) events. Consolidated methodologies, 
usually based on bow-tie analysis, exist to identify accident scenarios deriving 
from activities involving the use or the storage of hazardous substances. 
However, conventional approaches usually are not able to capture escalation 
scenarios. In the present study a methodology developed for the quantitative 
assessment of risk due to domino effect is applied to the analysis of an extended 
industrial area. A set of models for the calculation of equipment damage 
probability were developed and combined to improved criteria for the 
calculation of threshold values for equipment damage. A specific effort was 
dedicated to the improvement of models for the calculation of equipment damage 
probability due to jet and pool fires. The results evidence that quantitative risk 
assessment of escalation hazard is of fundamental importance in order to 
identify critical equipment and to address prevention and protection actions. 
 
Keywords: Land-use planning, escalation, domino effect, quantitative risk 
assessment, major accident hazard. 
1. Introduction 
Land-use planning with respect to major accident hazards needs to deal with 
high-consequence low-probability (HILP) events. Consolidated methodologies, 
usually based on bow-tie analysis, exist to identify accident scenarios deriving 
from activities involving the use or the storage of hazardous substances. 
However, domino effect was responsible of several catastrophic accidents that 
took place in the chemical and process industry (CCPS (2000), Khan and Abbasi 
(1999), Lees (1996)). Escalation of primary accidental scenarios triggering a 
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"domino effect" have caused extremely severe accidental events in the chemical 
and process industry. As a matter of facts, severe accidents may arise from the 
escalation of primary events to trigger secondary scenarios, as documented in the 
technical literature and in accident reports. Hence, the identification of possible 
escalation events is required in the safety assessment of sites where relevant 
quantities of hazardous substances are stored or handled. In the European Union, 
"Seveso-II" Directive (96/82/EC) requires the assessment of on-site and off-site 
possible escalation scenarios in sites falling under the obligations of the 
Directive. Particular concern is posed to the identification of domino scenarios 
involving secondary units outside the site where the primary event takes place. 
Consolidated approaches to this issue are still lacking. Several methods were 
proposed to assess the possibility of domino effect (Bagster and Pitblado (1991), 
Latha et al. (1993), Delvosalle (1998), Gledhill and Lines (1998), Khan and 
Abbasi (1998), Cozzani et al. (2005), Reniers et al. (2005)), but the identification 
and quantitative assessment of domino scenarios is still an open issue. 
In the present study a methodology developed for the quantitative assessment of 
risk due to domino effect is presented. A set of models for the calculation of 
equipment damage probability were developed and combined to improved 
criteria for the calculation of threshold values for equipment damage. A specific 
effort was dedicated to the improvement of models for the calculation of 
equipment damage probability due to jet and pool fires. Exclusion criteria were 
also developed to identify primary scenarios not likely to result in escalation. 
The “domino package” of the Aripar-GIS software was upgraded to allow its use 
for risk recomposition accounting for the contribution of domino effect. The set 
of tools developed allows the quantitative assessment of domino effect in 
complex lay-outs and extended industrial areas. A case-study was explored, 
evidencing that quantitative risk assessment of escalation hazard is of 
fundamental importance in order to identify critical equipment and to address 
prevention and protection actions. 
 
2. Methodology 
2.1 General features 
The main features of the methodology are outlined in the following, while 
further details may be found in the literature (Cozzani et al., 2005). Figure 1 
summarizes the main steps the procedure. 
The starting point of the methodology is the assumption that a full 
characterization of all the primary risk sources present in the lay-out of concern 
is available, as usual when the assessment of domino effect in a quantitative risk 
assessment (QRA) or quantitative area risk assessment (QARA) study is 
undertaken. If the site falls under the obligations of the EC "Seveso-II" Directive, 
such data may be easily gathered from the safety report of the plant.  
According to Figure 1, the starting point of the methodology is the analysis of 
the facility considered, aimed at evidencing the reference equipment which may 
lead to a Loss Of Containment events (LOC) able to generate primary fire 
events. This preliminary screening is based on a limited set of input data, such as 
the inventory of hazardous materials, the type of equipment and the operative 
conditions combined with the analysis of the facility layout. 
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After the reference equipment identification, the analysis is then focused (steps 
2,3 and 4) on the characterization of the primary event, both in terms of expected 
frequency and consequences assessment. In particular, the approach suggested 
by the “Purple Book” (Uijt de Haag and Ale (1999)) is used to determine the 
standard LOCs associated to the equipment considered, to which the release 
frequencies, also reported in “Purple Book”, are associated. 
 
 
 
Figure 1. Flowchart of the reference methodology developed for the quantitative assessment of 
domino effect. 
The consequences of the primary LOCs may be assessed with standard models 
for consequence analysis (Van Den Bosh et al. (1989), Van Den Bosh and 
Waterings (2005)). On the basis of these results, the secondary targets affected, 
involved by the primary events, are identified (step 5), applying a screening 
criterion based damage thresholds. 
The frequency calculation should be performed in three steps. First the damage 
probability of each escalation target, Pd,i, should be calculated. Simplified 
equipment damage models will be discussed in the followings. In the second 
step, the overall frequencies of escalation scenarios that result from a primary 
event and several secondary events taking place simultaneously should be 
calculated. It is reasonable to consider independent, from a probabilistic point of 
view, each escalation event causing the damage of a secondary unit. Thus, the 
damage probability of a unit due to a given primary event may be considered 
independent from the possible contemporary damage of other units. If n possible 
escalation targets are present, a single primary event may trigger up to n different 
secondary events. Each of the secondary events has an overall probability to take 
place due to the primary event considered equal to Pd,i. However, each secondary 
event may take place simultaneously to other secondary events. A single 
escalation scenario may thus be defined as an event involving the contemporary 
damage of k of n units resulting in k final outcomes, with k comprised between 1 
and n. The number of escalation scenarios involving k different final outcomes 
may be calculated by the binomial coefficient: 
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The total number of different overall escalation scenarios that may be generated 
by a single primary event, Nd, may be calculated as follows: 
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If a numerical index (1 to n) is assigned to each of the n secondary events that 
may be triggered, a single overall escalation scenario may thus be identified as a 
vector (Jkm = [γ1, γk]), whose elements (j (j = 1, …, k)) are the indexes of the k 
secondary events that take place during the overall escalation scenario. The 
subscript m of vector J indicates that the overall escalation scenario is the m-th 
(m = 1,…,Nk) combination of k secondary events. 
The probability of a single overall escalation scenario involving the 
contemporary damage of k units resulting in k secondary events, identified by 
the vector Jkm, may be evaluated as follows: 
 ( , ) , ,
1
1 δ( , ) 2 1
n
k m k
d d i m d i
i
P P i P

       J                    (3) 
where the function δ(i,Jkm) equals 1 if the i-th secondary event belongs to the 
vector Jkm, 0 if not. Eq.(3) is the algebraic expression obtained from the union of 
the probabilities of the k events belonging to the m-th combination, calculated 
considering as independent the secondary events. 
The expected frequency of the m-th overall escalation scenario involving k 
simultaneous secondary events, fd(k,m), may thus be calculated as: 
( , ) ( , )k m k m
d p df f P                                          (4) 
where fp is the expected frequency of the primary event that triggers the 
escalation. It must be remarked that the frequency fp is the overall expected 
frequency of the primary event. The total probability that a primary scenario may 
trigger an escalation may be calculated as follows: 
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Thus, the overall escalation frequency of the primary event may be calculated 
straightforwardly from the following expression: 
fe = fp Pe                                                        (6) 
Thus, the expected frequency of the primary event taking place without 
triggering an escalation, fp,nd, may be calculated as follows: 






 
 
n
1k
N
1m
m)(k,
dpndp,
k
Pff 1                                      (7) 
The procedure outlined above allows the identification and the calculation of the 
expected frequencies of overall escalation scenarios involving the contemporary 
damage of more than one secondary unit. This makes an important difference 
with respect to previous methodologies, that only consider the possible damage 
of a single secondary unit at time in a 1 to 1 sequence (the so-called "domino 
chains": a first scenario damaging a single equipment item and starting a 
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secondary scenario; the secondary scenario damaging a third unit and starting a 
tertiary scenario and so on). The possibility to consider simultaneously more than 
one secondary scenarios deriving from the damage of several equipment items 
due to the primary event of the domino sequence allows taking into account 
more realistic secondary scenarios, since the analysis of past domino accidents 
evidences that simultaneous secondary events usually take place during severe 
domino accidents (Reniers and Dullaert (2007), Reniers et al. (2008)). 
The probabilistic assessment combined with the frequency evaluation of step 3 
(see Figure 1) allows determining the expected frequency of escalation. Since the 
conventional models used for consequence assessment in a QRA framework are 
not able to consider the effects of multiple scenarios, a simplified approach needs 
to be used for the representation of the actual consequences of the domino 
scenarios. The overall consequences of the overall scenario, expressed as the 
probability of death of an unprotected individual, are assumed to be the sum of 
the death probabilities due to all the scenarios involved in the domino event, with 
an upper limit of 1. This approach, tough simplified, was found to be acceptable 
and not over-conservative in the framework of a QRA (Cozzani et al. (2005)). 
Risk recomposition may be carried out with a specific software. In particular the 
Aripar-GIS software package may be used, combining all the outcomes of the 
different steps of the methodology as shown in Figure 1 (Cozzani et al. (2006), 
Antonioni et al. (2009)). It should be remarked that the above methodology, due 
to the generation and vulnerability calculation of the overall domino scenarios 
also allows the calculation of societal risk if information is available on the 
distribution of the population. 
 
2.2 Threshold values for escalation assessment 
In order to apply the above methodology, some simplifications need to be 
applied in order to limit the computational effort required for risk calculation. In 
particular, the equipment items that may be damaged by a primary scenario need 
to be identified. In order to approach the problem, threshold values for radiation 
and overpressure damage are usually applied (Khan and Abbasi (1998), Gledhill 
and Lines (1998)). Since escalation is influenced both by the severity and the 
duration of the primary scenario (in particular in the case of fires), the derivation 
of specific threshold values should take into account these aspects. 
In the case of fire scenarios, two elements are necessary to describe the 
escalation vector on a given target: a reference value of the radiation intensity 
and a reference time for the duration of the scenario. The vulnerability of process 
equipment to fire radiation was explored in a previous study (Cozzani et al. 
(2006a)), on the basis of the estimated time to failure (ttf) of atmospheric and 
pressurized storage vessels. The analysis of a representative set of unprotected 
vessels showed that time to failure is always higher than 30min for radiation 
intensities lower than 10kW/m2 in the case of atmospheric vessels, and lower 
than 40kW/m2 for pressurized vessels. These results allowed the definition of the 
threshold criteria summarized in table 2 for atmospheric vessels and in table 3 
for pressurized vessels. 
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In the case of primary scenarios in which the escalation vector is a blast wave, 
the damage of process vessels is mainly related to the maximum peak 
overpressure on the equipment item of concern, although the damage extension 
is actually related also to other complicating factors (Cozzani and Salzano 
(2004a)). Damage thresholds may be obtained from probabilistic damage models 
(Cozzani and Salzano (2004b)). However, in the framework of domino effect 
assessment, it must be remarked that the structural damage threshold may not be 
correspondent to the threshold values related to the escalation of accidental 
scenarios. The possibility of escalation following the damage is dependent also 
on other factors, the more important being the damage extension and the 
characteristics of the released substance. This may lead to an apparent paradox of 
lower escalation thresholds for pressurized vessels than for atmospheric ones, 
due to the wider escalation potential of pressurized vessels event in the presence 
of minor structural damage. A specific assessment of these aspects was carried 
out in a previous study (Salzano and Cozzani (2006)). 
With respect to fragment impact, the very high projection distances experienced 
in past accidents (more than 800m) make the threshold approach useless, since 
the threshold distances would be high enough to extend far outside the plant 
boundaries. The introduction of probabilistic criteria may allow the estimation of 
more useful figures to estimate fragment impact probability (Gubinelli et al. 
(2004)). 
Escalation thresholds applied in the present study are reported in tables I and II. 
Further values of escalation thresholds for other equipment categories are 
reported elsewhere (Cozzani et al. (2006)). 
 
Table I: Threshold criteria for atmospheric vessels. 
Scenario Escalation vector Modality Escalation criteria 
flash fire heat radiation fire impingement unlikely 
fireball heat radiation flame engulfment I > 100kW/m2 
  stationary radiation I > 100kW/m2 
jet-fire heat radiation fire impingement always possible 
  stationary radiation I > 10kW/m2 
pool fire heat radiation flame engulfment always possible 
  stationary radiation I > 10kW/m2 
VCE overpressure MEM F≥6; Mf ≥ 0.35 P > 22kPa 
confined explosion overpressure blast wave interaction P > 22kPa 
mechanical explosion overpressure blast wave interaction P > 22kPa 
  fragment projection fragment impact 
BLEVE overpressure blast wave interaction P > 22kPa 
  fragment fragment impact 
point-source 
explosion 
  P > 22kPa 
 
Table II: Threshold criteria for pressurized vessels. 
Scenario Escalation vector Impact mode Escalation criteria 
 flash fire heat radiation fire impingement unlikely 
fireball heat radiation flame engulfment unlikely 
jet-fire heat radiation fire impingement always possible 
  stationary radiation I > 40kW/m2 
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pool fire heat radiation flame engulfment always possible 
  stationary radiation I > 40kW/m2 
VCE overpressure MEM F≥6; Mf ≥ 0.35 P > 16kPa 
confined explosion overpressure blast wave interaction P > 16kPa 
mechanical explosion overpressure blast wave interaction P > 16kPa 
  fragment projection fragment impact 
BLEVE overpressure blast wave interaction P > 16kPa 
  fragment fragment impact 
point-source 
explosion 
overpressure blast wave interaction P > 16kPa 
 
2.3 Models for equipment vulnerability 
The QRA framework calls for the development of simplified probabilistic 
models for equipment vulnerability. The conventional procedures used for 
accident frequency estimation, as well as the methods proposed for domino 
probability assessment (Cozzani et al. (2005)) require the availability of models 
that yield the damage probability of process equipment given the value of the 
physical effect that impacts on the equipment item of interest. The use of 
simplified models, based on a limited number of parameters, is required to 
contain the calculation time of QRA procedures for escalation assessment, since 
they involve the analysis of a high number of accidental scenarios (Cozzani et al. 
(2006a)). Thus, equipment vulnerability models were based on probit functions 
to relate a “dose” of physical effects to the escalation or damage probability of an 
equipment item. 
In the case of fires, in general radiation is the escalation vector, and equipment 
damage is caused by the temperature increase due to flame radiation and/or 
engulfment. Since this is a rather slow process (time to failure of a vessel is 
usually of the order of minutes or higher), a time lapse exists between the start of 
the primary event and the start of the secondary events triggered by the 
escalation. Thus, the “time to failure” (ttf) of target units, where the secondary 
events are likely to start, is a fundamental parameter in the analysis of escalation 
events triggered by fire. A longer ttf is likely to results in a less credible 
escalation, since the probability that mitigation actions by protection systems or 
emergency teams are successful increases. The ttf may be then compared to a 
characteristic time for an effective mitigation (tte). The analysis of protection 
systems (dumping aimed to depressurization, water curtains by automatic 
systems, additional water protection by emergency teams) can be performed by 
LOPA techniques, and specific damage probability functions may be obtained 
for the plant under examination. In the present study, specific models were used 
for the assessment of vessel “time to failure”, based on the results of detailed 
simulation (Landucci et al. (2009)). 
In the case of blast wave impact, probit functions may be defined correlating the 
peak overpressure to the probability of equipment damage (Cozzani and Salzano 
(2004a)). he maximum peak overpressure was assumed as the “dose” in the 
probit correlation since this parameter allows a conservative estimate of blast 
wave effects on structures (Salzano and Cozzani (2005)). In a previous study, a 
specific analysis based on fuzzy sets was carried out to discern the probability of 
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“limited” and of “extended” damage given the vessel failure caused by different 
values of peak overpressure (Salzano and Cozzani (2006)). 
Tables III, IV and V show the probit functions used in the present study to 
analyze the case-studies discussed in the following. As evident from the tables, 
no criteria is proposed for domino effects triggered by fragments, Actually, a 
complex probabilistic assessment is required to assess the probability and the 
possibility of vessel rupture (Gubinelli et al. (2004), Gubinelli and Cozzani 
(2009a), Gubinelli and Cozzani (2009b)). 
 
Table III: Equipment vulnerability models for atmospheric vessels. ttf: time to failure (s); 
V: vessel volume (m3); I: radiation (kW/m2); Ps: maximum peak static overpressure (Pa). 
Escalation vector Type of vulnerability model Vulnerability model 
radiation Probit model based on ttf and 
model for ttf vs. radiation 
Y = 12.54 – 1.847ln(ttf) 
ln(ttf)=-1.13ln(I)–2.6710-5 V+9.9 
overpressure Probit model based on  Y = -18.96 + 2.44 ln(Ps) atmosp. 
 peak static overpressure Y = -28.07 + 3.16 ln(Ps) elongated 
  Y = -17.79 + 2.18 ln(Ps) auxiliary 
 
 
Table IV: Equipment vulnerability models for pressurized vessels. ttf: time to failure (s); V: 
vessel volume (m3); I: radiation (kW/m2); Ps: maximum peak static overpressure (Pa). 
Escalation vector Type of vulnerability model Vulnerability model 
radiation Probit model based on ttf and 
ttf vs. radiation 
Y = 12.54 – 1.847ln(ttf) 
ln(ttf) = -0.95ln(I) + 8.845 V0.032 
overpressure Probit model based on peak static 
overpressure 
Y = -42.44 + 4.33 ln(Ps) 
 
 
Table V: Probabilities of limited (PLOC1) and severe (PLOC2) loss of containment following 
equipment damage due to blast waves. All pressures in kPa. 
atmospheric PLOCI1 PLOCI2 
ΔP < 15 1 0 
15 ≤ ΔP ≤ 20 1 - 0.2.(ΔP - 15) 0.2.(ΔP - 15) 
ΔP > 20 0 1 
pressurized   
ΔP < 40 1 0 
40 ≤ ΔP ≤ 50 1 - 0.1.(ΔP - 40) 0.1.(ΔP - 40) 
ΔP > 50 0 1 
 
3. Definition of Case-Studies 
3.1 Selection of Case-Studies 
In order to exemplify the methodology two case studies are presented and 
discussed. The first case-study selected is a “hot-spot”, consisting in a limited 
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area where a high escalation hazard is present, requiring a detailed analysis. The 
second case-study concerns the analysis of an extended industrial area and is 
aimed at understanding the actual effect that the inclusion of domino effect may 
have on individual risk figures used in land-use planning. 
 
3.2 Case-Study 1 
The layout considered for the case study is reported in Figure 2: a small area of 
large industrial facility is considered. The necessary input data for the analysis 
are summarized in Table VI. A hydrogen manifold is located close to an 
ammonia storage facility. The ammonia storage consists in 10 pressurized 
vessels (S101-S110) located at a distance of about 20m from the hydrogen 
pipeline. A leak from hydrogen pipeline is supposed to generate a strong jet fire 
able to impinge one or more pressurized vessels, thus leading to escalation. In 
order to simplify the case study, only one release position and orientation are 
considered in the analysis. 
 
3.3 Case-Study 2 
In Figure 3 a map of the industrial area considered is reported. As shown in the 
figure, several plants falling under the "Seveso-II" Directive are present in the 
area: 12 process and chemical plants, 6 storage plants and 1 waste treatment 
plant. Table VII reports a list of the hazardous substances handled or stored in 
the area and the final outcomes associated to these substances in the safety 
reports. A cooperation with the competent authorities for the application of 
"Seveso-II" Directive made available all the relevant data concerning primary 
events and possible escalation targets present in the safety reports issued for the 
industrial sites present in the area. These data were the basis for the case-study, 
although some changes were introduced to avoid the use of confidential data. It 
should be remarked that safety reports did not include detailed information on 
possible escalation scenarios, in spite of the requirements present in the 
legislation. Thus, the final outcomes of secondary events following target 
equipment damage due to escalation had to be defined in the present study. 
 
Figure 2. Lay-out considered for case-study 1. 
 
S101 – S110
Hydrogen pipeline
Ammonia storage tanks
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Table VI: Equipment characteristics and input data used for the analysis of case-study 1. 
Parameter 
Primary source: 
hydrogen pipeline 
Secondary sources: 
ammonia storage vessels 
(S101 – S110) 
Diameter (mm) 100 3000 
Length (m) 110 18 
Volume (m3) 0.86 127 (nominal 100 m3) 
Elevation 1 m Ground level 
Total inventory (kg) 0.5 56000 
Operative temperature (K) 293 293 
Operative pressure (barg) 6 9 
Design temperature (K) n.r. 323 
Design pressure (barg) n.r. 19.26 
 
 
4. Results and Discussion 
4.1 Results of case-study 1 
Following the approach reported in Figure 1, primary event characterization was 
carried out applying a standard LOC assessment for the primary source. In 
particular, according to “Purple book”, two reference LOCs are associated to 
pressurized pipelines. The LOCs are described in Table VIII, that also reports the 
correspondent standard frequencies. LOC1 is a catastrophic failure supposing the 
full bore rupture of the pipeline while LOC2 consists in a minor leak (10% 
nominal diameter rupture). 
 
 
 
Figure 3. Lay-out considered for case-study 2. 
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Table VII: Hazardous substances and final outcomes for primary scenarios considered in 
case-study 2. 
Name CAS No Scenarios in Safety Reports 
1,1,2,2-tetrachloroethane 79-34-5 Toxic dispersions 
Acetone 67-64-1 Fires 
acrylamide 79-06-1 Toxic dispersions, Fires 
acrylonitrile 107-13-1 Toxic dispersions, Fires 
allyl alcohol 107-18-6 Toxic dispersions, Fires 
ammonia 7664-41-7 Toxic dispersions1 
1,3-butadiene 106-99-0 Fires, Explosions 
but-1-ene; and isomers/mixtures 106-98-9 Fires, Explosions 
chlorine 7782-50-5 Toxic dispersions 
cyclohexane 110-82-7 Fires 
ethylene dichloride 75-34-3 Toxic dispersions2, Fires 
n-hexane 110-54-3 Fires 
heptane and isomers 142-82-5 Fires 
hydrogen 1333-74-0 Fires 
hydrogen chloride 7647-01-0 Toxic dispersions 
hydrogen fluoride 7664-39-3 Toxic dispersions 
LPG 68476-85-7 Fires and explosions 
methane 74-82-8 Fires 
methanol 67-56-1 Toxic dispersions, Fires 
methyl bromide 74-83-9 Toxic dispersions 
nitrogen oxides 10102-44-0 Toxic dispersions 
propylene 115-07-1 Fires 
styrene 100-42-5 Toxic dispersions3, Fires 
vinyl acetate 108-05-4 Fires 
vinyl chloride 75-01-4 Fires 
(1) Flammability scenarios for ammonia neglected in safety reports due to its narrow 
flammability range (15-28%). (2) Considered even if substance is only harmful (Xn) 
The jet release following LOC1 leads to limited consequences (not likely to 
trigger an escalation in the lay-out considered). On the contrary, the severe 
release following LOC2 is able to generate a strong jet fire affecting the 
ammonia storage. No other fire scenarios associated to the release were 
considered in the study, since a limited duration was assumed for the release due 
to the action of mitigation systems. The quantification of the heat flows 
following the LOC2 primary jet fire is presented in Figure 4. As shown in the 
figure, four equipment items are affected by the primary jet-fire: the first tank 
(S101) is directly impinged by the flame, while other three tanks are exposed to 
distant source heat radiation (S102, S103, S104). Table VIII summarizes the 
impact vector, e.g. the heat load received by each target in the considered fire 
scenario and the time to failure estimated by applying the correlations reported in 
Table IX, selected on the basis of the type of fire exposure of each vessel. For 
each of the target vessels, the escalation scenario was the release of the entire 
inventory of the ammonia storage tank leading to a toxic dispersion. An 
instantaneous heavy gas release (transitioning to neutral or buoyant during 
dispersion) with the source located on the ground level was modelled 
considering a wind speed 2m/s and stability class F. 
On the basis of the calculated ttf, the probit for vessel failure was obtained (see 
Table VIII) and the failure probability was calculated. Credible combinations of 
final scenarios were then calculated by the approach discussed in section 2. A 
probability threshold of 10-5 was fixed in the present case-study to limit the 
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computational complexity. As shown in Table IX, four combinations were found 
to exceed the threshold. The risk indexes including escalation scenarios were 
then calculated using the Aripar-GIS software (Egidi et al. (1995), Spadoni et al. 
(2000), Spadoni et al. (2003), Cozzani et al. (2006)). The results are reported in 
Figure 5, that shows the local specific individual risk. No significant differences 
are present in the extension of areas affected by the higher individual risk values 
(10-5 events/year) when escalation effects are considered, due to the low 
frequencies of such scenarios. However, the figure evidences that due to the 
massive toxic dispersion triggered by escalation, the risk contour of 10-7 
events/year reaches a distance of about 300m from the primary event when 
escalation is considered, thus affecting numerous facilities of the industrial area. 
Thus, an amplification of the risk profile is experienced when domino scenarios 
are considered. 
 
Table VIII: Escalation vector and vulnerability assessment of secondary units in case-study 
1. 
Equipment Type of fire exposure 
Heat load 
(kW/m2) 
Time to 
failure (s) 
Escalation 
probit 
S101 Full engulfment 74 983 4.07 
S102 Distant source radiation 50 1485 3.31 
S103 Distant source radiation 25 3400 1.78 
S104 Distant source radiation 12.5 7784 0.25 
 
 
Figure 4. Consequence assessment of the primary jet fire for target 
equipment identification 
 
Table IX: Domino scenarios above combination probability threshold (10-5) set for case-
study 1. 
ID combination Involved targets Combination probability 
1 S101 1.76 x 10-1 
2 S102 4.55 x 10-2 
3 S101 and S102 8.01 x 10-3 
4 S103 6.41 x 10-4 
 
4.2 Results of Case-Study 2 
case-study1-ok
Ellipse @ 50 kW/m2
Ellipse @ 37.5 kW/m2
Ellipse @ 12.5 kW/m2
Radiation Level
Weather: Category 2/F
Study Folder: case-study1-rev
Model: primary event 100mm
Material: HYDROGEN
Audit No: 1070
Intensity Radii for Jet Fire
S103
S104
Impinging jet
50.0 kW/m2
20 m
37.5 kW/m2
12.5 kW/m2
Radiation 
contours
S102
S101
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A few primary events were found to be able to damage a high number of 
potential targets (up to 15). The maximum number of domino scenarios that 
needed to be assessed for a single primary event was as high as 32767. More 
than 5000 domino scenarios resulted in an overall frequency value higher than 
the selected cut-off value of 10-12 events/year. As shown in Figure 3, the plants in 
the area of concern are located in two quite distant zones. Since the separation 
distances among these zones were far higher than the threshold distances for 
escalation, a separate analysis was carried out for the two areas. Individual risk 
and societal risk were calculated using the Aripar–GIS software. In the 
following, for the sake of brevity, only the results obtained for the southern area 
(lower part of Figure 3) will be presented, since similar results were obtained for 
the other area. Figure 6 shows the individual risk contours calculated 
respectively not considering and considering domino effect in the analysis. The 
increase of the overall individual risk is remarkable for the 10-6 events/year 
contour. The risk contour at 10-7 events/year is also enlarged, although to a lesser 
extent. This effect is mainly due to toxic dispersions, that may take place as 
secondary events triggered by fires (both jet and pool fires). Also societal risk 
was calculated, using available data on resident population. The results are 
shown in figure 7. The figure points out that the F/N curves without and with 
domino effect partially overlap, showing only a limited difference in the 
frequency values. This is mainly due to the low population density of the area. 
As a matter of fact, land use planning regulations forbid to use the surrounding 
of the industrial area for residential buildings. However, the low difference is 
also due to the very low frequencies of the more severe secondary accidents. 
 
 
 
Figure 5. Individual risk curves evaluated for case-study 1. 
4.3 Discussion 
 
The results obtained for both case-studies pointed out that the quantitative 
assessment of escalation hazard is a key tool to understand the credible and 
critical domino scenarios in complex industrial sites. The approach provides 
detailed information that allows going much more in detail than in a "worst-case" 
analysis. As shown in case-study 1, the methodology provides a detailed 
identification and quantitative analysis of escalation scenarios, yielding detailed 
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results on domino scenarios and related frequencies. The analysis of an extended 
industrial area, reported in case-study 2, shows that considering domino effect in 
risk calculations causes an increase of both 
individual and societal risk. However, since the expected frequencies of severe 
domino scenarios are reasonably low, separation distances may be effective in 
preventing the involvement of population in industrial accidents. This suggests 
on one hand that the proposed method is not over-conservative and, on the other 
hand, that the quantitative assessment of domino scenarios is an important 
complement in the analysis of industrial risk. The results of case-study 2 also 
allow the identification of the "escalation hot-spots", intended as critical 
escalation sources. Moreover, the results also allow the identification of the 
critical domino targets present in the area (the toxic pressurized storages 
responsible of the dispersion scenarios). Thus, the approach proposed, based on a 
quantitative assessment of the contribution of domino effect to risk indexes, 
resulted of fundamental importance in order to identify critical 
 
Figure 6. Individual Risk (events/year) contours calculated for 
case-study 2 (southern area only, lower part of figure 3). Dashed 
lines: without considering domino effect; solid lines: considering 
domino effect. 
 
Figure 7. Societal risk with and without considering domino effect for case-study 2. 
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equipment and to prioritize actions addressing escalation prevention and 
protection in the area of concern. 
 
5. Conclusions 
The present study was devoted to the analysis of domino effect in complex 
industrial layouts. A methodology was developed based on the results of 
previous studies on the probabilistic assessment of domino effect. Case-studies 
based an actual industrial layout analysis were analyzed in order to test the 
potentiality of the proposed approach in a land-use planning perspective. The 
study evidenced that the increase in the individual risk due to escalation events 
may give an important contribution to industrial risk, since high severity 
scenarios may result from the simultaneous damage of several process units. 
However, the methodology proposed allows the identification of critical areas 
and of population involvement by the use of societal risk indexes, providing 
useful information for the inclusion of hazards posed by domino scenarios in the 
analysis of land-use planning. 
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ABSTRACT 
One of the missions of the INERIS is to assess accidental risks induced by 
industrial activities. The use of liquid gases is very widespread in industry but a 
large potential hazard exists in case of accidental release. These substances can 
be flammable and explosive like the LPG or toxic like anhydrous ammonia. In 
case of an accidental leakage due to a vessel breach or a line rupture, a violently 
change phase could take place inside theses products. This phenomenon called 
flashing jet are still bad understood and many strong hypothesis are often used 
to predict by modelling its physical consequences in the near field like 
thermodynamic behaviour of the whole jet, pool formation. However all these 
physical consequences have to be well evaluated in order to better estimate the 
explosive cloud or toxic cloud formation. The objective of the INERIS-CORIA 
work is to develop a new numerical model with the aim of simulating two phase 
jet resulting from a leakage in a pipe containing a liquefied gas. The work 
focuses especially on the effect of the vaporization and boiling process in the jet. 
A thermodynamic equilibrium model for vaporization was thus developed. To 
test the model, an atmospheric two-phase jet of butane, emanating from a 
circular orifice is considered. The modelling results show that the calculated 
temperature behaviour in the spray jet by comparison with the observations is 
generally satisfactory. This result cannot be obtained with classical vaporization 
model. 
Keywords : Thermodynamic Equilibrium, flash-boiling, two-phase flow, droplet, 
vaporization 
 
Introduction  
Context 
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Accidental releases to the environment of pressurized liquid gases under ambient 
conditions could generate a large flow rate when the breach appears on the liquid 
filled containment. The superheated released liquid can form a two phase 
explosive or toxic cloud mixture. Potential consequences of these accidental 
releases are injuries, fatalities, destruction of installations and possible 
evacuation from the surrounding area of the accident. Examples of fatal 
accidents [1, 2, 3] involving superheated liquids showed huge consequences. 
Predicting behaviour of the liquid-gas cloud mixtures by modelling is of direct 
relevance for industrial risk assessment. 
At the breach level, in the case of an accidental release of pressurized liquefied 
gas, the product released in the ambient air is suddenly placed under temperature 
and pressure conditions that are such that a part of the liquid vaporizes violently. 
This phenomenon is generally called a "flash". 
In order to calculate safety perimeters around industrial installations, one of the 
objectives of atmospheric dispersion research projects of INERIS is to improve 
models of flashing releases in realistic industrial environments. 
Equivalent source term models exist for flashing release in current long range 
dispersion models intended to predict toxic effects or explosive cloud formation. 
Several factors can, however, invalidate simplified equivalent source models, 
especially in the very near field where many complex phenomena can occur and 
where obstacles can be found. 
We can easily say that total mass released and the release duration are major 
parameters. Others parameters as the velocity, thermodynamic state, and amount 
and droplet sizes of imbedded aerosols of the material at the exit of the rupture 
are also required as inputs to the jet and dispersion modelling. 
A number of experimental, theoretical and numerical studies have been carried 
out [5, 6, 7] to perform calculations of two phase mass flow rates. Several 
empirical and analytical models were developed based on hypothesis related to 
saturation conditions. In order to have a better use of the models, they have been 
compared with measured data obtained during experimental tests performed by 
INERIS since the 90’s [8]. These comparisons allowed us to conclude that to 
reach a good agreement between measured data and calculating flow rate is 
difficult but conservative models are clearly pointed out. This issue is relevant in 
a risk assessment. 
Recent critical review [4] of term source modelling for toxic release scenario for 
pressurized liquefied gases showed there is "still a significant uncertainty in the 
overall modeling process". Main difficulties come from modelling suspension, 
evaporation of aerosol and rainout. 
The aim of the present work is to improve the acknowledge and the numerical 
modelling of aerosol evaporation. 
Jets experiments  
In order to improve model of flashing releases in realistic industrial 
environments, INERIS carried out two-phase butane and propane jet releases [9] 
into the atmosphere and ammonia [10] jet releases in a congested environment. 
Indeed most leakage problems from breakages of vessel or line rupture result in 
the formation of jets due to difference between the internal and the external 
pressure. These experiments involved to measure the main characteristics of the 
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jet and to increase the understanding of the behaviour of superheated (flashing) 
liquid jets. 
 
Modelling objective  
Basic principles of flashing jets are summarized in Figure 1. The jet consists in 3 
areas:  
4. The expansion zone (flash boiling, atomization): Here, the fluid expands 
from the vessel hole pressure to the atmospheric pressure. At the end of 
this zone, we assume that the jet consist only in gas phase and liquid 
phase.  Both of them are at the boiling temperature. During the expansion, 
jet atomization occurs and the liquid jet ends here in droplets.  
5. The entrainment zone (secondary break-up, droplets evaporation): the 
turbulent jet drives the ambient air. The energy brings by the air, of which 
the temperature is greater than that of the jet, is used for droplet 
vaporization in the two-phase jet.  
6. The final dispersion zone: The entrainment by the air atmosphere heats the 
jet and decreases its velocity up to the wind speed.  
 
Figure 1. Schematic representation of the areas of the flashing jet 
The objective of this work is to develop a numerical model with the aim of 
simulating thermo dynamical behaviour of a two phase flow resulting from a 
breach or leakage in a vessel containing liquefied gas. A focus is made on the 
entrainment zone where a strong decrease of temperature was measured. 
This paper aims to present the first results and comparisons between modelling 
calculations with experimental data. 
 
A description of approaches used to simulate thermodynamic process inside 
flashing jets is given in Section 2. Results and discussion are presented in 
Section 3. 
 
Methods 
The first step of the work includes models used to describe the jet up to the end 
of expansion zone. These will be used as boundary conditions for the simulation 
of the jet from de beginning of the entrainment zone. In the second step, 
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precisions are given on the new phenomena brought by the flashing liquid jet and 
the models suggested for it. 
 
Expansion zone 
To represent the flash boiling phenomenon that occurs at the exit of the injector 
up to the end of expansion zone, the isenthalpic Homogeneous Equilibrium 
Model (HEM) 
has been used. The model is used to determine the vapour mass fraction at the 
end of the zone. 
The model supposes that the gas and liquid have the same velocity and the same 
saturation temperature due to the thermodynamic equilibrium assumption 
between the two phases. The mixture of the phases is homogeneous. These 
assumptions imply that: 
1. The two-phase flow is considered as a homogeneous fluid with properties at 
the middle of those of liquid and gas phase. 
2. The flow quickly tends to a thermodynamic equilibrium (no energy 
exchange between the liquid-gas system and the outside). So it is 
supposed to have this thermodynamic equilibrium during the expansion. 
3. Isenthalpic expansion: the enthalpy of the flow is constant while its 
entropy decreases.  
There is another HEM model with Isentropic expansion, the entropy of the flow 
is constant while its enthalpy decrease. This causes the fall in temperature of the 
system [12] showed that both of the assumptions are unrealistic but fewer errors 
are involved with the isenthalpic expansion. 
In the case of this work, the HEM model presents the advantage of vapour/liquid 
mass fraction estimation. This will help to determine the mass flow of each phase 
from the total mass flow given by the experimental data. 
Isenthalpic HEM Model: 
        Cte=ThX+ThX=Th gl expexpexp 1                                                                          (1)             
  dTC=Tdh pl                                                                                              (2)                
 
From the equation (1) describing the enthalpy conservation, we introduce (2) 
After a derivation by X: 
     
dX
dT
C
C
C
X+X+dTC+dTC=ThTh pl
pl
pg
pgpligil 







 1                                               (3)               
By supposing X << 1 and Cpg < Cpl, we see that the term   dXdTCX pl /1   in (3) is 
equal to latent heat vaporization: 
   
dX
dT
CX=TLv plb  1                                                                                            (4)                                                           
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The heat exchange due to vaporization is supposed greater than the heat due to 
warming: LvdTC pl  . By taking account of this assumption after the integration of 
(4), we finally have: 
Lv
TT
C=X
i
pl
exp
exp

                                                                                          (5)           
At the end of expansion zone, the jet is in atmospheric pressure. So the liquid, 
which is in thermodynamic equilibrium with its vapour, is at its boiling 
temperature  ebT=Texp Another issue of this work is the determination of the 
velocity induced by the pressure drop inside the injector and by the flash effect. 
The maximum kinetic energy can be estimated by the pressure drop and the 
variation of thermodynamic energy in the flow. Here, the velocity is considered 
to be driven mainly by the pressure drop, thus it is determined by the Bernoulli 
law. Additional velocity could be considered due to the flow expansion (liquid to 
gas) however there is also a reduction of velocity due to pressure loss. 
 
Figure 2. Computation area 
All the above work is useful to estimate values in the jet at the end of expansion 
zone. The simulations start at this point, since the CFD model used is the two-
phase Euler-Lagrange description model. The experimental case presented in this 
paper comes from the data base of the FLIE (Flashing Liquids in Industial 
Environment) project [13]Error! Reference source not found.. The numerical 
software used for this study is numerical package FIRE V8.41 from AVL. 
The chosen case is whose of a vessel of liquid butane at 7.78 MPa. The liquid is 
released through a pipe and reaches the ambient air in a two-phase jet. This 
jet emanates from a circular orifice of 10 mm in diameter. The mass flow 
rate conservation between the orifice and the end of expansion zone give 
the diameter 
this end zone : D = 60.45 mm. The numerical domain in which the butane is 
spreading is presented in Figure 2. It consists in a cylinder of 36 m in length and 
6 m in diameter. To simulate a rejection of liquefied gas with wind effect, a co-
flow of air surrounds the spray injection. The mass fraction of each phase is 
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given by the HEM model. The boundary conditions are recapitulated in Table 1. 
Finally, the turbulence is modelled with the K−Ɛ model and the applied gravity is 
9.8 m/s2. 
Table 10. Boundary layer conditions 
Variable Inlet Coflow  Outflow 
Material Butane 
(liquid 
& gas) 
air (gas)  
Velocity (m/s) 29.49 1 - 
Temperature (°K) 272.6 300.15 - 
Mass flow rate (kg/s) 1.33 - - 
Vapour mass fraction 0.17 - - 
Droplets size (µm) 100 - - 
Turbulence intensity 10 1 - 
Length scale 0.005 0.1 - 
 
Abramzon vaporization model 
Vaporization is based on Abramzon vaporization model [11]. By considering ρ 
and D the density, and the binary diffusion coefficient in the gas around the 
droplet, k and a, the droplet diameter and thermal conductivity, Sh and Nu the 
Sherwood and Nusselt number, the mass transfer rate m  m is given by (6) and 
(7): 
 
 1ln+BπρDaSh=m Mc                                                                                       (6)                                                                             
 1ln+BNu
C
ak
π=m Tc
pg

                                                                                     (7)                                                                              
Usually, the mass Spalding number MB  (equation (8)) and the thermal Spalding 
number TB  (equation (9)) are supposed to be the same B=B=B TM . One part 
of the energy available in the gas phase goes for the evaporation of liquid phase.  
The other part goes for heating the droplet. This is described in equation (10) 
below. 
sF,
F,sF,
M
Y
YY
=B

 
1                                                                                                 (8)                                                                          
c
pgss
T
h
Cvρ
=B                                                                                                     (9)                  
 
2
l
sssc
πa
Q
+Lvvρ=TTh                                                                                 (10)             
In the three equations above ((8), (9), (10)), YF is the vapour mass fraction of 
droplet material in the gas phase, vs is the velocity in the gas phase and hc is the 
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droplet convection coefficient. The subscripts s and  mean the values at the 
droplet surface and far from droplet. 
The introduction of the thermal Spalding number in (10) combined with equation 
(7) give the heat quantity necessary for droplet heating. 
   






 1ln+BNu
C
Lv
TT
k
ah
π k=Q Tc
pg
s
c
l                                                  (11)          
However thermodynamic conditions at the end of the expansion zone are very 
particular in the case of flashing jets. Thermodynamic equilibrium assumption 
imposes that the liquid and gas temperature are the same and equal to the boiling 
temperature. Additionally, near the inlet boundary conditions of the jet droplet, 
environment is composed of pure vapour  1 sF,F, YY . Thus, this is a limit case 
between boiling and vaporization. As seen in equation (8), with these conditions, 
MB  is uncertain. However, the security brought by putting the maximum value 
of the both vapour mass fraction at 0.99 is not sufficient. Thus, some simulation 
cases have shown that the classic Abramzon vaporization model is not suitable 
for post flashing two-phase jet. So there is a necessity to develop another model 
for vaporization. 
New model: Thermodynamic Equilibrium Model (TEM) 
We propose a special procedure to solve this problem. It is considered a 
thermodynamic system (see  Figure 3Error! Reference source not found.) at its 
initial state with certain liquid mass fraction  ly  and vapour mass fraction  vy  in 
the presence of other gas like air  gy . The liquid temperature  lT  differs from 
vapour temperature  gT . Like in HEM model, we consider thermodynamic 
equilibrium model at the final state. The physics assumptions here are: 
 Ideal gas. 
 Mass conservation (12). 
 Isolated system with constant pressure transformation: enthalpy 
conservation (13). 
 
Figure 3 : Initial and final state in the thermodynamic system 
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k
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k                                                                                  (12)                 
  Cte=yTH=yTH=H finalkfinalk
k
k
initial
k
in tial
k
k
kt                                  (13)                 
     finalfinalinitialginitiallinitialfinal THT,TH=Tf                                                               (14)               
The first step of this method is to find the enthalpy at the initial state with de 
quantities y  and T  in (13). Knowing that the enthalpy is constant, the second step 
consists in finding the new values of these quantities by applying a method for 
finding the zero of the function  finalTf  (14). At the final state, thermodynamic 
equilibrium implies that the liquid and gas are at the same temperature. 
This method can be more interesting than the Abramzon model, because not only 
it resolve the particular problem of flash-boiling, but also it integrates the 
condensation phenomenon, which is supposed to occurs during the jet spreading. 
The test of this model is done with the butane properties. The purpose of the test 
is to see if it is consistent by varying the initial quantities of y  and T . In this 
paper we show the test of the model by varying the initial liquid mass fraction, 
with the liquid and gas temperature at 272.5°K and 350°K respectively.  The 
total pressure is equal to 0.1MPa.  
The Figure 4 shows the final temperature (left-aligned) and the final mass 
fractions of liquid and vapour (right-aligned) in the system. The model is 
consistent with the physics. If the liquid initial amount is small, because of the 
great temperature in the gas compared to the liquid temperature, it evaporates 
completely. The temperature evolution in this case of total evaporation is linear, 
accordingly to the ideal gas law. But, the system come to a stage where the 
energy in the gas phase is not sufficient to completely evaporates the liquid. 
Thus, as we can see in figure 5, which compare the vapour saturation pressure of 
butane at the final temperature and the butane vapour pressure in the system, 
there is an equilibrium between the two phases when liquid remain in the system.  
 
 
 
Figure 4. Test of the model of mass and enthalpy conservation by varying the initial mass 
fraction 
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Figure 5 : Comparison between the vapour saturation pressure and 
the butane vapour pressure in the system 
 
 
Implementation on TEM in FIRE: 
 
 
Figure 6: Usage of the TEM model in two-phase flow module of FIRE 
The next step is to introduce this model in the FIRE software. However, this 
model did not give information on how long it takes to evaporate. So, the model 
is completed to finally have the mass transfer rate between liquid and gas phase. 
This is done by adding a film of evaporation (Figure 6). It consists in taking an 
amount lβ of liquid (15) and gβ  gas (16) which will be applied to the model. At 
the current state of the work, these amounts of liquid and gas are not yet 
determined precisely and have the same value β . In this paper, we will just 
compare the results given by taking account two different values of β . 
droplet
film  liquid
m
m
=βl                                                                                                   (15)                                                                                  
cell in gas
filmgas
m
m
=βl                                                                                                 (16)                                                                                         
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Results and Discussion 
It is complicated to have experimental results on the types of jets described 
above. But the INERIS were able to have more reliable measurements in 
temperature. These measurements show the same behaviour as seen on Figure 7 
showing the evolution of the temperature in the jet axis with β=10% .  
The spray is surrounded by a hot gas environment. However, the temperature of 
the spray decreases up to a certain distance. Due to the initial droplet boiling 
temperature, close to the injection, the vaporization process dominates the flow. 
Since evaporation is an endothermic phenomenon, the spray jet cools down until 
there is no droplet enough. Thus the spray temperature rises only once the liquid 
vaporization does not have enough influence in the flow.  
 
Figure 7: Temperature evolution in the jet axis 
INERIS has done temperatures measurements with thermocouples at different 
points on three axis (up, horizontal and down) in the jet as seen on Figure 7. The 
comparison of these measurements with computation results (β=10%) in Figure 
9 shows that the simulations are not far from reality. The differences can be 
explained by the fact that the choice of β and the calculations on the boundary 
conditions are not yet accurate. 
Conclusion 
The modelling results with the TEM model show that the calculated temperature 
behaviour in the spray jet by comparison with the observations is generally 
satisfactory. This result cannot be obtained with classical vaporization model.  
As a perspective to this work, a model is under development to calculate the 
value of β by taking account the turbulence in gas phase, the time step, the 
droplet area. Finally, the assumptions used to calculate the boundary conditions 
bring many lack of precisions. It would be desirable to do a CFD model of the 
material flow from inside the vessel to the end of expansion zone. 
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Figure 8 : Temperature field in a vertical plane 
passing through the simulated jet axis with the 
experimental thermocouples positions : Th1-Th6 = 
up axis; Th7-Th12 = horizontal axis; Th13-Th18 = 
down axis  
Figure 917 : Temperature comparison between experimental and 
simulation (with β=100%) results in the up (a), horizontal (b) and 
down (c) axis. 
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Abstract 
 
One of the main problems for fire fighters is to know about the fire behavior vs. 
time and its propagation in the different parts of a building and to other 
buildings. The main purpose of this paper is to show how it is possible through 
temperature measurements in the smokes to analyze the behavior of a fire in a 
confine space and to have information about the effects of a chosen strategy to 
put out the fire, in order to improve the decision support. When fire fighters have 
to put out an enclosed fire, smokes are one of the most important dangers they 
have to face. Smokes are very hot and contain much combustible gases and 
combustible particles such as soot. Consequently, under the effect of high 
temperature these smokes may ignite leading to a flashover phenomenon. 
Another danger comes from the fact that the smokes may be driven to every part 
of the building and propagates the combustion everywhere. In this study, it is 
shown that despite these smoke problems it is possible to have information on the 
fire behavior through temperature measurements in the smokes. The presented 
case is an example of a general situation and consists in a fire in a bedroom on 
the second floor of a multi storey building. This room contains usual furniture of 
a bedroom. Temperatures are recorded from K thermocouples located at 
different places in the zone on fire. The test procedure consists in measuring 
temperature during the fire evolution in order to compare its values at different 
locations and different time to detect the different events created by the fire and 
by the fire fighters actions. This analysis shows that real time temperature 
measurements inside a multi-compartment on fire give more accurate 
information about the fire behavior in order to improve the fire fighters security 
and efficiency. 
 
Keywords: compartment fire, smoke temperature information, decision support, 
thermal accidents, fire fighters efficiency. 
 
 
1. Introduction 
When fire fighters have to put out an enclosed fire, smokes are one of the most 
important dangers they have to face. Smokes are very hot and contain much 
combustible gases and combustible particles such as soot. Consequently, under 
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the effect of high temperature these smokes may ignite leading to a flashover 
phenomenon. Another danger comes from the fact that the smokes may be driven 
to every part of the building and propagates the combustion everywhere. 
As a consequence, one of the main problems for fire fighters is to know about the 
fire behavior vs. time and its propagation in the different parts of a building and 
to other buildings. These data may be given from temperature measurements 
made in the smokes in different parts of the buildings since the temperature of 
the smokes is an indicator of the heat release power evolution of the fire. This 
temperature analysis could be a way to decision support for fire fighters if that 
temperature captors had been installed during the construction. 
Temperature is a parameter very used to analyze compartment fires, especially 
physical phenomenon. Estimations of temperatures were made in compartment 
fire [1] in order to characterize the fire. Temperatures were used to study the fire 
safety in an industrial warehouse [2]. The temperature is a part of parameters 
used to determine the height of the interface air smoke in a room on fire [3]. The 
temperature is also a part of parameters which allow estimating the applicability 
of fire modeling as an alternative to large-fire tests [4].It also intervene in 
computational fluid of compartment fires [5] and in model for predicting fire 
suppression in spaces by water mist systems [6]. Zone model in compartment 
fire in buildings are analyze through temperature, as well [7] or in numerical 
comparison of enclosure fire in a multi-compartment buildings [8]. Physical 
interpretations are drawn from compartment fire tests by the analysis of the 
temperatures [9]. The more important for the presented study, an example of the 
evaluation of smoke ventilation in fire fighting in multi-storey buildings [10] and 
the positive pressure ventilation for high rise buildings used in this study [11]. 
 
Besides these studies, we are going to show that despite the smoke problems it is 
possible to have information on the fire behavior through temperature 
measurements. The chosen case is an example of a general situation and consists 
in a fire in a bedroom on the second floor of a multi storey building. 
 
2. Main goal of the study 
The smoke problem exists in many situations in fighting compartment fires. This 
is an important danger for the fire fighters when they have to fight a fire in 
confined compartment.  But the smoke can be used as indicator of the fire 
situation. Their composition, their temperature at different location, their opacity 
can give much information about the fire behavior and the effects of the strategy 
engaged by the fire fighters.  
Information from fire situation can be obtained from several methods. The main 
one is visibility. Visibility is the first parameter that fire fighters want to be 
improved when they progress into the smokes. They have a direct assessment of 
its evolution when they progress in the smoke. But visibility does not give good 
information from the fire situation. For example, near the fire the visibility may 
be good but with high temperatures in the top smoke layer, about 900°C, which 
is a real danger for fire fighters because rollovers or explosion may occur. 
Monoxide concentration does not give correct information of the fire situation 
because its concentration may be weak while the smoke temperature is high; this 
is the case after a flashover. CO2 concentration may be at a correct amount in 
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smoke lower layer because of the natural ventilation created by convection due 
to the fire heat, or mechanical ventilation of fans, while the smoke temperature is 
high in the upper smoke layer, which may produce an explosion due to the 
mixing of hot smokes and fresh air drawn in from outside.  On the other hand, 
temperature may give useful information at the location where the fire fighters 
are and of the fire evolution.   
Moreover, monoxide and dioxide information are not easy to measure and to 
analyze immediately in order to give useful information for decision support.  
The simplest method is to get temperature data. They can be recorded with 
simple thermocouples located at precise locations inside the building on fire or 
with infrared camera used from outside or inside the building when firefighters 
are exploring the different rooms searching for victims and fire through smoke. 
Real scale experiments were carried out to show how temperature measurements 
may be used to get useful information from the fire situation and improve 
decision support. All these experiments gave similar results. One of these 
experimental conditions is described and its results are detailed.  
 
3. Experimental conditions 
The fire sets in a bedroom in the second floor of a building doomed for 
destruction so it was possible to create a real situation without any risk. As 
shown in figure 1, the room overlooks the street and its door opens onto a 
corridor parallel to the street. The entire wall overlooking on the street is a glass 
façade. The corridor is closed just near the room door and opens onto the 
staircase. As shown in figure 2, the room is furnished with a table, a desk with a 
computer with its tower and its keyboard, three chairs, and a bed. There is a 
wardrobe with clothes on the corridor wall.  
Twelve K thermocouples are used to record temperature data. As shown in figure 
1, they are located as follow:  
- Inside the room at each corner behind the window, one thermocouple 30cm 
under the ceiling and another one at mid height, 
- inside the room close to the door, three thermocouples, one 30cm above the 
floor, one at mid height and another 30cm under the ceiling; the temperature 
above the floor and the temperature at mid height represent the temperatures at 
which the fire fighter legs and head are exposed when they progress on their 
knees, 
- in the corridor close to the door, two thermocouples, one 30cm above the floor 
and the another 30cm under the ceiling,  
- in the middle of the corridor, two thermocouples, one 30cm above the floor and 
the another 30cm under the ceiling, 
- one thermocouple in the staircase, under the ceiling at the second level. 
Temperature data are recorded with LabView software at a frequency of 5Hz. 
Table I gives the different actions of the fire fighters during the test. In order to 
analyze the ventilation efficiency, it was decided not to attack the fire with water 
hose before the visibility has improved, considering that the visibility is the first 
parameter that fire fighter can use to assess the ventilation effect. However, the 
visibility is not the main parameter which can guaranty the security of the fire 
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fighter because the visibility may be good but with a hot smoke layer (800-
900°C) under the ceiling which may be very dangerous. 
 
 
 
 
Figure 1: Compartment situation in the building and the thermocouples location. 
 
 
Figure 2: Combustible furniture in the fire test room 
The usual fire fighters equipments were used to carry out the test, usual fire 
fighting vehicles, and ladder and water hose. 
Overpressure ventilation, usually called positive pressure ventilation, is created 
at the beginning by one and next by two portable fans located in front of the 
main door of the building, successively.  
The main door of the building and the window of the test room are on the same 
facade so that the wind has no effect on the overpressure ventilation created by 
the fans 
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The fire is ignited on the bed representing a cigarette still burning. Before any 
action on the fire a time delay is left to represent the time between the fire start 
and fire brigade arrival. This delay is estimated to less than 4min. It is important 
to note that during this delay a flashover occurs. In order to analyze information 
provided by temperature data, the two main actions on fire, ventilation and water 
attack are separated: as shown in table I, first ventilation with one fan, next with 
two fans and at the end with fans and with one water-hose (500l/min).  
Table I: the events during the experiment 
 
Time Event 
0min Fire ignition 
1min 30s to 3s Plateau 
3min Flashover 
3min 45s 1st  fan  start 
6min 2nd fan start 
7min 40s Fire attack with water, extinction 
 
 
4. Experimental results 
 
4.1 Temperatures evolution vs time in the room on fire in front of the 
window 
 
As shown in figure 3: the evolution of the temperatures just in front of the 
window in the room on fire shows several parts: 
- 0 to 1min 30s: fire growing on the bed, 
- 0 to 3min; extension of the fire from the bed to the other furniture in the 
room 
- at about 3min: a flashover occurs, temperatures rise  from about 500°C to 
over 800°C; at the same time the glass window explodes so that an outlet 
for the smokes is created, 
- at 3min45s a first fan is started: temperatures still increase to more than 
900°C during less than one minute and then decrease to 800°C, this 
decrease is due to the effect of the first fan that brings in fresh air; it is 
not possible to draw any conclusion about the heat release rate decrease 
from this temperature decrease, 
- at 6min the second fan is started: the temperatures decrease of only  about 
100°C, they are still at a high dangerous level for fire fighters and fire 
propagation, 
- at 7min 40s the fire is attacked with water-hose: temperatures decrease to 
about 600°C and after a plateau still decrease to about 200°C. 
It is important to note that these temperatures are measured in the smoke after the 
fire considering the flow created by the fans from outside at the main door to 
outside through the window. The high level of these temperatures shows their 
dangerousness and the risk of propagation of the fire they represent. 
Land Use Planning and Risk-Informed Decision Making   
342 
 
 
 
4.2  Temperature evolution vs. time inside the room on fire just near the 
door 
 
The location inside the room on fire just close to the door is the place where the 
fire fighters enter progressing to find victims and the fire. The evolution of the 
temperatures at this place shows similar parts than in front of the window. The 
fire growing and the plateau are clear, as well, but temperatures show 
stratification from bottom to top. Above the floor, e.i. at the level of the legs of 
fire fighters progressing on their knees, the temperature is only 200°C, and at 
mid height of the room, e.i. at the level of their head temperature is only 320°C, 
which is acceptable wearing a fire suit. If fire fighters were standing up, 
temperature at their head level would de higher than 550°C. These temperature 
levels show stratification before the flashover occurs. When the flashover occurs, 
all the temperatures suddenly increase until reaching 700 to 800°C.  
 
 
Figure 3: Temperatures evolution vs time in the room on fire 
 
At 3min 45s when the first fan is started, temperatures decrease to 600°C 
becoming at the same amount from bottom to top. The fan has just a little effect 
on the decrease of the temperatures in the room on fire. This decrease stops after 
about one minute then temperatures increase again to a high amount of about 
800°C. 
At 6 minutes after ignition, the second fan is started. During a few seconds 
temperatures still increase and suddenly decrease from 800°C to 400°C when the 
water-attack is started, after what temperatures decrease to 200°C at the top and 
under 100°C under mid height. The fire is finally completely extinguished with 
water-hose. 
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4.3 Temperature evolution vs. time in the corridor through which the 
rescue teams come 
 
Temperatures in the corridor show a different evolution until the first fan start. 
Under the ceiling where the smoke flows, temperatures increase up to 450°C 
close to the door and to only 200°C at the middle of the corridor. The flashover 
is clearly detected under the ceiling near the door by the sudden temperature 
increase from 200°C to 450°C. Temperatures 30cm above the floor remain at a 
low level, under 50°C, which is quite acceptable. The temperature under the 
ceiling at the middle of the corridor does show a clear evolution as the other 
temperatures under the ceiling close to the door and in the room do. This 
temperature shows a plateau until the global temperature decrease. 
 
 
Figure 4: Temperature evolution vs time inside the room just near the door 
When the first fan is started, the temperature under the ceiling near the door of 
the room shows a sudden decrease of 200°C from 450°C to 250°C. But this 
temperature increases again about one minute later indicating that fresh air 
drawn in by the first fan pushed up again the heat release rate due to oxygen 
brought in with fresh air. Consequently, only the first fan is not sufficient to 
draw out all the heat released by the fire. 
Temperature under the ceiling at the middle of the corridor shows so clearly 
neither the fire evolution nor the effect of the mechanical ventilation. 
Nevertheless, this temperature shows that the conditions are quite acceptable for 
a fire fighters standing up in the corridor since the temperature at this location is 
at most 200°C. We must consider, in the direction of the flow of air and smoke 
created by the fan, this location is before the fire so only a little smoke is drawn 
back from the fire. 
Temperatures above the floor near the door and at the middle of the corridor 
remain under 50°C all along the fire evolution showing that the smoke is clearly 
 
0
100
200
300
400
500
600
700
800
900
0 2 4 6 8 10 12
Top of the door
Mid height of the door
Bottom of the door
Plateau
Flashover
1
st
 Fan
2
nd
 Fan
Fire attack 
with water
Land Use Planning and Risk-Informed Decision Making   
344 
 
 
stratified which hot layer spread under the ceiling. At these location conditions 
are quite good for the fire fighters progressing on their knees. 
 
1. Analysis of information from real time temperature 
measurements  
Temperatures may be analyzed in several ways. In this study, temperatures are 
analyzed through large variations and sudden changes in level. These details are 
compared with the events during the test in order to draw out information about 
the fire evolution.  
On figure 3, which shows temperature evolution just in front of the window 
inside the room on fire, four events can be identified from temperatures 
evolution: 1) the ignition until 500°C, 2) a plateau at 500°C, 3) a sudden 
temperature increase which is clearly a flashover, 4) another plateau around 
850°C and 5) the temperature decrease under the overpressure ventilation and at 
end water hose. 
.  
Figure 5: Temperature evolution vs time in the corridor through which the rescue teams 
come 
These temperature allow to detect dangers, the possible flashover occurrence 
during the first plateau at 500°C, the flashover and the high temperature plateau 
around 850°C in spite of the first fan action. At the end these temperatures show 
the positive effect of the second fan start and at the end of the water-hose. It 
should be noted that temperatures at mid height are at similar level although the 
glass window has exploded. 
Temperatures evolutions near the door inside the room, e.i. before the fire in the 
direction of the air and smoke flow created by the fan, show the same events but 
with besides a temperature decrease after the first fan start which does not last a 
long time. This brings to light that the first fan is not sufficient to control the 
smoke movement and draw them outside through a chosen way which is the 
window. Temperatures at this location, at mid height and above the floor which 
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are acceptable at the beginning for fire fighters become dangerously very high 
after the flashover and remain at this level until the second fan start.  
Temperature in the corridor under the ceiling near the door shows similar 
evolution, as well. The flashover appears clearly. It is also clear that the first fan 
is not sufficient to decrease the temperature, in fact the fire is reactivated by the 
fresh air and some smoke flows back again under the ceiling. It is only when the 
second fan is started up that the temperature decreases which is clearly shown by 
the temperature decrease under the ceiling. 
As a consequence, the temperature level and evolution become good indicators 
of the events which occur and of actions which are led. So it can allow to 
identify and show the dangers which can appear.  
The method used to draw out the smoke so to draw out the heat released by the 
fire which is one of the most danger, is mechanical ventilation applied with 
portable fans. The temperature evolution at different locations shows the effect 
of the fans. There are two main decreases in the evolution of temperatures level 
under the ceiling from the staircase to the window. The first is produced by the 
first fan start but it does not last a very long time which means that the fan power 
is not sufficient to control the smoke movement in order to draw them out 
through the window and to prevent them to flow back to the corridor and to the 
staircase. It is only when we start up the second fan that a real control of the 
movements of smokes can be obtained. The temperature decreases everywhere 
including after the fire in the direction of the gas flow created by the two fans. If 
the temperatures are decreased as soon as we start up one fan then two fans it 
means that these temperatures can serve to estimate the efficiency of these fans. 
In the same way, the temperature plateau at about 550°C after the growing phase 
is an indicator of the flashover risk. In this test, the flashover does not spread to 
the corridor because the window has exploded and due the overpressure created 
by the first fan even if it is not sufficient to completely control the smoke 
movement. The flashover develops outside through the window as shown in 
figure 6.  
 
 
 
Figure 6: The flashover which develops outside under the 
overpressure effect created by the fans 
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The last thing shown by the evolution of the temperatures is the complete control 
of the fire at first when the second fan is started up and then when the extinction 
with the water hose has begun. 
 
The analysis of this test shows that the measure of the temperatures in various 
places allows having information on the state of the evolution of the fire, on the 
efficiency of implemented means and on the risk with which fire fighters may 
have to face. 
As a consequence one of the main applications which may be drawn from this 
study is to install in the new constructions temperature sensors connected with a 
control center which may be used by officers for decision support, and by the fire 
fighters progressing into the fire to immediately have more accurate information 
about their situation in the fire. This temperature information may allow 
improving the security and the efficiency of the fire men in their operation 
against compartment fires. 
 
2. Conclusion 
In compartment fires, smokes are a real danger for fire fighters, they also 
represent an important risk of propagation of the combustion because of their 
high temperature. But on the other hand, it is possible to draw some information 
to know about the situation of the fire and to know the effect that the actions led 
by the fire fighters. The distribution of the temperatures in the different spaces 
gives indications onto the place of the fire, onto its area(extent), and onto its 
evolution. When temperatures in the smokes are quite the same from top to 
bottom and at high level the fire fighters is probably not far from the 
measurement location. When temperatures are stratified from top to bottom with 
low level near the floor, fire fighters are probably in an air flow from outside or 
in a room where there is no fire. In this case, the high temperature under the 
ceiling is due to the smoke back layering or due to the spreading of the hot 
smoke layer in a room. It is well known that a plateau around 600°C is an 
indicator of a flashover occurrence risk. A global decrease of temperature 
followed by a temperature increase means that an action, such as mechanical 
ventilation or water-hose, is not really efficient, whereas a global decrease of 
several hundred degrees with no increase reveals the efficiency of the action led 
by fire fighters. As a consequence, temperature analysis during fire fighting 
operations may be a way to decision support if temperature sensors have been 
installed during the buildings or designed specifically for fire fighters conditions 
in compartment fire attack. 
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Abstract  
 
This paper deals with the modelling and the numerical simulation of fluid 
dispersion in highly heterogeneous media such as cities, urban places, industrial 
plants and even countries. Examples of phenomena under study are chemical 
products dispersion from damaged vessels, gas dispersion in an urban place 
under explosion conditions, shock wave propagation in urban environment etc. 
A 3D simulation code (HI2LO) has been developed in this aim. To simplify the 
consideration of complex geometries, an heterogeneous discrete formulation has 
been developed. When dealing with large scale domains, such as countries, the 
topography is considered with the help of elevation data. Meteorological 
conditions are considered, in particular regarding complex temperature and 
wind profiles. Heat and mass transfers on subscale objects, such as buildings, 
trees and other obstacles are considered too. Last, a high order numerical 
scheme in space and time is used to compute mass concentration of pollutant. 
 
 
Keywords: Discrete model, heterogeneous media, compressible flows, 
dispersion. 
 
 
1. Introduction 
In many physical and industrial applications fast efficient computations are 
needed for safety studies. Two types of difficulties appear when dealing with 
such numerical simulations. First, the topology of the medium under interest may 
be very complex regarding the presence of many obstacles or objects of different 
types. Second, large disparities in both space and time scales often require 
attention. This is the case when dealing with the dispersion of gases from 
explosions in strongly heterogeneous media such as urban places, cities or hilly 
ground. 
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A new discrete model is proposed hereafter for highly heterogeneous gas 
dynamics flows. In this context, obstacles of very different sizes may be present. 
Large Eddy Simulation (LES) is no longer appropriate to solve the gas dynamics 
equations over such complex geometries, as the time to generate the mesh is 
prohibitive, as well as the computational time on long time scale events. Thus an 
homogenized model with cells of large dimensions containing obstacles is more 
appropriate [1]. This type of model belongs to the class of averaged multiphase 
flows models as described in [2, 3] but with a single phase, the other phases 
corresponding to obstacles being motionless. Such an heterogeneous model must 
consider the volumes occupied by the solid obstacles as well as their effects on 
the macroscopic flow dynamics.  In this aim, the local pressure forces are 
determined by considering internal boundaries and specific Riemann solvers, or 
specific boundary solvers. In that sense, the method presented in this paper is 
quite close to embedded boundary methods (or cut-cell) approaches [4, 5] when 
dealing with the geometry description. It differs when very small obstacles are 
present, such as trees for which the exchange surface is not those of the cut-cell. 
We summarize in the present paper the discrete model of [1] and complement it 
to mass concentration determination. In this aim, the high order ADER scheme is 
used to lower the numerical diffusion and handle correctly concentration fields. 
Last, mass diffusion and heat exchanges are introduced both at macroscopic and 
subscale levels. 
 
2. The discrete model 
The presentation begins with the inviscid multi species gas dynamics equations 
in the absence of mass diffusion that will be considered latter. To be concise, the 
non-dissipative model is addressed first for the sake of simplicity: 
0)F.(
t
U
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                                                    (1) 
U

 represents the conservative variables vector and F

 the flux vector, 
T
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T
kF(Y,,uu,EuPu) . 
 , u

 and P represent respectively the mixture density, the velocity vector and 
the pressure. kY  is the mass fraction of the chemical species k and E is the total 
energy, defined by, 
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. 
The thermodynamic closure of System (1) is given by the ideal gas equation of 
state for the mixture, 
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2.1 Integration on an heterogeneous control volume 
 
System (1) is integrated on an heterogeneous control volume containing both 
fluid and solid, as shown in Figure 1 and over a time step. 
Space and time integration provide the discrete heterogeneous model. The 
procedure starts with, 





tV
0dtdV)F.(
t
U 

, 
where V corresponds to the fluid volume within the cell, which is not necessarily 
equal to the cell volume, because of the possible presence of internal solid 
volumes.  
The mass conservation equation is considered hereafter as a calculation example. 
The following integral has to be computed, 
 




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tVtV
0dtdV)u.(dtdV
t

  .   (3) 
 
 
 
 
Figure 1. Representation of the heterogeneous control volume. Internal 
obstacles can potentially burst and let some gases escape within the cell. 
Green-Ostrogradski theorem is used to transform the volume integral into a 
surface one. Typical surfaces to consider are shown in the Figure 2 where n

 the 
outward normal vector for the fluid. 
 
 
Figure 2. The left picture shows the integration surfaces which can be solid or fluid. The picture 
on right provides definitions for the outward normal vector. 
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The integration surfaces can be fluid or solid. Solids may appear inside the cell 
and at the cell boundaries. With the definitions of Figure 2 it is possible to split 
the surface integral of Equation (3) in several parts,   
O
s
O
FsF SSSSS  , 
 
FS  and SS are respectively, the fluid surface and the solid surface on the cell 
boundary. 
O
FS  and 
O
sS  are respectively the permeable surface and the solid 
surface contained within the cell. Thus, 
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For the mass conservation equation, the flux contribution related to the solid 
surfaces vanishes. Regarding fluid surfaces at cell boundaries, conventional 
Riemann problem [6] is solved to determine the fluxes. When dealing with 
internal obstacles, the same reasoning applies. Solid walls result in vanishing 
flux and a tank boundary condition is used if the surface is permeable. The fluxes 
integration thus results in, 
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The variables marked with the superscript “*” correspond to the ones computed 
at a cell boundary with the help of a Riemann solver. Thus, the discrete model 
for the mass equation reads, 
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It corresponds to a Godunov type scheme for heterogeneous cells. The fluxes 
related to the cells boundaries are marked in dashed lines while those related to 
internal volumes are marked with solid lines. The same calculation method is 
used for all the equations of System (1) to get the full discrete model. Some care 
has to be taken with the momentum equation. The calculation details are given in 
[1]. 
 
2.2 Validation of the discrete model 
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2.2.1 Interaction of a shock wave with obstacles 
The model is tested over some significant experimental flow configurations. The 
interaction of a shock wave with solid plates inside a square cross section shock 
tube is considered. The experimental configuration is shown in the Figure 3. 
Internal obstacles in the discrete formulation are used to model the vertical 
plates.  
 
Figure 3. Experimental configuration of shock tube with vertical obstacles. 
Vertical plates of two different sizes have been used in the experiments: plates of 
surface A/4 and A/2, where A is the tube cross section. Pressure gauges located at 
different places are considered to get pressure profiles versus time.  
 
 
 
Figure 4. Pressure signals obtained with HI2LO (lines) compared to the 
experimental ones (symbols) at 4 different locations in the shock tube. The 
vertical obstacles have a surface equal to A/2 and the shock wave Mach 
number is 1.1. 
Figures 4 and 5 show the recorded and computed pressure signals at the various 
stations.  Note that the computed pressure corresponds to an averaged value and 
not to a local one, such as the measured one. Good agreement is obtained, 
particularly regarding the wave dynamic that is well reproduced. The computed 
results are obtained with a very coarse mesh as it involves 4 cells only in each 
cross section.   
 
2.2.2 Blast wave in an urban canyon 
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In this section, the propagation of shock wave between two parallel walls is 
studied. The experimental data of [7] have been used. The aim is to compute 
wave propagation from an explosion located between two walls of varying 
heights. The experimental configuration is shown in Figure 6.  
 
 
 
Figure 5. Pressure signals obtained with HI2LO (lines) compared to the 
experimental ones (symbols) at 4 different locations in the shock tube. The 
vertical obstacles have a surface equal to A/4 and the shock wave Mach 
number is 1.5 
 
 
 
Figure 6.  Blast wave in urban canyon experimental configuration. 
A constant volume explosion is used to model the charge with an equivalent 
TNT equal to 1.32 (more details are given in [7]). Two configurations are 
studied, summarized in the Table 1. The results are shown in the Figure 7, 
where the pressure signals for each case are plotted. Experimental results and 
numerical ones are in a good agreement. In particular the wave dynamics and 
amplitudes are correct.  
 
Table 1: Experimental configurations for urban canyon blast waves. 
Case  Street width: W(mm) Obstacles height: H(mm)  
(a) 400 150 
(b) 400 600 
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Figure 7. Comparison of pressure records with HI2LO (symbols) and experimental ones 
(lines).  
 
3. A high order scheme for the concentrations: ADER 
The aim is now to track pollutant concentrations in the same type of 
heterogeneous media as previously. The use of a first order finite volume scheme 
results in huge numerical diffusion and forbids the correct prediction of 
concentration fields. The solution we have considered consists in using a third 
order version of the ADER scheme [8,9]  for the mass concentrations. In Section 
4, physical diffusion phenomena will be included. 
 
3.1 The ADER scheme 
The ADER scheme allows the determination of a high-order flux to be used in a 
finite volume type scheme. This scheme was introduced in [8,9] and is based on 
the resolution of the Generalized Riemann Problem (GRP) [6]. It also uses 
polynomial reconstruction of the variables [12-14].  
In the present approach the mass fraction equations only are solved with the third 
order ADER scheme for simplicity reasons as well as numerical cost. Let’s 
define by  q= kY . The generalized Riemann problem is given by the following 
Cauchy problem, in the one-dimensional case, 
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)x(p i  and )x(p 1i  are the Newton polynomials of order K respectively in cells i 
and  i+1. In the conventional Godunov method, the variables are piecewise 
constant functions, while they are now piecewise polynomial functions, as shown 
in Figure 8: The solution of the Cauchy problem (6) is given by the time Taylor 
series expansion: 
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With )0,0(q

 denotes the solution of the conventional Riemann problem. The 
successive time derivatives have to be expressed in term of the spatial derivative 
with the help of Equation (6). 
 
 
 
Figure 8. Polynomial reconstruction is used 
for variable q in each computational cell.  
It is necessary to get an evolution equation for these derivatives. It is possible to 
show that all spatial derivatives satisfy the following equation, 
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where 
)k(
xq represents the kth spatial derivative. To express the fluxes at the cell 
edges, several Riemann problems have to be solved, for the variable q and for its 
derivatives as shown in the Figure 9.  
 
 
 
Figure 9,   Structure of the solution of the generalized 
Riemann Problem in x-t plane. The waves are curved, 
contrary to the classical case  
After solving the Generalized Riemann Problem the fluxes are computed with 
(7). As shown latter, this scheme improves considerably transport equations 
solutions.  
 
3.2 Algorithm summary and numerical examples  
The ADER scheme can be summarized as: 
 Compute variable polynomial reconstruction in each cell. 
 Determine the cell variables at each cell boundary. 
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 Solve the conventional Riemann problem for the leading order solution. 
 Solve the Riemann problem for spatial derivatives. 
 Compute the flux time integral. 
 
Results obtained with the third order ADER scheme are now compared with 
those obtained with others schemes on a basic test problem.  It consists in the 
transport of a Gaussian profile at a constant velocity. Several schemes are 
considered: 
 
 The Godunov first order scheme [6]. 
 The MUSCL-Hancock higher order scheme [6].  
 The ADER third order scheme. 
 
The transport velocity is equal to 1 m/s and the mesh contains 100 cells. Periodic 
boundaries conditions are used in the computations. All the results are compared 
with the exact solution. Figure 10 shows the Gaussian function after 10 s of 
physical time. Figure 11 shows the results after 100 s. When using the first order 
scheme, the Gaussian function disappears quickly, while the higher order 
schemes preserve better the Gaussian shape. Nevertheless, the MUSCL Hancock 
method tends to deform the Gaussian function while the third ADER scheme 
keeps the right shape.  
 
 
 
Figure 10. Gaussian profiles obtained with three different schemes (symbols) compared to 
the exact solution (lines) at time t =10 s. 
 
 
 
Figure 11. Gaussian profiles obtained with three schemes (symbols) compared to the exact 
solution (lines) at time t =100 s. 
These results clearly show that the ADER scheme is very accurate for the present 
application involving dispersion phenomena.  
 
Land Use Planning and Risk-Informed Decision Making   
358 
 
 
4. Diffusion phenomena  
As the numerical diffusion is now correctly managed by the ADER scheme, it is 
interesting to consider physical diffusion phenomena such as the molecular one, 
or the turbulent one, as well as heat transfer. Details on the way these phenomena 
are considered are given hereafter.  
 
4.1 Molecular diffusion 
The formulation given in [15] is used. A diffusive flux appears in the mass 
fraction evolution equations. These fluxes imply an additional term in the total 
energy equation. Let us rewrite these two equations as, 
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C is a diffusive coefficient and kP  is the partial pressure of species k. When 
using these definitions, it is possible to show that the system satisfies the entropy 
inequality. These terms allow to model turbulent diffusion (with an appropriate 
diffusive coefficient) but also mass deposition on solid surfaces by imposing the 
mass flux, or a mass exchange coefficient at the walls. To illustrate the influence 
of the diffusive terms, two computations are made in two limit situations: 
without and with diffusion.  We consider an array of solid obstacles in a uniform 
wind. An internal obstacle is also present, one of its faces being permeable and 
connected to a tank condition containing the pollutant (see the left picture of 
Figure 12). 
 
 
 
Figure 12.  The initial and boundary conditions are sketched on the left figure. The mass fraction 
of pollutant at time t =3 s is shown in the middle figure when mass diffusion is omitted and on 
the right figure  when it is considered. Both concentration fields are computed with the ADER 
scheme. 
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Part of our future work will be devoted to the selection of optimal diffusion 
parameters, in order to retrieve the conventional solutions for atmospheric 
dispersion of neutral pollutants, accounting for meteorological boundary 
conditions and stability classes. 
 
4.2 Heat transfer 
To model heat transfer, conductive heat flux is added to the total energy 
evolution equation (equation (10)) which become,   
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with Tq 

 the heat flux and   the thermal diffusivity. This last equation is 
integrated on the control volume depicted on Figure 2, resulting in heat fluxes at 
the cell boundaries as well as heat exchange terms at the solid surfaces. 
 
5. Very large scales  
 
The same formulation is used to compute flows at very large scales on natural 
topographies, such as those of a country. The dissipative effects are now 
modelled as turbulent ones with appropriate correlations. Elevation data are used 
to reproduce the topography. Some results of large scale computations are 
shown. Two chemicals species are used in these computations, with a 
logarithmic wind profile. The burst of an obstacle on hilly ground is studied. An 
internal obstacle connected to a tank boundary condition is used to model burst 
effects. The tank pressure is equal to 5 atms. Numerical elevation data are used 
to reproduce part of Corsica Island. Figure 13 shows the position of the internal 
volume responsible for the polluting source. 
 
 
Figure 13. Position of the polluting 
source and wind orientation 
 
In the Figure 14 and Figure 15, the mass fraction of the pollutant is plotted at 
different instants with two different angles of view. The effects of topography on 
the wind direction are visible.  
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Figure 14. Evolution of the concentration field  from the polluting source (side view) 
 
 
 
Figure 15. Evolution of the concentration field  from the polluting source (top view). 
 
5. Conclusion 
A 3D computer code has been built to consider highly heterogeneous media such 
as cities, hilly ground or other specific geometrical domain. Its structure and 
formulation enables the consideration of complex domains quite easily. The 
physics considered at present corresponds to gas mixtures, with transport, wave 
propagation, heat and mass diffusion, at molecular and turbulent levels. The code 
HI2LO is parallel. It is planned to extend its capabilities to two-phase flows and 
low Mach number flow conditions. 
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Industrial Risks and Land use Planning – Study of blast 
window resistance 
B. Le-Roux, M. Reimeringer, G. Chantelauve D. Jamois, G. Leprette, C. Proust, 
L. Mathieu 
INERIS, Parc technologique Alata BP 2  
F-60550 Verneuil-en-Halatte, France 
Abstract 
Technological Risk Prevention Planning (PPRT) is a French tool for managing 
land-use planning near upper-tier SEVESO industrial facilities. Its purpose is to 
protect the population against industrial hazards. Risk limitation measures may 
include for example window reinforcement for new or existing blast risk exposed 
buildings. In order to better define technical guidelines for window 
reinforcement, INERIS developed an innovative experimental device. INERIS has 
studied window behaviour and has evaluated blast capacity of different kinds of 
glass panels (monolithic or insulated glasses with or without anti-explosion film, 
laminated glasses...), mobile frames or window locking or anchorage systems. 
Results show that all window components have to be considered to improve 
safety. 
Keywords: PPRT, window, blast loading test 
1. Introduction 
 
Most of experimental studies consider blast loading with high intensity and short 
duration simulating detonating devices. Moreover they have mainly focused on 
the behaviour of monolithic glass panels (annealed or tempered). Weisman et al. 
[1] or Giltaire and al. [2], [3], [4] studied the response of monolithic or laminated 
glass subjected to blast shock wave within a short time (inferior to 10 ms). 
Coevert and al. [5] also studied security window film and insulating glass panel 
to high intensity blast load with a positive duration of approx. 1 ms to 10 ms. 
 
In this paper, INERIS presented tests results of window subjected to a blast 
loading from accidental explosion characterized by a low intensity (20-50 mbar) 
and long duration (100 ms). These tests allowed to: 
 Evaluate blast load capacity of different insulating glass panels 
 Study the response of the whole window taking into account glass, frame, 
locking and anchorage system; 
 Identify what the weak points are; 
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2. Experimental device 
 
Tests are realised at a tunnel extremity. Window is fixed on rigid steel test frame. 
Steel and wood panels are placed on test frame around the window. It forms with 
tunnel walls a 25 m3 box. An explosive charge is placed at the center of the box. 
 
 
   
Figure 1: Experimental device outsideface 
 
 
 
Figure 2: Schema of experimental device 
 
Two pressure gauges record the blast load magnitude and time development 
impinging the window. One gauge is placed on the room floor. The other one is 
positioned on test frame near the window. 
 
 
Blasting charge 
Wood panel 
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Figure 3: Blast pressure gauge 
 
3. Tested windows 
Tests allow to study: 
 
 The blast capacity resistance of 1.20 m x 1.05 m different glass panels 
₋ Annealed insulating glass 4/16/4 
₋ Insulating glass 4/16/4 with daylight or wet-glazed security window 
film 
₋ Insulating glass fabricated with laminated glass 44.2/8/44.2 
 
 
 (a)                        (b)                       (c) 
Figure 4: (a) Insulating glass, (b) insulating glass with 
daylight security window film, (c) insulating glass with 
wet-glazed security window film 
 
 
 The behaviour of 1.40 m x 1.20 m French style inwards opening double 
window composed of 
 PVC frame and standard locking system 
 Wood frame and reinforced locking system 
 
 
  
Land Use Planning and Risk-Informed Decision Making   
366 
 
 
 2 
2 
1 
1 and 2 - – standard locking 
system (catch + strike)  
Figure 18: Standard locking system window 
 
 
2 2 
2 
2 
2 
2 - Reinforced locking 
system (catch + strike) 
 
Figure 5: Reinforced locking system window 
 
4. Results analysis 
The evaluation of glazing performance is done in accordance with the evaluate 
hazard rating criteria in Table  [6]  
 
Table 1: Hazard rating criteria for tests 
Hazard rating Hazard ratio description 
A No break 
B No Hazard 
C Minimal hazard 
D Very low Hazard 
E Low hazard 
F High hazard 
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Figure 6: Cross-section through witness aera 
 
 
Glazing shall be considered as “blast-resistant” only if it achieves a “minimal 
hazard” rating C or safer. 
 
A complete window is considered as “blast-resistant” only if: 
 Glass achieves a “minimal hazard” rating C or safer. 
 Window is still fixed to frame after the test 
 Mobile frame are still closed after the test 
 None piece of window is projected outside 
 
5. Experimental results and discussion 
5.1 Blast capacity resistance of glass panel 
 
An initial series of [20-50 mbar] overpressure peak tests was performed to study 
the resistance of different glass panels. All panels were a 1.08 m x 0.60 m. 
Tests results are given in Table  and Table . 
 
Table 2: Glass panels subjected to blast load (part 1/2) – Results of blast tests 
N° 1 2 3 
Glass 
4/16/4 
Annealed Insulating glass 
4/16/4 
Annealed Insulating glass 
+ Wet-glazed security 
window film 
Dimensions of glass panel 
h=1.08 m 
l= 0.60 m 
h=1.08 m 
l= 0.60 m 
h=1.08 m 
l= 0.60 m 
Characteristic 
of blast wave 
Incident 
peakoverpressure 
(mbar) 
20-25 35-50 45-50 
Positive phase 
duration (ms) 
> 500 ms > 500 ms > 500 ms 
Hazard level A F A 
 
 
Table 3: Glass panels subjected to blast load (part 2/2) – Results of blast tests 
N° 3 4 
Glass 
4/16/4 
Annealed Insulating glass 
+ daylight security 
window film 
44.2/8/44.2 
Laminated Insulating 
glass (annealed glass) 
Dimensions of glass panel 
h=1.08 m 
l= 0.60 m 
h=1.08 m 
l= 0.60 m 
Characteristic 
of blast wave 
Incident 
peakoverpressure 
(mbar) 
50-55 mbar 65-70 
Positive phase 
duration (ms) 
> 500 ms > 500 ms 
Hazard level F A 
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Table  shows that annealed insulating glass panels resist an incident of 20-25 
mbar overpressure for hundreds of ms equivalent triangular duration. There was 
no damage to the glass. However increasing overpressure to 35-50 mbar causes 
the same glass to break (Figure ) with most fragments projected up to 3 m (Figure 
). 
 
 
      
 
Figure 7: Insulating glass subjected to a blast wave 
 
 
 
Figure 8: Fragments landed on 
the floor – zone 0-3 m 
 
Insulating glass with a security film was also tested. This kind of film is applied 
internaly. Glass panel with a window film did not resist to a [20-50 mbar] blast 
load. During the blast The “Inner” pane was projected in one piece 2 meters from 
the window and the outer pane shuttered projecting pieces up to 3 m from the 
window. (Figure  and Figure ).  
On the other hand the use of wet-glazed window film does improve glass 
resistance. In that case, the glass does not shutter and the film stays on the frame. 
There is no glazing hazard (B rate). 
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Figure 9: Annealed Insulating glass with daylight security window film subjected to 
blast wave 
 
 
  
Figure 10: Annealed Insulating 
glass with daylight security window 
film – Post test 
 
Another blast test also show that insulating glass made with laminated glass 
resists to a 50 mbar blast incident overpressure with a hundred milliseconds 
equivalent load duration. 
 
Figure 11: Annealed Insulating glass 
with wet-glazed security window film – 
Post test 
 
5.2 Blast capacity resistance of windows 
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A second test series studied the response of a French style inwards opening 
double window to a blast wave: resistance of the anchorage system, the fixed and 
mobile frame or locking system. All windows have a 1.25 m x 1.40 m2 size. Test 
results are given in Table  and Table . 
 
Table 4: Window subjected to blast load (part 1/2) – Results of blast tests 
Dimensions of window h=1.25 m x l= 1.40 m 
Opening window French style inwards opening double window 
Anchorage system 
Standard anchorage system : 
angle brackets clipped to the 
window and fixed to the 
structural framing 
Reinforced anchorage 
system with angle brackets 
Locking system 
Standard locking system (catch 
+ strike) 
Standard locking system 
(catch + strike) 
Frame PVC PVC 
Glass panel 4/16/4 4/12/44.2 
Blast 
wave 
Incident 
peakoverpressure 
(mbar) 
20-25 55-60 
Positive phase 
duration (ms) 
> 500 ms > 500 ms 
Results 
Deformation and rupture of 
anchorage system 
Rupture of frame 
Opening the window  
Projection of the window 
between 1 m and 2 m  
Opening the window 
Rupture of mobile frame 
Projection of the window 
casement between 2 m and 3 
m 
 
 
Table 5: Window subjected to blast load (part 2/2) – Results of blast tests 
Dimensions of window h=1.25 m x l= 1.40 m 
Opening window French style inwards opening double window 
Anchorage system 
Reinforced anchorage system 
with angle brackets 
Reinforced anchorage 
system with angle brackets 
Locking system 
Standard locking system (catch 
+ strike) 
Reinforced locking system 
Individual closure of the 
openings 
Frame Wood Wood 
Glass panel 4/16/4 44.2-8-44.2 
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Blast 
wave 
60-65 65-70 65-70 
> 500 ms > 500 ms > 500 ms 
Results 
Opening the window 
Rupture of mobile frame 
Projection of one of the opening 
at approximately 2 m 
Mobile frames remain 
closed 
Glass panels intact 
 
 
The inward opening window has a standard anchorage system constituted of 6 
angle brackets (Figure ) which are clipped to the window and screwed to the 
structural frame. Test results show that this system is not sufficient to resist a 20 
mbar incident overpressure blast wave. Figure  shows deformation of angle 
brackets, an opening of window and a projection of the window between 1 m and 
2 m.  
 
 
   
Figure 12: Window fixed with angle bracket (at left) – Angle bracket (at right) 
 
 
   
Figure 13: Response of window to blast wave (at left) - Angle bracket 
after the test (at right) 
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For the second test the anchorage is reinforced in order to retain the window to 
the structural frame. Window is subjected to a 50 mbar incident overpressure. It 
does not resist either but the weak points have changed as shown in Figure , the 
mobile frames were broken and projected between 1 and 2 m. However fixed 
frame remained screwed to the building. The use of wood frame produces the 
same test results (Figure ). 
 
 
         
Figure 14: Projection of mofile frame of French style inwards opening window composed with 
PVC frame (at left) or wood frame (at right) and a common locking system (catch and strike) 
 
 
Given the results of previous tests, a French opening window with a reinforced 
locking system illustrated in Figure  was tested. The window is composed of 
wood frame, laminated insulating glass and a reinforced anchorage sysem. It was 
subjected to a blast wave with a 50 mbar incident overpressure and an equivalent 
positive phase duration of hundreds milliseconds. Tests results showed that the 
configuration resists. The Glass panel was intact, The frame remained closed and 
attached to the frame (Figure ). 
 
 
Figure 15: French style inwards opening 
window with reinforced locking system, 
laminated glass and reinforced anchorage 
system subjected to blast wave – 
Photography after blast test 
 
6. Conclusion 
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These experimental tests have produced new data on the response of windows 
subjected to a low incident overpressure and a long duration (hundreds of 
milliseconds) blast load. 
 
Blast loading tests showed that a wet-glazed security window film improves the 
insulating glass panel resistance. Laminated insulating glass is also a good 
technical solution. However it is not sufficient to have a resistant glass panel. 
Reinforcing locking system and anchorage system are also recommended. All 
window elements have to be considered to improve safety. 
 
Thanks to an experimental study and a theoretical analysis INERIS produced a 
practical guide [7] giving elements for improving the integrity of window 
subjected to a blast load. For instance, this guide gives recommendation on type 
and size of glass panel that can be used for various blast wave intensities and 
various blast wave types (deflagration or shock wave). It also indicates 
requirements for the locking system, the design and the number and position of 
the anchorage points. 
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Abstract 
 
Efectis France is one of the important actors of TRPP. He has written the 
technical prescription guidelines for buildings exposed to thermal effects in the 
goal to protect occupants inside the buildings, called the stakes. Since 2008, 
EFECTIS France has performed for public (or private customers) specific 
studies to assess the buildings vulnerability exposed to overpressure effects, to 
transient or continuous thermal effects and to toxic effects. In Haute Normandie, 
EFECTIS France has realized this kind of studies for the Port Jérome TRPP, for 
LUBRIZOL TRPP closed Rouen and the one of Le Havre TRPP is in course 
(including more than 100 stakes after a first selection  realized by authorities). 
EFECTIS France will present the methodology used for the specific studies of 
vulnerability. The different steps for each building are: identification of all 
dangerous phenomena impacting the building, physical characterization of 
buildings, vulnerability analysis including reinforcement prescriptions and 
inherent costs. For the regional studies, EFECTIS France will present the 
application of this methodology for existing buildings.  
 
Keywords: Technological Risk Prevention Plans, building’s vulnerability, 
overpressure effects, thermal effects, toxic effects 
 
1. Introduction 
Technological Risk Prevention Plans (TRPP) called in France PPRT (Prevention 
Plans of Technological Risk) are performed to manage urbanism in the vicinity 
of industrial establishments all over France in order to protect population. For 
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that, the TRPP needs to estimate the building’s vulnerability (with the aim of 
protecting occupants inside the buildings) in case of accidental phenomena 
produced by SEVESO plants. 
Especially, specific studies must be performed to evaluate the impact of 
overpressure, thermal and toxic effects on buildings (called the stakes) near these 
SEVESO sites.  
For these applications, EFECTIS France has produced for the French ministry, 
the technical prescription guidelines for buildings exposed to thermal effects. 
Since 2008, EFECTIS France has performed specific studies to assess the 
building’s vulnerability exposed to overpressure effects, to transient or 
continuous thermal effects and to toxic effects. Most of these studies are 
performed for public customers as DREAL (Direction Régionale de 
l'environnement, de l'Aménagement et du Logement, old denomination) / DRIRE 
(Direction Régionale de l'industrie, de la Recherche et de l'Environnement, new 
denomination). Using conclusions of these vulnerability studies DREAL/DRIRE 
define the best strategy to adopt for each stake issue concerned by the TRPP 
field. Some specific studies are realised for private customers when 
administration procedure is in progress.   
In a first part, we will present vulnerability studies performed by EFECTIS 
France, works in progress and possible future work. A focus will be made in 
Haute Normandie region. 
In a second part, we will present the methodology which is applied to realise all 
the vulnerability studies taking into account overpressure effects, transient or 
continuous thermal effects and toxic effects.  
In a third part, we will present an application of this methodology for an existing 
building. This stake is an administrative building exposed to overpressure effect, 
continuous thermal effect and toxic effect. For this building, the intensity of 
worst effects is quantified, the constructive dispositions are characterized, its 
vulnerability is determined, thus the adapted reinforcements with its inherent 
costs, are proposed. 
 
2. Vulnerability studies realised, works in progress and 
possible future works 
 Since 2008, EFECTIS France has performed for public (or private customers) 
specific studies to assess the buildings vulnerability exposed to overpressure 
effects. More than 25 studies have been achieved in different regions in France 
(including overseas areas) and between 5 and 10 vulnerability studies are in 
progress (Figure 1).  
For the specific Haute Normandie region, two vulnerabilities studies have been 
achieved (Figure 2, blue circles): 
 Port Jérôme TRPP closed to Notre Dame de Gravenchon including : 
 more than 50 industrial buildings 
 4 public buildings  
 5 sample habitations 
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 Lubrizol TRPP closed to Rouen including 
 8 industrial buildings 
 4 dwellings buildings 
For the specific Haute Normandie region, one vulnerability study is in progress: 
Le Havre TRPP, for which EFECTIS France has a contract to study (Figure 2, 
red circle): 
 more than 60 industrial buildings 
 2 public buildings  
 9 sample habitations 
Finally, for the specific Haute Normandie region DREAL Haute Normandie is 
preparing a new TRPP in the Rouen area concerning lots of buildings: 
 more than 600 industrial buildings, 
 20 public buildings  
 3 000 habitations 
 
 
 
 
Figure 1.  Main TRPP studies realised by EFECTIS France till 2012 
 
 
Land Use Planning and Risk-Informed Decision Making   
378 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2.  TRPP studies performed or works in 
progress by EFECTIS France till 2012 
 
3. Methodology applied to perform vulnerability studies 
Vulnerability studies are realised using the following methodology: 
 To quantify the intensity of worst effects of investigated buildings 
 To characterize the investigated buildings 
 To characterize its vulnerability 
 To propose reinforcements 
 To assess the inherent costs  
 
3.1 To identify and to quantify the intensity of worst effects of investigated 
buildings 
 
DREAL/DRIRE establishes different maps for overpressure effects, to transient 
or continuous thermal effects and to toxic effects in the whole area of the TRPP. 
For each stake and each effect (thermal, overpressure and toxic), they give the 
range of intensity according to the appropriate guideline.   
For each building the first step of our work consists to quantify the worst 
intensities due to overpressure effects, to transient and continuous thermal effects 
and to toxic effects. For each effect, physical rules are used to determine the 
precise intensity of the effect on the stake in accordance with technical studies 
realised by the SEVESO industrial building at the origin of the phenomena. 
More precisely, different parameters are estimated: 
 For the overpressure effect: overpressure intensity, duration, shape of the 
signal (blast or shock wave) and façade of the stake which is the first 
impacted by the pressure wave. 
 For the continuous thermal effect: thermal intensity and façades of the stakes 
which are impacted. 
 For the Boiling Liquid Expanding Vapor Explosion (BLEVE) or other  
transient thermal effect induced by fire: thermal dose, duration and façades 
impacted during the aggression 
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 For the Unconfined Vapour Cloud Explosion (UVCE) or Vapour Cloud 
Explosion (VCE) transient thermal effect (flash-fire) : duration and area of 
the stake impacted 
 For the toxic effect: calculation of the attenuation coefficient (ratio of the 
toxic cloud concentration and the irreversible effects threshold) for the stake   
 
3.2 To characterize the investigated buildings 
 
The physical characterisation of each building is realised by visits of the building 
and by collect of plans or information provided by the owner or the lodger. 
During the visit, different investigations are conducted: 
 Photographic report inside and outside the building 
 Measurements of the global building and the structure of the building 
 In case of toxic effect,  identification of a potential confinement room 
 Generic information such as the specific activity of the building, the 
maximum number of people inside (outside) the building … 
 
These investigations have not to be destructive. As a consequence, if 
documentations are not available and observations are insufficient, only verbal 
information of the owner or the lodger is taken into account. If all these 
information are not sufficient, assumptions proposed on the different guidelines 
are used to complete the physical characterisation.    
 
3.3 To determine the building vulnerability 
 
Knowing the characterisation of the building and the worsts effects impacting it, 
the vulnerability can be studied by: 
 Simplified approaches using data and tables presented on the different 
national guidelines according to the overpressure effects, transient or 
continuous thermal effects or toxic effects. 
 Advanced approaches where advanced calculations are necessary to 
conclude.  
Moreover, to evaluate the impact of one effect on one specific part of the stake, it 
is considered the effect do not challenged all the other parts of the building. For 
instance, when studying the impact of the overpressure effect on the global 
structure of the building, it is supposed that façades and roof stay in place and 
that all mechanical efforts received by these elements are transferred to the 
structure of the building: 
For overpressure effects, both the intensity and the duration of the effect are 
taken into account on the analysis. Different methods can be used: 
 Empirical approaches giving the impact of the effect on the structure using 
database (simplified approach) 
 Analytical approaches calculating a constraint level on the structure which is 
compared to the failure constraint limit of the building (semi-advanced 
approach) 
 Numerical calculations using a finite element method (FEM) to study the 
structural behaviour of the building (advanced approach) 
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 For thermal effects, both the intensity and the duration of the effect are taken 
into account on the analysis. Different methods can be used: 
 Using database of the thermal guidelines (simplified approach, for incident 
fluxes less than 8 kW.m-2) 
 Calculation of the thermal heating of facades and roof using 1D FEM 
software to calculate the heat transfer by conduction (advanced approach, for 
incident fluxes less than 12 kW.m-2) 
 Calculation of the tenability condition inside the building using 
Computational Fluid Dynamics (CFD) software to calculate the temperature 
on the volume inside the building (advanced approach) 
 For toxic effects, different steps are necessary: 
 During the visit or by analysing plans, locate a confinement room 
 Provide a first technical diagnostic taking into account the identified room and 
the global stake  (size, dilapidation, general organisation inside the stake …) 
 Determine the n50  (air change rate at 50 Pa) value taking into account the 
attenuation ratio through tables of guidelines (especially for residential 
buildings) or calculations (Specific tools developed by French Ministry) 
 Realise in situ measurements of the n50 using a blow door 
 
 These parts will allow knowing the impact of all effects on glasses, roof, 
facades, building structural stability, tenability conditions inside the building 
… 
 Verification criteria are as follow: 
 For structural deformation due to an overpressure effect, two parameters are 
analysed: the ductility ratio and the rotation angle at the boundaries. Criteria 
are given on Table I according to [7]. 
 
Table I: Criteria for the structural deformation due to an overpressure effect 
Structure Type 
Ductility ratio (-
) 
Rotation angle 
(°) 
Steel beam  10 2 
Concrete wall (mechanical resistance function) 10 2 
Concrete or brick wall (no mechanical resistance 
function) 
- 1 
Steel panel on façade 1.75 1.25 
 
Moreover considering a structure composed of beams and columns, the 
global stability of the structure is acceptable if the following criterion is verified: 
25
1
  
H


                                                        (1) 
 Where  the maximum displacement of the structure and H is the height of the 
building. 
 For condition tenability due to thermal effects, criteria are given by thermal 
guideline [2]: 
- Inside ambiance temperature less than 60°C 
- Inside wall flux less than 2.5 kW.m-2 
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- Degradation temperature of combustible component of the façade 
upper than the façade heating 
- Critical temperature of other materials upper than the façade heating 
These criteria can be adapted by taking into account the specificity of each 
building and especially, the location of people and fire loads inside the building. 
 For condition tenability due to toxic effects, the analysis consists in 
comparing the calculated n50 value with the in-situ measurement if available.  
 
3.4 To propose reinforcements and to estimate inherent costs 
 
According to the vulnerability of the building and to the objectives that have to 
be reached, reinforcements are proposed such as changing or protecting glasses, 
reinforcing columns or beams, adapting or creating confinement rooms, adding 
insulation on façades … In accordance with the DREAL/DRIRE, different levels 
for the reinforcement are proposed from a global reinforcement to a 
reinforcement of a single room of the building. 
Costs of these reinforcements are also estimated. These estimations will be used 
by the authorities in order to take a decision for the strategy to apply for each 
building (global or single reinforcement, to repurchase the building …). 
 
4. Application of this methodology for an existing building 
This chapter presents the application of the methodology for an existing building 
of a TRPP of 34 stakes (Figure 3).  
The presented stake is an administrative building located inside an industrial site 
where different risks have been identified from SEVESO industrial buildings 
such as VCE, UVCE, jet flames, toxic gas leakages … 
 
 
Figure 3.  Map of all stakes of the TRPP and localisation of 
the studied stake 
 
4.1 Identification and quantification of worst effects on the building 
 
Using global phenomena maps given by DREAL/DRIRE, the different worsts 
effects for the administrative building are as follow: 
 For the overpressure effect, the building is located inside the deflagration / 
chock wave intensity and duration levels of 35 – 50 mbar and 20 – 100 ms. 
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 For thermal effects, only continuous aggression occurs. The building is 
located inside 3 – 5 kW.m-2 thermal intensity range.  
 For toxic effects, the building is located inside the CL1% area, corresponding 
to the lethal concentration of the gas mixture studied.  
Analysing all phenomena and maps, characteristics of worst effects are 
determined by EFECTIS France: 
 For the overpressure effect, the worst phenomena are 2 UVCE leading to 
deflagration of 37 mbar during 162 ms in the Est/Nord direction. 
 For thermal effects, the worst phenomenon is a fire pool due to a canalisation 
break leading to a thermal solicitation of 3.4 kW.m-2 on Est wall.  
 For toxic effects, the worst phenomenon is induced by a leakage on an 
ammonic storage. It leads to a concentration of 3 400 ppm closed to the 
stake.  
 
4.2 Characterization of the investigated building 
 
The physical characterisation of the building has been realised by visiting 
the building and collecting plans and information. 
This administrative building is a two level steel structure with offices and staff 
parts. Façades are composed of steel sandwich panel (Figure 4) with thermal 
insulation plus plasterboards on inside walls. There is a phonic isolation on the 
staff part. The roof is composed of steel sheet without thermal isolation and there 
is a false ceiling. All windows are double-glazed on an aluminium frame opening 
inside the building. Finally, doors and sectional doors are present on façades. 
The indicated confinement room identified during the visit is the refectory 
located on the ground level with a habitable surface of 29 m², a height of 2.7 m 
with a false-ceiling and plasterboard insulation on walls. There are windows on 
the interior walls but also on the façade. This room includes water and it is near 
water closed.  
 
 
Figure 4.  One façade of the studied stak 
 
4.3 Characterization of the building vulnerability 
 
Knowing the characterisation of the building and the worsts effects 
impacting it, the vulnerability is studied considering one effect by one effect.  
For overpressure effects,  
Proceedings of the 43rd ESReDA seminar, France, October 21-23, 2012 
 
383 
 
 The nature of the façades and the range of the aggression show that these 
façades are non-vulnerable (due to especially to the presence of plasterboard 
on walls and of the important fixation points on it). 
 Nevertheless, calculations show that the structure of the building is 
vulnerable due to the range of the aggression (Figure 5). More especially, the 
criterion  /H </1/25 is not respected. 
 Taking into account steel purlins on the roof, it is vulnerable because the 
ductility ratio is upper than 10 (criterion non respected).   
 According to the guidelines, all glasses of windows and all glasses of doors 
are vulnerable due to the range of the aggression 
For thermal effects,  
 The nature of the façades and the range of the aggression show that these 
façades are non-vulnerable (due to especially to plasterboard and/or thermal 
insulation on walls and façades) 
 In the staff part where only a single sheet is present, heat transfer calculation 
show that the ambient conditions inside this part are at a temperature less 
than 60°C. As a consequence, this part of the building is not vulnerable too. 
For toxic effects, the surface of the room and the volume of the room allow 
determining the permeability per unit area equal to 10 m3.h-1.m-2 at 4 Pa [10]. 
Calculations using CONFINE give values of n50 between 2.3 to 4.1 vol.h-1 
according to different external boundary conditions. The n50 measured on the 
refectory is 41 vol.h-1. 
 
 
Figure 5.  Deformation of the building due to the worst 
overpressure effect a) staff part b) offices 
 
4.3 Reinforcements and inherent costs for the studied stake 
 
Knowing the vulnerability of the stack, different reinforcements can be proposed 
and the inherent costs can be estimated. 
To prevent overpressure effects,  
 Complementary columns can be added for each frame: complementary FEM 
calculations allow determining sections of these complementary profiles (IPE 
360 and IPE400 according to the location inside the building) to reduce the 
displacement/height ratio.  
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 Complementary purlins can be added on the roof each 1.5 m to reduce the 
ductility ratio.  
 An anti-fragment membrane can be applied on all glasses of windows and 
doors 
For thermal effects, no reinforcement is necessary for this stake. 
For toxic effects, due to the poor permeability of the refectory room, lot of 
reinforcements are necessary such as: 
 To add doors and partition walls to create airlock space 
 To replace existing doors and windows 
 To close all leakages as cables paths (draught proofing) 
 To reinforce the false-ceiling using plasterboard plus air insulation  
 To add survey equipment 
The range of costs for these reinforcements can be summarized on the Table II. 
The elementary costs are based on building commercial list [12].  
DREAL/DRIRE will compare these costs to the estimated value of the stake in 
order to define the best strategy to adopt. Particularly, one can imagine that only 
a part of the identified reinforcements can be realised in order to prevent a 
specific risk. 
 
5. Conclusions 
Technological Risk Prevention Plans are in progress in France in order to 
evaluate the impact of accidental phenomena of SEVESO sites on third parties. 
Vulnerabilities studies are technical reports that physically characterize each 
stake and define reinforcements taking into account accurate intensities received 
by the stack. Inherent costs are also defined and can be compared to the market 
value of the building. 
Table II: Range of costs for the different reinforcements proposed 
Building part Range of costs (€ HT) 
Structure (columns)  16 200 
Roof  (beams) 11 100 
Façades 0 
Doors and windows  31 800 
Confinement room 22 300 
Total 82 400 
 
In that context, these vulnerability studies are realized in order to help authorities 
to define and to choose the strategy to adopt for each stake taking into account 
the location of it inside the perimeter of the TRPP, the identified risks in terms of 
probability and intensity, its activity, the number of people concerned, the 
reinforcement costs, the building market value … 
Moreover, these technical studies are indicative reports. These studies can be 
updated by the authorities, the owner or the lodger taking into account 
complementary information on the physical characterization, reduction of 
impacted intensity due to reduction of certain risks, changing a part of the 
strategy of the TRPP  
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Abstract 
 
When a natural or industrial disaster occurs, communications become crucial 
both for rescue teams and for alerting populations. When local or global 
infrastructures are damaged or destroyed, communication and alert systems rely 
on temporary infrastructure that has to be powered-supplied but also carefully 
positioned in order to cover the whole area within which rescue teams operate. 
While unavoidable for long-term coordination of the different rescue actions, 
such a system may require a relatively long time for setting it up, incompatible 
with the first hours. Having a ready-to-use communication system during the 
first hours is a necessity. Mobile ad hoc networks (MANET) may be one solution 
for providing such an emergency communication system. The current work is an 
attempt to measure qualitatively and quantitatively the performances and the 
reliability of mobile ad hoc networks in real world environments. 
 
Keywords : Networks, MANET, communication 
 
 
Introduction 
The French Normandy region is rich of many highly sensitive and dangerous 
industrial [1] as well as natural sites, more than half are located in Le Havre and 
its surrounding. The Direction of the information about Major Risk (DiRM) of 
the urban community of Le Havre city have in charge to think about and to 
propose solutions for all aspects of risk prevention and management and crisis 
management. In particular, DiRM continuously tries to improve its alert systems 
by developing and adding new vectors of communication to inform the 
population in case of disaster. However, today, all communication solutions are 
based on infrastructures and in case of major damage in the neighborhood of the 
disaster, infrastructure might be out of order and GSM-like networks, if still up, 
might be overloaded or blocked, weakening the whole alert system. 
Many scenarii have been envisaged [2], [3], and the unavailability of classical 
infrastructure based communication networks for whatever reasons constitutes a 
critical one. Indeed, the absence of communication infrastructure usually means 
that coordination between actors would be difficult. In addition, in such 
situations people belonging to rescue teams are continuously moving making the 
transmission and exchange of information more tricky. While the installation of 
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temporary infrastructure could appear as one solution, it requires: time to be set 
up, power-supply capacities available in the neighborhood of the initial problem 
and the distribution of relevant devices for the members of rescue teams.  
An ad hoc network may be defined as an infrastructureless network of wireless-
enable communicating devices (stations, sensors ...) and this could be an 
complement of the different communicating systems for managing risk. If the 
stations are mobile they constitute a mobile ad hoc network (MANET).  
This has been discussed with the head of DiRM and all the listed elements lead 
them to look for alternative solutions, both ready and easy to use, decentralized, 
self-powered and lightweight for people participating in the rescue action, and 
they agreed for testing MANET-based solutions. One of their requirements for 
the project was to have an evaluation of the behavior of such networks in real 
environments. We focus our attention on the neighborhood of stations and in 
particular on the sensitivity of this neighborhood to various endogenous as well 
as exogenous conditions. Our interest for the neighborhood comes from the fact 
that many algorithms, protocols and applications are neighborhood-dependent. 
 
The goal for risk management application 
Until very recently, DiRM has deployed infrastructure-based alert and 
information systems, but the perspective of having more adaptable 
communication systems lead them to identify two types of final use depending 
on the capacity of the MANET: 
 
Alerting population: relying on existing siren system of alert the goal would be 
to couple that sirens with wireless-enable devices in order to be able to broadcast 
warning information to stations belonging to the MANET. The mobile 
application is able to catch this information, to inform directly the user of the 
device and to perform a local broadcast of this information to the neighbors. 
 
Supporting communication between risk actors: for this use, the purpose is to 
provide a geolocalized information sharing service. 
Civilian population alert 
Alerting people via MANET means as a matter of fact broadcasting information 
in a peer-to-peer way. The release would be made by the siren system of DiRM  
equipped with wireless interface working in ad-hoc mode. This system would 
emit an alert on a specific network at the same time as the sound alert. In a 
second time, these sirens would then play the role of static stations activating the 
alert on mobile stations located in or passing through their covered area. 
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Figure 1: Siren alert context 
From neighbors to neighbors, mobile stations periodically broadcast the alert 
message, according to their movement, new stations are met and reached by the 
information, allowing a fast propagation of the alert in the network. Moreover, 
the process is also robust since no station plays a central role and any station may 
appear or disappear at any moment without endangering the broadcasting 
process.  
 
Figure 2: Mobility effect on network topology 
This type of scenario is realist in dense urban area where the sound propagation 
is constrained by buildings and subject to hazard like wind. However, in such 
environments the density in mobile devices is generally high, counterbalancing 
the harmful effects of wind and buildings. Finally, relying on devices composing 
MANETs allow the alert messages to be more explicit than a simple warning, 
more relevant information including local maps, short messages, up-to-date 
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informations may be transmitted. 
Maintain a spontaneous network between risk actor 
During an incident, rescue teams have to acquire, transmit and exchange very 
quickly a significant number of information (localization, type, gravity, possible 
injured person, etc.). One of the central ideas in this context is to exploit the 
capabilities of MANET devices to broadcast and exchange information between 
rescue teams which would be equipped with such devices. 
 
Figure 3: New nodes warned by the alert 
 
 
 
Figure 4: Information flooding to the neighborhood 
Every participant possesses a wireless-enable mobile device (Pocket PC, PDA, 
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smartphone, etc.). Every participant belongs to a group, Emergency Medical 
Service, Fireman, Police, etc., and can consult the information circulating on the 
network according to his group. Any participant may take photos, may provide 
oral or written notes, may annotate local maps and then share part of or the 
whole material. Note that all these application have already been implemented 
and are operational [4–6]. According to the various movements, the information 
propagates in the network. The information can then be run for those belonging 
to the relevant groups. The data are of two types: spatial localization and 
information about the problem: description, photo or oral message. 
 Of course, the quality and the fluidity of the broadcasting process depends on 
the properties of the neighborhoods of the stations: stability, cardinality, etc. The 
remaining part of this article will focus on that particular point. 
 
Related works 
On the risk management 
 
The idea to use MANET technology in the context of natural or industrial 
disaster is recurrent and not new [3]. It is motivated by the fact that rescue actors 
of a crisis search the best ways to exchange and gather information using the 
most suitable communication vectors. Some experiments have demonstrated the 
abilities of wireless networks to deliver some services in disrupted environments 
[2]. However, these experiments do not study the limitations of MANETs and for 
the authorities of DiRM having some elements about the expected quality of the 
network is essential, both from the robustness point of view and from the service 
point of view. The evaluation of the network is unavoidable especially for 
emergency situations.  
 
 
Figure 5: New rescue nodes informed about the hazard 
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About MANET experiments 
 
Many of wireless networks testbeds were mostly designed for bandwidth and 
protocol efficiency measures. These experiments focus mainly on local results 
about the delay, packet loss [7], [8] or link quality [9], but only a few [10] try to 
understand the evolution of network topology, even in the static case, evolution 
caused by the instability of the connection between two nodes. Moreover, tests 
are usually run on indoor static networks composed of desktop computers and 
very few has been done on outdoors networks composed of small wireless 
electronic devices. For instance, in [11], real networks were tested with up to 49 
nodes in a reduced indoor environment but, like large scale testbeds [8], all 
devices had external power supply and powerful processors. The experiments 
with limited mobile devices are extremely rare and study neither classical 
measures nor topology changes, they mainly focus on strategies for transferring 
data in a multihop way. Finally, in general protocols for MANETs are simulated, 
and most often are not validated on real ones [12]. 
This led us to think about an experimental protocol for testing properties of real 
outdoors MANETs under various conditions. For that purpose, we have built a 
software layer, kind of communication middleware, intended to help the stations 
to self-connect and self-configure in order to participate in existing MANETs. 
Our approach may be called ``bottom-up''.  
In the context of our work, the application should not require much bandwidth. 
So, in addition to bandwidth, we focus our analyze on more relevant measures 
like: the real range of communication for mobile devices, battery limitation and 
signal strength of network. We are convinced that a careful study of these 
measures will allow us to reach a better level of knowledge on the way such 
networks are working and to improve their quality from a communication point 
of view.  
 
The MANet layer 
A complete framework for testing MANET has been developed. It was primarily 
designed for Windows Mobile-based devices but a version for Android platform 
has been also developed. The framework consists mainly in a dynamic library, 
functional today on Windows Mobile from Win 2003 to the last Windows 
Mobile. The objective of this layer is twofold. On the one hand it allows the 
station to automatically set up sets of parameters for entering an existing 
MANET and, on the other hand, it enables a careful observation and logging of 
the connections and communications of this station. 
 
1. This layer interacts at different levels of the mobile device architecture : 
2. management of the system; 
3. management of the power of the IEEE 802.11 interface; 
4. settings of the wireless interface (channel, bssid, time of scanning...); 
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5. IP setting (randomly chosen); 
6. network connection and disconnection; 
7. communication management (receive, send message).  
 
An additional piece of software manages operations of message emission and 
reception. To identify uniquely each node, it uses its IMEI 14  number. 
Communications are based on the UDP protocol. This choice was motivated by 
the fact that UDP supports packet broadcasting, and wireless communications in 
MANET consist mainly in broadcast operations since all nodes in the range of 
the emitting device can listen for the message. Finally, as exchanges are based on 
information broadcasting, IP addresses are useless, so IP addresses have been 
randomly attributed (no address at all would be correct also).  
Two types of message are considered: HELLO messages are intended to help 
stations to build and maintain neighborhood information and ``classical'' 
messages that contain application-specific data (see figures 7 and 8). As UDP 
communications are limited, in volume, to 1472 bytes, messages of the latter 
type are again divided in two classes identified by the header, a first class for 
small messages (up to 1472 bytes) and a second class for large messages (more 
than 1472 bytes). In this latter case, upon reception, the message is rebuilt (later 
detailed). We have limited the size of the packet to 1024 bytes. 
In the framework, three threads operate simultaneously. One thread is associated 
to the emission of HELLO messages and to the management of the list of 
neighbors (let us call this thread the neighbor-thread. Another thread (emission-
thread) is dedicated to the emission of application messages and a last one, the 
reception-thread, to the reception of all messages (HELLO  and application).  
Each time reception-thread receives a HELLO message, it timestamps the 
message and transmits it to the neighbor-thread. This one periodically updates 
the list of neighbors by removing neighbors for which HELLO messages have 
not been received for a given time, the discovery time (2 seconds for our tests), 
and by updating the last-reception date of neighbors for which an HELLO 
message has been received. Neighbor-thread periodically sends HELLO 
messages figure 7 containing its network identifier ID, its number of neighbors 
and the list of identifier of its neighbors vi.  
 
 
 
Figure 6: Hello packet 
 
                                                        
14 International Mobile Equipment Identity 
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The reception-thread discriminates HELLO messages and application messages. 
The former are transmitted to the neighbor-thread while the later are processed. 
Short messages are made of only one packet while long messages are composed 
of several packets.  
A packet is composed of two parts: the header and the data. The header is made 
of the identifier of the source (ID), the number of the message (TID) and the 
number of packets (PID) if the packet belongs to a long message.  
 
 
 
Figure 7: Unique enclosed message 
 
 
When the size of the data to be transmitted is lower than or equal to 1012 bytes, 
only one packet is required for sending the message, and in the header the field 
PID is set to 0 (see figure 8). When the size of the date to be transmitted is 
larger than 1012, several packets are required for the communication. In that 
case, the field PID takes values ranging from 1 to n for the n first packets and -
n for the last packet, indicating by the negative value the end (see figure 9). 
Upon reception of all the packets, the message is rebuilt and sent to the 
application.  
When the size of the data to be transmitted is lower than or equal to 1012 bytes, 
only  
 
 
Figure 8: Discontinuous message 
 
Experiments 
In order to perform valuable tests for studying neighborhood properties in ad hoc 
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networks (independently of the mobility), full connected networks should be 
avoided, so the experimental protocol has to take this into consideration. The 
experimental protocol consists in two parts: a software part and an experiment 
part.  
In these experiments, we focus on static topologies in order to prevent 
modifications on the neighborhood detection mechanism by mobility. If the 
network is a static ad hoc network, however, the whole process and framework 
may be reused for mobile ad hoc networks as well.  
For the first experiment, the goal is to have an idea of the local perception, by 
each station, of the global network locally rebuilt from the received messages 
containing neighborhoods of other stations. The stations are not simultaneously 
switched on in order to observe the multi-hop nature of the network or a split ad-
hoc network.  
For the second experiment we try to test the sensitivity of neighborhood 
detection versus the network load. To do that, we fix all parameters which can 
directly have an influence on the neighborhood (position, mobility and 
transmission rate [13]). 
Devices used are HTC Mega (T3333) on Windows Mobile 6.5 with broadcom 
802.11 DHD Network Adapter. This adapter is tuned by the application in mode 
ad-hoc on channel 1 at 54MBit/s rate. The network was tested in open space, 500 
meters away from the first houses, so the network is not perturbed by other 
Wireless station. 
For the experiments, the parameters are fixed as following: 
Spatial Coordinates:  the coordinates (x,y,z) in meters of each device are stored 
in a MANET position file (.mpf) (it can be a dynamic file generated by GPS). 
The stations form a square, and the maximum distance between two stations is 
less that 5 meters. In that configuration, when the network is switched on, it is 
full-connected (see figure 10). 
Discovery Time: the refresh delay of neighborhood; Here, 2000ms; 
Send Time: the time between two emissions of message;  Variation range: {300 
ms, 150 ms, 100 ms, 50 ms, 25 ms}; 
Size of Data: the size can be set (by default message which contains the 
neighborhood); Variation range: {1024 bytes, 512, 256, 128, 80 bytes};  
Type of Devices and number: indicates the network heterogeneity; 8 or 9 HTC 
Mega (T3333); 
Environment: urban or obstacle-free place as an indication of radio propagation 
perturbations.  Here, obstacle-free place; 
Wireless interface setting: includes interface type, rate, mode and channel. 
(802.11g, 54 MBit/s rate, ad-hoc mode, channel 1); 
 
Before beginning the experiments, all devices were synchronized on the same 
netbook clock. 
To analyze logs, the application first sorts events according to timestamps then 
replay the execution step-by-step and event-by-event. The application displays 
topology in real-time on a dynamic graph (see Figure 16), and various 
information about the network (number of messages, bandwidth, message route, 
signal strength evolution, battery consumption ...). 
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Figure 9: Spatial Coordinates when the network is down (left side) and MANET layer started 
with neighborhood discovery (right side). Each edge represents an unidirectional neighborhood 
link. 
First experiments - neighborhood construction 
During the first experiments 9 devices were placed directly on the ground, the 
spatial distribution is like a 3x3 grid where the nodes are spaced out of 25m and 
disposed on the ground. For testing, we consider the broadcasting of its own 1-
hop neighborhood as the application. Figure 11 the color white on device 
represents an idle device which has its wifi layer non-activated, in red the 
devices which are activated and look for the network and green is dedicated to 
connected devices. Edges illustrate the neighborhood of stations. Each edge 
defines a neighbor and its referent, it allows to indicate a non-symmetric 
perception of stations. 
 
  
Figure 10:  Spatial arrangement of the 9 mobile devices, at 45.981 seconds for the left and 
221.588 seconds for the right. 
The first experiments show a difficulty for the station to connect to the network 
since no neighborhood appear, this situation is confirmed by the number of 
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received messages showing that when stations are located on the ground they are 
unable to receive messages (see figure 12). 
For the second experiments, the 8 devices were spaced out by 20 meters and 
were located at 1,2 meters height (see fig 13) from the ground. This height might 
correspond to the fact that the devices are carried by human beings. The distance 
between each node is decreased to be sure that the connections can be 
established. One station has never started the test phase due to low power battery. 
Notice that the distance is not the reason of the connection in comparison with 
the first set of experiments since, in the second set of experiments, two stations 
spaced out by more than 60 meters are connected while stations put on the 
ground and located at distance lower than 30 meters were unable to connect to 
each other. It appears then clearly that putting stations directly on the ground has 
a huge incidence on the wave propagation and thus on the network topology. 
 
Figure 11: Sum of all types of messages for all devices in experimentation with 9 devices. 
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Figure 12: The spatial arrangement of working network, 58.115 seconds for the left and the 
network is fully connected at 250.139 seconds. 
The sum of communication (see figure 14) of the entire network shows an 
increase of communication and a normal behavior with little packet lost.  
+Within this set of experiments we measure the sum of neighbors (SoN). This 
value corresponds to the sum of neighbors of each station. This corresponds to 
the number of arcs in the communication graph. For a full-connected network 
with eight stations, this value is equal to 56. 
During the first test a message is sent every Δ ms. We make Δ varying from 300 
to 25. From 300ms to 100ms no noticeable change occur for the value of SoN. 
The value is close to 56 (left side of figure 15). The topology of the network is 
close to be full-connected as illustrated on figure 16. When Δ is equal to 50ms, 
the neighborhoods are less stable and the average value of SoN is close to 54. 
Finally, when we increase the frequency of the emissions, for a value of Δ=25 
ms, the neighborhoods are no longer stable and the mean value of SoN decreases 
down to 26.8, which means that more than 50% of the neighbors are lost. This 
clearly appears on the right side of figure 16. Moreover, after 30s of test, that can 
be considered as a transitional period, the value of SoN varies between 11 and 38 
as illustrated on figure 15.   
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Figure 13: Sum of all type of message for all devices in experimentation 
 
Second experiments - neighborhood stability 
 
With fixed Data Size (80 bytes) 
Remark about the transitional period: during the first 5 seconds after switching 
on the network, the only exchanged messages concern neighbor detection. This 
explains why in the first few seconds the value of SoN tends to its maximum as 
the network is not congested (the situation corresponds to the right side of figure 
10). Then, the value of SoN decreases according to the neighborhood refresh 
mechanism.  
 
  
Figure 14: Global neighborhood evolution on left for 100ms and on right 25ms. Time 
corresponds to x axis and global neighborhood to the y axis. 
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Figure 15: State of the network for different values of Δ. When Δ=100 ms, the network is 
not congested and is full-connected most of the time (left side). When Δ=25 ms, the 
neighbor detection mechanism fails because of the congestion. 
 
With fixed Send Time (150ms) 
 
In this second set of experiments, we fixed the period of emissions to 150ms. We 
focus on the same measure: the sum of neighbors (SoN). During this test, a 
message is sent by each station every 150ms but the size of the packet varies 
from 80 bytes to 1024 bytes. From 80 bytes to 256 bytes no noticeable change 
occur for the value of SoN. This value is close to 56 (left side of figure 17). 
When the size is equal to 512 bytes, the neighborhoods are less stable and the 
average value of SoN is close to 50. Finally, when we increase the size of the 
packet up to 1024 bytes, the neighborhoods are no longer stable and the mean 
value of SoN decreases down to a value less than 50. This appears on the right 
side of figure 17. But what is more important is that, after 30s of test, that can be 
considered, as previously, as a transitional period, the value of SoN varies 
between 56 (full-connected network) and 40. 
 
  
Figure 16: Stability and variation of the neighborhoods when the size of the packets vary 
from 80 bytes (left side) to 1024 bytes (right side), for a fixed period of emission equal to 
150ms.  
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Conclusion 
The analyses of the results stemmed from our experimental framework show that 
neighborhood may be unstable in spite of use in normal conditions. The 
neighborhood management is a key for most routing protocol in MANET. So, a 
bad management of communication can have huge effects on the neighborhood 
and thus the routing cannot be effective. 
We have started next steps which are to design a routing protocol which avoid 
the neighborhood instability, and to test it in mobile topology and real 
configuration. The results are promising, actually we are able to command, the 
network of sirens located in the territory of the agglomeration called 
``CIGNALE''. 
This technology could consolidate the special stand-alone radio systems which 
provide monitoring, maintenance facilities and triggering synchronized from a 
single location for the system of alert. 
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Figure 17: Interconnection between CIGNALE and MANET 
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Abstract 
 
Urban systems are built and developed in a natural environment including landscape, soil 
and subsoil. This environment is both a resource and a constraint. The interactions between 
urban and natural environment thus take on a very important social, environmental and 
economic dimension. Despite this, the criteria of sustainable development and, then, the 
governorship of the urban systems, generally underestimate the problem, and sometimes even 
ignore it completely. In any cases, there is a lack of global consistency and the thematic 
approaches are favoured. By associating urban stakeholders (community, city planners) with 
the scientists (social sciences and earth sciences), the D2SOU project aims at developing the 
basis and tools necessary for the integration of soil and subsoil in urban development. 
Keywords: Land use planning and management, Assessment, Risks management, Sustainable 
Development, Support Decision Tool. 
 
1. D2SOU project : Soils and subsoils as a sustainability criterion for 
urban development 
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1.1 Creation of tools for urban developers, policy makers and project leaders to 
favour a comprehensive and coherent integration of soil and subsoil issues in urban 
development 
 
Urban systems are built and developed in a natural environment including landscape, soils 
and underground water. This environment constitutes at the same time a resource (space, 
water, aggregates, geothermal energy, storage capacities.) and a constraint or a source of risk 
(rugged landscape, adequacy to construction and underground works, geological risks, 
polluted soils). The interactions between urban and natural environment thus take on a very 
important social, environmental and economic dimension. In spite of that, the criteria of 
sustainable development and, thereby, the governorship of the urban systems, generally 
underestimate these problems, and are even, sometimes, completely unaware of them. Most 
approaches remain thematic when a sustainable approach would require accounting 
consistently for these various dimensions.  
By associating urban stakeholders (communities, developers) with scientists (social sciences 
and geosciences), the project D2SOU funded by the National Agency of Research aims at 
developing the bases necessary for taking into account in an integrated manner the soil and 
sub-soil issues in urban development.  
Various visions of the project arise: perception of the stakes and space-time scales are not the 
same according to the different actors. This diversity of actors and their concerns lead us to 
develop two tools: 
a qualitative debate-aid tool based on multicriteria methods of analysis. The objective is to 
develop an exploitable tool in multi-actor public concertation; 
a quantitative decision-making aid tool devoted to stakeholders. The aim is to model how 
data can be gathered on the soil in order to feed the decision process. These data (which can 
be collected by geophysical or geotechnical methods, but that can also have different origin, 
including cartography) must be combined in such a way that they lead to “indicators” that 
bear relevant information regarding the decision process. These indicators can be either 
qualitative or quantitative, some of them being possibly quantified on the basis of a 
statistical/probabilistic analysis, which accounts for the quality/reliability of the information.  
A tool that favours an economic cost/benefit approach concerning the interest of using 
different means of investigation (geophysical, geotechnical, etc.) is being developed. 
The articulation between the two tools is achieved through: 
 the use of a check-list that makes an inventory of main issues that may be encountered 
during typical urban development projects, at the scale of the project or at wider urban 
scales, 
 a set of relevant indicators that agglomerate the information from basic data in order 
to make it usable in the multi-actor public concertation. 
A conceptual framework is proposed in the paper, based on the expertise of the project 
partners in data gathering (soil investigation), in operational urban development or in project 
management. It is validated and tested on several real test cases, corresponding to specific 
urban projects. The methodology also includes experimental phases focusing on ground 
investigation in order to test the adequacy of investigations in the context of urban 
development (kind of information, scale, cost, technique, etc.). The ability of geophysical and 
geotechnical methods, used alone or in combination, is also quantified during these 
investigations.  
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1.2 An integrative methodology : first results 
1.2.1 The Integraal framework for Sustainability Assessment. 
The following six-step scheme, conceptualised by C3ED / REEDS around 2007, is referred to 
as the INTEGRAAL procedure.  
The general sequence of INTEGRAAL is represented in the scheme below: 
Although presented here as a sequence of steps, Integraal is not to be conceived as a rigidly 
linear process.  The principle is to constitute a “deliberation forum” that offers opportunities 
to participants to explore progressively, or in parallel, different aspects of the agreed 
problem.  In the view of the C3ED team, deliberation exercises can be iterative, allowing 
participants to go deeper and to gain or exploit more detailed information (e.g., in the choice 
and mobilisation of different indicators).  It can be expected, as collective learning continues, 
that new policies for addressing the issue or sub-issues will be identified, new issues, 
stakeholders and values may be declared, and new information or analysis requirements may 
be highlighted. 
 
 
Figure 1 : Integraal method process 
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Step ONE — Identification by the stakeholder community of the social choice 
problem, or range of options. This task delivers the context, the scale, and the dynamics of 
the exercise. 
Step TWO — Organise the social choice problem in terms of the actors concerned, the 
situations or options being assessed, and the value criteria. 
This means developing in a pragmatic way, typologies or classifications of: 
(1) the stakeholders who are impacted by the problem or by the impact of the means of 
addressing it; 
(2) the policies, strategy options, or scenarios to be appraised; and 
(3) the issues against which the performance of the policies, options or scenarios will be 
appraised. 
(for example: preservation of the environment, decent work, health, etc.) 
Step THREE — Identify and mobilise information and tools for system representation 
(e.g., maps, models of processes and systems). 
These information and tools can help to ‘ground’ the deliberations in a robust knowledge 
base and, more particularly, this will assist in populating catalogues of indicators representing 
the stakeholders’ reference points when working to evaluate situations and scenarios. 
This step leads to the definition of indicators, which are units of information obeying to 
certain structural qualities. 
Step FOUR — Mobilise the actors for tasks of deliberation. 
This step relies on the framework and information developed in steps 1-3 above.  It produces 
outcomes in the formal sense of a multi-actor multi-criteria evaluation.  It also provides 
insights and learning to participants via the discussions that take place and observation of the 
respective positions adopted and of how these evolve through the collective learning that 
occurs.  
Deliberation exercises of current performance or future options, are undertaken in a multi-
stakeholder multi-criteria perspective at appropriate scales (e.g., from farm to region to 
nation…), corresponding to defined contexts or “theatres” of collective debate and 
action.  There may, in principle, be many discrete evaluation exercises — hence our term 
“piecewise deliberation” — that can be loosely coupled by engaging common typologies of 
stakeholders and performance values, or by considering the same or analogous strategies. 
REEDS has developed a tool, the Deliberation Matrix (KerDST), which can be used to 
organise the interfacing of the options for evaluation relative to the stakeholders and relative 
to the performance criteria. 
Step FIVE — Communication of Results & Recommendations.   
This step includes, but is not limited to, the final reporting stages of an evaluation exercise.  It 
also includes all tasks “along the way” of information sharing relating to the design and 
preparations of deliberations, documentation of discussions and intermediate results.  
Communication must and will take place around all aspects of the social learning process and 
its outcomes (e.g., the framing of evaluation tasks, the selection of indicators, the 
determination of reference values (by whom, for whom?), and the reporting of outcomes of 
multi-criteria evaluations). 
A great number of documents might be produced, many destined to remain unpublished in a 
process punctuated by higher-profile benchmark & strategic reports, brochures, and scientific 
publications.  Management of these products (e.g., with CMS technologies on a website) 
becomes a significant task in itself. 
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 Step SIX — Reflection on the outcomes obtained and, in an iterative sense, return to Step 
ONE of the process in order to review the entire evaluation sequence or, as seems fit, to 
formulate new specific evaluation problems. 
1.2.2 First results of our methodology 
Within the D2SOU project, the INTEGRAAL method (REE3DS-UVSQ) is implemented to 
promote the integration of soil / subsoil in urban projects. The INTEGRAAL method has 
been developed in recent years through various research projects. It identifies five 
consecutive steps (Identify, Organize, Represent, Evaluate and Communicate) of a recursive 
process of multi-criteria and multi-actor evaluation. This evaluation aims at making more 
readable the diversity of challenges and viewpoints associated with a problem and at 
engaging actors in a concertation process. The first step of the process is the identification of 
actors, challenges and possible scenarios. Some of the challenges are "specific" to the nature 
of the project (functionality, structure, etc ...) and others are "localized" in the sense that. they 
relate to the site and its environment (including soil / subsoil). The "Structure" step enables 
the project team to settle questions that should be considered. A specific tool is developed 
for: 
• accessing a database that highlights the soil/subsoil topics potentially impacting urban 
development projects, 
• accessing a database gathering the soil / subsoil means of investigation 
• assessing the "value of information" they provide. 
The step "Represent" is essential for launching following steps of concertation ("Evaluate" 
and "Communicate"). The data that characterizes the soil / subsoil (sometimes very technical) 
must be used and linked with the project challenges by developing a system of relevant 
indicators. 
 
1.3 Innovative aspects 
The D2SOU project has several innovative results:  
• An analysis of the "urban development project" system leading to the identification of 
actors and challenges; 
• The application of a multi-criteria and multi-actor approach for urban projects; 
• The provision of tools for project managers to ensure proper consideration of issues 
related to soil and subsoil: checklist to take into account all aspects of soil / subsoil ; 
access to learning sheets explaining the different issues related to soil and means of 
investigation; tool for calculating the value of information. All these tools will be 
made available on Internet at the end of the project; 
• Implementation of combined geophysical and geotechnical methods to acquire 
optimal information in an urban context. To achieve this, experiments have been 
performed on three fields of study offered by the associated partners (municipalities 
or developers): Pessac (33), Mignaloux-Beauvoir (86), Chelles (77). 
 
1.4 Implementation of the INTEGRAAL method in the framework of the D2SOU 
project 
 
1.4.1 A multi-criteria / multi-actors approach  
The « Identify » step will allow us, taking in account the urban planning project, to highlight 
several issues: 
-  « specific » link to the nature of the project (function, structure, environmental 
implementation, etc…) 
- « local » link to the project geographical site and its environment (bond to soil issues). 
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The « Structure » step will permit the urban planning project team (non-expert of 
soils/underground issues) to think about what we called « the check list of good questions ». 
A specific tool has been developed to access a database introducing means of soils / 
underground investigation and to evaluate their real added value on these issues. 
The « Represent » step is significant for the next deliberation and communication steps. 
Through this step, we want to define soils / underground data (mainly technical) and link 
them with project issues elaborating an efficient indicators system. 
   
Thus, stakeholders are able to express their concern on project issues taking in account these 
informations. 
 
 
Figure 2 : Implementation of Integraal method 
within the project 
 
1.4.2 The “check list of “good questions”” tool to improve projects assessment 
To put in perspective the interaction between the project and soils / underground and to take 
into account issues linked to these thematic in project management, we propose to use a 
« check list of good questions » in order to audit a project or to help auto evaluation from the 
project team. 
Several kind of interaction between the project and its soils / underground component can 
exist. These synergies can be classify as below : 
- Based on the « cause » part of interaction : 
o Impact of the project onto soils / underground  
o Impact of current soils / underground on the project (soils typologies related to 
buildings basement,   
- Based on thematics : legislation, risks mitigation, soils / underground natural events. 
- Based on the trilogy Soil / Project / external issues : urban planning project can be 
structured on 3 pillars : (1) specification of the project which impact its content, (2) 
soils constraints, (3) external issues (eg. Legislation). An inconvenient of this 
classification is several issues can be put in multiple groups. 
- Sense of interaction / SWOT analysis: 
o Strenghs : e.g. soils stability, 
o Weaknesses : e.g. soils contamination, 
o Threats : e.g. conflicts with soils uses, 
o Opportunities : e.g. geothermic energy. 
- Based on contract owner expectations : socio-eco aspects, NIMBY effect, legislation ; 
- Based on project timeline and phases. 
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In order to easy our work, we have chosen to create our check list from the Soil / Project / 
External issues point of view: “good questions” have been gathered in 3 groups : 
- « Soil» 
- « Project » 
- « External Issues » 
Even if with this classification we can put some item in multiple groups, it appears to be the 
most relevant one. 
Then, this list has been implemented in a double entry excel sheet. It allows us for each 
question, to see how its responds to contract owner expectations and how it can be 
appreciated. 4 categories have been created : 
- « Barrier and legislation outcomes » 
- « Technical and economics aspects » 
- « Social acceptance » 
- « Opportunities ». 
As to obtain a synthesis of contract owner expectation and improve its perception of soils and 
underground issues as a sustainable criteria to practice urban planning. 
 
1.5 Added-value of technique prospection in urban planning process 
1.5.1 Choice of a best compromise on the basis of prior hazard assessment  
 
The basic idea is that many hazards may influence the development of a project. The term 
“hazard” includes all items that must be accounted for since, if not anticipated, they will have 
negative consequences, either on the project or on its environment. Such hazards 
(archeological remains, unexpected soil conditions, area sensitive for ecological reasons…) 
can impact the project in terms of cost or delay but also in terms of performances (the project 
will lack to satisfy its requirements if it provokes a soil pollution in a sensitive area…). The 
same word also covers some possible positive properties (opportunities) which, if anticipated, 
may help in designing a better project (geothermal potential, soil that may used on site…). 
Figure 1 describes how technical choices can be assessed regarding consequences. Here are 
compared the consequences of a “basic solution” BS and those of a “cautious solution” CS.  
The choice may result from a risk/benefit analysis with the following steps: 
- Each hazard must be qualified on in terms of probability of occurrence pH and, when 
it occurs, distribution of probability of hazard magnitude p(M). The hazard magnitude 
can be described on a 5-level Likert scale, from 1 to 5, the 0-value corresponding to 
no hazard. When having no site-specific knowledge, one may assume prior 
distribution for these parameters, which may result for a general knowledge of the 
context (regional context, similar projects, company expertise…).  
Example: hazard = bad soil condition 
Probability of occurrence pH = 25 % 
Distribution of magnitudes p(M) : 1 (minor):30%; 2 (moderate):30%; 3 
(significant):20%; 4 (severe):15%; 5 (very severe): 5% 
 
 
Land Use Planning and Risk-Informed Decision Making 
 
410 
 
 
 
Figure 3. Framework of the decision process regarding the technical solution. 
- Two technical solutions will be weighted: a “basic” solution which is a usual one, 
with only a small attention paid to risk and a “cautious” solution, with a higher 
attention paid to risk. The latter is more expensive, and does not avoid all risks.  
- For the two solutions, cost and impacts are assessed. The risk is assessed by 
evaluating the impact I(M) of each technical solution with regards to each possible 
risk magnitude. Impact can be quantified on a 11-level Likert scale, from -5 to +5 
where negative values correspond to adverse consequences and positive values 
correspond to beneficial consequences (opportunities). It must be noted that impact 
covers any type of consequences due to hazard occurrence: delay, overcosts, loss of 
technical performance, impact to environment. Thus a key issue will be to weight the 
impact values I(M). This could be done using a collaborative approach involving the 
project team members. 
- Risk is finally quantified by: 
R = pH  M [ p(M) x I(M) ] 
           Table 1 summarizes the data used for this evaluation. 
Table 1. Principle of cost and risk evaluation for the two basic and cautious solutions and one given hazard. 
Hazard pH 25%   
 M 0 1 2 3 4 5 
 P(M)  30% 30% 20% 15% 5% 
Techniques        Costs 
Basic 
solution 
Impact 0 -1 -2 -3 -4 -5 CBS 
Cautious 
solution 
Impact 0 0 0 -1 -1 -2 CCS = CBS + OC 
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        Total risk 
Basic 
solution 
Risk 0 -0.075 -0.150 -0.150 -0.150 -0.0625 -0.5875 
Cautious 
solution 
Risk 0 0 0 -0.050 -0.0375 -0.025 -0.1125 
Since each project may be subjected to many hazards (archeological remains, watertable 
level, possibility of bad soil properties…), the above analysis must be lead for each hazard 
and all consequences (costs and risks) must be summed.  
This analysis can also be refined since the “cautious solution” may be replaced with a series 
of solutions ranked in terms of “caution level”, from the basic solution to the more cautious 
one. In this case, cost and risk are quantified for each solution and the comparison must help 
in identifying the best compromise. 
At the end of this process, all technical choices can be compared in terms of both costs and 
resulting risk. 
1.5.2 Quantifying efficiency of a prospection technique regarding hazard assessment  
The next issue is the evaluation of added-value that may result of using one or several 
prospection technique, in order to improve the knowledge about possible hazards on a given 
site, and to adapt the technical choice in order to reduce the negative consequences. 
The idea is that, after having used a prospection technique PT (this concept may be extended 
to any way of gathering additional information which about hazards which may influence the 
project, including for instance on site visit or library work), one will be able to update his 
evaluation of hazards and thus make a more appropriate choice. The updated information 
upon hazards will be noted with a “prime” symbol: p’H instead of pH for probability of 
occurrence, p’(M) instead of p(M) for the distribution of hazard magnitudes. 
Each PT can be assessed in terms of cost (including real costs and time to cover a given area) 
and efficiency. Efficiency corresponds to the ability to (a) detect the hazard (or checking that 
it does not exist) and (b) quantifying its magnitude. Of course, efficiency depends both on the 
technique and the type of hazard. A simple way for quantifying efficiency is that of defining 
a matrix Eij(PT, H), where: 
- PT designs the prospection technique 
- H designs the hazard type 
- i and j are the magnitude of the hazard (on the 0-5 scale), i being the “real value” and 
j being the assessed value. 
The efficiency of a given technique can be quantified by experts, and checked thanks to 
feedback experiences. With this notation system, a perfect technique corresponds to a 
diagonal matrix with Eij(PT, H), = 1 if i = j and Eij(PT, H), = 0 if i ≠ j. For any real technique, 
Eij(PT, H) values for i ≠ j may be non zero, either because of (a) false alarm (i = 0 but j ≠ 0), 
(b) non detection (i ≠ 0 but j = 0) or (c) simple uncertainty in hazard magnitude assessment (i 
< j if the hazard is overestimated or i > j if it is underestimated). 
The effect of using a PT will be to replace the prior distribution [pH, p(M)] which is not site-
specific, with an updated posterior distribution [p’H, p’(M)] which would provide a better 
picture of the real hazards on  site. Figure 2 describes the process in this situation. 
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Figure 4. Framework of the decision process regarding the technical solution, using a 
prospecting technique in order to improve the site-specific knowledge. 
 
Thus the problem to be solved is twofold: 
- problem A: what is the best compromise (between risk and cost) regarding the 
technical solution for the project? 
- problem B: what prospection technique(s) would have to be used in order to improve 
the quality of the choice of the technical solution for the project? 
1.5.3 Quantifying added-value of a prospection technique for project management  
The next issue is the evaluation of added-value that may result of using one or several 
prospection technique, in order to improve the knowledge about possible has about the site. 
It must be added that the prior risk evaluation is only performed in a statistical way, when the 
real decision would have to be fitted to the specific site conditions. In fact, if pH = 20%, this 
means that the hazard only occurs one time out of five. Thus the choice of the basic solution 
will be the best one four times out of five, while a more cautious one will be best fitted in the 
other cases (and the “caution level” will have to be fitted to the magnitude of hazard). 
This leads to define two reference situations: 
- Decision with only prior knowledge: in this case, the best compromise is that defined 
above, on the basis of assumed prior distribution of hazards, 
- Decision with full knowledge: this comes to say that the choice is done on the basis of 
existing (and fully known) site-specific hazards. If one comes back to Table 1, when 
comparing only two possible choices, this will lead to choose the “basic solution” in 
all cases where there is no hazard and the “cautious one” when hazard occurs. The 
total risk will be that of the cautious solution (-0.1125 with the values taken in the 
example), but the total cost will be reduced to: 
CTOT = (1 - pH) CBS + pH (CBS + OC) + CT = CBS + pH OC + CT  
 
Where CT is cost of the prospecting technique. This means that the overcost OC is only paid 
when the hazard exists, thus saving money. This would be possible as soon as one uses a PT 
that detects all existing hazards, even if it is not able of sizing them. It would also be possible 
to decrease further this cost by using a more efficient technique that would reduce the 
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uncertainty about the hazard magnitude, such as one will be able to adapt the caution level of 
the technique to the assessed hazard magnitude. 
However, it must be kept in mind that full knowledge is unreachable in practice and that the 
real decision process is in fact that of decision with non perfect knowledge. The idea is that 
the updated information regarding hazards will improve the quality of the decision process, 
and lead to a cost which will lay between the two bounds (only prior knowledge / full 
knowledge).  
One must also remind that when analyzing costs, the cost balance must include the PT cost, 
and that it some situations the total cost CTOT = CBS + pH OC + CT may be higher than the 
initial one. 
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Abstract  
 
High availability constraints ensure a high level of operational performance that must be 
maintained during a contractual measurement period. Such constraints must be satisfied, 
particularly, for critical systems related to global security and human safety. High 
availability often results from material redundancies and lead to large stochastic discrete 
event models with numerous states. Markov processes and stochastic Petri nets can be used 
to model, simulate and analyze such systems but their use is limited by the so called 
“combinatorial explosion” problem. This paper investigates the fluidification of stochastic 
Petri nets to overcome the previous problem. The main contribution is to propose a modular 
modeling of active and passive redundancies with Petri nets. Some approaches are then 
proposed to obtain equivalent behaviors in the long time with stochastic and continuous Petri 
nets. 
 
 
Keywords: Reliability analysis, Redundancies, Petri nets, Fluidification. 
 
 
1. Introduction  
 
Reliability and availability analysis are major challenges to improve the global security and 
the safety of processes. Users want their systems, for example, airplanes or computers, to be 
ready to serve them at all times. Availability refers to the ability of the user community to 
access the system, submit new work, update or alter existing work, or collect the results of 
previous work. If a user cannot access the system, it is said to be unavailable. The terms 
downtime and uptime are used to refer to periods when a system is unavailable and available. 
Scheduled and unscheduled downtime must be distinguished. Scheduled downtime results 
from maintenance operations and has little impact upon the user community. Unscheduled 
downtime events typically arise from hardware or software failures or environmental 
anomalies. Examples of unscheduled downtime events include power outages, failed CPU, 
over-temperature related shutdown, and so on. Such downtime must be considering at first in 
order to evaluate the availability of the system. 
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Mean availability can be expressed as the percentage of uptime in a given year. The table I 
shows the downtime that will be allowed for a particular percentage of availability, 
presuming that the system is required to operate continuously (without maintenance periods). 
 
Table I : Availability and downtime 
 Mean availability Downtime per year 
90% (“one nine”) 36.5 days 
95% 18.3 days 
99% (“two nines”) 3.7 days 
99.5 1.8 days 
99.9 (“three nines”) 8.8 hours 
99.99 (“four nines”) 53 minutes 
99.999 (“five nines”) 5.3 minutes 
99.9999 (“six nines”) 32 seconds 
 
High availability implies no human intervention to restore operation in complex systems. For 
example, availability limit of 99.999% allows about one second of downtime per day, which 
is impractical using human labor. Human intervention for maintenance actions will certainly 
exceed this limit. Availability limit of 99% would allow an average of 15 minutes per day, 
which is realistic for human intervention. So, high availability refers to availability at less 
equal to 99%. 
Redundancy is used to eliminate the need for human intervention and to reach high 
availability requirements. For complex dynamical systems with numerous interdependent 
components and high availability constraints, the modeling and analysis methods are mainly 
based on stochastic discrete event models like Markov models (Rausand et al., 2004) or 
stochastic Petri nets (SPNs) (Molloy, 1982). Such models are mathematically well founded 
and lead either to analytical results or numerical simulations. The first contribution of this 
paper is to propose modular models of the redundancies with SPNs. The compact and 
systematic design of SPNs is highlighted as an advantage in comparison with other state 
space models like Markov models. Estimation of availability with SPN simulations results as 
a consequence. But, in case of large systems, simulation and analysis methods lead to the 
problem of combinatory explosion that limits the use of state space models. In this context, 
fluidification can be discussed as a relaxation method (Recalde and Silva, 2002; 2004). The 
main idea of PNs fluidification is to replace a discrete SPN by a continuous one. The second 
contribution of the paper is to investigate some fluidification methods to evaluate the 
availability. 
 
2. Stochastic Petri nets for availability evaluation  
2.1 Petri nets 
 
A Petri net (PN) is defined as <P, T, WPR, WPO > where P = {Pi} is a set of n places and T = 
{Tj} is a set of q transitions, W = WPO – WPR  (Z)nq is the incidence matrix. M(t, Pi) stands 
for the marking of place Pi at time t, M(t) is the PN marking vector at time t and MI the PN 
initial marking. The marking changes when a transition fires. Transitions fire depending on 
the marking vector and on the firing conditions. The marking variation is given with respect 
to the firing vector X  (Z)q such that M = W. X. For a complete description of PN models 
and analysis, one can refer to (David et al., 1992, Recalde and Silva, 2002). 
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2.2 Stochastic Petri nets 
 
A stochastic Petri net (SPN) is a timed PN with transitions firing periods that are 
characterized by exponential probability density functions (pdf) with firing rate µj, j = 1,…,q 
(Ajmone et al., 1987; Molloy, 1982). The marking of the place Pi of a marked SPN at time t 
will be referred as M(t, Pi). The SPNs considered in this paper are bounded, reinitialisable, 
with infinite server semantic, race policy and resampling memory. As a consequence, the 
considered SPNs have a reachability graph with a finite number N of states {S1,…,SN} and 
their marking process is mapped into a Markov model with state space isomorphic to the 
reachability graph (Bobbio et al., 1998). The generator G of this Markov model can be 
computed from the reachability graph and from the firing parameters of the SPN. The state 
probabilities k(t), k = 1,…,N of Markov model and the mean marking Mmm(t, Pi), i = 1,…,n 
of SPN satisfy: 
                                         𝑀𝑚𝑚(𝑡, 𝑃𝑖) = ∑ 𝑚𝑘 𝑖 . 𝜋𝑘(𝑡)                                                (1)
𝑘=1,…,𝑁

where mki stands for the number of tokens in place Pi when the system is in state Sk. 
 
2.3 Example 
 
Petri nets can be used to model systems with failures and repairs (Schneeweiss, 2001). The 
simplest example is to consider a system composed of a single component (Figure 1). This 
component is assumed to fails and repairs with respect to exponential pdf. The failure rate is 
denoted by  and  stands for the repair rate. The place P1 stands for the safe state and P2 for 
the defect one. The transition T1 represents the occurrence of a fault and the transition T2 
represents the end of the repair process.  
 
 
Figure 1: Failure and repair process of a single component; SPN (left); 
corresponding Markov model (right) 
One can notice the similarity of both representations. In fact, the SPN in Figure 1 (left) is 
equivalent to the Markov model (right) with generator G: 
 
 
 
  
 
G
 
 
 (2) 
 
The resolution of the Chapman Kolmogorov equation (Rausand et al., 2004) leads to the 
determination of the mean availability A() with respect to parameters  and . 
 
1 1mmA( ) ( ) M ( ,P )


 
     
  (3) 
To conclude with this example, one can notice that high availability requirements are 
achieved only if the repair process is at least 99 times quicker than the failure process.  
P1 P2
T1 : 
T2 : 
S1 (OK)

S2 (NOK)

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3. Modular models of redundancies with PNs 
The simple example provided with Figure 1 does not enhance the advantages to use SPNs in 
comparison with Markov models. Such advantages will appear as evidence when 
redundancies are considered. Two kinds of redundancies can be considered: active 
redundancies and passive redundancies. 
 
3.1 Models of active redundant systems 
 
Active redundancies are used to achieve high availability by including enough excess 
capacity in the design to accommodate a performance decline. Systems with active 
redundancies include several identical components working together. A simple example is an 
aircraft with two separate engines. The aircraft continues to fly despite failure of a single 
engine. A more complex example is multiple redundant power generation facilities within a 
large system involving electric power transmission. Malfunction of a single component is not 
considered to be a failure unless the resulting performance decline exceeds the specification 
limits for the entire system. 
Figure 2 provides the usual representation of active redundancies with SPNs. A number n of 
identical component is considered. Components running simultaneously are represented by 
the tokens in place P1. Non reparable (left) and reparable (right) processes are considered. In 
both cases, the sojourn time of any token in place P1 is a random variable (rv) with 
exponential pdf of parameter . The duration to fire transition T1 is also a rv with exponential 
pdf of parameter .M(t, P1). When a component fails or is repaired, this parameter changes as 
M(t, P1).  
The SPNs in Figure 2 are used to represent total or partial active redundant system. A total 
redundant system is said to be available as long as M(t, P1)  1. In comparison a partial k / n 
redundant system is said to be available as long as M(t, P1)  k. Mean availability with partial 
and total redundancies is easy to work out, with the evaluation of the marking M(t, P1). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
In Figure 3, the case of non identical components is considered. This representation will be 
preferred when the redundant components have different failure and repair rates. More 
precisely, in Figure 3, p classes of components are considered and ni stands for the number of 
identical components in class i. In comparison with the previous model, the SPN in Figure 3 
is composed of 2.p places, and availability will be evaluated according to the sum of marking 
variables M(t, P11) + … + M(t, Pp1). 
 
 
P1 P2T1 : 
n
P1 P2
T1 : 
T2 : 
n
Figure 2: Active redundancies with n identical 
components; Failure process for non reparable 
systems (left); Failure and repair processes for 
reparable systems (right) 
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Figure 3: Failure and repair processes for active redundancies with p classes of ni components i = 1,…,p 
 
Models of passive redundant systems 
 
Passive redundancy is used in complex systems to achieve high availability with no 
performance decline. Multiple components are incorporated into a design that includes also a 
method to detect failures and automatically reconfigure the system to bypass failed items and 
replace them with safe ones. This is used with complex systems that are linked. For example, 
the rescue wind turbine in aircraft is a passive redundant component that will be used only 
when the power generators are out of order and when all batteries are down. In that case the 
rescue turbine will produce the energy required to maintain the main control devices of the 
aircraft. 
 
Figure 4 provides the usual representation of passive redundancies with SPNs for reparable 
systems. The duration to fire transition T1 is a rv with exponential pdf of parameter 
.min(M(t, P1), M(t, P3)) = .min(M(t, P1), 1). In Figure 4-left, concurrent repairs are 
considered and in Figure 4-right, non concurrent repairs are considered.  
 
P1 P2
T1 : 
T2 : 
P3
n
P1 P2
T1 : 
T2 : 
P4
n
P3
Hazard 
Prior 
probability 
Prior 
magnitude 
distribution 
Technical 
solution 
Basic 
solution 
Cautious 
solution 
Consequences 
Basic cost 
Cautious 
cost 
Cautious 
over-cost 
Basic risk 
Cautious 
risk 
Basic over-
risk 
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Figure 4: Failure and repair processes for passive 
redundancies; concurrent repairs (left); non 
concurrent repairs (right) 
 
4. Availability evaluation with SPNs 
4.1 Analytical background 
 
SPNs can be used to evaluate usual indicators of reliability as characteristic times (MUT, 
MDT, MTTF or MTBF) and also instantaneous indicators as reliability or availability. In this 
work we will consider the particular case of mean availability. The basic idea is to use the 
equivalence that exists between the reachability graph of the SPN and the corresponding 
Markov model. The N states of the reachability graph are first separated into two classes: the 
class OK of Ns safe states and the class NOK of Nd defect ones. Let us denote s  [0, 1]1 x Ns 
as the row vector of the state probabilities for normal states and d  [0, 1]1 x Nd as the row 
vector of the state probabilities for defect ones. The Chapman Kolmogorov equation of the 
associated Markov model can be written as in (4): 
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21 22
OK NOK
OK NOK
G Gd ( t ) ( t )
( t ) ( t ) .
G Gdt
 
 
 
  
   (4) 
 
where G11, G12, G21 and G22 are sub-matrices of the generator G with appropriate dimensions. 
Thus, state probabilities are given by (5): 
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G G
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and the mean availability is given by (6): 
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     
   (6) 
with 1Ns = (1,…1)T of dimension Ns. 
4.2 Stochastic estimator by means of simulations  
 
SPNs can be used to estimate the mean availability (and also other indicators) by means of 
simulations with time horizon D. For that purpose, the probability of each state Sk is 
estimated with equation (7): 
 
 
 
0
1
 and lim
D
k k k k
D
( D ) f ( t ).dt ( ) ( D )
D
  

  
 (7) 
 
The functions fk(t), k = 1,…,N are defined with equation (8): 
 
 
1 if    and 0 if   k k k kf ( t ) M( t ) S f ( t ) M( t ) S   
 (8) 
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4.3 Examples 
 
Let us consider again the example of Figure 1 with parameters  = 1.5e-5 TU-1  and  = 1e-4 
TU-1. The simulation of the system over time interval [0 : 1e7] leads to the estimation of state 
S1 probability reported in Figure 6. For this example, the availability equals the probability of 
state S1 and tends to the mean availability A() = 0.87. This numerical estimation coincides 
with the theoretical value of the mean availability provided by equation (2) and the 
considered system is not high available. 
 

Figure 5: Estimation of the state S1 probability with 
SPN simulations for the system of Figure 1 
 
Let us consider an active redundant system with 3 identical components with the same 
parameters  = 1.5e-5 TU-1  and  = 1e-4 TU-1. The SPN and Markov model are described in 
Figure 6. The simulation of the SPN leads to the estimation of the mean availability A() = 
0.998 (Figure 7). 
 
 
 
 
Figure 6: Active redundancies with 3 identical 
components 
 
 
 
Figure 7: Estimation of the mean availability with SPN 
simulations for the system of Figure 6 
 
5. Performance evaluation for systems with redundancies 
5.1. Modular modeling 
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As long as high availability is considered, systems with numerous redundant components 
must be represented. Each process proposed in figures 2 to 4 is a modular sub-model that can 
be included in the representation of a large system with redundancies. Figure 8 represents the 
connection of the failure and repair processes in large systems. The server with redundancies 
is represented by the transition T3 that is connected to the sub-model {P1, P2, T1, T2} (a 
failure process for n reparable components with total active redundancies). A simplified 
representation of the system is used with {P3, P4, T3, T4}. 
 
 
 
Figure 8: Failure and repair processes for active 
redundancies: integration of sub-models 
The mean availability worked out with the sub-model in Figure 2 right and with the complete 
model in Figure 8 are equal. The proof is given for n = 1 and can be extended for n > 1. 
Assuming that the server T3 has a firing rate x and that T4 has a firing rate y, the SPN in 
Figure 8 is equivalent to a Markov model with states S1 = (1 0 1 0)T, S2 = (0 1 1 0)T, S3 = (1 0 
0 1)T, S4 = (0 1 0 1)T and generator G: 
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The mean availability is given by the asymptotic probabilities of states S1 and S3: 
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with: 
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After simplification (3) may be rewritten with (11): 
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Thus the mean availability of SPNs in Figures 2 and 8 are identical and one can conclude that 
the integration of the sub-model for failure and repair process does not change the 
availability. The advantage of including the failure and repair processes in the global system 
is to evaluate the influence of availability on the server activity. In Figure 8, the flow of 
transition T3 depends on the redundancies that are included in the system design. The 
previous proof can be generalized for n redundant components and for partial k / n 
redundancies (arcs (P1, T3) and (T3, P1) will be weighted with k). 
 
5.2. Example 
 
The system in Figure 9 models a simple manufacturing system.  
 
 
 
Figure 9: Assembly workshop 
The final product is composed of two different parts, A and B, that are processed in machines 
M1 and M2 (represented by transitions T1 and T2), and stored in buffers P4 and P6, 
respectively. Then, they are assembled by M3 (i.e. transition T3), and processed in M4 (i.e. 
transition T4). Finally, M5 (i.e. transition T5) packages them. During the processing of parts A 
and B, tool1 (tokens in place P5) and tool2 (tokens in place P7) are needed. Also tool3 (tokens 
in place P3) have to be used in the three final operations. The machines M1, M2, M4 and M5 
are assumed to be reliable and an active redundancy (n = 3) is considered for the assembly 
machine M3 that is assumed to have failure and repair rates  = 1.5e-2 TU-1  and  = 1e-1 
TU-1. The productivity of the workshop is evaluated with the computation of the output flow 
X(t, T5) with respect to the number k of pallets and tools : MI = (2k 2k k 0 k 0 k 0 0 3 0)T. The 
results obtained with Markov models and SPNs simulation over a time interval of D = 1000 
TU are summed up in Tables 2 and 3. For k > 4, the computational effort becomes heavy 
because of the large number N of states and the performance evaluation with Markov model 
analysis is no longer computable. 
Table 2: Performance evaluation with Markov models 
k N X(t, T5) with Markov model Computational effort (TU) 
1 48 0.29 0.1 
2 216 0.61 0.9 
3 640 0.93 12 
4 150
0 
1.25 108 
5 … … … 
 
Simulation with SPNs can be used to overcome the computational limitation with Markov 
model (Table 3). One can notice that the computational effort remains reasonable even for 
heavy loaded nets. The simulation error does not exceed 3% for the considered system and is 
P9T4 T5
P3
P6T2
P7
P4T1
T3
P5
P8
P1
P2
P10
P11
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T7: 
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less than 1% for many other cases. The addition of 3 redundant components is enough to 
reach high availability requirements. 
Table 3: Performance evaluation with SPNs 
 
 
 
6. Fluidification of SPNs 
A usual limitation encountered with the use of SPNs simulations is the determination of the 
time horizon D. Tide horizons lead to approximation errors and large horizons increase the 
computation effort. To overcome this difficulty, SPNs can be transformed into timed 
continuous Petri nets (contPNs) that are compact continuous time models. Such models 
converge very rapidly to their steady state. 
 
6.1 Timed continuous Petri nets 
 
ContPNs have been developed in order to provide continuous approximations of the discrete 
behaviors of timed PNs (David and Alla, 1992; Recalde et al., 1999; Recalde and Silva, 2002; 
20). The marking of each place is a continuous non negative real valued function of time. 
Xmax = diag(xmax j)  (R+)qxq is the diagonal matrix of maximal firing speeds xmax j, j = 1,…q 
and X(t, Tj) is the firing speed of transition Tj at time t that depends continuously on the 
marking of Tj input places. The flow through the transition Tj is defined by (12): 
 
 X(t, Tj) = xmax j.enab(M(t), Tj) (12) 
with: 
 enab(M(t), Tj) = min {M(t, Pk) / wPRkj : Pk  °Tj} (13) 
 
where °Tj stands for the set of Tj upstream places. 
 
6.2. Approximations of SPN with standard fluidification 
 
Standard fluidification is the simplest way to transform a stochastic discrete event models 
into a continuous time one. Standard means that both models have the same structure (i.e. 
incidence matrices), parameters (i.e. firing rate of the transitions) and initial state (i.e. initial 
marking). In particular, xmaxj = j, j = 1,...,q is used with equations (12) and (13) for standard 
fluidification (Recalde and Silva, 2002; 2004). 
An open issue is that standard fluidification of SPNs leads to continuous models such that the 
steady states of SPNs and contPNs do not coincide in many cases, particularly for non-
ordinary PNs or non join-free PNs. As a consequence, availability estimation provided by the 
steady state of contPNs is different from the one resulting from the analysis of Markov model 
or from the SPN simulations.  
k X(t, T5) with SPN Computational effort (TU) 
1 0.30 0.59 
2 0.61 2.0 
3 0.94 4.0 
4 1.24 6.8 
5 1.55 11 
10 2.41 30 
100 2.63 39 
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6.3. Example 
 
The example of Figure 9 is considered again and simulated as a contPN. Standard 
fluidification is used and the results are reported in Table 4.  
 
Table4: Performance evaluation with contPNs 
k X(t, T5) with contPN Computational effort (TU) 
1 0.33 0.25 
2 0.66 0.22 
3 1 0.22 
4 1.33 0.20 
5 1.66 0.22 
10 2.61 0.23 
10
0 
2.61 0.22 
   
 
Simulation with contPNs lead to biased results, but the errors do not exceed 8% for k  10. 
One can also notice that the computation effort does not depend on the marking magnitude. 
Thus, standard fluidification can be used to evaluate the performance for heavy loaded net. 
 
7. Discussion and conclusion 
In this paper we have proposed a modular modeling with stochastic Petri nets to represent 
redundancies in large systems in order to reach high availability requirements. The usual 
methods (analysis of the corresponding Markov model and SPN simulations) are discussed 
and fluidification of the discrete event models is presented as an alternative solution that 
provides good approximations of the mean availability under some specific assumptions (in 
particular the net is assumed to be heavy loaded).  
To conclude let us notice that several recent studies have been started to transform SPNs into 
contPNs that will provide a better approximation of the SPNs behavior in the long run. 
Markovian and Hybrid Markovian Continuous Petri Nets have been introduced for that 
purpose (Vazquez et al., 2008; Vazquez and Silva, 2009). These models are continuous time 
Petri nets including stochastic variables with Poisson pdf. One difficulty is that the resulting 
models are no longer deterministic. In (Lefebvre et al., 2009; Lefebvre and Leclercq 2011), 
piecewise constant timed continuous PNs have been proposed that are suitable to compute the 
SPNs steady state in some regions of the marking space. A homothetic approach has been 
also developed to provide an approximation of the SPNs steady state in the whole marking 
space (Lefebvre et al., 2010; Lefebvre 2011). Both approaches have been combined with 
interpolation and classification methods to provide an approximation of the SPN steady state 
(Lefebvre et al. 2012). 
At this time, the estimation of mean availability for large systems with fluid models remains 
an open issue that will continue to attract our interest. In particular a supervised combination 
of SPNs and contPNs in a single hybrid model will be investigated in our future work. 
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Abstract 
We report on a case-study concerning land-use planning around an LPG importation facility 
surrounded by urban development. The authorities have required the operator to implement a 
costly technical  measure which is part of national doctrine concerning the technological 
risks of LPG storage facilities. We have undertaken a benefit-cost analysis of different 
technical measures which reduce the risk generated by the facility, in order to compare the 
cost of the measures with their estimated benefit, over the lifetime of the facility, in terms of 
reduced probability  and consequences of an industrial accident. Our socio-economic 
analysis suggests that, for the facility studied, the status quo is the most efficient in economic 
terms. 
 
Keywords:benefit-cost analysis, decision-support, land use planning, technological risk 
 
1. Introduction to benefit-cost analysis 
Land use planning around hazardous establishments raises numerous questions, which cannot 
be resolved by binary yes/no answers: 
 which criteria should society use to decide that the level of risk of an industrial facility 
has been reduced as low as “reasonably practicable”? 
 which balance between different methods of reducing risk from a facility (investing in 
preventive or protective barriers on site, in protective barriers offsite, imposing forms of 
land use for areas near the plant which lead to a lower exposed population, etc.) should 
be implemented?  
Benefit-cost analysis (BCA) is a decision-support tool which can help in the discussion with 
stakeholders concerning these questions. It provides a structured framework for presenting all 
of the components of a decision and their different weightings, increasing the transparency of 
the decision-making process. It provides a historical record of the elements considered in a 
decision, and the level of uncertainty existing at the time the decision was made. 
BCA advises in favour of all decisions whose benefits, for the whole of society, are greater 
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than their costs. Concerning the management of industrial risks, benefits could include the 
consequences of a reduction in the level of pollution or the risk of mortality from accidents. 
Considered costs could include spending on new safety measures and indirect costs such as 
impacts on and competitiveness. To compare costs and benefits, it is necessary to use a 
common measure. BCA uses a monetary measure, and involves the conversion of costs and 
benefits into euros [1]. 
While costs are often naturally expressed in euros, the benefits of prevention measures 
(reduced probability or lower consequences of industrial accidents) are more difficult to 
monetize. BCA makes this conversion based on citizens' preferences, attempting to estimated 
people’s willingness to pay for a change in their environment (such as the construction of a 
railway line between two cities, or an improvement in air quality in their area, or a reduction 
in noise from an airport). The underlying philosophy is thus democratic, or populist, rather 
than technocratic or paternalist. 
Concerning decisions on industrial safety, BCA will monetize individuals’ willingness to pay 
for a marginal reduction in their exposure to technological risk. By extrapolating to a large 
population, this leads to the concept of value of a statistical life (VSL), or the cost of a 
fatality which is avoided by the spending on safety. Assuming that VSL = 5M€ implies that 
an average individual would pay 5€ to reduce his mortality risk by 1 in a million, and in a 
symmetric manner would accept 5€ as compensation for a 1 in a million increase in his 
probability of death from the specified risk; it also means that a population of 1 million 
people would be willing to pay 5M€ to prevent a statistical fatality. It is important to note that 
VSL is not what society would pay to save an identified life, nor should it be interpreted as a 
measure of the intrinsic “value” of a human life [2, 3]. This notion, which strikes some 
people as being immoral, is in fact implicit in any public spending on safety which is limited 
by an annual budget (for instance, public spending on road safety).  
Willingness to pay for changes in exposure to risk can be estimated either by asking people 
how much they would be prepared to pay to benefit from a specific risk-reduction measure 
(called “direct methods”), or by observing their preferences on similar markets, such as 
purchasing ABS equipment in automobiles, or smoke detectors, or wage differentials for jobs 
which are similar in required qualifications but differ in the level of exposure to hazards (so 
called “revealed preference” methods, which tend to be more reliable than direct methods). 
Willingness to pay for an environmental “good” such as a national park can be estimated by 
observing the number of kilometers that people are willing to travel to benefit from the 
amenity, and adding travel costs and the opportunity cost of the time spent in the park. A 
body of research in economics over the last 30 years has accumulated evidence concerning 
people's willingness to pay for many aspects of their environment [4]. 
Benefit-cost analysis has been used since the 1970s in the USA for regulatory impact 
assessments of environmental legislation. It is used in the UK in a Seveso context as the 
recommended measure for justifying the ALARP nature of a safety investment. It is little 
used in France, with the exception of public spending on managing flood risk. In the next 
section, we report on an experimental application of the technique to a decision concerning 
management of technological risk generated by an LPG storage facility located in an urban 
area, and compare land use planning implications with the traditional analysis method used in 
France. 
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2. Case study: land use planning around an LPG storage facility 
The facility studied16 is a maritime LPG importation site located in north-eastern France, 
comprising butane and propane storage spheres and facilities for transferring LPG both to 
small trucks and train wagons, and for filling small bottles for domestic use. The facility is 
located in an industrial port which is surrounded by an urban area. Since industrial activity 
and some urban homes were located within the effect perimeter for certain accident scenarios 
on the plant, different technical solutions were being investigated to reduce the level of risk. 
Our case study consisted of comparing a number of possible changes to the facility: 
 scenario 1: the implementation of a number of safety barriers and changes to 
management of the facility, proposed by the plant operator: removal of one of the 
LPG storage spheres, removal of all railway wagons on site, and a reduction in the 
quantity of gas stored in the spheres.  
 scenario 2: the implementation of a more costly technical measure proposed by the 
competent authorities, involving covering the gas storage spheres with a layer of 
material (“mounding”) to protect them from a possible impinging gas flame, as well 
as a reduction of the quantity of gas stored in the tanks. 
 scenario 3: the complete closure of the facility, with the assumption that clients in the 
area currently supplied from the plant would be supplied by trucks arriving from 
another importation facility on the west coast of France. 
We compare scenarios 1, 2 and 3 to the reference situation at the time the study was launched 
(scenario 0), by carrying out the following steps which comprise a BCA: 
1. Specify the perimeter of the analysis, i.e. the list of economic agents for whom we 
will estimate the consequences of the different possible scenarios; 
2. List the consequences of the scenarios and choose ways of measuring them; 
3. Provide a quantitative prediction of the consequences for each scenario, over the 
project lifetime; 
4. Monetize the consequences, or convert them into a monetary unit to allow 
comparison; 
5. Discount future benefits and costs, in order to obtain the net present value of each 
scenario; 
6. Analyze the robustness of the results obtained by undertaking an uncertainty analysis 
for the main uncertain input parameters; 
7. Recommend a decision.  
Hazards considered. Three types of hazards were included in the safety case for the facility, 
and were assessed in our study: 
1. unconfined vapour cloud explosion (UVCE), due to a leak of flammable gas to the 
atmosphere which explodes some time after the time of release; 
2. jet fire, a large flame due to a leak of gas to the atmosphere which ignites 
immediately; 
3. BLEVE, or boiling liquid expanding vapour explosion, a very dangerous phenomenon 
which can occur if liquefied flammable gas stored under pressure is heated for a long 
period (for instance due to the presence of an impinging jet fire), leading to an 
increase in pressure inside the tank and a weakening of the tank structure, and 
eventually to the rupture of the tank body, a large release of gas and a fireball.  
                                                        
16 The study reported on was carried out by Valérie Meunier, with the assistance of Nicolas Treich. 
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The accidental scenarios considered are listed below: 
 BLEVE of LPG transport trucks, railway wagons, or large LPG storage spheres; 
 pipe ruptures, for pipes of small and large diameter; 
 the rupture of loading mechanisms for railway wagons or trucks. 
 The probability and different effect distances of each scenario were estimated by a 
specialized firm, working for the plant operator in order to write the Safety case17. The 
BLEVE of the LPG storage spheres are the accidental scenarios with the largest effect 
distance in our study. The heat released can have deadly effects on people within a distance of 
around 600 meters, and the overpressure from the explosion can cause severe injuries (in 
particular due to projections of glass from windows) up to 1300m.  
Consequences of a possible accident. We used assessments of the population in three zones 
around the plant, made for previous safety case studies. Relatively dense urbanization is 
present around the site (see figure 1), with 420 people (in addition to the 22 workers on site) 
working or living within a radius of 360m; 6700 people living between 360 and 900m; and 
24500 people living between 900 and 1600m18. The level of traffic on nearby roads and the 
railway was also estimated. These allowed us to estimate the number of people who would be 
killed and injured for each type of accident (only BLEVE and UVCE have consequences 
which extend off site; effects of UVCE are largely attenuated beyond 450m by the presence 
of a cliff which would prevent the propagation of gas clouds). 
Our study considered the following consequences of the different scenarios: 
 direct costs for the facility operator: in scenarios 1 and 2, capital costs related to the 
safety mechanisms implemented; for scenario 3, the dismantling of the facility, the 
additional cost of supplying clients in the region via road transport, and the social cost 
of eliminating jobs. 
 The indirect costs to the facility operator: in scenarios 1 and 2, such as impact on 
productivity (which we assumed to be negligible in scenarios 1 and 2) and strategic 
consequences of scenario 3, such loss of market share if cost overheads are 
transferred to clients (we did not have sufficient information concerning the market 
structure to estimate this indirect cost, and assumed it  
 would be negligible).   
 direct benefits linked to the reduction in the probability or the consequences of an 
accident due to the safety measures implemented in scenarios 1 and 3 were studied in 
detail, and include avoided damage to people (deaths and injuries avoided), avoided 
damage to the facility and to nearby industrial activity, and lost production caused by 
the temporary closure of activities on site after an accident.  
Event probabilities and effect distances were extracted from the risk assessment studies 
undertaken by a consultant on behalf of the industrial operator in order to compare the 
different investment strategies and to write the safety case.  
Consequences excluded from the study perimeter. The impact on the image of the firm 
in case of an accident is not included in our study, as it is very difficult to estimate, and 
would depend strongly on how the accident was reported in the media. The strategic 
                                                        
17 The safety case was approved by the competent authorities. The underlying risk assessment is 
undertaken using a somewhat conservative method, which tends to overestimate the probabilities and 
consequences of industrial accidents; when used in a BCA context, this bias (which we have not attempted to 
correct for) tends to overstate the value of spending on safety. 
18 For simplicity, population density within the spherical red region and orange annular region is assumed 
to be uniform. 
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value for the nation of an LPG importation location is also not included in the perimeter 
of our study. The impact on productivity in each scenario is assumed to be negligible.  
 
 
Figure 1. Aerial view of the site surroundings, with circles representing distances of 360 and 900m 
Estimation of the costs and benefits of each scenario. In our study, benefits are generally 
associated with a smaller probability of an industrial accident, and thus with a smaller 
number of people killed or injured, and a lower probability of causing material damage. In 
the case of scenario 3, benefits are negative due to an increased expected number of people 
killed during road transport. The following assumptions were made to monetize different 
types of benefits and costs: 
 Concerning averted fatalities and injuries, we use values suggested by the European 
Commission (2.5M€ per statistical fatality, which is an upper value recommended by the 
Commission for air quality regulatory impact assessments) and by the UK Health and 
Safety Executive (300k€ for a severe industrial injury) and French figures for road 
accidents (225k€ for a severe accident and 33k€ for a minor accident). 
 For avoided material damages, the value of the industrial facility is estimated at 25M€; 
nearby industrial installations which would be damaged by an accident have a replacement 
cost of 67.5M€; LPG tankers or cargo boats potentially at port have a value of 60M€; lost 
production of firms in the nearby industrial zone is estimated at 5M€; houses in the 
potentially affected area are assumed to have an average value of 150k€ and apartments 
120k€19; the cost of replacing window frames and windows in a dwelling is 5500€; an 
average household owns 1.5 vehicles, each worth 15k€.  
 Concerning scenario 3, the closure of the site leads to an estimated increase in 475000 km 
per year in road traffic (400000 km of trucks with small LPG bottles, and 75000 km for 
LPG tankers). Given accident statistics concerning hazardous materials transport, this 
traffic leads annually to 366×10−5 statistical deaths, 2928×10−5 severe injuries and 5124
                                                        
19 These values were estimated from for sale announcements for houses and apartments in the area.  
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×10−5 light injuries. The environmental impact (in terms of CO2 emissions) is estimated 
at 0.6€/km [5]. Dismantling the facility is assumed to have a zero net cost, since the sale of 
scrap metal from the installations would compensate for labour costs. 
 Investments for scenario 1 are estimated by the plant operator to cost 1.5M€, and 10M€ 
for scenario 2. Extra operating costs for scenario 3 (primarily due to higher LPG 
purchasing costs at other importation sites on the French west coast and to additional road 
transport) are estimated to be 2.4M€ per year. The cost of lost employment on the site 
(both direct and indirect) over 4 years is estimated at 1.2M€.  
In order to compare costs and benefits generated in different years, it is necessary to convert 
future costs and benefits into their net present value, using assumptions on a discount rate20. 
We have assumed a social discount rate of 4%, and assumed an investment horizon of 15 
years (this means that the annualized cost of the safety mechanisms, used in our BCA, is 
obtained by dividing by the total cost by 15).  
 
Summary of benefits and costs.  
The following table summarizes the values obtained, using the assumptions described 
above21. Costs and benefits are represented per year. 
 
 Scenario 1 Scenario 2 Scenario 3 
Benefits 
Averted fatalities 6 275 6 400 -1 169 
Averted injuries 2 745 2 817 -5 060 
Material damage avoided 
    On site 950 675 4 000 
    Off site 1 045 1 016 1 087 
Sum of benefits 11 015 10 908 -1 142 
Direct costs 
   Investment 129 723 864 818 0 
   Distribution overheads 0 0 1 100 000 
   Other direct costs 0 0 43 241 
Indirect costs 
   Environmental costs 0 0 2 850 
   Lost indirect employment 0 0 103 778 
Sum of costs 129 723 864 818 1 249 869 
Net annual benefit -118 708 -853 910 -1 251 011 
Interpretation of the results 
The numerical results presented can be interpreted in the following manner: 
 The closure of the LPG importation site would, given our hypotheses, lead to an 
                                                        
20 The social discount rate represents the opportunity cost of other projects which could be implemented 
with the same money; it is related to the rate of return of bank deposits (which in turn are related to inflation).  
21 The values are presented with many significant figures, but in fact comprise significant uncertainty. We 
have  undertaken a full uncertainty analysis and obtained probability distributions for each output, but for 
simplicity only present median values in this paper. 
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increase in the level of risk to which inhabitants of the region are exposed (due to the 
increase in transport of hazardous materials via the road network in order to supply 
clients in the area). 
 Scenarios 1 and 2 would result in levels of technological risk which are within the 
same confidence interval. However, the cost of the second scenario is 7 times greater 
than the first.  
 An alternative manner of presenting our results is to calculate, for each scenario, the 
net cost to society of each statistical death averted by the implementation of the safety 
measure. Scenario 1 implies annual net costs of 125000€ and allows a reduction of the 
number of statistical fatalities of 251×10-5 per year. The annual social cost per averted 
fatality is thus 50M€. With the same type of calculation, the second scenario implies a 
social cost of 332M€ per statistical death averted. (Scenario 3 implies more spending 
for an expected mortality which is higher.) Economic analysis of public spending on 
prevention suggests that risk reduction projects should be implemented when the cost 
per averted fatality is lower than 1.5M€ (for public investment in road safety projects 
in France), or 2.5M€ (value used for the regulatory impact assessment of European 
legislation on air quality). This analysis suggests that scenarios 1 and (especially) 2 
are inefficient, in the economic meaning of the word: a larger number of fatalities 
could be avoided if the spending was allocated to the reduction of other classes of 
risks22.  
Robustness. We have undertaken a sensitivity analysis of the results with respect to the 
principle uncertain variables (cost of a statistical life, discount rate, base probability of an 
accident, investment horizon, etc.). The analysis shows that the most sensitive uncertain 
factors are the investment horizon (time-frame for amortizing the spending on safety), the 
discount rate and the overheads in scenario 3 for obtaining gas from a different supplier. The 
uncertainty analysis shows that the conclusions are robust, i.e. that with most possible 
combinations of uncertain input variables, the ordering of scenarios (in terms of social net 
benefit) remains the same.  
3. Reception of the BCA method 
The results described concerning the case study were presented to the competent authorities 
by the operator of the plant, in an attempt to obtain approval for scenario 1, as opposed to the 
(significantly more expensive) measures described in scenario 2. The attempt failed, and 
scenario 2 was finally implemented. Several reasons were given for the rejection of the BCA 
(risk-informed and cost-informed) argument: 
 the argument was not judged sufficiently convincing to override a Best Available 
Technology approach, which underlies the national doctrine requiring all operators of 
LPG spheres to implement flame-proof mounds (irrespective of costs); 
 an argument based on concepts such as the statistical value of life, which is often 
poorly received on moral grounds in Latin cultures such as France, was seen as 
difficult to defend in discussions with the local population23; 
 national doctrine concerning the management of technological risk is based on 
uniform thresholds defining acceptable exposure to risk, and includes little latitude for 
the integration of cost considerations, instead of being guided by local preferences. 
                                                        
22 The LPG distribution sector has traditionally been quite profitable, which has led the competent 
authorities in France to require higher levels of safety spending than less profitable, but similarly hazardous, 
industrial sectors.  
23 Legislation introduced in France after the AZF accident in 2001 mandates the creation of local 
communication/consultation bodies called Comités Locaux d'Information et de Concertation. 
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While these arguments have their merit, we believe that the cost of such decisions (in 
monetary terms, but also in terms of lives which could have been saved by allocating the 
spending to more efficient sources of safety improvement) should be presented to the public, 
to allow democratic debate on alternative doctrines. It is worth noting that cost 
considerations24 are today a significant obstacle to the timely implementation of new land-use 
plans around top-tier Seveso facilities in France, called Plans de Prévention des Risques 
Technologiques.  
Conclusions 
Despite having been invented in France by the engineer Jules Dupuit in the mid 1800s, to 
assist  decision-making concerning maintenance of public transportation infrastructures, 
benefit-cost analysis (and more generally, decision-evaluation techniques) see little use in 
France. Our research  suggests that these techniques could provide decision-makers with a 
clearer view of the benefits  and drawbacks of the various alternatives available in land-use 
planning decisions and help to establish compromises which are in the public interest. By 
documenting the different issues which  impact the decision and highlighting the different 
weights accorded to different criteria, the decision process becomes more transparent and 
more open to public debate and critique, and could  lead to land-use planning decisions which 
are better accepted by stakeholders. 
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Abstract 
 
Domino effect is responsible of several catastrophic accidents that took place in the chemical 
and process industry. Although the destructive potential of these accidental scenarios is 
widely recognized, scarce attention was paid to this subject in the scientific and technical 
literature. 
As mentioned above, accidents caused by domino effect may lead to catastrophic events, such 
as destroying the industrial process or storage site. Hence, enforcement measures should be 
taken appropriately. The identification of possible escalation events is required in the safety 
assessment of sites where relevant quantities of hazardous substances are stored or handled. 
In the European Union, “Seveso-II” Directive requires the assessment of on-site and off-site 
possible escalation scenarios in sites falling under the obligations of the Directive. Generally 
speaking, two strategies are always adopted, namely the active and passive strategy 
([Cozzani et al., 2007] and [Cozzani et al., 2008]). The passive strategy involves proper 
design of physical barriers or protection systems (e.g. thermal insulation of process 
equipment), while the active strategy usually means compulsory countermeasures required by 
national legislation as well as international standards. As for the prevention framework 
against domino effect, Reniers proposed a framework “Hazwim”, in which many kinds of 
analysis methods (including Hazop, What-If analysis and the Risk Matrix) were integrated 
([Reniers et al., 2005a] and [Reniers et al., 2005b]). However, for both passive and active 
strategies, dominant major hazard installations should be determined in advance. Therefore, 
there is a much need to develop models capable of picking out critical node from a given 
Domino effect network. 
The results evidence that quantitative risk assessment of escalation hazard is of fundamental 
importance in order to identify critical equipment and to address prevention and protection 
actions. Unfortunately no well accepted approach exists to date for the analysis of domino 
hazards. Only several simplified models are available ([Bagster and Pitblado, 1991], 
[Cozzani and Zanelli, 2001], [Khan and Abbasi, 1998], [Latha et al., 1992], [Pettitt et al., 
1993] and [Reniers et al., 2005]). Nevertheless, safety distances or threshold values for the 
damage to equipment are currently used for preliminary assessments. However, a relevant 
uncertainty exists in the threshold values to be assumed in such assessments ([Cozzani et al., 
2006] and [Cozzani and Salzano, 2004]).  
 
In this paper we present how the combinations of simulation techniques on the one hand and 
qualitative and quantitative data on the other, will offer a comprehensive up-to-date list of 
cross-company domino hazards and recommended actions in industrial parks. 
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